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ABSTRACT
LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS IN INDIAN 
INDUSTRY: A COMPARISON OF 
MUMBAI AND KOLKATA
by Satoshi Miyamura
The thesis examines labour-management relations in Indian industries to provide 
an alternative analysis o f labour market reform priorities. It argues that labour 
market institutions (LMIs) reflect the balance of power at the macro level, and in 
turn affect the historically specific ways in which industrial development 
proceeded in India.
Using a combination of micro level data collected from field research in Mumbai 
(Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta), complemented by secondary evidence on the 
wider social and historical context, the reproduction and transformation of 
different types of LMIs are explained in terms of their location within changing 
patron-client politics. The thesis challenges the common argument that industrial 
performance in Mumbai was better because it enjoyed professional company- 
based unions compared to unions organised at industry level and affiliated to 
political parties in Kolkata. Our interpretation is that the causality is at least 
partially in the opposite direction, with dynamic regions providing strong 
incentives for unions to organise to seek company based ‘rents’ rather than 
political rents that are more attractive in less industrially dynamic regions.
This approach contrasts with some mainstream theories that focus on 
informational and transaction costs and policy failures as the main determinants
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of LMIs. We also examine how the labour process is managed under different 
types of LMIs. We establish the importance of different types o f macro political 
conflicts in shaping the opportunities, incentives and constraints of micro 
bargaining agents. The mode of bargaining in the LMIs is also shown to be 
affected by the bargaining powers of other actors in the wider social context in 
which labour-management bargaining takes place.
Many mainstream models that inform policy assume that LMIs precede growth 
and misleadingly treat them as ‘exogenous’ variables. An important implication of 
the thesis is that LMIs are ‘endogenous’ variables and therefore a broader set of 
reforms are required for sustaining economic growth.
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INTRODU CTIO N
Labour market institutions — culture vs. social relations
Between late 1997 and early 1998,1 was working as an assistant in a field research 
project visiting Indo-Japanese joint venture companies in Delhi and its 
neighbouring States. In interviews with Japanese company executives, many of 
whom were experienced in managing companies in other parts of Asia and 
Europe, I often came across comments that labour management in India was 
very ‘different’ from that in other countries. They talked about the ‘culture’ and 
‘societal problems’ unique to India, and complained about how management in 
India had to deal with trade unions, political and social actors, government 
officials and even mafias on a day-to-day basis in a distinctive way. This 
experience motivated me to study labour-management relationship in Indian 
industry in an attempt to provide a material explanation for them that goes 
beyond such cultural categorisation.
In recent decades, the field o f labour economics has seen a general decline of 
interest in studies on trade unions and collective bargaining in favour o f a more 
ambiguous notion of human resource management, partially reflecting the 
apparent decline in the influence of trade unionism in many parts of the global 
economy, especially in advanced capitalist countries. It has also seen an increase 
in the influence of new institutional economics (NIE), which has generally 
dominated the discipline o f economics, resulting in trade unions and other 
collective bargaining institutions to be analysed as part o f the wider labour market 
institutions (LMIs), a concept that contrasts to the labour market. As we discuss 
in Chapters 1 and 2, this has led to an emerging consensus amongst mainstream 
economists to consider inefficient or unproductive LMIs itself as the sources of
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economic problems, and thereby treating LMIs as ‘exogenous’ variables. The 
policy recommendations that are informed by such models focus on policy 
instruments that lower transaction costs and reduce rent-seeking by bargaining 
agents. We also point out that where inefficient or unproductive LMIs persist, as 
is often perceived to be the case in India, these are explained either in terms of 
policy failure that can be attributed to ideology o f key actors or with reference to 
patron-client relations between political ‘elites’, industrial capital and organised 
labour, which once again tend to appeal to cultural explanation of different social 
formations.
This thesis makes interventions both in theoretical and policy debates on 
unionism and labour-management relations by proposing that LMIs should be 
seen as forms o f capitalist social relations and manifestations of the balance of 
power at the level of macro political economy, which in turn reflects the 
particular processes and patterns of accumulation. We argue that patron-client 
relations that dominate distributional conflicts in developing countries such as 
India can be problematised and explained by specifying historical and material 
conditions, rather than to reduce them to cultural factors and policy failures. In 
terms o f our theoretical framework, this alternative approach makes an important 
contribution to the growing field of political economic analysis of institutions and 
governance, such as Khan (1996; 1998; 2000; 2005b) amongst others, by arguing 
that LMIs should be treated as ‘endogenous’ variables. The policy implication of 
this thesis is that labour law amendments and micro-level governance reforms 
with regards to unions and collective bargaining institutions that do not address 
structural problems are insufficient as effective policy instruments to sustain 
economic growth.
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is broadly split into two parts. The first part from Chapters 1 through 
3 develops our analytical framework for a political economic analysis of LMIs in 
Indian industry. Chapter 1 further elaborates on the motivation o f this thesis as 
discussed in this introduction, by critically reviewing the on-going debates on 
labour market reforms in India, and proposing an alternative perspective on the 
existing types of LMIs in Indian industry that focuses on the historical and social 
contexts in which labour-management relations have taken place. In Chapter 2, 
we critically reassess the existing economic models of LMIs and collective 
bargaining and outline the analytical framework of our alternative political 
economic approach to the LMIs in India. Chapter 3 outlines some 
methodological challenges and dilemmas related to a research on labour- 
management relations.
The second part of the thesis, from Chapters 4 to 6, examines competing 
hypotheses on LMIs using data collected from the author’s field research in 
Kolkata (Calcutta) of West Bengal and Mumbai (Bombay) o f Maharashtra. In 
Chapter 4, we identify types of LMIs in our surveyed units, which are then 
explained by focusing on a combination of technological and production 
organisational factors on one hand, and macro-level structural conditions on the 
other, as outlined in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the micro-level responses and 
implications of different types of LMIs. The concluding chapter outlines the 
theoretical hypotheses and findings of the empirical analysis, and discuss further 
theoretical insights.
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Chapter 1 Rethinking LMIs in India
C h a p t e r  1
R ETH IN K IN G  LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN IN D IA N
INDUSTRY
1.1 Political economy of labour market institutions (LMIs)
This thesis aims to develop a political economic analysis of labour market 
institutions (LMIs) in Indian industries. We define political economic analysis as 
an analytical approach and methodology whereby the emphasis is placed on the 
structural totality by which the opportunity, incentives, constraints and capacity 
of micro-level agencies are significantly influenced. The overall aim of this thesis 
is to analyse the existing forms or types of LMIs in Indian industries as 
determined by economic, social, and political conditions, and to examine their 
implications for the way in which the labour process1 is managed, as opposed to 
treating the different types of LMIs as being ‘chosen’ by micro-level bargaining 
agents as typically assumed under the framework of new institutional economics 
(NIE).
In India, there is a well established body of literature that has examined industrial 
labour in India from structural and historical perspectives, such as Sen (1997), 
Bagchi (2002) and Das Gupta (1979; 1981), amongst others. However the recent 
policy agenda on labour law reform and LMIs has generally been debated 
between the so-called ‘distortionists’ who highlight the extent and scale o f the 
labour market distortion due to LMIs and the ‘institutionalists’ who focuses on 
the type o f LMIs and its potential differential effect on efficiency and growth, as
1 Labour process can be defined as the process whereby objects and instruments o f  work are transformed 
into exchangeable products by a purposeful and productive activity. In other words, the labour process is 
about how labour power is put together in the sphere o f  production, which gives rise to the antagonistic 
relationship o f  exploitation, and which extends to social patterns o f  this relationship (Bensaid 2002). We 
shall further elaborate on the concept o f  labour process in Chapter 6.
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well as the more recently emerging consensus on LMIs based on the N IE  
framework (for example see surveys by Bhattacherjee 1999; Shyam Sundar 2005; 
Sharma 2006). As we shall discuss in Chapter 2, the analytical approach that 
dominates this debate treats LMIs as operational variables that can be chosen by 
micro-level agents. We will also discuss the implications o f this mainstream 
perspective, which is consistent with the so-called ‘Post-Washington’ consensus 
or the ‘good governance’ agenda in the mainstream development economics 
literature (Fine 2001; Khan 2005), whereby failed institutions are ultimately 
explained in terms of information asymmetry and preferences o f micro-level 
agents. However, these models and theories that inform the on-going policy 
debates are scholarly attempts to analyse the labour-management relations in 
India, and cannot be reduced simply to ideology o f promoting or justifying neo­
liberal labour market reforms. Therefore there is a need to seriously engage with 
the existing literature in order for us to develop an alternative analysis o f labour 
market reform priorities.
Nevertheless, these conventional approaches based on the N IE  framework are in 
contrast to our political economic analysis in which the types o f LMIs and 
bargaining relations are seen as packages or constellations o f variables that are 
interdependent to each other, rather than being explainable in terms of ‘choices’ 
by micro-level agents. In our view, differences in LMIs are reflections of different 
social and political structures within which bargaining agents operate, not a result 
of different extents o f information or transition costs, as often postulated in 
mainstream models (Pencavel 1995; Banerji, Campos, and Sabot 1995; Aidt and 
Tzannatos 2002).
While there are some commentaries on the policy issues from the Marxian 
perspective, such as Chakrabarti and Dasgupta (2007), the political economic 
alternative has been generally underrepresented in recent debates. Therefore our
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objective in this chapter is to critically review the debates on Indian LMIs as a 
starting point in developing our political economic alternative, which will be 
followed by chapter 2 in which we provide a critical reassessment of the existing 
theoretical approaches to the analysis of LMIs and further expand on our 
analytical framework to provide political models on the relationships between 
different types of macro political economic conflict and the type o f micro-level 
strategies by bargaining agents in the LMIs.
It is worth noting at this early stage that our discussion o f LMIs primarily focuses 
on its effect on productivity growth. This is of course not to suggest that other 
effects of LMIs on class formation, distribution and workers’ rights are not 
important, and these themes will frequently appear in our discussion. However 
the main focus o f recent debates has been on their impact on growth and 
efficiency, by often reproducing a stylised image of LMIs in Indian industries, as 
we discuss in this chapter. The aim of this thesis is to challenge this conventional 
wisdom by offering an alternative analytical framework of the differential effects 
of LMIs on productivity growth.
Political economic or dialectical analysis focusing on social and political contexts 
is important in developing countries such as India, where income and income 
streams of bargaining agents in LMIs are significantly influenced by many other 
actors who compete over public resources. Sociologists use the term political 
entrepreneur to describe such rent-seeking actors, including local councillors and 
state bureaucrats (Veron, Williams, Corbridge and Srivastava 2006), rich farmers 
and rural elites (Jeffrey and Lerche 2000; 2001), and intermediate classes (Harnss- 
White 2003). Because by definition markets and property rights are not well- 
established in developing countries, transfer o f rights and resources are often 
determined by distributional conflicts between these political entrepreneurs who 
organise factions and coalitions of various interests (Khan 1996; 1998). LMIs and
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bargaining relations are also formed within this context of distributional conflicts 
in the macro political economy, and therefore the types of LMIs and their 
differential effects are better understood by focusing on the social and political 
structural factors.
1.2 Defining labour market institutions (LMIs)
Labour market institutions (LMIs) can be defined as a set of rules, formal or 
informal, that governs labour markets2. Organisations involved in wage setting 
and negotiating terms of employment, such as trade unions, employer 
associations and tri-partite bodies are commonly cited examples o f LMIs. Laws 
and regulations, such as employment protection legislation, minimum wage 
legislation, and unemployment benefit systems, also constitute LMIs by 
influencing labour market outcomes, such as labour costs and wage structure. 
Certain forms of state intervention in industries such as the provision of subsidies 
and taxation may also be interpreted as LMIs when they are used to shape the 
opportunities, incentives and constraints o f bargaining agents in labour markets.
A political economy analysis requires understanding o f the existing type o f LMIs 
within the context o f how society organises the process o f development and 
accumulation, and as a result how it manages the labour processes. This is 
particularly important in developing countries where the capitalist property 
relations are not dominant, the transfer of rights and rents relies on extra-market 
processes (Khan 2000), industrial capital is always in need o f intervention and 
support by extra-economic powers (Wood 2002), not only in general but also in 
detail, including organising industrial production and maintaining industrial 
labour and labour-management relations, even to the extent o f managing the 
hiring and firing o f labour, and imposing labour discipline (Morris 1955).
2 For example, Nunziata (2003) and Baker, Glyn and Howell (2004).
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Therefore the type o f LMIs is closely associated with the mode of managing 
labour processes. In this Chapter, we shall discuss how existing LMIs were 
established and maintained in a historical context, and also the relationship 
between the types of LMIs and the mode of managing labour processes will be 
examined using data collected from our field research in Chapter 4.
In developing countries, LMIs as defined above are thought to differentiate 
between the so-called ‘unorganised sector’ and the ‘organised,’ ‘formal’ or 
‘registered’ economy, whose workers are organised by registered trade unions and 
whose activity is directly regulated by the state. In 1999-2000 India had a 
workforce o f around 393 million in a population just below 1 billion (Sundaram 
2001: 932). It is estimated that less than 10 per cent of this total workforce was in 
the organised sector (Bhowmik 1998; Dev 2000: 48), which largely consists o f the 
public sector, registered manufacturing, and the private corporate sector3. The 
organised manufacturing sector refers to factories under sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) 
of the Factories Act 1948, i.e. employing 10 or more workers and using power and 
those employing 20 or more workers if not using power on any day o f the 
preceding 12 months. It is this small segment of the population that receives
3 The Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) defines the organised sector as consisting o f  1) Agriculture: 
government irrigation system, non-departmental enterprises and crop production in plantation crops o f  
tea, coffee and rubber covered in private corporate sector; 2) Forestry: recorded production o f  industrial 
and fuelwood, as reported by the State Forest Departments; 3) Fishing: non departmental enterprises 
(public undertakings); 4) Mining & quarrying: major minerals, as reported by the Indian Bureau o f  Mines;
5) Manufacturing: registered factories covered under Factory Act; 6) Electricity, gas and water supply: 
total activity o f  electricity, public sector part o f  gas and water supply; 7) Construction: construction works 
in the public sector and private corporate sector (Joint Stock Companies); 8) Trade, hotels & restaurants: 
public and private corporate sector and cooperatives; 9) Railways: entire sector; 10) Transport by other 
means: public sector, private shipping companies and road transport under the private corporate sector; 
11) Storage: warehousing corporation in public sector, cold storage covered under Factory Act 1948; 12) 
Communication: public sector and companies covered under the private corporate sector; 13) Banking and 
insurance: total activity except the commission agents attached to life Insurance Corporation o f  India and 
unorganised non banking financial undertakings including professional moneylenders and pawn brokers; 
14) Real estate, ownership o f  dwellings and business services real estate companies in the private corporate 
sector and public sector; 15) Public administration and defence: entire sector; 16) Other services: public 
sector medical, education and sanitary services, TV and radio broadcasting and recognised educational 
institutions in the private sector.
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protection from most labour laws and legislation, such as the Trade Union Act o f 
1926 and the Industrial Disputes Act o f 1947. Workers who are members o f 
trade unions are even fewer, estimated to be about 2 to 5 per cent of the total 
work force4.
It is generally accepted that organised workers enjoy relatively secure employment 
and higher wages than their unorganised counterparts. By definition, data on the 
unorganised sector are difficult to obtain, but the sample survey carried out by 
the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) in 1999-2000 reports that the 
average money wage of urban males who were in regular employment was 169.5 
rupees per day compared to 63.3 rupees for casual labourers, implying that urban 
male workers in regular employment earned more than 2.5 times o f those in 
casual employment (Ghose 2004: 5110). Also the lowest money wage o f urban 
male regular employees was 60.2 rupees per day whereas the lowest wage for the 
casual labourers in the same category was 49.7 rupee per day5. O f course, since 
the data do not allow us to control for the types o f occupations and jobs, these 
are not rigorous estimates of the wage differentials between different segments o f 
the labour markets in India, but it at least allows us to infer that organised 
workers are highly unlikely to be amongst the poorest in the world of Indian 
labour.
4 Bhowmik (1998) estimates that about half o f  the workers in the organised sector is unionised, and
accordingly 5 per cent is obtained. 2 per cent is obtained by dividing the number o f  unionised workers (6.1 
million) according to the Labour Bureau by the total workforce (306.8 million, which is 37.68 per cent o f  
the total population) according to the population census in 1991. Following the similar method, the 
unionised workers is 22.8 percent o f  the organised labour. As we will point out below, statistics regarding 
unionisation is unreliable and therefore these figures should be seen as a rough indication rather than 
precise estimate. While this figure o f  union density may appear to be low compared to many o f  European 
countries, in relation to other developing countries in Asia it is one o f  the highest together with Japan (24 
percent o f  wage and salary earners), Pakistan (29 percent o f  formal sector wage earners) and the 
Philippines (38.2 per cent o f  wage and salary earners) (all data for 1995; according to the ILO statistics).
5 Mohammad and Whalley (1984: 409) assume a differential o f  the region o f  50 percent, which involves an
estimated 30 billion rupees o f  rent-seeking costs in labour markets o f  India in 1979/80.
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While the perception of the organised sector as a privileged and protected enclave 
of ‘labour aristocracy’ (Holmstrom 1976) which enjoys secure employment, 
higher wages and better skills and working conditions, may still be dominant 
amongst some economists and is reproduced in policy debates, as we shall 
discuss in this chapter, sociological and anthropological studies in recent years 
have found that in reality the distinction between the organised and unorganised 
may be difficult to make6, as expressed in Holmstrom’s (1984: 319) revised view 
that “ [t]he organized/unorganised boundary is not a wall but a steep slope.” For 
example, the perception that there are no regulations or organisation o f labour in 
the informal economy underestimates the division o f labour and the disciplining 
mechanisms in the informal sector which involves contracting and subcontracting 
by middlemen (Breman 1999b; Harriss-White 2003). Also the laws and policies 
that divide the two sectors constantly change and may differ between sectors and 
regions, and more importantly the extent o f its implementation and enforcement 
varies. Even within the ‘organised’ and ‘registered’ firms and factories, typically in 
the public and corporate sector, there are various activities organised informally 
by sub-contractors that escape state regulation and formal institutions (Breman 
op cit.: 413).
These observations should not mean that concepts such as organised/formal 
labour or sector are redundant. Rather they offer several important implications 
to our analysis of LMIs in Indian industries. First, the observations show that 
there is “enormous diversity, not only between formal and informal sectors but 
also within them, that should above ail be stressed” (Breman op cit.: 418). 
Workers employed by ‘organised’ and ‘registered’ firms and factories range from
6 The view that organised/unorganised or formal/informal are clear-cut dual segments o f  the labour market is 
attractive for neo-liberal proponents such as Soto (1989; 2000) in which development through ‘self-help’ 
and entrepreneurship, rather than through “supranational or intra-national redistribution o f  the sources o f  
wealth and prosperity” (Breman 2003, p.205) is promoted.
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educated skilled workers in a multinational company to temporary and casually 
employed, some of whom are hired by subcontractors and ‘jobbers’ under 
informal, typically verbal, arrangements. This means that workers in the organised 
sector are diverse in terms of income, social background, caste composition, 
education, and life style, as is the case amongst workers in the so-called 
unorganised sector. Analysis and policy debates on Indian labour based on a 
simplistic categorisation o f organised vs. unorganised, and on stylised images of 
organised workers, is therefore hardly helpful.
Second, the observations advise us that the existence and continued reproduction 
of organised and unorganised sectors must be understood within the wider 
process of industrial development and capital accumulation (Fine 1998). We 
argue that the existing labour market structure is a reflection of how society 
organises the process of development and accumulation, and how labour 
processes are managed and controlled. For example, the politicised trade 
unionism, which has been the focus of much of the recent policy debates in 
India, is at least partially explained by the way in which unions are organised in 
response to opportunities, incentives, and constrains shaped by the organisation 
of political power and the specific form of capitalist social relations in India. The 
mode and extent to which trade unions and the state act as mediators o f 
controlling or managing the labour process again reflects the specific patterns of 
accumulation under India’s historical and social conditions7. Similarly, specific 
labour laws and legislation are understood as particular legal form o f capitalist 
social relations. Therefore the existence o f the dual sector cannot be explained 
merely in terms of state intervention or the interests of ‘insiders’ in the organised 
sector who ‘exploit’ the subordinated unorganised workers. Differential types o f 
LMIs, including the types of labour organisations, bargaining agencies, and
7 Morris (1955: 304) inferred that “the ways in which the state uses the union as a disciplinary agent vary 
considerably” between countries and societies with different historical conditions.
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contractual arrangements, are diverse because of specific needs to manage labour 
processes in different sectors at a particular point in time. Further, we must focus 
on the historical context in which segmentation of labour was encouraged in 
order to detach “the industrial elite from its links with the far greater mass of 
workers” (Breman 1999: 31) by excluding the majority of labour from formal 
industrial relations. An analysis of the types of LMIs must therefore pay 
considerable attention to the social and political structure in which both 
“beneficiaries of the segmentation of the labour markets” and the workers are 
embedded, and also which determines their opportunity, incentives and 
constraint (Breman 2003: 198). Thus by focusing on the LMIs in Indian 
industries, the purpose o f our analysis is not to specifically focus on the organised 
sector at the cost of neglecting the unorganised sector, but is rather aimed at 
examining factors that influence the choices of bargaining agents, particularly 
under differential social and political conditions.
1.3 The stylised image of LMIs in Indian industry
The predominant image that emerges from the literature and debates on 
industrial relations in India is that o f rigid, confrontational, and interest-driven 
LMIs. For example, in a World Bank industrial survey, labour regulation was 
identified as the second highest obstacle to the operation of business and growth, 
only after inflation and ahead of corruption, which is seen to have resulted in 
employment protection and relatively high wages amongst the few employed in 
the formal sector (World Bank 2000: 84). The labour legislation is also seen to be 
responsible for creating “a very wide scope for initiating industrial disputes 
(which can be initiated on the basis of ‘interests’ rather than ‘rights’) 8, long 
procedures for settlement of industrial disputes, inflexible provisions relating to 
change in conditions o f service (instead of being part of the collective bargaining
8 Note the preference o f  liberal legal ‘rights’ over class ‘interests’, which again reflects the particular legal fornf 
o f  capitalist social relations.
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process), and provisions enabling government interventions in areas such as lay 
off[s], retrenchment and closures.” In addition, Indian trade unions are perceived 
to be undemocratic and unaccountable due to the peculiar laws that govern them 
(Debroy 2000). And these trade union militancy and job security laws are seen to 
“impede efficient resource allocation and thus constrain the capacity o f 
economies [in South Asia] to grow faster” (Hossain, Islam and Kibria 1999: 67). 
Unionisation as the source of high wages and constraints on employment 
flexibility is often cited as one o f the causes of ‘industrial sickness’ (Anant 2005). 
A casual correlation, such as that produced in figure 1-1, shows a positive (but 
statistically weak) association between the extent of unionisation and the number 
of industrial units recognised by the statutory Board for Financial and Industrial 
Reconstruction (BFIR) as ‘sick’.
F i g u r e  1 - 1  S c a t t e r  p l o t  o f  u n i o n i s a t i o n  a g a i n s t
IN D U S T R IA L  SICKNESS
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Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is +  0.56 and significant only at the 12% level 
Source: Falk (2005: 136).
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The image of rigid and over-politicised LMIs preventing smooth ‘adjustment’ and 
productivity growth is attractive both theoretically and politically. The 
observation of wage increases in the formal sector combined with limited growth 
of organised employment appears to confirm the perception that labour markets 
can be described in terms of conflict between the insiders, or the incumbent 
employment in the organised sector, and the outsiders, whereby insiders are only 
interested in their own jobs and are indifferent to the fate o f outsiders (Lindbeck 
and Snower 1988). In the context of Indian labour, some go further to suggest 
that workers in the organised sector tend to ‘selfishly’ align their interests with the 
middle class or even identify with their employers. The idea o f a labour 
aristocracy’ is a popularly held image of organised workers in Indian industries, 
and reemphasised in some studies such as Holmstrom (1976), which is seen to 
give justification to labour market reforms from the ‘economic’ interest of 
removing the ‘distortion’ and releasing the allocative efficient ‘markets’ (Harriss 
1990) and/or from the political interest o f transforming relations and forces of 
production (Ghose 1994).
Note the contrasting analytical frameworks of conventional models o f LMIs and 
its political economic alternatives. Many mainstream models that inform the 
policy debates in India assume that LMIs precede efficiency or productivity 
growth, as we shall discuss in Chapter 2, and misleadingly treat them as 
‘exogenous’ variables. Thus correlation is confused with causality in the 
interpretation o f empirical observations such as Figure 1-1. In contrast, political 
economic analysis treats LMIs as ‘endogenous’ variables reflect the balance of 
power at the macro level, which in turn both reflect and affect the historically 
specific ways in which industrial development proceeded in India.
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In the following sections, we shall chtically assess the highly problematic evidence 
that apparently supports the above stylised image of LMIs. Reviewing this 
evidence on the types of labour legislation, unionisation, wages and employment 
is important for the purposes of the present thesis, not only to respond to the 
current debates on labour market reforms, but also because from our political 
economic perspective, social and political structures are experienced as these 
judicial-socio-economic processes, as we shall examine in Chapters 5-6.
1.3.1 ‘Rigid* labour legislation as the apparent source of ‘jobless growth*
Various attempts have been made by mainstream economists to measure the 
extent o f ‘distortions’ to the labour market. For example, by comparing the 
number of ILO conventions ratified by the government, whereby India’s 36 
ratified conventions is compared to, say, four in South Korea, advocates of 
labour market reforms argue that the legal framework in South Asia allows for 
more institutional intervention than in East and South East Asian economies 
(Hossain, Islam and Kibria 1999: 73; also see table Al-1 in the appendix o f this 
chapter).
Another well cited example is Agarwarla’s (1983) index, which aims to measure 
the degree of distortion in factor markets, foreign exchange markets and product 
markets. As can be seen from table 1-1, his distortion index implies that South 
Asian countries have “high” to “medium” level of distortion whereas East Asia 
has “low” to “medium” distortion. The contrast is particularly stark when 
comparing Agarwala’s index for wage distortion, which is measured by “whether 
real wages in manufacturing rose significantly faster than per capita real income” 
and qualitative evidence of intervention in labour markets by government and/or 
trade unions (pp.26-7). From table 1-1, we see that all South Asian countries are 
classified as 3 which indicates high wage distortion in contrast to the East Asian 
economies with the index of 1 implying low distortion. He then tries to relate this
30
Chapter 1 Rethinking LMIs in India
to growth performance and argues that East Asia with relatively low distortion 
tended to perform better than other developing countries with higher factor price 
distortion.
T a b l e  1-1. A g a r w a l a ’s (1983) d i s t o r t i o n  i n d e x
Index of wage distortion Overall distortion index
Bangladesh 3 2.57
India 2 1.86
Pakistan 3 2.29
Sri Lanka 3 1.86
Indonesia 1 1.86
Korea 1 1.57
Malaysia 1 1.57
Thailand 1 1.43
Source: Agarwala (1983)
Labour legislation is thought to signal ‘rigidity’ in labour markets for several 
reasons. Advocates of labour market reforms, such as the World Bank (2000) and 
Debroy (2004; 2005), highlight the so-called ‘Inspector Raj’ syndrome9 and argue 
that existing labour laws and legislation increase transaction costs for business as 
well as for society in general. In addition, in the so-called ‘exit policy’ debate10 
(Singh 1995), job security regulations such as the 1976 amendment o f the 
Industrial Dispute Act (IDA) of 1947, in which Chapter VB was added to 
stipulate that firms employing more than 300 workers have to obtain permission 
from the government in order to layoff or retrench workers or close down
9 Labour legislation come under the concurrent list (list III) under the Indian constitution, which means both
the central and the state governments can enact labour laws. In all there are 47 central labour laws and over 
200 state labour laws (Datta and Sil 2007). Each labour law has separate inspector whose inspection are not 
synchronised, and each demand maintaining and filling appropriate returns, which are not standardised. 
Definitions o f  concepts such as wages vary between legislation and case law also differs. It is argued that 
such arbitrariness in the legal framework as well as the inspection process opens scope for corruption, and 
hence further transaction costs. Advocates o f  labour market reforms such as Debroy (2004) have argued 
for the need to harmonise the legislation to reduce transaction costs.
10 Advocates o f  ‘exit policy’ argue that if  economic liberalisation enables capital, including foreign investment, 
to enter and operate freely, the reverse movement o f  exiting and closing down must also be eased.
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establishments11, have come under scrutiny, on the grounds that they only serve 
to protect a small minority o f the total work force at the cost o f economic 
development and employment growth by constraining flexibility, which leads to 
both static and dynamic inefficiency, and ultimately to reduction o f welfare for 
society as a whole. For example, as possible consequences o f constraints on ‘exit’, 
Fallon and Lucas (1991, pp.401-2) highlight that job security provision might lead 
to (1) the speed in employment adjustment to be severely retarded; (2) 
employment of permanent workers to be reduced in favour o f temporary 
contracts, which may have implications for productivity, and further declines in 
employment demand; (3) bargaining power of unions and ‘insiders’ in general to 
increase which may lead to increases in wages, although workers with wages 
higher than the minimum wage may agree to lower the wages in return for further 
employment security; (4) increase in longer hours per employee leading to 
diminishing productivity. The empirical evidence for Fallon and Lucas’s argument 
is based on the estimation of a labour demand equation, whereby the logarithm 
of the number o f employees is regressed on the lagged dependent variable as well 
as the current and lagged labour-demand-related variables, and a job security 
dummy variable that takes the value zero up to 1975-76 and one thereafter. O n 
the basis of the coefficient on the job security dummy variable, Fallon and Lucas 
estimate a long-run reduction in employment that averages 17.5 per cent across 
industries in India. More recently Besley and Burgess (2004) have focused on the 
amendment to the IDA at the state level and suggested that not only has pro­
worker labour legislation lowered investment, employment, productivity and 
output in registered manufacturing sector, but that it has also contributed to 
increases in urban poverty. Although these empirical studies are not without 
controversy, as we shall see below, they are nonetheless influential and
11 The 1982 amendment has further extended the application o f  this provision to firms employing more than 
100 workers.
32
Chapter 1 Rethinking LMIs in India
frequently-cited in policy debates to apparently give credibility to the advocates of 
labour market reforms.
Despite both the Congress government and the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) coalition, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), producing sound bites 
in favour of drastic reforms with regard to LMIs, and despite the ‘exit policy’ 
being proposed to the parliament on several occasions in the early 1990s, the 
reforms on LMIs is alleged to have been relatively hesitant and policy proposals 
have been dropped in the face o f labour protests12. Under the NDA government, 
the Second National Commission on Labour (SNCL) was compiled which 
sparked opinions and debates on its proposal for Chapter VB of the IDA to be 
repealed. This has led advocates o f labour law reforms such as Shnivasan (2003) 
to prompt another widely-accepted popular perception that powerful unionism 
and state officials with a stake in labour regulations are hindering progress in the 
aspects of reforms such as the ‘exit policy’.
The hypothesis of protective labour legislation as the main cause o f economic 
efficiency and slow employment growth in the organised sector is problematic for 
several reasons. First, since legislation such as the IDA of 1947 is applicable to a 
relatively small segment of the total employment, Papola (1994) argues that the 
effect o f labour legislation on employment may be negligible (p.11). Another 
reason the effect on job security provision on employment cannot be the only 
explanation for ‘jobless growth’ is the poor enforcement of such laws. Freeman
(1993) points out that the poor compliance with regulations means that there is 
little direct effect o f job security provisions on employment and suggests that this 
results in de facto flexible wages. For example, Mathur (1991) found that, while
12 In the winter session o f  1992, the Congress government proposed an amendment to the IDA that would 
remove requirement o f  mandatory government permission for retrenchment and closure. In face o f  
protests and bandh (general strikes) by trade unions and workers, the amendment was redrawn, was put 
back on the agenda in 1993, only to be dropped again (Singh 1995).
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labour law has not changed, its implementation differed in different states. It has 
been observed that the procedure of conciliation proceedings in recommending 
disputes for judicial scrutiny and the approaches of conciliation officers varied 
from state to state, in some cases even within the same state. Mathur explains that 
because of the lack of clear policy guidelines, “labour department officials invoke 
their own understanding o f fairness based on past court verdicts” (p.50). This 
implies that even in the organised sector which supposedly is protected by labour 
law and legislation there is scope for the actual enforcement to be influenced by 
rent-seeking and political processes. At the least, the claim that laws give income 
and employment security to organised workers must be considered within the 
context of implementation of such legislation. Singh (1995), Jenkins (1999), and 
Bardhan (2002) go further to suggest that part of the reason for the slow 
progress in reforms on labour laws and legislation is because employers have 
increasingly been given the ability and the measures to avoid laws effectively 
resulting in ‘reform by stealth’, and thereby making the need to dismantle or relax 
labour laws and legislation redundant.
In addition, empirical evidence that supposedly supports the case for labour 
market reforms tend to be problematic. For example, the empirical support for 
the postulated relations between Agarwala’s distortion index and growth is weak 
at best. If  we plot Agarwala’s distortion index against GDP growth as in Figure 
Al-1 (i), we find a negative but at best weak association, represented by a low 
coefficient o f correlation r —— 0.31.13 Also note that when Agarwala (1983) talks
13 The postulated negative correlation appear to fit well with East and South East Asian economies, such as 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, combining rapid G D P growth with low index o f  real wage 
distortion, and slow growing South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
which were rated to have a high extent o f  wage distortion. However, we must also note that there are 
examples o f  economies such as Bolivia and Colombia which had low wage distortion but also slow growth. 
Similarly, the performance o f  economies such as Chile with a very high extent o f wage distortion is 
comparable to many o f  the East Asian economies with less distortion. Plotting distortion index against 
G DP growth in Figure A1 -1 (if), again, we find negative but weak correlation.
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about real wage distortion, what he actually measures is the difference in 
institutional structures, such as the strength of trade unionism and government 
intervention in wage determination. The assumption here is that such institutional 
characteristics necessarily lead to wage distortion. Yet the same centralised 
industrial relations system whereby conflicts o f interests are resolved by recourse 
to corporatism between the state, employers and unions in Northern and 
Western European countries is seen as a factor in achieving wage restraint, as we 
shall see in Chapter 2. In other words, institutional and state interventions in 
wage determination may by definition be ‘distortions’ to the labour markets, but it 
does not necessarily follow that such LMIs are negative for efficiency and 
productivity. Therefore, while Agarwala’s study is a useful starting point in 
recognising the extent of the social costs of LMIs in India, it fails to discuss under 
what conditions LMIs are harmful for productivity and when they lead to 
efficiency and growth enhancing outcomes.
Similarly, recent studies raise questions with regard to the validity o f some 
influential empirical studies such as those of Fallon and Lucas (1991) and Besley 
and Burgess (2004) that apparently gave weight to the argument that concerns 
over the restriction on exit adversely affected organised employment growth. For 
example, Bhalotra (1998) questioned the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients in Fallon and Lucas’s labour demand function, which led them to 
conclude an average o f 17.5 per cent reduction in employment growth (p.7). She 
finds that the negative coefficient on the job security dummy variable was 
statistically significant for only 11 out of 35 industries. Similarly, Bhattacharjea 
(2006) has criticised the scoring methodology Besley and Burgess employed in 
constructing their index o f state-level labour market regulations, which is sensitive 
to small changes in the scoring system or the interpretation as to whether a 
particular amendment is ‘pro-labour’ or ‘pro-employer’. Also Bhattacharjea points 
out validly that frequently cited econometrical evidence is based almost exclusive
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on the IDA, when other laws as well as judicial interpretations of such laws are 
also important in determining the nature o f labour market regulations.
In addition to the lack of judicial enforcements as well as the weakness o f 
empirical evidence for ‘rigidity’ and its effect on efficiency and employment, the 
hypothesis of ‘rigid’ LMIs is problematic at a more fundamental theoretical level, 
in that the argument is made in a remarkably static and casual causality linking the 
observed existence o f LMIs to inefficiency and lack of employment growth with 
little attention to the structural changes in the Indian economy since the 1980s. 
This aspect has been exposed most evidendy in the ‘jobless growth’ debate in 
recent decades.
1.3.2 Rethinking the ‘jobless growth’ debate
The perception that the extent and nature of trade unionism and labour 
legislation in India have resulted in a combination o f high wages in the organised 
sector and slow utilisation of labour in India’s industrial sector has attracted 
renewed attention since the 1980s in the so-called ‘jobless growth’ debate14. In 
contrast to the industrial stagnation o f the 1970s, the 80s was understood to be a 
decade of improved industrial growth. The output growth of the manufacturing 
sector as a whole increased from 4.3 per cent per annum in the 1970s to 7 per 
cent per annum in the 1980s, and the increase in the organised factory segment 
was much sharper, increasing from 4.6 per cent per annum in the 70s to 7.9 per 
cent in the 1980s (Sundaram and Tendulkar 2002). In contrast, employment in
14 The recognition o f  slow utilisation o f  labour in industrialisation is not a new theme. Despite the initiative 
for industrialisation in the post-independence era, the structural change in the labour markets in India has 
been marginal, particularly concerning the industrial sector. During the 50 years between 1951 and 2000, 
the share o f  the secondary sector’s share o f  the G DP rose from 16 per cent to 27 per cent (Joshi 2004). 
Although this change in the share o f  output is less dramatic compared to the experience o f  many East and 
South East Asian countries, the changes in the labour market have been much more modest; the male 
work force involved in the secondary sector has only increased from 12.6 per cent to 16.9 per cent during 
the same period (see Table A l-3). Many authors, including Byres (1991), have commented that given that 
early planners were trying to make industry the dominant sector, the intended objective o f  structural 
change o f  the economy was not achieved.
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the organised manufacturing sector, which experienced steady growth in the 
1970s at a rate of 3.8 per cent per annum, declined sharply in the 1980s to 0.53 
per cent per annum (Goldar 2000). The observation that the employment growth 
in the organised manufacturing sector has been slower than the growth of output 
or value added led some to argue that ‘jobless growth’ is ‘the most significant 
problem facing industry at the present time’ (Ghose 1994: 143). In the early 1990s, 
an improvement in employment growth was noted, but the 1990s as a whole the 
employment growth was “at a slower rate and with a greater fluctuation — peaking 
in 1995-96” (Dev 2000,: 3447; see also Goldar 2000). Generally there is no 
evidence to suggest a turnaround of the declining trend o f employment growth in 
the organised manufacturing sector in the 1990s onward. Therefore it appears 
that the slow employment growth in the organised sector relative to its output 
growth has been a constant feature of the Indian economy since independence.13
As one explanation of the ‘jobless growth’ it has been suggested that there was a 
sharp increase in wages. Ahluwalia (1991) reported a real wage increase o f 6.8 
percent in the manufacturing sector, and in particular a hike of 9.1 percent16 in 
the consumer durables sector between 1980/81 and 1985/86, while Lucas (1988: 
189) as well as the World Bank country report written by James Hanson and
15 While growth in the organised employment stagnated, there is a debate on the growth o f  employment in 
the unorganised sector. While D ev  (2000: 48) reports a faster employment growth in the unorganised 
sector, suggesting that there has been a tendency for employers to shift away from secure permanent 
contracts and increase informal and casual employment arrangements, others such as Ghose (2004) finds 
that employment growth in the unorganised sector is declining. As a possible explanation for the lack o f  
employment growth in the unorganised sector, Nagaraj hypothesises that use o f  labour in the unorganised 
sector is more intensive and flexible, for example workers working longer hours or taking up more than 
one job, which restricts employment generation in this sector (Nagaraj 1994). Nevertheless, even if  
employment is generated outside the organised sector, given the often inferior wages, working conditions 
and security in the unorganised sector, increased informalisation and casualisation raises obvious concern 
for its impact on poverty. For example, when workers in the organised sector lose jobs as a result o f  
closure or restructuring o f  the industries, such as in textile mills in Mumbai and Ahmedbad, they often seek 
unorganised casual jobs in competition with migrant workers and other incumbent informal workers, 
further weakening the position o f  each other in the process (Breman 1999b; 2003; Mosse 2007).
16 In a widely cited article, Sharma (2006) quotes a 34 per cent real wage increase in the manufacturing sector 
during the same period, citing the same source, but this appears incorrect.
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Samuel Lieberman focused on an increase o f product wages by 7.2 per cent per 
annum between 1979/80 and 1984/85 (World Bank 1989)17. Another explanation 
is that the slow formal employment growth is due to the capital deepening 
observed during the 1980s, which is also thought to be consistent with this 
explanation based on changing factor prices. Focusing on the observation that 
the average annual rate of growth of net capital stock in the manufacturing sector 
increased from 3.14 per cent between 1975/75 and 81/82 to 5.93 per cent in 
82/83 to 88/89 period, Ajit Ghose o f the ILO also supports the argument that 
the rising relative price o f labour has resulted in a substitution o f capital for 
labour adopted (Ghose, 1994)18.
Several problems with the argument that ‘jobless growth’ in Indian industry is 
caused by LMIs such as employment security legislation and trade unionism that 
protect existing organised employment can be highlighted. First, the notion that 
wages are set higher in the organised or unionised sector because o f institutional 
interventions is not consistent with historical evidence. It has been suggested that 
“long before the era o f trade union or government intervention, wages in large 
textile factories were high in comparison with alternative earnings” (Ma2umdar 
1989 p .l l  cited in Freeman 1993).
17 Curiously in another well cited report by World Bank economists, Fallon and Lucas (1991) found little 
evidence o f  labour law affecting wages or speed o f  adjustment, but nonetheless maintain that it reduced 
total employment. Freeman (1993) rightly questions this conclusion as ‘odd’.
18 Significantly, while both the World Bank and ILO studies focused on the importance o f  the rising wages as 
an explanation for the slow employment growth in the organised sector, the reason for the wage increase 
seems to differ. The World Bank’s perspective is represented in Flanson and Lieberman’s focus on LMIs 
such as restriction on retrenchment and closer, reflected in the 1976 and 82 amendments o f  the Industrial 
Dispute Act, as the main cause for the increase in costs o f  labour adjustments, which led to employers 
become reluctant to increase employment (World Bank, 1989). Also they focus on the “overindexation o f  
wages” which takes the form o f  dearness allowances (DA) in many Indian industries as another cause o f  
increase in labour cost (p.l 13). In contrast, the ILO position, represented in Ghose (1994), rejects the 
popular argument that this was caused by LMIs such as employment security regulations. Rather Ghose 
focuses on the difference in food price control by the government, which stabilised the relative price o f  
labour in the 1970s and increased it in the 80s.
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Moreover, the observation of rising wages has come under scrutiny in recent 
years. For example, Ramjas (1992) presents an econometrical study that shows no 
wage effect by the job security clauses in the IDA. Similarly Nagaraj (1994) and 
Bhalotra (1998) amongst others argue that the earnings growth in the 1980s 
coincided with an increase in man-days, and thus the wage rate rose only 
modestly, a view later debated by Goldar (2000) and Nagaraj (2000).
Significantly, Nagaraj (2004) has calculated the wage rental ratio19 for the 
organised manufacturing sector and found that it has decreased by 19.4 per cent 
between 1981 and 1991 and by 24.8 per cent between 1991 and 2001. This 
implies that the cost of labour relative to capital fell rapidly in the two decades 
when output increased at over 7 per cent and employment growth was marginal. 
Moreover, Nagaraj finds that the same period saw an increase in labour 
productivity (by 119.1 per cent in 1981-91 and 80.6 per cent in 1991-2001) and 
capital per worker (83.3 per cent in 1981-91 and 131.2 per cent in 1991-2001). On 
the basis o f such evidence Nagaraj questions the perception of rigid labour 
market in Indian industries. He hypothesises that the labour market was ‘flexible’ 
enough to allow productivity increases and changes in the production structure to 
augment output by work intensification to move closer to the production 
possibility frontier, in face of increased market pressure during this period.
Those who challenge the hypothesis that sharp increases in wages led to the 
substitution of capital for labour or labour market rigidity due to LMIs have 
explained the slow employment growth in the organised manufacturing sector by 
focusing on various changes in the industrial structure that have taken place since 
the 1980s. Within the organised sector it has been observed that the industrial 
structure o f Indian manufacturing has shifted in favour o f less labour intensive
19 Wage-rental ratio is computed as the product wage per worker divided by the deflator for machinery and 
equipment, which is used as proxy for cost o f  capital.
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industries and smaller sized establishments. Nagaraj (1994: 182) reports that 
industries with above average growth in value added during the 1980s were also 
those with a below average share o f wages in value added20. Contrary to the 
standard argument of capital-labour substitution, what is observed here is a shift 
of industrial structure, not necessarily an increase of capital investment across the 
sector as such. Nagaraj also points to field evidence that suggests that firms’ 
response at the micro level is to increase labour intensity by linking wages to 
productivity; to reorganise jobs and work content; and to intensify the use of sub­
contracting, contract labour, and part-time workers {op. cit:. 183).
Taking the argument further, Jose (1992: 214) has turned the causality in the 
standard orthodoxy to argue that increases in real earnings were made possible by 
an improvement in productivity, by pointing out that an increase in real earnings 
was observed in capital intensive industries which experienced sharp acceleration 
in productivity rates in the 1980s. This is of course not to suggest that there was 
no link between the slow down of employment and the observed wage/ earning 
increase, and indeed Jose reports that employment stagnated or declined in those 
industries which saw a significant rise of productivity and real earnings (p.215). 
However, Papola (1994: 10) points out that the major reduction o f organised 
manufacturing employment in the 1980s took place in two major industrial 
groups, namely cotton textile and food products, which is “caused mainly by the 
closure of a large number o f mills due to sickness [...] and rationalisation of 
many of them to overcome obsolescence”.
These critiques of the Jobless growth’ hypothesis is important because it places 
the observed slowdown in employment within the context o f the structural 
changes that has taken place in Indian industries during the 1980s and 90s,
20 These industry groups included food products; rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal products; chemical and 
chemical products; non-metallic mineral products; and electrical machinery.
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including restructuring of industries away from traditional sectors such as textiles, 
and the shift in production from the organised to the unorganised sectors. It is 
however also critical to note that the debate reflects two contrasting assumptions 
about labour markets and LMIs in the mainstream literature (Freeman 1988; 
1993). On one side, there are the ‘distortionists’ represented by economists such 
as Agarwala (1983), Lucas (1988), Ahluwalia (1991) and Srinivasan (2003), all of 
whom have been influential in the policy debates of institutions such as the 
World Bank, who see LMIs as hindrance to competitive and allocative efficient 
labour markets, and argues for the removal of state and institutional interventions. 
In the other camp, we see variants o f ‘institutionalists’ such as Jose (1992), Papola
(1994) and Nagaraj (1994; 2000; 2004) who sees the problem as caused by the 
failure o f regulations and ineffective LMIs, and argue for reforms that ensure 
“workers accept income security and flexible labour use, while employers offer 
better work and productivity sharing agreements” (Nagaraj 2004: 3390). However 
the two sides of the debate share much in common in that both perceive the 
existing ‘mix’ of LMIs as ‘inappropriate’ and propose reforms to change them. In 
fact, as we argue in Chapter 2, distortionists and institutionalists make 
contributions to the same theoretical framework, in which the persistence of 
ineffective LMIs is seen as irregularity or divergence from the some notion of 
equilibrium, and can be ‘chosen’ by micro-level agents. This is in contrast to our 
political economic approach in which existing types o f LMIs are reflections o f the 
way in which society organises the process of development and accumulation, 
particularly how the labour processes are controlled and managed, an idea which 
we shall explore in the context o f the historical development o f India’s LMIs in 
Section 4 of the present chapter, and will be theoretically developed in Chapter 2.
1.3.3 Politicised LMIs and the ‘patronage regime’ hypothesis
Another popular criticism to trade unionism in India is that it harms the efficient 
running of businesses, citing, for example, the frequent strikes and lockouts
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imposing high costs to industries (Surendra Nath 2005). For example, Agrawal 
(1997: 155) has pointed out that Indian labour unions are known to call strikes 
with the slightest pretext or very short notice “creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty about production schedules, and exposing employers (and public) to 
considerable inconvenience”. It is also often perceived that that strikes and other 
labour protests are often called by political parties for their political gains, and 
may have little to do with the interests of workers21. Curiously, as shown in table 
Al-3, although it is certainly the case that India has one of the highest number of 
labour disputes (Shyam Sundar 2004; Nath 2005), with more than 1,000 labour 
disputes with often more than 20,000 work-days lost as a result o f labour disputes 
in the 1990s, it is important to note that the number o f workers involved in 
disputes is relatively low. Workers involvement during the period between 1985 
and 1998 ranged from 600 to 1,200 workers per dispute in India, which was 
much less than countries like the USA (6,000-12,000 workers per dispute), Italy 
(400-3,600) and Brazil. (6,400-7,700). Countries like the USA also had a much 
higher number o f man-days lost due to disputes. The combination of frequent 
labour disputes combined with relatively low worker participation in collective 
action reveal a ‘paradox’ about Indian unionism and questions the popular image 
that Indian trade unions have strong bargaining power (Bhattacherjee 1999).
A glance at the time trend o f labour dispute statistics (figures A l-2 to A1-4) 
reveals that the number of disputes peaked in the mid-1970s, the period of 
political contestation to the Nehruvian-style state-dominated industrialisation 
strategy leading up to the Emergency Regime. That the labour disputes increase 
at the time of economic crisis is not surprising, but again this is taken as 
indication that bargaining agents are “highly politicised [... and] are more
21 “Removing old stigma,” Deccan Herald, Monday, April 19, 2004
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interested in cultivating their political affiliations rather than dealing with 
enterprise-level issues” (Hossain et al. 1999: 77).
The alleged consequence of politicised unionism is what Pencavel (1995: 4) calls 
“the macroeconomics o f populism”, which is a situation where macroeconomic 
policy tools are used “to engineer a redistribution o f income” to deliver higher 
wages for workers, leading to macroeconomic instability. Similarly, Bardhan 
(1988: 70) argues that:
The deliberate promotion o f trade unions affiliated to the ruling political 
party often leads to damaging union rivalries and irresponsible 
‘economism’. Overstaffing, ‘featherbedding’, fake payrolls, absenteeism in 
regular hours and working only for ‘overtime’ payments, and other 
irregularities are condoned, if not actively encouraged, by trade unions and 
their political bosses by citing flagrant cases o f corruption, political 
patronage and cronyism [...] Irresponsibilities at the managerial, technical 
and worker levels thus feed on each other, creating a general atmosphere of 
demoralization and parasitism on the state.
Pencavel characterises India as a “patronage regime” whereby close ties exist 
between political parties and labour unions. With trade unions highly politicised, 
the union’s relation “with the state and political leaders becomes more important 
than their dealings with the employers of the workers they represent” (p.3). While 
Pencavel accepts that “a highly politicized collective bargaining system is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the macroeconomics of populism” it is 
often argued that the Indian economy represents a case o f this problem.
The popular perception that the politicised nature o f LMIs, often through 
politically-motivated labour militancy, impair efficiency and productivity growth, 
has led to advocates of labour market reforms to propose various measures to 
remove state and institutional interventions to the industrial relations. For 
example, the Second National Commission on Labour (SNCL) has proposed 
various measures to restrict government intervention in dispute settlement
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(section 6.34) and to curb the influence o f central trade union organisations, such 
as limiting the role played by ‘outsiders’ who are not workers at the establishment 
(6.50), resolution o f inter- and intra-union rivalries, and limiting the use of union 
funds for political purposes (6.56). The current policy consensus is that outside 
political interference prevails in Indian unionism because of the lack of legislation 
on the method to identify and recognise the representative bargaining agent in 
the Trade Union Act. While accepting that secret ballots may be “logistically and 
financially” difficult, the SNCL also recommends the selection and recognition of 
the negotiating agent on the basis of a check-off system, which “ascertain the 
relative strength o f trade unions based on continuing loyalty reflected by the 
regular payment of union subscription” (GOI Ministry o f Labour 2002: 40-1) 22.
It is interesting that in the argument about labour disputes, the distinction 
between strikes and lockouts is often ignored. For example the SNCL sees illegal 
strikes and illegal lockouts as equal sins (Datt 2002). This does not take into 
account the reality that it is the increase in lockouts that is having a significant 
impact on industrial relations23. On the basis of such observations some writers 
like Jenkins (1999) argue that what characterises industrial dispute in India today 
is ‘management militancy’ whereby labour disputes have also often been used as a
22 The SNCL recommends the check-off system for establishments employing 300 or more workers, whereby 
“with 66% entitling the union to be accepted as the single negotiating agent, and if  no union has 66% 
support, then unions that have the support o f  more than 25% should be given proportionate 
representation on the college” (GOI 2002: 41).
23 In figure A l-2 , in which the data for number o f  disputes is provided with one series representing strikes 
alone and another for the sum o f  strikes and lockouts, we notice that over time the number o f  lockouts has 
increased, both in absolute terms and as a proportion to the total number o f  labour disputes since the mid- 
1960s. In 1961 lockout accounted for 8.62 percent o f  the total labour disputes. In 1996 this ratio has 
increased to 31.33 percent. Again this trend o f  increasing significance o f  lockouts in industrial disputes in 
Indian industries can also be observed for the number o f  workers involved in disputes (figure A l-3) and 
number o f  work days lost in disputes (figure A l-4). Particularly figure A l-4  suggests that the increasingly 
labour disputes initiated by lockouts tend to go on for a relative long period compared to strikes.
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pretext for putting into effect an ‘indefinite lockout’.24 Though a more careful 
look at data on lockouts, Shyam Sundar (2004) reveals that the tendency for 
lockouts to become more dominant in industrial disputes is not necessarily the 
same across the country, with West Bengal and Maharashtra amongst the states 
where lockouts occupy a significant proportion of disputes (table Al-4). We shall 
examine this in the next section, but at this point the popular image of labour 
militancy due to strong unionism must be questioned.
It is also worth noting that the focus on politicised LMIs is increasingly becoming 
a policy consensus amongst institutions such as the World Bank and the ILO25, 
which traditionally adopted opposing positions on labour related policies. It is 
also interesting to evaluate this trend within the context o f the increasing 
dominance of new institutional economics (NIE) in the development economics 
literature. This development, particularly amongst researchers associated with the 
World Bank, is evident in the publication of the World Development Report 1995: 
Workers in an Integrating World,’ and various working papers leading up to the 
Report by Pencavel (1995), Banerji, Campos, and Sabot (1995), and more recendy 
in an influential report by Aidt and T 2annatos (2002). Many observers26 have 
hailed this as a sea change in the policy debate on labour since unlike in the 
Bank’s traditional discourse, trade unions and other institutional interventions in 
the labour market are no longer considered to be necessarily hindrances to 
improving economic performance. Instead the argument is that countries that
24 We must be careful about simplistically associating strikes with labour and trade union militancy and 
lockouts with employer militancy. As Sundar (2004) points out, it is often difficult to distinguish lockouts 
from strikes because the causes o f  disputes are complex. It is possible that strikes are called in response to 
aggressive tactics by employers, as it is equally possible to argue that closure and lockouts are caused by 
pressure from unions.
2Z> For example, see an ILO researcher Hayter (2002/3)’s policy research paper quoting North (1997), to 
explain different types o f  bargaining relations focusing on the role o f  politics.
26 Amongst many, for example see the AFL-CIO (2003)’s review o f  Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) welcoming 
that “ [ajfter years o f bashing unions, the World Bank is acknowledging that union membership can be a 
boon to workers and to a nation’s economy”.
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have performed poorly have done so because the institutional arrangement is 
such that trade unions and other institutions do not contribute positively to 
growth and efficiency.
Given that the apparent task is to find the “appropriate mix” of LMIs (Dean, 
Glyn, Howell and Schmitt 2004: 4), it is important to consider why the seemingly 
inefficient and growlL-diminishing LMIs persist and to identify the factors that 
are important in changing them. Here the NIE-inspired literature is not helpful. 
For example, Banerji, Campos, and Sabot (1995) argue that amongst the many 
factors27 that determined the type o f institutional regime in India, the most 
important, at least at the initial stage, was the “intellectual heritage” (p.22):
The elite’s choice of a distributional strategy was not the result of short­
term rent-seeking but based on the belief that a non-distributional strategy 
would have low returns. The elite’s choice does not seem to have been 
influenced by their expectations of labour’s choice between confrontation 
and non-confrontation.
The elite’s ‘distributional’ strategy was mirrored by the ‘confrontational’ approach 
adopted by organised labour, which was ‘chosen’ because of their own leftist 
‘ideological bent’ that led them to believe that market forces erode their gains 
rather than to lead to higher returns for labour. The persistence of this 
‘confrontational-distributional’ strategy mix is then explained as a ‘prisoner’s
27 For example, Banerji et al. (1995) argues that political elites in Africa, Latin America and South Asia were 
“less contestable” compared to the East Asian counterparts. According to this argument, because elites in 
East and South East Asia were under threat from domestic communist insurgents, and other powerful 
political forces, leaders had to widen their base o f  political support. This led to the adoption o f  
“encompassing” strategy expressed by their commitment to a “labour demanding growth path”. In 
contrast, Benerji et al. argues that the ruling elites was less contestable in South Asia, which allowed the 
elites to form an implicit pact with wage labour to “maximize their share o f  the pie at the expense o f  the 
poor” (p.12). However Banerji et al. goes on to note that this issue o f  contestability was perhaps less 
important in the case o f  India, since the Congress Party “drew its support from rich and poor alike” (p.22). 
In our view, the question o f political contestation is extremely significant in understanding why distributive 
politics prevailed in India, but an analysis o f  the type and the structure o f  political groups contesting the 
state is required..
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dilemma’ game whereby neither side changes their strategy due to lack of 
information and credibility to sustain alternative policies.
This ideologically-based reasoning is insufficient in explaining the persistence of 
seemingly inefficient and growth-damaging LMIs in the long-run. Firstly, even if 
we accept Banerji et al.’s argument that the elites (in the case of India, the ‘tall 
men’ such as Jawaharlal Nehru and subsequent leaders of the Congress Party) 
were ideologically committed to a “distributional” strategy, this does not explain 
why ‘elites’ and organised labour have been able to continue to maintain alliances 
at the cost o f denying the remainder o f the workforce increased wage 
employment and the rest of the economy cheaper commodity prices. 
Explanations based on lack of information and ideology are insufficient (Khan 
2000) without addressing the material basis on which ‘elites’ could justify the 
belief that “a non-distributional strategy would have low returns” (Banerji et al. 
op cit.: 22).
Secondly, Banerji et al.’s reasoning is that while intemal-politics within the 
Congress Party and the national debate over the model o f development in post- 
independent India clearly had a strong ideological aspect, it is too simplistic to 
assume that the socialist planning models received majority support amongst the 
political actors who led the Freedom Struggle and was influential in Indian 
politics after independence. In fact, as Corbridge and Harriss (2000) have argued 
that the political leaders within the Congress Party were far from united in 
promoting the model o f socialist planning as the engine for development in India. 
Indeed, state control over industrial relations, such as the pay commission model 
of wage determination and dispute resolution based on compulsory adjudication 
was resisted even from within the government. Given that not all o f the political 
elites were ideologically united in pursuing a “distributional” strategy, there is a
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need to explain what economic and political conditions contributed to the 
shaping and maintenance of the existing LMIs.
Thirdly, there is also a need to explain why the group of elites who promoted the 
distributional solution was able to exercise control and power to the extent that 
they could define the mode of industrial relations regardless of labour’s choice 
between strategies. It is difficult to think that the ruling elites in the Congress 
Party enjoyed such strong political legitimacy. Rather their political legitimacy 
depended on their ability to offer economic benefits to their supporters.
The report by Aidt and Tzannatos (2002: 15), published as part o f the World 
Bank’s “Directions in Development” series, also focuses on the “inappropriate” 
mix between types of government and unions as the key factor in explaining 
economic outcomes of LMIs. In addition, they argue that “ [mjost industrial 
countries have stable, liberal democracies” but “ [tjhis is not the case in many 
developing and middle-income counties”. They argue further that the “economic 
impact o f unions in an environment of ill-designed labor [sir.] and product market 
in which rent seeking is profitable is very different from the economic impact of 
unions in a well designed environment”. This implies that the positive economic 
effect of collective bargaining may apply to advanced industrialised countries but 
may not be the case for developing countries.
Aidt and Tzanntos’s argument takes us back to our earlier comment on the 
business environment and ‘good governance’. The observation that the efficiency 
implication of LMIs tends to be negative where there is market imperfection and 
a larger potential for rent seeking is tautological and unhelpful, since the 
implication is that almost all developing countries would have growth-damaging 
LMIs solely on the basis of their being ‘developing’. However, such view is 
reflected in policy suggestions, such as those proposed by the Second National
48
Chapter 1 Rethinking LMIs in India
Commission on Labour (SNCL), which claims that, if market distortions are 
addressed and rent-seeking is policed better, say by encouraging democratic 
processes in LMIs and enhancing information flows, then LMIs may be growth 
enhancing. The assumption that the elimination o f rents and rent-seeking, as well 
as improving on democratic accountability and transparency, are the precondition 
for productive LMIs is not only somewhat Eurocentric, it is also theoretically 
tautological, since conventional economic models explain the existence of LMIs 
in terms o f rent or surplus (more on this in Chapter 2), the very thing that is 
suggested to be reduced to make LMIs more conducive to economic growth and 
adjustment. Also such policy prescription is empirically questionable as it is 
difficult to establish relationships, and more importantly causality, between 
governance o f LMIs and successful growth performances28. Here, Khan’s (2005a) 
observation that the historical experiences suggest that ‘good governance’ is the 
outcome, rather than the source, o f growth is insightful.
This is of course not to say that the politicised nature of LMIs is not important. 
Rather, it is precisely the task o f the political economic analysis to problematise 
the politicised form for LMIs. However, from our political economic perspective, 
the politicised nature of Indian LMIs must be understood as a systematic 
consequence of the historically and socially specific ways in which industrial 
development proceeded in India. The historical process o f the creation and 
reproduction of the types of LMIs cannot be reduced to individual optimisation 
or to arbitrary and tautological attachment to well-defined and stable property 
rights, since this is a question about how society deals with the process of 
capitalist incorporation (Fine 1998; Khan 2000b). At the core o f any process of
28 In the Indian debate, it is popularly held that the success o f  East Asian economies was related to their 
labour standards, and the resulting wage repressions. For example, Nath (2005) cites Singapore as a success 
case o f  a labour standard reform implementing a system o f  industrial relations that promotes productivity 
growth and accountability. However, others such as Freeman (1993) argue that labour standards were not 
significant factors in growth performances o f  East Asian countries.
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industrialisation and economic development lies the problem of organising and 
managing production and labour processes. In contrast to developed economies, 
in which such processes are organised in the ‘economic’ sphere (Wood 2002), in 
developing countries, where the capitalist sector is relatively underdeveloped, this 
process typically takes a politicised form. Unlike the conventional models in 
which the political interventions are treated as a deviation from or compromise 
from the norm, our political economic analysis aims to explain the existing types 
of LMIs within the socially and historically specific context.
We shall elaborate on our analytical approach further in Chapter 2. At this point, 
it is important to highlight the methodological contrast between the NIE-inspired 
conventional models and the political economic alternative. The N IE  framework 
is an important development in mainstream economics to the extent that it goes 
beyond the simple policy failure paradigm to explore factors that determines the 
extent of institutional failures. However this analytical approach that dominates 
the theoretical and policy debates on LMIs is limited in explaining the persistence 
of seemingly inefficient institutions because the N IE  fails to recognise that there 
may be distributive or political conflicts over the emergence or transformation of 
institutions, which adds important additional dimension to the transaction costs, 
and have significant implications to the forms of distributive conflicts within 
which LMIs operate (Khan 2000b). For example, the N IE  approach cannot offer 
an explanation for the persistence of politicised form of LMIs in India beyond 
referring to cognitive or cultural factors, and thereby treats them as ‘exogneous’ 
variables.
In contrast, political economic approach treats LMIs as ‘endogenous’ to the wider 
patterns of economic development and accumulation, and thereby explains why 
LMIs in India take its ‘peculiar’ form. For the political economic analysis, this is a 
question that cannot be theoretically pre-determined but must be resolved within
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the specific historical and socio-political contexts that give rise to the specific 
forms of distributional conflicts. Therefore in the following section, let us 
examine the historical origins and processes that gave rise to the specific types of 
LMIs in India.
1.4 Evolution and involution: LMIs in India in a historical perspective
In the following sections, we shall explore the historical conditions for India’s 
particular LMIs, which was the subject of the debates examined in Section 1.3. 
The first part surveys the economic, social, political and legal conditions since the 
dawn of industrialisation under the British colonial rule up to the 1960s when the 
institutional frameworks o f labour-management relations were established. This is 
followed by the second part in which we interrogate the changing conditions in 
the 1970s, when the contradiction inherent in the institutional frameworks 
became apparent, and in the third part, consider how the LMIs may have been 
reorganised since the 1980s. From our political economic approach, the observed 
judical-social-political processes are reflections of structural tendencies in the 
overall patterns o f economic development and accumulation, and how the labour 
processes are managed. Therefore while summarising some key legal, social and 
political features of each period, we will also try to draw inference for our political 
economic analysis, which we shall further develop in Chapter 2.
The general character of institutional frameworks o f labour-management 
relations in Indian industries is critically termed as ‘involuted’ or ‘state dominated 
pluralism’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bhattacherjee 1999; 2000), whereby the 
state not only constrains, fragments and manipulates interests and activities of 
bargaining agents, but “it is also itself a major interest, competing with” groups 
involved in the bargaining process (Rudolph and Rudolph op cit:. 247). Under this 
model, the labour relations described as ‘paternalistic’ were established “based on 
the belief that the state knew more about workers’ need than they did
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themselves” (Bhattacherjee 1999: 7). O f course in reality diverse types of LMIs 
can be observed, ranging from the centralised tri-partite bargaining involving 
traditional party-based unions to the decentralised bargaining and plant-based 
‘independent5 unions, as well as non-political federation at regional-cum-industrial 
level such as Datta Samant5s Maharashtra Gimi Kamghar Union (MGKU) and 
the Engineering Mazdoor Sabha led by R. J. Mehta (Ramaswamy 2000: 55). 
Moreover, the model of state-dominated pluralism has come under increasing 
scrutiny after the crisis o f the Nehruvian state-led industrialisation strategy after 
the mid-1960s. Nonetheless, state intervention in industrial relations and 
involvement of ‘outside5 agents, especially political entrepreneurs and 
intermediate classes, are important characteristic of LMIs in India.
While there are some disagreements about the different structural breaks that are 
significant in describing the history o f industrial relations in India29, most authors 
seem to broadly agree that (a) there was a particular type of bargaining relation 
that was established in the 1950s, following the condition in the pre- 
Independence period; and (b) that bargaining relations has undergone a structural 
change sometime after the mid-1960s. More specifically it seems that a crucial 
turning point in the industrial bargaining relations of India was the economic 
crisis leading up to Indira Gandhi's National Emergency in 1975-77 since this 
historical event exposed the failure of cooperation between the state and labour 
unions. This is perhaps contrary to the public perception of a structural break in 
LMIs as a result o f liberalisation and globalisation in the 1990s. Rather, these
29 Venkata Ratnam (1996a: pp. 9-12) divides the historical evolution o f  Indian industrial relations in two 
phases: the postcolonial period (1945-90) and the period o f  structural changes (1991 to date). Papola and 
Rogers (1992) describes the development o f  LMIs in four phases going further back in history and starting 
from the (i) early and limited industrial development (1850 - First World War); (ii) inter-war period; (iii) 
post-War and post-Independence period; and (iv) industrial restructuring since the 1980s. Bhattacherjee 
(1999) divides the history into four phases in his 1999 paper (1950 to mid-1960s; mid-1960s to 1979; 1980 
to 1991; and 1992 to 2000), while in his 2000 paper it is reduced to two phases (1950 to the late 1970s and 
1980 to the present).
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historical or ‘evolutional’ (Bhattacherjee 2001) approaches attempt to understand 
the problem o f LMIs in Indian industries within the context of how those 
institutions developed during the earlier phases of industrialisation.
1.4.1 State-led industrialisation and ‘paternalistic labour relations’
The institutional framework of industrial relations in India started to take form in 
the late 19th to early 20th century when the British colonial government laid out 
laws in face of the emergence of trade unionism and labour protest, as well as a 
response to the perceived need to fulfil labour requirement 30 . After 
Independence, India followed the path of a state-led industrialisation strategy, 
which involved the formation o f a large labour intensive public sector 
(Bhattacherjee 1999). This has created space for unionised employment, which is 
reflected in the rapid increase in the number o f trade unions and union 
membership, as shown in figure Al-5 and Al-6. While the data suffer from 
various sampling and non-sampling error31, for our purpose, it is sufficient to
30 From the late 19th to the early 20th century, it was generally perceived that securing employment is a 
challenge due to labour shortage For example, Mehta (1954) argues that owners o f  cotton textile mills in 
Bombay suffered severe shortage o f  labour, and that this perception was recognised and shared by policy 
makers. The labour shortage hypothesis is however challenged by some economic historians such as 
Morris (1965) amongst others.
31 Before we comment on the trend o f unionisation in India, it should be noted that these official statistics on 
trade unions and union memberships are frustratingly unreliable. Official statistics on trade unions and 
union memberships in India, published in Indian Labour Year Book and Indian Labour Statistics by the 
Labour Bureau, rely on voluntary annual return by trade unions. It is known that trade unions often ignore 
the requirement to submit returns (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). Therefore there are three categories o f  
unions: unions that do not register; unions registering but do not report their membership size; and unions 
that register and submit returns. The first group o f  unions are invisible in official statistics. Rudolph and 
Rudolph (280-1) estimates that the number unregistered union is as significant as one-third to one-half o f  
the number o f  officially recognised union. The second group o f  unions is accounted for in terms o f  the 
number o f  registered unions but not in terms o f  union memberships, while the third group is reflected in 
both. From figure A l-5  , it is evident that increasingly large proportion o f  unions does not submit annual 
returns. Moreover it is often pointed out that even if  unions did submit returns, the submitted membership 
claims tend to be inflated (Ramaswamy 1992). Therefore the number o f  unionised workers that is available 
from official statistics in figure A1 -6 is the claimed number o f  memberships unions that is registered with 
and submit returns to the government. The reason for not registering or submitting returns may be due to 
administrative inability to collect basic information about membership, but it may also be due to various 
social and political reasons. Although these weaknesses o f  the office statistics are clearly recognised, there 
is no obvious way to verify how much sampling and non-sampling error is contained in the data.
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confirm from figure 1-5 a general upward trend in the number of registered 
unions throughout the post-Independence period. Also from figure 1-6 we may 
note that at least until 1979 there appears to have been a constant growth in 
unionised workers in India. At the centre of this process of unionisation was the 
relatively scarce educated and skilled white collar workers and professional 
personnel in public sector enterprises and some high technology private firms, 
who formed powerful interest groups, to the extent that Bardhan (1984) argued 
that they formed one o f the ‘dominant proprietary classes’ of India32 in the 1960s 
and 70s. In addition, urban industrial labour played important roles during the 
freedom struggle for Independence (Ramaswamy 2000). For the organised left, 
supporting the formation o f trade unions became the basis of party organisation. 
Socialist politicians and the middle class intelligentsia, who were at the heart of 
the Congress-led freedom movement in the 1930s and 40s, identified strikes and 
labour unrest against wage cuts and for the improvement of working conditions, 
and early attempts of unionisation with the nationalist effort. It was also 
important to restrain ‘red unionism’ in industrial centres like Mumbai (Bombay).
For the Congress government in pursuit o f industrial development, it was 
important to accommodate both industrial entrepreneurs and workers (Morris 
1955). Industrial disputes were considered to be disruptive for smooth economic 
development and it was deemed to be the state’s responsibility to contain conflict 
in the industrial sector. This ‘involuted’ or state dominated pluralism’ or 
‘paternalistic labour relations system’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bhattacherjee 
1999; 2000) is evidently reflected in legal frameworks, which is characterised by
32 Critiques such as Dhar (1987) and Jenkins (1999) have argued that Bardhan has left out some major 
pressure groups from his analysis, including the unionised labour. While it is perhaps correct that the 
emphasis is placed in the role o f  industrial bourgeoisies, rich farmers, and the professional class, Bardhan 
(1984) does mention “the white-collar workers with partial salary-indexation in the form o f  ‘dearness 
allowances’” (p. 68) and also argues that as a result o f  political democracy, “ [s]ome section o f  unionized 
workers [...], taking advantage o f  their larger numbers, are increasingly vocal in electoral politics for a 
larger share o f  the pie” (p.67).
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the state’s active involvement, rather than through bi-partite collective negotiation, 
in sustaining stable labour-management relations, whereby a breach of contract is 
dealt with by a criminal sanction by the state, not by civil action (Sankaran, 
2007)33. Two pieces of legislation in particular significantly reflect this peculiar 
character of Indian LMIs, and also have been the focus o f recent policy debates; 
namely, the Trade Union Act o f 1926 and the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 
1947 34.
The Trade Union Act o f 1926, legalises trade unions in both organised and 
unorganised sectors, and facilitates freedom of association, whereby any seven 
people can form and register a union. However, significantly the Trade Union 
Act does not provide a method of recognition, such as a secret ballot mechanism 
to determine the bargaining agent, let alone legislate so that the employers must 
recognise the representative union, or they are compelled to enter into a collective 
bargaining. This means that the employers may recognise, or even set up, trade 
unions favourable to their interests as the representative union, even if their status 
in terms of the rank-and-file support may be questionable, as has been the case in 
the Mumbai (Bombay) cotton textile industry, where the unrepresentative 
Congress-affiliated RMMS is the sole bargaining agent o f workers (Kamik 1978; 
Bhattacherjee 1988; 1989; D'Monte 2002). The combination o f the ease of 
registering a union and the lack of a process for recognition through the Trade 
Union Act is often thought to have contributed to multiple, typically political 
party-affiliated, unions within units in many industries (Bhattacherjee 1999: 4). 
Also, the Act does not require office bearers and members o f unions to be 
workers directly employed by a particular employer, allowing ‘outsiders’ to
33 At the same time, the Trade Union Act 1926 gave immunity to the trade unions against certain forms o f  
civil and criminal action (Nath 2005:182).
34 Labour legislation come under the concurrent list (list III) under the Indian constitution, which means both 
the central and the state governments can enact labour laws. In all there are 47 central labour laws and over 
200 state labour laws (Datta and Sil 2007).
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intervene in industrial disputes between workers and employers35 (Datta and Sil 
2007: 11). These outsiders may include contractors and brokers who may 
combine the roles of jobber, recruiter, and supervisor, as well as political 
entrepreneurs who organise factions and coalitions and engage in distributional 
conflicts in the wider macro political economy (Khan 1996; 1998; Jeffrey and 
Lerche 2001; Harriss-White 2003; Veron, Williams, Corbridge and Srivastava 
2006).
The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 36, which was amended in 1965, 76, 
and 82, and legislates the legal framework for conflict resolution by state 
intervention, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication, as opposed to that 
through bi-partite collective bargaining. Ramaswamy (1997) points out that the 
model of conflict resolution charging “the state with major responsibility to 
contain conflict and negotiate order in labour-management relations” is deeply 
rooted in the British colonial policy to restrain strikes and lockouts “forcing the 
disputants to resolve their differences through conciliation and adjudication”.
Similarly, state intervention is dominant in the area of wage determination. 
Government may influence and regulate wages directly through appointing pay 
commissions or indirectly by endorsing recommendations made by ad hoc 
administrative bodies. One classical example of this is the Rau Court of Inquiry in 
1940 and the Central Pay Commission o f 1947, which established indexation of 
income in the form of dearness allowance (DA) as a norm of wage payment in
35 The amendment in 2001 (i) raised the minimum number o f  workers to 100 or more to form a union, and 
(ii) restricted the number o f  outsiders to one-third or five officers, whichever is less, in the organised sector 
(Datta and Sil 2007).
36 The ID A was in fact a descent o f  two laws that existed prior to it: the Trades Dispute Act o f  1929, which 
provided for investigation and settlement o f  trade disputes, and the Deference o f  India Rules N o. 81-A 
which prohibited strikes and lockouts in public utilities.
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Indian industries to neutralise price inflation37 (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 278-
9).
Such legal frameworks for the LMIs in India were not uncontested. In the 1950s, 
alternative institutional frameworks to the Trade Union Act had been proposed 
and discussed without being enacted, including voluntary arrangements to 
determine the representative union in a single bargaining unit (Bhattacherjee 
1999: 6). The most famous attempt to readdress the LMIs in the early phase of 
independence came from V. V. Giri, whilst serving as the Labour Minister 
between 1952 and 54, who criticised the compulsory adjudication process in the 
IDA and proposed making collective bargaining statutory. This so-called ‘Giri- 
approach’ was vetoed by the government’s executive branch and Giri resigned his 
post in protest (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 285). Contestation of the existing 
laws concerning LMIs has been attempted in various parts of India, most notably 
in the Mumbai textile industry, but with limited success (D'Monte 2002).
Another aspect o f the ‘involuted pluralism’ in India’s LMIs was the dominance of 
trade unions affiliated to central political parties. The observation that unionism 
in India closely linked to political parties is however not new. A. R. Bumett-Hurst 
(1925), an English sociologist who wrote in the early 20th century, also 
commented that unions in India “have not been established in the best interest of 
labour, but are largely to be used to employ the voice and strength o f labour for 
political ends” . The history of organised labour movement in the industrial sector 
goes back to the formation of the Bombay Millhands’ Association in 1890. 
However workers’ organisations at this early stage existed to promote workers’ 
welfare and while it can be considered a trade union in the sense that it is a
37 Dearness allowance (DA) is used widely in Indian industries, often accounting for a majority o f  earnings in 
the organised sector. It was initially introduced in the 1940s in order to keep the real wages constant in face 
o f  the rapid price inflation after the First World War. The system, however, is used in various forms today, 
reflecting different modes o f  managing the labour process, as we argue in Chapter 6 Section 6.3.
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coalition or collective association of workers to protect common interests and 
improve working conditions, it did not take the form of modem trade unionism, 
it did not have any explicit notion o f membership, there were no rules or 
regulations, and no wage settlements to negotiate (Ramaswamy 2000: 47). During 
the next two decades various collective organisations emerged in various 
industrial areas, gradually forming the characteristic of modem trade unionism. In 
1920, the first central trade union organisation (CTUO) was formed. This was the 
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). The AITUC was, of course an 
outcome of decades of struggle by rank-and-file workers. But it is not entirely 
correct to say that it was ‘unionism from below’. What made the AITUC become 
the first central trade union organisation was the formation o f the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). India who hosted the ILO’s foundation conference 
needed to select its representative, and this was at least part of the reason why the 
formation o f the AITUC received strong support from the government. Also 
while the AITUC did not have formal political affiliation at the time, from the 
beginning there was rivalry between different political groups, particularly 
between communists, congress activists, and moderate socialists. This led to 
continuous infighting and organisational splits, which ultimately led to the 
formation o f the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) by Indian 
National Congress party activists in 1947. In 1948, non-communist non-congress 
socialists formed two organisations, the independent Hind Mazdoor Sabha 
(HMS) and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) affiliated to the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party, which resulted in the AITUC being controlled by 
the Communist Party o f India (CPI). In 1955, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) set 
up its own labour arm Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS); and in 1970, the Centre 
of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) was set up following the split of the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), from the CPI in 1964. This tendency of 
political parties forming trade union fronts can be found in regional parties as
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well, most notably the split of labour movement between those affiliated to 
DM K and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, and the emergence of Shiv Sena (‘Shivaji’s 
Army’) unions in Mumbai in the mid-1960s (Bhowmik 1998; Hansen 2001).
Proliferation of trade unions in India thus has been significantly driven by 
political parties as well as regional, communal, and caste lines. Within this context 
of politicised bargaining, links with political actors, parties and the state becomes 
important to gain access to resources. Under this framework, “agreements are far 
more determined by state goals and interests than by bargaining struck between 
employers and employees” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 269) and as 
Ramaswamy (1997) observes “[w]ith the government assuming the role of arbiter 
in industrial relations, the question before labour and management often is not 
how to influence each other, but how to mount pressure on the government 
which is going to determine their fate”.
The ‘paternalistic labour relations’ in India’s LMIs may partly be explained by the 
dominance o f the public sector in the organised sector, at least in the early phases 
of India’s industrialisation. It is also often argued that the paternalistic labour 
relations were employed as a strategy by the state to dominate industrial relations 
and keep labour weak and fragmented (Rudolph and Rudolph op cit.: 268-9). 
Similarly Bhattacherjee (1999) argues that in light o f the attempts such as the 
“Giri approach” to introduce alternative labour legislation that promotes 
‘genuine’ collective bargaining, it may have been a “strategic mistake” by the state 
to adhere to the paternalistic labour relation system. The model implicitly 
assumes that the state and political elites were able to choose between different 
labour policy options, for the benefit of the society as a whole. However, in 
reality, Bhaskar and Khan (1995) argue that the state and politicians use a 
particular section of organised labour, such as the educated white-collar workers, 
for political mobilisation. Therefore the types of LMIs that took shape cannot be
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understood without considering the patron-client networks, within which 
bargaining agents such as trade unions were accommodated, and which 
dominated the macro political economy of India.
It would however be misleading to associate the types of LMIs directly and solely 
to the accumulation strategies of the political elites, or the ‘choice’ of state 
planning as the development strategy (Bhowmik 1998: 149). These patron-client 
networks38 were organised by intermediate or middle class political entrepreneurs, 
at the backdrop o f relatively underdeveloped capitalist economy, in which both 
industrial capital and wage labour were (and still are) a minority, both numerically 
and politically, as we shall argue below.
O n the final point, another insightful observation, not mutually exclusive from 
the above, is that the condition o f the industries was such that the state and 
political officials, as well as other social actors, were inclined to intervene because 
of entrepreneurs and managers’ inability to establish labour discipline at the local 
level. Again this is an observation that reflects the particular pattern of economic 
development and accumulation in India, in which capitalist property relations are 
not dominant, and extra economic coercion is the rule rather than exception 
(Khan 2000; Wood 2002). For example, in his study on the Mumbai (Bombay) 
textile mills in the 1920s and 30s, Morris (1955) observes that in the early stage of 
industrialisation, “ [a] 11 recruitment and virtually all disciplining (including 
discharge) of workers was left by employers in the hand o f foremen [...] called
38 The use o f  this term ‘patron-client’ relations is often associated with the neo-Weberian analysis o f  neo- 
patrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Erdmann and Engel 2006; 2007) whereby personalised 
politics and rent-seeking are analysed with reference to cultural explanations (Khan 2005b). This is exactly 
the opposite to our approach in which the network o f  patron-client relations must be given a materialist 
explanation; as a form o f  capitalist exploitation. As we show in this section, the reason why the social 
relations take this form o f  patron-client relations must be understood within the historical context o f  
India’s early phase o f  industrialisation, particularly the colonial arraignments o f  organising resource 
redistribution. However, a fully developed political economic analysis o f  patron-client network requires a 
separate study.
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jobbers” (p.294) who, based on personal contacts developed ‘clientele’ 
relationships with, and controlled, a specific group of workers typically from the 
same village or region (van Wersch 1992; Chandavarkar 1994). Similarly 
important were neighbourhood headmen or dada (‘elder brother’) who “could 
exercise very real physical power and could, like the jobber, be an instrument in 
making or breaking a strike” (van Wersch op cit:. 16). A similar observation is 
made by Ratina Sen (1997) in relation to the Kolkata (Calcutta) jute mills in the 
1930s, whereby the jobbers (sardar) “had absolute rights to hire and fire, and who 
alone dealt with the management”. Morris argues that this mode o f controlling 
the labour process through social networks and organisation is a reflection of the 
failure by employers to establish discipline effectively, which was later 
institutionalised by the increasing role o f the state in creating labour discipline and 
“the peculiar role of trade unions” :
Because o f the potential political influence of industrial workers and the 
need to avoid prolonged labor unrest, the state in these other areas also 
seems to undertake the responsibility o f distributing wage-welfare benefits, 
while leaving increasingly to the unions the responsibility for acting as an 
instrument o f labor discipline. (Morris op cit:. 308)
At the background of this hypothesis is the weak legitimacy o f capital-owning 
groups in the early phase of development in many parts o f India. This is 
somewhat paradoxical considering that India is thought to have had a reasonably 
strong industrial capitalist class at the time of Independence. Many of the 
traditional industrial houses in India derive from merchant communities such as 
the Marwaris, Parsis, and the Muslims. It has been pointed out that many of these 
early business families were dominated by “a set of reckless, unscrupulous 
insubstantial speculator[s]” (Ray 1992) who were more interested in getting rich 
quickly by selling mismanaged factories at times of boom, rather than focusing on 
day-to-day operations o f firms. There are largely three explanations to the 
weakness o f industrial capitalism, based on cultural, technological and political
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economy factors. Buchanan (1934) argued that entrepreneurship was inhibited by 
religious philosophy of resignation and the rigid social and economic system of 
caste, purdah and the joint family. Morris (1983) focuses on the “technological 
backwardness” of the Indian economy as a possible explanation for the lack of 
successful development of large-scale industries, and argues that the reason 
Indian entrepreneurs stayed away from industries was because there were more 
profitable activities elsewhere such as the bazaar. Some writers such as Bagchi 
(1992) argue that there was an “imperial division o f economic space” such that 
the colonial interest inhibited investment by domestic capital owning groups. An 
important consequence was that in general the capital owning groups in the 
society was not always the same as the social groups who had political power. 
There are cases such as the cotton textile industries in Bombay (Mumbai) and 
Ahmedabad, where local capital owning groups, such as the Marwaris and 
Gujarati families, founded textile mills, and became dominant business groups in 
the region. But Bombay and Ahmedabad were exceptions. Other industries like 
the jute manufacturing in Bengal were dominated by European enterprises 
between the 1850s and 1880s. Despite initial attempts by the Bengalis to 
collaborate with the Europeans (Kling 1992), strong endogenous capital did not 
emerge in Calcutta (Kolkata). Instead it was the Marwaris that became the most 
successful business group in Calcutta, who had “strategic position” as 
collaborators of the Europeans in the China trade (Ray 1992; Timberg 1992) 
initially in the form of managing agency (Rothermund 1993: 44-45). and later 
stepped into the breach to take over the control of the industry (Sen 1997). That 
industries like jute in Calcutta were run by capital owning group who was not part 
of the dominant social groups at the locality had implications in terms of the 
policies legitimacy and ability o f these industrial capitalists to manage the labour 
processes, making dependency on extra-economic (i.e. non-market) power and
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actors necessary, including trade unions, other mediators such as the jobbers, and 
most importantly, the state and bureaucratic agency.
It is important to understand the observation of unionisation from ‘above’ and 
the reliance on political process to manage the labour processes within the 
context of the early phase of industrialisation in developing countries such as 
India, where by definition, capitalism is not the dominant sector of developing 
economies, and also industrial capital and wage earners are not the numerical 
majority o f the society. Khan (2005b) argues that industrialisation in developing 
countries involves the mobilisation of resources to the capitalist sector, but this 
may not always take fiscal or regulatory means, given the limited size of the 
formal economic sector. Rather, distributional politics in developing countries 
tend to be dominated by political entrepreneurs who organise patron-client 
networks by mobilising “enough organizational muscle to be able to capture 
resources through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even illegal means” (op 
cit. p.718). In the case of India, these political entrepreneurs are predominandy 
from the middle or ‘intermediate’ classes (Raj 1973; Jha 1980; Khan 1998; 2005b; 
McCarthey and Harris-White 2000), which include the educated self-employed 
petty-bourgeoisie as well as the middle to rich peasants and small farmers, who 
form a distinct socio-economic class/regime, in that “its earnings can neither be 
classified as a reward for labour, nor as a payment for risk taking (i.e. profit) but 
are an amalgam of the two. The self-employed thus lie midway between the large 
scale, professionally managed capitalist enterprises of the private sector, and the 
working classes.” (Jha 1980: 95).
The establishment o f ‘paternalistic labour relations’ and the peculiar type o f LMIs 
associated with them can therefore be understood as a reflection of the patron- 
client politics that dominates the process of redistributional conflict in India. The 
process of industrialisation opened space and opportunity for appropriation by
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political entrepreneurs, not only in the form of the creation and transfer of 
property rights, economic resources and activities, but also by the emergence of 
rapidly expanding but disgruntled wage labour in the industrial sector. Industrial 
workers were incorporated into the patron-client networks o f political factions as 
‘foot soldiers’ who can be mobilised for political events, including strikes (Khan 
2005b: 719). As Singh (1980: 214) observed, “ [IJnstances of how unions are 
formed show the attempts o f middle-class intermediaries to provide some form 
to the nebulous mass of unaware workers and to act as links between modem 
bureaucratic institutions and the dissatisfied workers”. However it is also possible 
that the ‘pay-offs’ from being part o f the patron-client organisation, which would 
have included not only income, but also secure employment and other fringe 
benefits, were higher than those from alternative activities, given the relatively 
low productivity across the industrial sector. Industrial capitalists and employers, 
with weak political legitimacy, also had to deal with and accommodate these 
political entrepreneurs, not only to secure their property rights and economic 
activities, but also to manage the labour process. Thus, we argue that the socio­
economic structure in the early period of industrialisation in India created 
incentives for bargaining agents in industrial relations to engage in redistributive 
conflict as part of the patron-client network.
1.4.2 Contradiction and crisis of the state dominated pluralist model
At least on the surface, the Nehruvian model of state-led industrialisation and 
harmonious industrial bargaining relations based on the “state pluralism” model 
appeared to have achieved moderate economic growth exceeding or matching the 
target growth rates set by the first and second 5-year plans (target for first plan 
2.1%, actual growth 3.61%; target for second plan 4.5%, actual 4.32%). This was 
accompanied by growth in industrial employment both in public and private 
sectors, with wage increases kept relatively low and the overall the industrial 
conflict moderate (Jackson 1972; Bhattacherjee 1999).
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However there are indications that the ‘state pluralism3 model contained an 
inherent paradox from the beginning. First, if we consider the state-led 
development project, within which the “state pluralism” model was embedded, 
we see that it can be described as a mixed economy, neither the socialist planning 
nor the market-driven private enterprise economy. (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 
59). This mixed economy was a result o f compromise between vested interests: 
between those who believed Congress as the vehicle of social transition and those 
who saw the Congress as the instrument of national unity; and between the 
English educated political actors in the centre and the conservative coalition 
between the landowning classes in the country-side and business classes in the 
urban area. In addition, while the state under the Congress promoted 
development, it failed to put into place a developmental state. This leads us to 
the second point. The Congress under the leadership of Nehru, came to 
dominance by holding together disparate elements of the Indian society and 
trying to “occupy not only the centre ground of Indian politics but also much of 
the terrain both to the left and the right’3 (Corbridge and Harriss op cit:. 53). While 
the struggle in the 1930s was strongly influenced by the left wing English 
speaking intelligentsia, the prospect that the Congress would come into power 
after Independence attracted new members seeking patronage. Many of these 
new members who became dominant in the Congress government were from the 
dominant landowning class and business families. Particularly the dominant 
landowning caste (the ‘big men’) was able to attract mobilisation o f electoral 
support, in exchange for offices, jobs and access to public resources {op cit:. 49- 
50). This network of political affiliation through the hierarchy o f local notables 
became an increasingly important support base of the Congress, in addition to 
the organised labour. Corbridge and Harriss argue that the state in this period had 
to take an accommodating policy over a broad spectrum of interest groups and 
“the power of the Congress depended upon networks o f intermediation and of
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clientelism,” (op.cit.: 58) which directed policies in such a way that they “enhance 
the power of industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, rich peasantry” and “the 
bureaucratic office holders” {op.cit:. 65).
The state dominated pluralist model was justified on the ground that it was 
“being run in the interests of an alliance of a heterogeneous but numerically 
dominant class” (McCartney and Harriss 2000: 30). However, as the industrial 
and economic growth started to stagnate, the political influence and rent seeking 
activities of the intermediate classes was highlighted as one of the factors that led 
to inefficient investment, bad income and resource distribution, and poor 
planning management (Jha 1980). These contradictions were already present 
during Nehru’s premiership, but by the 1970s it became clear that Nehru’s 
accommodating strategy was facing a crisis (Corbridge and Harriss op cit:. 92). The 
GDP growth rate dropped to 2.38 per cent during the third plan (1961-66) and 
3.21 per cent during the fourth plan (1969-74), both o f which was way below the 
target growth rates. This was followed by industrial stagnation in the 1970s, most 
evident in the rapid drop of industrial production during the fourth plan, which 
was “not only short o f the (lowered) targets, but was also much slower than in 
the earlier period” (Ahluwalia 1998: 273). After three five years plans, “the rate of 
inflation rose above the politically sensitive danger-mark of 10 per cent in 
1966/67 and 1967/68, and food price inflation was even higher (around 20 per 
cent)” (Joshi and Little 1994: 48).
The failure of achieving the social goal o f the Nehru’s project led to wider 
inequality in Indian society and social discontent expressed through various 
channels, including labour disputes, such as the railway union strike in 1974; 
popular uprisings, such as riots in Gujarat in the same year; and armed conflict 
between peasants/labour and landlords, such as the Naxilite movement that 
started in West Bengal. Particularly the rail workers strike represented “the first
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political challenge by a trade union to the central government at a national level” 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 274). Also, the internal struggle within the Congress 
party meant that Mrs Gandhi lacked organisational power and that she had to rely 
more on her popular image (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 73). The high court 
ruling accepting accusations o f corruption during Indira Gandhi’s election 
campaign and declaring her seat in the Lok Sabha invalid, combined with 
Congress’s defeat in Gujarat local election triggered the implementation of the 
Emergency Regime from 1975 to 1977, which included imprisonment o f political 
opponents, suspension of civil rights, censoring o f the press, and postponement 
of elections. In order to justify the declaration of emergency as a necessary engine 
for social change, Indira Gandhi presented the Twenty-Point Programme, which 
included rural improvements, abolition of bonded labour, mass education, and 
urban renewal. It is possible to see the Emergency as the last attempt by the 
Congress government to pursue Nerhuvian project o f what is today often seen as 
urban-biased development policies and over-emphasis on industrial development 
through state planning (for example, Waelbroeck 1998). Whatever the 
motivation, in reality Indira Gandhi lacked political support to implement these 
programmes. The end o f the Emergency saw the defeat of Mrs Gandhi in the 
1977 election and a brief rule by the Janata Party, the precursor o f the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Our primary concern here is how these 
political crisis leading up to the Emergency may have induced a reorganisation of 
patron-client networks, within which LMIs such as trade unions were embedded.
In terms of industrial relations, the Emergency had a seemingly contradictory 
effect. This has to be seen within the context of the intent and limitation o f the 
Indira Gandhi’s government. O n the one hand, the Emergency was an attempt to 
revive the Nehruvian ‘state pluralism’ model o f industrial relations. This is 
reflected in the pro-labour 1976 amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, 
which may have been largely a “populist” measure (Bhattacherjee 1999: 9), but
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nonetheless legislated that firms employing more than 300 workers had to obtain 
permission from the government in order to layoff or retrench workers or close 
down establishments. On the other hand, the Emergency saw the first clear 
indication of the central government retreating from the industrial relations arena. 
Draconian measures such as freezing wages, phasing out of the wage-based 8.33 
per cent annual bonus, transferring increments in the dearness allowances (DA) 
to a compulsory saving scheme and the de facto banning of strikes (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987: 276), but more importantly this period saw the formation o f the 
National Apex Body (NAB), a bipartite body between central trade union 
organisations such as the AITXJC, INTUC and HMS on one hand, and 
employers’ organisations such as the Employers’ Federation of India, the All 
India Organisation of Employers, and the All India Manufacturers’ Organisation 
on the other hand. Although the Ministry of Labour had a close involvement in 
the organisation, reflected in the fact that the Labour Minster and Ministry 
officials attending many o f the NAB meetings (All India Trade Union Congress 
1976), the NAB was intended as a platform to discuss bipartite solution to 
problems of lay-off, retrenchment and closure that took place during the 
Emergency. However, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) argue that the impression 
that the NAB was a more voluntary and open-ended collective bargaining 
organisation that was responsive to bargaining agents, namely trade unions and 
employers, compared to previous tripartite organisations, such as the Indian 
Labour Conference, where the voice o f trade unions was restricted to a strictly 
consultative role, was “deceptive” and “spurious” (p.275).
There is no question that NAB meetings ultimately reflected the government’s 
desire to restrain militancy and keep production costs low. Indeed some argue 
that the bi-partite solution (or lack of it) to the problem o f lay-off, retrenchment, 
and closure enabled firms to increase profits and assets at the cost of the 
repression of labour (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 87). This evidence suggest that
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industrial relations under the Emergency should be seen as “an exaggerated and 
repressive version of the more general Indian approach to industrial relations 
common to national centrist parties” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 276), rather 
than to see it as an immediate shift away from the state dominated pluralist 
model.
Nonetheless the Emergency and the period after it saw a subtle but significant 
change in the organisation of patron-client networks and the position of LMIs 
within them. Once the Congress lost the ability to function as “an effective 
instrument of class rule” (p-94) the numerically small and organisationally weak 
and fragmented organised labour became weaker in its ability to extract public 
resources under the process o f India’s development. The contradiction of the 
state dominated pluralist model and the LMIs associated with this was further 
exposed since the process of economic liberalisation, which began ‘hesitantly’ in 
the mid-1980s and became more ‘systematic and systemic’ since the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy in 1991 (DeLong 2003; Panagariya 2004; Rodrik 
and Subramanian 2004; 2005). At a macro-economic policy level, there has been a 
shift away from planning economy to a neo-liberal economic reform. This was 
mirrored at sector level by the dynamic, but uneven and segmented, development 
in labour and skill intensive industries such as garment, jewellery, information 
technology (IT) and light engineering. These structural changes in the Indian 
economy during the course of the 1980s has led to a relative decline in the 
political influence of the intermediate classes that flourished under the planned 
economy and stagnation, while also creating a set o f countervailing class forces 
(McCartney and Harris-White 2000: 29). In urban India, a new group of middle 
class, such as professional managers, who are politically unaffiliated and enjoys 
the global consumption culture, which led to a progressive thawing of autarchic 
attitudes (p.34). In the rural area, the influence of rich peasants was challenged by 
the rise of backward castes, who became the centre of social mobilisation in the
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nineties. The emergence o f these new groups of middle class does not mean an 
end to redistributional conflict driven by political entrepreneurs, but rather signals 
a reorganisation o f factions. Indeed, just as much as the new middle class with 
aspirations for ‘globalised’ lifestyle and consumer culture, there are indication that 
economic liberalisation has in turn created new space and opportunities for 
patron-client politics, as apparent in the rise of regionalism, ethnic and communal 
politics (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Hansen 2001; Harriss-White 2003).
The long-term future of such redistributive politics remains to be seen. However, 
for the objective of this present thesis, the question is how this reorganisation of 
patron-client politics has altered the types of LMIs in Indian industries.
1.4.3 Reorganisation of LMIs
Since the 1980s, there is a growing perception amongst academics, policy makers 
and the popular media that the traditional form of industrial relations based on 
confrontational union politics and state intervention is no longer relevant, and 
that there is a paradigm shift in favour of a more ambiguous human resource 
management (HRM) (Ramaswamy 2000: 216-7). We have already seen that, in 
recent decades, pro-reform policy makers, industrial associations, mainstream 
media, and several influential economists have put forward a renewed attack on 
the legal framework of LMIs in India, most notably in the ‘exit policy’ debate, on 
the ground that the existing types o f LMIs needs to be altered in response to 
labour market conditions under globalisation and economic liberalisation (Basu 
1995; Basu, Fields and Debgupta 1996; 2000; Debroy 2004; 2005). While 
employers39 and advocates for labour market reforms argue that changes in 
labour law and labour market reforms are “desirable and will almost certainly 
make reforms better serve the masses in the long-run”, they are “either too slowly
39 For example, see comment by Mr. Subrata Dutta Gupta, Managing Director, Birla Hom e Finance Ltd. 
(http://www.birlahome.com/news_interview_bhfl_md.html; retrieved 26 January 2006).
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implemented, or may come later than sooner” (Sachs, Varshney and Bajpai 1999), 
it has also been pointed out that, despite the lack of official exit policy, the 
conditions faced by organised labour have changed drastically since the 1990s and 
it is as if the industrial-relations reform was “preceded by stealth” (Jenkins 1999). 
The cornerstone of the ‘unstated’ reform is the voluntary retirement scheme 
(VRS), which was initially intended as an integrated programme for redeploying 
surplus labour, but increasingly functioning as a ‘“back door’ labour reform” 
aggressively pursued by management40 and the state. In fact the VRS has been so 
successful in making adjustments that for example, “the big capitalists themselves 
stopped pushing the government for an unrestrained Exit Polity, and argued they 
could manage with the VRS” (Singh 1995: 1359).
Despite such erosion of labour rights in the organised sector and dynamic 
accumulation in less-unionised sectors such as handloom textile and software 
industries, it is difficult to accept the argument that the politics of labour has 
changed fundamentally, nor can it be argued that industrial relations is no longer 
relevant (Chakrabarti and Dasgupta 2007). Organised and unionised labour has 
always been a numerical minority in India’s labouring class (Harriss-White 2000), 
and as we have argued, even in the unionised sector, intervention from other 
actors in the wider social context was always the norm rather than exception in 
collective bargaining. The perception of an apparent ‘retreat o f the state’ from
40 Another important change that must be commented is the nature o f  industrial capital. Since the 1980s, and 
increasingly the 1990s, employer’s attitude toward unionism has hardened, partly in response to the 
perceived rise o f  labour costs and militancy during the 1970s, and the crisis o f  industrial relations around 
the period o f  the Emergency Regime. The introduction o f  liberalisation policy in 1991 also created 
opportunities as well as compulsion to change the employment system dramatically. But another significant 
change is the development o f  ‘management accounting framework’ as means to increase “the ability o f  
headquarters management to monitor wage costs and labour productivity” (Armstrong 1994: 199). 
Armstrong points out that there has been an “increased influence o f  accounting control systems on the 
managerial conduct o f  industrial relations” (191) in large British companies since the mid-1970s, and 
Hensman and Banaji (2001: 2) suggests that this change in corporate control may have taken place in some 
industrial establishments in India as well, particularly in big modem sector firms in places like Bombay. 
Such change would also have impact on the role bargaining agents may play in controlling the labour 
process.
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industrial relations, as in the traditional ‘state dominated pluralism’ model, masks 
the active political interventions at various levels that allowed the ‘reforms by 
stealth’. Liberalisation policies and rising fiscal deficits meant a decline in public 
sector investment and central support for state-level expenditures. This has 
forced certain state governments to adopt a more ‘liberal’ interpretation of labour 
laws regarding restructuring, retrenchment and closure in order to attract private 
and foreign capital (Tendulkar 2003). Jenkins (1999) observes that Chief Ministers 
in a number o f states have been centrally involved in pushing through VRS as 
‘compromises’ between unions and managements. This is another change that 
has taken place. In addition, there are various examples of the state effectively 
giving implicit permission to firms to restructure, retrench and close down, which 
includes substituting regular employees with contract employees (op cit:. 193); the 
use o f restructuring as a way of closing unviable production units (op cit:. 194); 
making firms “immune to strike” by declaring their products “essential public- 
utility items” (140); and deregistering unions that do not comply with a narrow 
definition of the Trade Union Act. These observations reaffirm our argument 
that these are particular legal form1 of capitalist social relations.
The implication of these ‘back door reforms’ for the bargaining agents has been a 
change in the ‘payoff structure which determines their opportunity, incentives 
and constraints. Traditional party-affiliated unions have increasingly found it 
difficult to deliver an acceptable level o f wages and non-wage benefits to mobilise 
workers, who have sought alternative forms of political accommodation. Indeed 
there have been reorganisations in the LMIs in response to the changing factional 
politics since the 1980s, especially in the rise of caste and communal-based 
politics by traditional ‘intermediate’ classes such as the petty commodity 
producers and middle peasants.
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Thus the ‘evolution’ o f labour movements since the 1980s can be reinterpreted 
within this context o f changing patron-client politics. For example, the 1980s saw 
a number of large scale industrial actions, the most famous of which is the 
Mumbai (Bombay) textile strike of 1982-83 (Bhattacherjee, 1988; 1989; 1999; van 
Wersch, 1992). It started as a dispute over the regularisation of casual workers (or 
badh) and wage increases in a few cotton textile mills, and expanded to an 
industry-wide stoppage that lasted over a year. At the heart of the dispute was the 
dissatisfaction amongst the rank-and-file workers towards traditional party 
affiliated unionism that imposes centralised settlement from above (Bhattacherjee 
1999: 12). The textile industry is amongst those under the Bombay Industrial 
Relation Act (BIRA) of 1947, where industry-wide collective bargaining was 
mandatory, represented by the Congress-affiliated Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh 
(RMMS), despite apparent weak support from the rank-and-file. With the Shiv 
Sena unions withdrawing from the strike in support of the Congress government, 
mill workers turned to the Maharashtra Girini Kamghar Union (MGKU) of Dr. 
Datta Samant, the leader of the ‘independent’ trade union movement in Mumbai 
(Adarkar and Phatak 2005). Since the case provides us with important insights on 
the transformation of LMIs and the particular pattern of accumulation in 
Mumbai, we shall return to the textile strike over the course of our discussion in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
The Mumbai textile strike is one of many disputes whereby dissatisfaction 
towards traditional party affiliated unionism was one of the underlying issues. 
This was especially so in places like Mumbai where the segmentation o f growth 
was rapid, and also a relatively long history of employee unionism. The process of 
accumulation under liberalisation was severely uneven, not only between sectors, 
but also within sectors, which was the basis of discontent towards traditional 
industry-level collective bargaining, as indicated by the strong preference towards 
enterprise or plant-level bargaining amongst ‘independent’ unions. In industries
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with high productivity, plant-based unions were able to extract higher wages, 
while in the low paid sectors, traditional party-based unions faced difficulty in 
delivering the ‘wage-welfare’ pay-offs. (Bhattacherjee and Chaudhuri 1994). There 
are some examples of organised ‘independent’ unions, most notably the 
Hindustan Lever Employees’ Union, with a strong membership base and 
sufficient financial resources overcoming problems of multiple unionism and 
internal union rivalry. However, such successful cases of ‘independent’ unions are 
few and far between, and have so far not been able to provide an alternative all 
encompassing labour movement (Bhattacherjee 1999). Also such attempts to 
challenge the existing LMIs have not always achieved stability o f industrial 
relations. For example, despite the display o f unity amongst mill workers, the 
Mumbai textile strike came to an end without a resolution to the issue of 
representation, and resulting in the loss of as many as 75,000 jobs (Hensman 
2001: 10).
It is our interpretation that the reorganisation o f LMIs since the 1980s reflects the 
struggle for accommodation in the changing patron-client politics. Two factors, 
economic and political, which are not independent of each other, are important in 
explaining this41. Firstly, the shift in industrial structure meant that not only 
traditional party-based unions could no longer deliver sufficient benefits to 
industrial workers, but also the mode o f managing the labour process changed. 
This does not necessarily mean that employers were able to “exert greater control 
over the labour process” (Bhowmik 1998: 158) since there is the active 
involvement o f state government and other political actors in regulating labour,
41 At a more fundamental level, these economic and political conditions must be understood and historically 
situated as particular manifestations o f  ‘late’ capitalist transformation and social formation in the context in 
which there is increasing integration into the world economy and the international division o f  labour 
(Trotsky 1969; Callinicos 1990). While the foucs o f  the present thesis is on the specific forms o f  labour 
relations and particular process o f  accumulation within India, it is recognised that these o f  course must be 
coneived as part o f  capitalst development in the perspective o f  world-historical totality, the analysis o f  
which would require a separate paper to develop further.
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but the type of intervention required to maintain the specific pattern of 
accumulation after liberalisation is likely to be different from that under the ‘state- 
led industrialisation’ o f the 1950s and 60s. Secondly, and not unrelated to this 
economic process, the period after Indira Gandhi saw the rise o f new political 
forces organised around regional, caste and communal symbols. The combination 
of the factional nature of Indian politics and the ‘deepening’ of democracy meant 
that increasingly politics depended on votes from lower castes’, a loose term that 
refers to various social groups that are sandwiched between ‘middle’ castes and 
schedule castes and tribes42. Parties like the BJP benefited most from playing the 
communal card, but Indira’s son Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress-(I) also 
participated, to some extent hesitantly, in this ‘politics of communalism and 
religious nationalism’ (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 115). This also implied a 
relative shift of political attention to rural India. The struggle for accommodation 
has intensified for both organised labour and employers in that they are now 
competing for resources with these new political forces that have gained a strong 
political influence. However, changes in economic and political conditions 
proceeded differently across regions, and therefore created different structural 
opportunities, compulsions and capacities for bargaining agents to reorganise 
their LMIs, as we shall discuss in Chapters 4 and 5.
1.5 Summary and discussion
This chapter highlighted key hypotheses underlying the current policy debate on 
reforms of labour markets and legislation. First, we have seen that, despite being 
based on strongly contested empirical studies, the perception that poor industrial 
performance and slow employment growth in the organised sector can only be 
addressed by tackling the rigid LMIs, is widely shared. This is reflected in the
42 Scheduled caste and tribes (SCs/STs), also known as dahts and adivasis, are the so-called ‘depressed classes’ 
who are defined and listed under the Indian Constitution. According to the 2001 Census, SCs/STs 
together comprise over 24% o f  India's population.
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fixation on the Chapter VB of the IDA in the policy debate, for instance apparent 
from the headline-grabbing recommendation by the Second National 
Commission on Labour (SNCL) to repeal the provision.
Second, a policy consensus has emerged in recent years around the hypothesis 
that the politicised nature o f the LMIs is the main cause o f inefficiency and slow 
industrial development in developing countries, such as India. Again the SNCL 
has made recommendations which are thought to prevent trade unions and other 
LMIs from being exploited by political parties and outside political entrepreneurs, 
making them more responsive to the economic realities at the shop-floor and 
firm levels.
What emerges from the policy discourse is the idea that the existing types of 
LMIs prevalent in Indian industries are the “inappropriate” ones chosen either 
because of ideological beliefs (Banerji, Campos, and Sabot 1995) or because of 
rent-seeking and lack of effective democratic representation (Aidt and Tzannatos 
2002). This logic is used to justify the promotion of the micro based reforms 
focusing on changing bargaining institutions, by promoting better democratic 
process and transparency, as measures that enable LMIs to contribute more 
effectively to economic efficiency and growth.
Such an emerging consensus in the policy debate on LMIs is also consistent with 
the methodologically individualistic view of institutions and society prevalent in 
contemporary economic analysis, most evidently developed in the work by 
Douglass North (1990; 1999). North and his followers argue that institutions and 
institutional structures can change incrementally as political and economic 
entrepreneurs perceive new opportunities. O f course, institutions, which are 
thought of as an accumulation o f rules, norms and beliefs over time, has path 
dependence, and therefore constrains the choices of micro-level agents. However,
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as the perception about the reality changes, sets of beliefs and ideologies 
regarding the reality are formed, which incrementally changes policy and in the 
end also the institutional structure. From this viewpoint, the on-going attempt to 
change LMIs in Indian industries can be seen within a wider effort to ‘adjust’ the 
institutional structures to make it more comfortable to the opportunities and 
threats faced by micro-level agents. The implication is that by making micro-level 
adjustment to allow better representation and information flows, the incremental 
changes in the institutions can be achieved.
There is however an alternative perspective on the relationship between the 
institutional structure and choices of individual micro-level bargaining agents. 
According to this view, organisational and distributional conflicts at the macro 
political economic level, and more specifically, how political and economic 
entrepreneurs of different types compete for resources might precisely be what 
characterises the institutional structure of society (Khan 1998; 2005b). These 
macro political economic conflicts in turn reflect the broader patterns of 
economic development and accumulation, whereby industrial capital requires 
extra-economic interventions in organising the labour process. This social and 
political structure determines the opportunities, incentives and constraints of 
local bargaining actors such as trade unions and employers. Thus different types 
of LMIs are reflections of the social structure and pattern o f accumulation, rather 
than something that is ‘chosen’ by micro-level agents. It also implies that micro­
level reforms regarding ‘good governance’ are inadequate in addressing what is 
essentially a structural problem, and that a broader set of reforms are required for 
adjustment and sustaining economic growth This is an aspect insufficiently 
addressed by the on-going policy debates as well as conventional institutional and 
bargaining models, if not ignored entirely.
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The dichotomy of the two perspectives is of course represented in classical 
debates between rational choice approaches and structuralism in social sciences 
(Callinicos 1988; Giddens 1989; Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992). To some extent we 
find interesting insights in both arguments, but in the context o f the analysis of 
LMIs in developing countries such as India, the latter structural arguments 
require closer attention. The emphasis on social structure is important in 
countries like India where industrial capital and organised labour are numerically 
small and politically less established, and they are subjected to the institutional 
structure that results from the organisational and distributional conflicts, which 
give rise to different types of rent-seeking based on patron-client networks (Khan 
1998; 2000b). This being the case, the task for this thesis is to explore the 
structural opportunities for and capacities of micro-level bargaining agents as 
being determined by macro political economic conditions.
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A PPEN D IX  TO CHAPTER 1
T a b l e  A l-1  R a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  IL O  c o n v e n t i o n s
Total no o f ratification
Bangladesh 31
India 36
Pakistan 31
Sri Lanka 33
Indonesia 10
Korea 4
Malaysia 11
Singapore 21
Thailand 11
Source: Hossain, Islam and Kibria (1999)
T a b l e  A l- 2  S e c t o r a l  s h a r e  i n  m a l e  w o r k  f o r c e  ( % )
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1993-94 1999-2000
Primary 6 9 . 1 6 8 . 0 6 9 . 7 6 5 . 6 6 2 . 8 6 4 . 6 6 0 . 5
Secondary' 1 2 . 6 1 2 . 7 1 2 . 0 1 4 . 5 1 3 . 9 1 5 . 2 1 6 . 9
Tertiary 1 8 . 3 1 9 . 3 1 8 . 3 1 9 . 9 2 3 . 3 2 0 . 3 2 2 . 7
TOTAL 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Note: Primary sector is defined as agriculture and allied industries; secondary includes mining, manufacturing, 
and construction; and tertiary includes trade and commerce transport and other services. N ote that figures 
are based on the national census for 1951-1991 while the 1993-94 and 1999-2000 are based on the national 
sample surveys. Due to difference in coverage and data collection methods the two types o f  data are 
strictly not comparable, and therefore should be interpreted with care.
Sources: Figures for 1951-91 are census data; 1951 and 61 from Rao (1983); 1971 and 1981 from Deshpande 
and Deshpande (1985); 1991 from Census o f  India 1991.1993-94 and 1999-2000 are based on NSSO cited 
in Sundaram (2001).
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F i g u r e  A l - l  S c a t t e r  p l o t  o f  A g a r w a l a ’ s  d i s t o r t i o n  i n d i c e s
A G A I N S T  A N N U A L  G D P  G R OW T H RATE
(i) Index of real wage distortion
| Korea |
O  8.00-
| Matysia|
S '  6 .00-
Bangladesh|
FP Linear = 0.097
1.5 2 2.5 31
Index of wage distortion
Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is — 0.31 and significant at the 8.8% level
(ii) Overall distortion index
FP Unear = 0.338
1.5 2 2.5 3
Overall distortion index
Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is — 0.58 and significant at the 0.1% level 
Source: Authors calculation based on Agarwala (1983)’s indices.
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T a b l e  A l-3  N u m b e r s  o f  l a b o u r  d i s p u t e s , w o r k e r s  i n v o l v e d
IN D IS P U T E S ,  A N D  W O R K D A Y S  LOST IN D IS P U T E S  IN SE LEC TED
c o u n t r i e s / r e g i o n s , 1985-1998.
1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
N o  o f  labour disputes 1,755 1,825 1,066 1,166 1,305 1,097 565
India15) N o o f workers involved in disputes 1,078.8 1,307.9 989.7 939.3 981.3 1,288.9 647.7
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 29,239.5 24,086.2 16,289.6 20,284.8 16,971.4 22,062.0 8,857.7
N o o f  labour disputes 627 284 209 193 178 144 NAV
Japan 0 N o o f  workers involved in disputes 123.4 84.3 37.5 23.2 47.2 26.3 NAV
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 264.1 144.5 77.0 42.8 110.2 101.5 NAV
N o o f  labour disputes 54 44 31 37 29 34 17
U S A 2) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 323.9 184.9 191.5 272.7 338.6 386.8 72.6
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 7,079.1 5,925.5 5,771.2 4,888.6 4,497.1 5,115.7 1,995.8
N o  o f  labour disputes 829 579 328 330 284 375 413
Canada 3) N o o f workers involved in disputes 162.2 270.5 149.2 281.8 257.7 232.9 158.6
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 3,125.6 5,079.2 1,583.1 3,351.8 3,609.8 2,460.8 2,445.7
N o o f  labour disputes 903 630 235 244 216 166 205
U K 4) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 791.3 298.2 174.0 364.3 130.0 92.7 140.9
N o o f  workdavs lost in disputes 6,402.0 1,903.0 415.0 1,303.3 234.7 282.4 241.8
N o o f  labour disputes NAV 777 361 200 144
Germany5) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 78.2 257.2 183.3 165.7 13.5
N o o f  workdavs lost in disputes 34.5 363.5 247.5 98.1 52.9
N o o f  labour disputes 1,901 1,790 2,066 1,439 1,607 1,475
France 6) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 22.8 18.5 43.5 11.4 12.2 10.1
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 726.7 528.0 783.8 444.1 393.4 345.6
N o o f  labour disputes 1,341 1,094 545 904 923 1,103
Italy7) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 4,842.8 1,634.0 445.0 1,689.4 737.3 435.4
No o f  workdays lost in disputes 3,830.8 5,181.3 909.3 1,930.0 1,185.6 580.4
No o f  labour disputes 160 126 36 9 14 13
Sweden 8) No o f  workers involved in disputes 124.5 73.2 125.5 9.1 11.9 0.6
No o f  workdays lost in disputes 504.2 770.4 627.3 61.3 23.6 1.7
No o f  labour disputes NAV 260 8,856 8,278 17,007 11,162 7,285
Russia 9) No o f  workers involved in disputes NAV 99.5 489.4 663.9 887.3 530.8 238.4
No o f  workdays lost in disputes NAV 207.7 1,367.0 4,009.4 6,000.5 2,881.5 1,827.2
No o f  labour disputes 3 15 9 17 7 8
Hong K o n g 10) No o f  workers involved in disputes 0.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 0.4 0.6
No o f  workdavs lost in disputes 1.2 3.5 1.0 2.7 0.8 1.4
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T a b l e  A l - 3  ( c o n t . )
1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
N o o f  labour disputes 265 322 88 85 78 129 198
South Korea n) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 28.7 133.9 49.7 79.0 43.9 146.1 92.0
N o o f  workdavs lost in disputes 64.3 4,487.2 392.6 893.0 444.7 1,452.1 1,366.0
N o o f  labour disputes 25 17 13 9 5 12 11
Malaysia 12) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 9.0 98.5 1.7 1.0 0.8 1.8 3.5
N o o f  workdavs lost in disputes 36.0 302.0 4.9 2.6 2.4 2.7 10.6
N o o f  labour disputes 4 9 39 18 23 NA V
Thai N o o f  workers involved in disputes 0.6 4.3 16.8 8.7 11.9 NA V
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 13.1 71.6 219.9 92.1 150.6 N A V
N o o f  labour disputes 78 61 276 346 234 N A V
Indonesia 13) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 21.1 31.2 126.9 221.3 145.6 N A V
N o o f  workdays lost in disputes 557.0 262.0 1,300.0 2,496.4 1,250.4 N A V
N o o f  labour disputes 371 183 94 89 93 92 58
Philippines M) N o o f  workers involved in disputes 111.3 68.4 54.4 32.3 51.5 34.5 15.5
N o o f workdays lost in disputes 2,457.7 1,344.6 584.2 518.9 672.7 556.8 229.2
N o o f  labour disputes 1,895 1,193 643 543 447 518 729
Australia16) N o o f workers involved in disputes 570.5 729.9 344.3 577.7 315.4 348.3 460.9
N o o f  workdavs lost in disputes 1,256.2 1,376.0 547.6 928.5 534.2 526.2 650.4
No o f  labour disputes 383 137 69 72 42 35 32
New Zealand 17) No o f  workers involved in disputes 182.2 50.0 32.1 42.3 7.7 15.2 10.7
No o f  workdays lost in disputes 756.4 330.9 53.4 69.5 24.6 11.8 16.7
No o f  labour disputes 843 1,846 NAV NAV NAV NA V
Brazil ,8> No o f  workers involved in disputes 5,431.0 14,243 NAV NAV NAV N A V
No o f  workdays lost in disputes 49,575.0 17.0 NAV N A V NAV N A V
Sources: Japan: Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, Rodo-sogi Tokei Chosa Nen-hokoku [.Annual 
Report of Labour Disputes Statisticx], Germany: Federal Statistical Office, Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1997, 
Others: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics.
Note: Number o f disputes in actual units. Number o f workers involved in disputes in 000s. 
Number o f workdays lost in 000 days. 15) Excludes political and sympathetic strike, and 
disputes with less than 10 workers involved. Figures for 1999 are preliminary. 1) Exclude 
disputes lasting less than a half-day. Number o f workers involved in disputes is the number o f  
workers actually participated. 2) Exclude disputes with less than 1,000 workers involved and 
lasting less than a day. Disputes started within the year. 3) Disputes lasting half day or more and 
with 10 workdays or more lost. Number o f workers involved in disputes is the number o f  
workers actually participated. 4) Includes disputes lasting less than a day, or with less than 10 
workers involved, if the workdays lost exceeds 100. Excludes political strike. 5) Ex-West 
Germany prior to 1990. Includes disputes lasting less than a day, if the workdays lost exceed 
100. Excludes public sector after 1993. Number o f workers involved in disputes is the number 
o f workers actually participated. (Note continued on next page)
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N o te  (continued): 6) E xcludes localised disputes (disputes at the level o f  single firm), agricultural 
and public sectors. M easures the num ber o f  d isputes by the unit o f  establishm ents. N u m ber o f  
workers in volved  in disputes is calculated from  the m onthly average. 7) N u m ber o f  workdays 
lo st is calculated assum ing 7 w ork  hours per day. 8) E xcludes d isputes lasting less than 8 hours. 
N um ber o f  workers involved  in disputes is the num ber o f  workers actually participated. 9) 
E xcludes disputes lasting less than a day. 10) Includes disputes lasting less than a day, or w ith  
less than 10 workers involved , i f  the workdays lost exceeds 100. E xclude public sector. N u m ber  
o f  workers involved  in  d isputes is the num ber o f  w orkers actually participated. 11) N u m ber o f  
workers involved  in disputes is the num ber o f  w orkers actually participated. 12) Strikes only. 
N u m ber o f  workers involved  in d isputes is the num ber o f  w orkers actually participated. 13) For  
1985 num ber o f  workdays lost is calculated assum ing 7 w ork  hours per day. 14) E xcludes 
disputes lasting less than a day. N u m b er  o f  workers invo lved  in disputes is the num ber o f  
workers actually participated. 16) E xcludes disputes w ith less than 10 workdays lost. Figures for  
1994 m easured in  n ew  industrial categorisation. N u m b er o f  w orkers in volved  in d isputes is the 
total num ber o f  workers em ployed  in firms involved  in disputes. 17) E xcludes disputes w ith  less 
than 10 workdays lost. Figures for 1985 excludes public sector. N u m ber o f  workdays lo st is 
calculated assum ing 8 w ork hours per day. 18) Strikes only. N u m ber o f  workers involved  in 
disputes is the num ber o f  w orkers actually participated.
F i g u r e  A l - 2  N u m b e r  o f  d i s p u t e s
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Source: Indian Labour Yearbook, Indian Labour Statistics, Indian Labour journal, labour Bureau, various 
years.
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F i g u r e  Al - 3  N u m b e r  o f  w o r k e r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  d i s p u t e s
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Source: Indian labour Yearbook, Indian Labour Statistics, Indian labour Journal, labour Bureau, various
years.
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T a b l e  A l - 4  P e r c e n t a g e  s h a r e  o f  l o c k o u t s  i n  t o t a l  l a b o u r
D I S P U T E S
Number of 
occurrences
1967-69
Number
of
workers
involved
Number
of
workdays
lost
Number of 
occurrences
1986-88
Number
of
workers
involved
Number
of
workdays
lost
Andhra
Pradesh 5.6 8.3 14.8 24.0 12.6 9.3
Bihar 7.3 2.6 6.5 20.9 6.5 64.9
Gujarat 1.7 3.4 6.5 13.4 21.4 39.4
Karnataka 8.0 32.4 42.8 18.4 18.3 51.9
Kerala 6.9 2.7 6.8 25.5 10.9 17.8
Maharashtra 4.1 3.3 15.1 33.8 27.3 67.3
Tamil Nadu 22.8 14.8 43.8 11.7 7.8 24.8
Uttar Pradesh 11.0 17.7 54.4 17.4 12.2 43.1
West Bengal 36.6 17.2 43.6 75.1 32.3 85.6
India 12.0 9.9 30.5 24.4 15.8 55.6
T a b l e  A l - 4  ( c o n t .)
Number of 
occurrences
1993-95
Number
of
workers
involved
Number
of
workdays
lost
Number of 
occurrences
1996-98
Number
of
workers
involved
Number
of
workdays
lost
Andhra
Pradesh 57.2 63.4 71.7 65.0 62.6 64.6
Bihar 53.4 10.3 77.5 30.8 11.7 35.3
Gujarat 10.1 10.1 50.7 13.8 7.6 23.9
Karnataka 42.3 23.7 49.7 25.2 3.1 29.9
Kerala 43.6 21.2 61.9 37.8 11.7 66. 3
Maharashtra 26.0 28.6 69.0 33.1 21.7 68.0
Tamil Nadu 13.5 14.8 21. 9 15.5 13.4 31.2
Uttar Pradesh 39.2 33.1 68.0 53.3 52.6 74.9
West Bengal 83.8 15.2 95.3 81.0 46.5 85.4
India 33.0 29.0 68.8 37.8 36.2 60.4
Source: Sundar (2004) p.4381.
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F i g u r e  A l - 5  I n d i a : N u m b e r  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s
60000
no. of reg istered  trad e  unions
50000
no. of unions submitting re tu rns40000
30000
20000
10000
in or-'- ro cn05 CNinO)
oom inoo
05
oo
CO
05
05
CNOO
05
05
05
Source: Indian Labour Yearbook, Indian labour Statistics, Indian labour Journal, labour Bureau, various
years.
F i g u r e  A l - 6  I n d i a : U n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
’M em bership of unions submitting returns (in 
thousand): Total
M em bership of unions submitting returns (in 
thousand): Male
T - c o t o r ^ O ) * - o o m h - a > * - c o i n r s^ o > T - o o i n r ^ o > ' « - o o i r >
i n m i O l f ) i f i 0 ( D ( O ( O ( D N S N N N O O C O C O C O C O O ) a ) O )
Note: Figure in ‘000s.
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years.
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C h a p t e r  2
TH EORIES OF COLLECTIVE BA RG AINING AND LABOUR 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS
2.1 Towards an analytical framework of LMIs in developing countries
This chapter aims to develop a methodological and theoretical approach for 
analysing the institutions o f collective bargaining in developing countries, by 
reviewing the main theoretical literature in economics and critically assessing 
them. The purpose is not to produce a comprehensive literature survey of 
economic models of labour market institutions (LMIs), but to critically evaluate 
the strengths and limitations of each model and highlight issues that our analytical 
framework would address, particularly in the context o f analysing LMIs in 
developing countries. At the same time, these theories and models are a result of 
scholarly attempts to analyse the labour-management relations of particular 
countries or industries, and thus are manifestations of real historical experiences 
of different ways in which LMIs are involved in controlling and managing the 
labour process.
Economic models highlight possible types o f LMIs associated with specific 
effects on productivity growth and economic efficiency. However, we point out 
that conventional models undervalue the social and economic conditions within 
which LMIs operate, mirroring the assumption in new institutional economics 
(NIE) that higher level institutions and organisations, even ultimately the social 
structure, can be attributed to micro-level behavioural models, whereby the 
persistence of failed institutions is explained by the cognitive limitations of 
economic agents. We argue that this lack of emphasis on social and political 
structure is problematic, especially in applying the models to LMIs in developing 
countries such as India, where the ‘organised’ or ‘regulated’ industrial capitalist
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sector is still relatively small and underdeveloped; bargaining agents’ 
opportunities, incentives and constraints are subject to the pattern of 
distributional conflicts at the macro political economy; and the scope for 
productivity growth is typically not high enough compared to the payoff gained 
from rent-seeking over public resources. This leads to our proposition in favour 
of an alternative political economic approach, whereby the existing types of LMIs 
are explained within a more holistic framework of economic, social and political 
determinants.
2.1.1 Efficiency implications of LMIs
The economic analysis of LMIs is concerned with its various economic effects. 
There is the principal effect on allocation of resources through the bargaining 
process in the presence o f LMIs. For example, wage increases associated with 
unionisation and collective bargaining, known as the union-wage premium, has a 
similar effect to taxation in that it imposes higher labour costs in the unionised 
sector compared to the non-unionised sector and thus leads to factor market 
distortion and allocative inefficiency (Johnson and Mieszkowski 1970; DeFina 
1983). Successful wage increase in the unionised sector leads to a decline of 
demand for labour in that sector, which results in displacement of labour from 
the unionised to the non-unionised sectors. In theory the social welfare loss arises 
from workers being employed where their marginal productivity is lower than 
before (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993: 327).
In addition there is also the secondary effect of LMIs on rent-seeking and 
transaction costs, which ranges from ‘over-manning’ and creation o f complex 
work rules in order to protect jobs or resist technological change, an act known as 
‘featherbedding’ in the US labour relations literature, to corrupt transactions to 
political administrators, which are resources spent by bargaining agents in 
competing over a larger share of resources.
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Thirdly, LMIs such as trade unions can potentially play a role beyond its ‘narrow’ 
economic effect on resource allocation and output, and contest the social and 
political structure. Apart from the social and ideological influences such a role 
may have, this could also in turn have economic effects by increasing the 
instability of existing property rights and the institutional structure of society. 
However such ‘corrosive’ effects of LMIs is difficult to predict, and therefore 
most economic literature focuses on the above two ‘allocative’ effects o f 
institutions (Khan 1996: 14).
Traditionally the debate on LMIs in economics has been between what Richard 
Freeman (1988; 1993) famously labelled the ‘distortionist’ and ‘institutionalist’ 
perspectives. The ‘distortionist’ position is associated with economists such as 
Agarwala (1983), Fallon and Lucas (1991), Joshi and Little (1994), and Pencavel
(1995), who were instrumental in the policy research at the World Bank up to the 
1990s. According to the distortionists, trade unionism and labour legislation is 
typically harmful for allocative efficiency and growth by increasing labour costs 
and lowering labour demand, as well as increasing rent-seeking and transaction 
costs. In the context of Indian industrial labour, much of the recent debates on 
‘jobless growth’ and labour law reforms have predominantly taken place within 
this traditional distortionist position.
In contrast, the alternative position categorised as the ‘institutionalists’ is 
associated with writers such as Freeman and Medoff (1984), Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988), Nelson (1991) and Standing (1992), many of whom are associated with 
the policy research at the International Labour Organization (ILO). The main 
argument of the institutionalists is that trade unionism and state regulation can 
create conditions for economic development and efficiency. For example, trade 
unions can act as a channel o f information by collecting information about 
employees’ preferences and use it for negotiation with the employers (Freeman
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and Medoff 1984). If  employers can act on this information, unnecessary 
turnover or replacement can be reduced. Also unions can contribute in 
monitoring and maintaining ‘effort levels’ or the amount o f labour power 
provided, by collectively agreeing on work norms and implementing them. LMIs 
can also have ‘dynamic effects’ (Standing 1992) on efficiency and growth. Unions 
can help establish long-term cooperative relations on which human capital 
development and efficiency enhancing measures can be instigated. The effect of 
imposing higher than market clearing wages can force capital investment and can 
potentially have a positive impact. This was the explanation put forward in the 
Vroduktivitatspeitsche (‘productivity whip’) debate in Germany or the Rehn-Meidner 
model in Sweden, whereby firms are forced to adopt new technology and 
improve efficiency in order to reduce costs (Calmfors et al. 2001: 68).
While these two positions represent two opposing camps in the debate on the 
efficiency effects of LMIs, in fact they are merely highlighting two aspects or 
‘faces’ of institutional interventions. The distortionist perspective emphasises the 
cost incurred by the firm and society by the presence o f LMIs, while the 
institutionalist view focuses on the potential benefits from it. But for the 
economy as a whole, the issue is its net efficiency effect, that is, whether the 
allocation o f resources and output subsequent to the bargaining through LMIs 
signals higher productivity and efficiency compared to the initial ones, or to put it 
differently, whether the efficiency and welfare-improving aspects of LMIs 
exceeds its social costs. For example, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002: 37) define the 
net benefit o f unionism as “participatory and dispute resolution benefits minus 
the sum of monopoly and rent-seeking costs”.
Empirical studies suggest that the generalised conclusion on this net efficiency 
effect is difficult to arrive at. O n the social costs o f LMIs, a large number of 
studies have focused on estimating the wage mark-up from unionisation, or
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union-wage premium, typically by comparing the coefficients in wage functions 
for unionised and non-unionised workers. Much of this literature is on advanced 
industrialised economies, particularly the US and the UK. For example, 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2002) estimates the wage differential between the 
unionised and non-unionised sectors in US industries as 18 per cent and in the 
UK as 10 per cent, while for an average o f 17 countries (Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and 
Spain) the wage mark-up is estimated to be 12 per cent. The evidence for 
unionisation wage premium for developing countries is mixed. O n the one hand, 
countries such as Malaysia appears to have higher wage premia ranging from 15 
to 20 per cent (Standing 1992), Panagidas and Patrinos (1994) estimate the overall 
union-nonunion wage gap as 10.4 per cent, and similarly Butcher and Rouse 
(2000) finds a union-wage premium of around 20 per cent for African workers 
and 10 per cent for white workers in South Africa. But there is also evidence of 
lower wage differentials than in advanced industrial economies, for instance a 
mark-up of less than 4 per cent in 1988 in South Korean manufacturing sector. 
India is generally thought to belong to the first group of developing countries 
with high union wage premia, as suggested in Madheswaran and Shanmugam 
(2003), which provides an estimate of the wage differentials between unionised 
and non-unionised workers, controlling for occupations, education, experience, 
marital status etc., to be around 42-47 percent using data for blue collar male 
workers employed in the manufacturing industry in Chennai (Madras). A number 
of studies also offer estimates o f the social cost of the union-wage premium by 
measuring the dead weight welfare loss, which suggests that in advanced capitalist 
economies such as the US, the allocative consequences of the union-wage 
premium tend to be small. Empirical studies in the US based on general 
equilibrium models suggest that the output loss associated with unionisation is as 
low as 0.1 to 0.4 per cent of the GD P (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 110). While all
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such estimates must be interpreted with caution given the limitation of data, the 
difficulty o f controlling for all other factors other than unionisation in the wage 
function, and self-selection problems (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993), it is 
interesting that the extent of ‘wage distortion’ due to unionisation does not 
necessarily seem to be correlated with the efficiency or growth performances of 
the economy. This implies that we cannot evaluate the efficiency and growth 
implications of LMIs by the scale and extent of its monopoly and rent-seeking 
costs alone.
On the other hand, empirical studies on other effects o f LMIs on efficiency and 
growth are even more complex to summarise. Freeman and Medoff famously 
estimated that the effort o f unionisation leading to lower turnover is “equivalent 
to a 1 percent to 2 percent reduction of cost” and that this corresponds to 0.2 to 
0.3 per cent of GNP in the US, which is “of comparable magnitude to the social 
cost of unionism” (op. cits. 109-110). However the overall effect o f LMIs on 
productivity is difficult to generalise (Booth 1995; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002; 
Metcalf 2002; Hirsch 2003). Studies on the US and the UK suggest that the 
differential levels and growth o f productivity between unionised and non- 
unionised firms may be “positive, negative, or insignificant, depending on the 
particular industry” (Booth 1995: 199). Similarly in studies on Japanese firms, 
Muramatsu (1984), Bruno (1992), and Noda (1997; 2007) find differential 
productivity effects depending on types of firms and model specifications. In a 
study on Malaysian unions, Standing (1992) finds positive impact on productivity 
levels associated with the dynamic efficiency effects o f unionism. Again, keeping 
in mind that these empirical estimates are subject to various empirical issues, 
including doubts over the validity o f the production function approach, on which 
many of these analyses are based, we may at least suggest that there appears to be 
greater variations in the effects of LMIs on differentials and growth of 
productivity.
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A glance at the conventional distortionist-institutionalist debate indicates that 
there is no simplistic way in which we might make inferences about the 
monopoly and rent-seeking costs or the types of efficiency and growth enhancing 
effects, without reference to more specific conditions. Yet we may observe that 
some types of rent and rent-seeking clearly signals inefficient resource allocation 
and barriers to growth, while others might be a reflection o f dynamic efficiency in 
the economy. In other words, we need to explore how different types o f rent and 
rent-seeking may be associated with differential implications on productivity.
2.1.2 Rents, bargaining agents and social structure
Economic analysis of labour market institutions (LMIs) such as trade unions and 
collective bargaining focuses on the economic rent sought. This is because “for a 
union to be able to increase workers’ remuneration there must exist some 
economic rent or surplus that is available for sharing” (Booth 1995: 259), or from 
a political economic perspective, to force capitalist to reduce the rate o f surplus 
extraction. There has been competing definitions of economic rent or in 
economics1. Neoclassical economics define economic rent, or cquasi-rent’ if we 
borrow the term from Marshall (1969), as the payment to the factor of 
production in ‘excess’ or above its opportunity cost or transfer earnings (Gravelle 
and Rees 1992: 272-3). Opportunity cost or transfer earning is the amount that 
could be produced if the production factor is used in the next best opportunity.
1 While the neoclassical definition o f  rent is associated with the classical theory o f  agricultural rent, it is also a 
departure in several respects. M ost apparently, the concept is no longer limited to agriculture. The 
implication o f  this is that categories such as wages, profits, and rents are treated as equivalent, with obvious 
ideological content (Fine 1982). This also reflects the failure o f  neoclassical economics to explain the non­
temporary existence o f  surplus profits. Khan (2000a) points out that under the standard neoclassical 
assumptions o f  perfectly competitive markets in long-run equilibrium and homogenous production 
function, all factor payments equal to their opportunity cost, and thus there is no rent and the rate o f  profit 
is zero. A temporary existence o f  profit and rent is explained by the firm being in a position o f  monopoly 
or monopsony, by dynamic economic changes (as in Joseph A. Schumpeter), or by the premium earned 
through managing risks (as in F. H. Knight). Hence the profit has a rent-like characteristic in the 
neoclassical theory.
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In other words, the rent is defined as the amount necessary to keep the factor in 
the current employment status. For classical political economists, such as Ricardo
(1996) and Marx (2000), the term rent was used to refer to the landowner’s 
income from the appropriation of surplus profit created from application of 
capital to lands with different productivity.
In this thesis we will use the term rent to refer to income and income stream 
generated through or influenced by bargaining, or to put differently, income 
stream generated by making, changing, or destroying property rights that would 
not have existed if those changes in property rights did not take place. The 
income stream is again broadly defined, which includes not only wages but also 
other non-wage payoffs obtained from employment relations, inter alia, 
employment, security and fringe benefits. Bargaining influences income in this 
case by changing the access to resources. Our working definition of rent enables 
us to analyse diverse types of rents in existing economic models, and more 
importantly, focus our analysis on how bargaining influences creation and 
allocation o f different types of income and income streams.2
2 While our broad definition o f  rent serves our purpose in terms o f  analysing different types o f income 
streams and its implication to the opportunity, incentives, and constraints bargaining agents face in 
industrial relations, it is recognised that our definition does not address the problems highlighted in the 
debates on the theory o f  rents. Like the neoclassical definition, we are using the term rent or ‘quasi-rent’ in 
the sense that the effects o f  state intervention or monopoly represents obstacles to the pure mechanism o f  
competition and capital accumulation, just as agricultural rent arises from the ability o f  landowners to 
intercept the surplus profits generated from the application o f  capital to lands with different productivity 
(Fine 1982; 84). In this sense, our definition also fails to distinguish rent from surplus profits or wages, 
which is problematic because it confuses distinctively different economic processes and treats different 
money forms o f  surplus value as economically equivalent. At the same time, as we have pointed out, in 
developing countries where the capitalist sector is not necessarily dominant in its economy and where 
property rights are not well established, distinguishing rent from surplus profit can be difficult. Also 
income received in a form o f  transfer (in our terminology outside-firm rents) may have implications on the 
size and share o f  surplus generated through production (within-firm rents), which further blur the 
boundary between these categories.
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The broad definition of rent employed here is also relevant for our purpose of 
analysing the bargaining process in developing countries such as India, where 
factor markets are underdeveloped, and therefore the opportunity cost o f a factor 
is difficult to pin down, where property rights are unstable, capital does not 
necessarily have monopoly over the means o f production, and the division of 
factor compensation cannot be easily evaluated, and further where the payment 
to keep the factor in production may take diverse forms, which cannot necessarily 
be reduced to wages or monetary income.
Within- and outside-firm rents
Rents discussed in the context o f collective bargaining can be broadly categorised 
from their income streams into two types, which we shall call within- and 
outside-firm rents.
Within-firm rents’ are rents directly generated as a result of a firm’s production 
activities. More specifically it is the share of above normal returns that exists 
because o f the market power of firms; the ‘monopoly’ rent in modem economics 
literature. Note that the existence of monopoly rent does not necessarily mean 
that the firm has a monopoly. A firm can have market power to earn above 
normal returns due to (‘artificial’ or ‘natural’) barriers to entry and sunk costs. 
Under these conditions ‘within-firm rents’ can be targeted by unions without the 
firm going out of business.
In contrast, our second category o f rents, the ‘outside-firm rents’ are a share of 
politically created incomes that are not directly generated by the production 
activities of the firm or negotiated by bargaining within the firm. Rather they are 
targeted by bargaining agents’ lobbying activities to state officials and politicians. 
‘Outside-firm rents’ can be of two types. The first is various forms of transfer 
made from within the political mechanism through taxes, loans and direct
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subsidies, the share o f which may be negotiated by bargaining agents. For 
example subsidies to sustain an industry and keep workers employed can be 
considered a type o f rent or rent-like income (Khan, 2000a). Note that the 
‘outside-firm rents’ in the form of transfer cannot be considered in isolation to 
the ‘within-firm rents’, because the subsidy or tax benefits may be necessary for 
the firm to stay in production in the short run, and more importantly to act as 
critical incentive for the firm to invest in new technology and improve its 
productivity in the long run. The second type of outside-firm rent is the change in 
labour laws, regulations or regulatory frameworks that give bargaining agents 
access to resources. This second type of outside-firm rent also overlaps with 
within-firm rent because it does not work unless the firm has market power that 
justify surplus, that is, even if the regulatory framework is changed in favour of 
the particular bargaining agents, this only translates into extra earning for the 
agents if the surplus to share exists and if that can be appropriated.
Our categorisation o f within- and outside-firm rents avoids the misleading 
dichotomy between company-based ‘economic rent’ and ‘political rent’ in 
conventional rent-seeking literature. From a political economic perspective, what 
we call within- or outside-firm rents are both part of the (total) surplus value, 
over the distribution of which labour and capital struggle, which is at once both 
an ‘economic’ and ‘political’ process.
However, it is not our intention to suggest that ‘within’ and ‘outside’ firm rents 
are essential categories that characterise a particular macro political economy. 
From our political economic approach, these differential types of rents are 
reflections of particular patterns o f economic development or accumulation, as 
opposed to be ‘chosen’ by bargaining agents at the micro-level, as we shall 
elaborate below. However the categories of ‘within’ and ‘outside’ firm rents are 
useful to the extent that they provide us with a framework to critically evaluate
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the differential types of rents assumed in the conventional literature on LMIs. In 
our literature survey in Section 2, we shall argue that different models o f LMIs in 
economics implicitly assume specific types of rents which reflect particular 
processes of accumulation in the society in question. We also point out that 
within-firm rent-seeking is often associated with ‘economic’ processes, while 
outside-firm rent-seeking is typically representing political or extra-economic 
processes. We argue that this dichotomy of the economic and the political is 
problematic, especially in applying these models to developing countries such as 
India, where almost all economic activities involves some form of extra-economic 
interventions. In our view, identifying outside-firm rents as the cause for rent- 
seeking and politicisation would be simplistic and tautological. Also, calling for 
micro-level governance reforms in LMIs, such as improving democratic 
accountability and transparency o f unions, fails to address the social and political 
structures within which LMIs are embedded, as we discussed in the context of 
India’s labour market reforms in Chapter 1.
Internal and external bargaining agents
Different types of rent-seeking can also be categorised in terms o f the bargaining 
agents involved. By definition, bargaining in LMIs involves bargaining agents 
internal to the firm, which typically consists o f incumbent employees and the 
employer. In conventional economic analysis of labour-management bargaining, 
such as the neoclassical labour market models and insider-outsider models, which 
we shall discuss in the next section, it is assumed that trade unions represent the 
interest of incumbent employees alone, who seek to increase their share o f 
‘within-firm rents’ in the form of higher wage and secure employment, while the 
employer tries to maximise the firm’s profit (Cartter 1959; McDonald and Solow 
1981; Oswald 1982; Lindbeck and Snower 1988).
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In reality, collective bargaining in LMIs may also involve agents who are external 
to the firm. These external agents may be state officials and bureaucrats, 
politicians and political entrepreneurs of different types who not only can 
significantly influence the process and outcome of collective bargaining, but also 
may actively take part in the bargaining process. One o f the reasons why external 
agents may play a role in the bargaining process is because the institutional 
framework of collective bargaining may be altered by labour policies and laws 
(Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen 1994). For example, labour laws may 
stipulate whether disputes are resolved through bi-partite collective bargaining or 
through state intervention, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, which may 
influence the incentives and opportunities for bargaining agents. Labour laws may 
also constrain the choices available to bargaining agents and thus influence their 
relative bargaining power. An example o f this is the amendment of Chapter VB 
in the Industrial Dispute Act (IDA) o f 1947 in India, which stipulated that firms 
employing more than 300 workers have to obtain permission from the 
government in order to layoff or retrench workers or close down establishments, 
although whether the law is effectively enforced is debatable as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (Mathur 1991; Singh 1995; Jenkins 1999; Bardhan 2002). Outside 
influence over collective bargaining might also take the form of direct state 
intervention in wage determination, as in the Pay Commission model in India, or 
participation by the state as one o f the bargaining agents in the form of tn-partite 
collective bargaining (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bhattacherjee 1999).
External agents might also become involved in collective bargaining as ‘outside’ 
trade union leaders, who do not come through the rank-and-file of the firm. 
These ‘outside’ leaders may be lawyers or professional administrators with 
specific skills to run the union effectively, politicians and party-affiliated activists 
with an interest in cultivating patron-client relations with workers, social and 
political entrepreneurs who may mobilise factions organised under caste, religious,
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linguistic or regional identities, or in some cases all o f above (Matthur and 
Matthur 1957; Vaid 1962; Fonseca 1964; Ramaswamy 1977; Kamik 1978; Acharji 
1980; Singh 1980; Sinha 1984; Mashihi 1985). Other actors in the wider social 
context, such as jobbers (sardar), freelance recruiters (daffadars), village-level 
recruiters {arkatis), and neighbourhood headmen (<dada), just to name a few of the 
more common euphemisms that frequendy appear in the Indian context, are also 
important external agents in LMIs in India, as we have discussed in Chapter 1 
(Morris 1955: 294-5; Van Wersch 1992; Robb 1993: 19; Chandavarkar 1994; de 
Haan 1993; 1999; Sen 1999). These social actors can affect the labour process by 
controlling specific group of workers through their network o f patron-dient 
relations, and regulate in part the extent o f surplus extraction.
Trade unionism led by political entrepreneurs, who not only are external to the 
firm, but also come from different social background to the workers, has invited 
frequent criticism in the literature that trade unions in India exploits the 
organisation power of workers for personal and political ends, as we have 
discussed in Chapter 1. O f course, the presence of outside trade union leaders 
does not necessarily signal that the bargaining agenda set by the unions is 
divorced from the interest of the rank-and-file workers. It is possible that the 
interests of external bargaining agents overlap with that of the internal agents, and 
especially where the incumbent employees can exercise sufficient bargaining 
power, it is also possible that internal agents may influence or constrain the 
strategy of external agents. In general, however, external bargaining agents may 
have interests and motivation o f their own in the intervention. The state and 
political parties may intervene in LMIs in order to guide and control the process 
of collective bargaining, and possibly to achieve greater social and economic 
development, which may or may not conflict with the interest o f internal 
bargaining agents (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bhattacherjee 1999). Political 
entrepreneurs and ‘outside’ trade union leaders may seek personal gains and self­
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promotion, for instance in the form of wage and non-wage payments, fringe 
benefits and access to political offices (Mathur and Mathur 1957; Vaid 1962; 
Fonseca 1967). They may also take interest in labour-management relations to 
strengthen the influence of their factional groups, which may be based on 
working class mobilisation, but may be organised under various other communal 
and cultural identities (Karnik 1978; Mashihi 1985).
The ways in which external agents are involved in bargaining have implications 
for the types of rents in LMIs discussed above. We may observe that collective 
bargaining is mainly over within-firm rents when the involvement o f external 
bargaining agents is limited to seeking changes in labour policies and laws that 
stipulate the institutional framework o f collective bargaining. Similarly we may 
observe external agents more actively involved in LMIs in order to engineer 
resource transfers in the economy when the dominant income stream of 
bargaining agents may take the form of outside-firm rents, for example in the 
shape o f subsidies and tax exemption to the firm. Outside-firm rents may also 
play a prominent role in collective bargaining when the external bargaining agents 
are political entrepreneurs engaged in rent-seeking over resources at the level of 
the macro political economy.
This last category of rent-seeking is particularly important in developing countries 
such as India where there is instability in property rights and the majority o f 
resource transfer takes place through political processes outside the market (Khan 
1996; Harriss-White 2003). As a result distributional conflicts over resources in 
the wider macro political economy impact upon the way in which bargaining 
takes place in LMIs. This also implies that where external bargaining agents 
critically influence the process and outcome of collective bargaining, the analysis 
of LMIs requires careful consideration of the social and political structure in 
which the rent-seeking takes place.
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Again it is important to note that it is not our intention to argue that the 
distinction between internal and external bargaining agents is a legitimate general 
category for characterising the macro political economy. The concepts are 
introduced here to highlight differential rent-seeking processes assumed in 
conventional literature on LMIs surveyed in Section 2. On the one hand, 
neoclassical labour market analysis and collective voice models typically focus on 
internal agents alone. On the other hand, some models associate the presence of 
external agents to particular productivity or efficiency effects. For example, rent- 
seeking models tend to lead to a policy suggestion o f removing the influence of 
external agencies to reduce rent-seeking costs and making the bargaining agenda 
reflect the ‘economic’ reality of the firm, while others such as neo-corporatists 
argue that better coordination with external agents lowers wage inflation.
However, in our view, the issue is not whether or not external agents are involved 
in bargaining at all, but how they are involved. More specifically, in developing 
countries such as India, where the ‘organised’ industrial sector is still relatively 
small and institutional and market ‘compulsions’ are weak (Khan 1996; Wood 
2002), economic processes are almost inevitably subjected to social and political 
conditions for the process of economic development and accumulation. The 
objective of our political economic approach is therefore to explain and locate 
bargaining agents of different types involved in LMIs within the context of 
redistributional conflict at the macro political economic level, as we shall 
elaborate in Section 3.
Propositions for a political economic analysis of LMIs
We define ‘structure’ as the set of opportunities, incentives, constraints and 
capacities, which is determined by how political entrepreneurs o f different types 
compete for resources at the level of the macro political economy, and which 
shapes the strategies of micro-level actors. The structure in turn reflects the
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particular process of economic development or accumulation in general, and the 
mode of organising and managing the labour process more specifically. In other 
words, social structure is a summary expression for the whole nexus or system of 
social relations, constituent to the relations of production, but which takes 
different forms under different historical contexts (Marx 1973; Fine 1989). While 
the structure and social relations correspond to particular modes and processes o f 
production, its specific political and legal forms differ socially and historically, in 
often dynamic and contradictory ways. The ‘observed’ relations and institutions 
must therefore be understood within the social and historical context, while being 
aware that such political and juridical forms are constituents of ‘essential’ 
processes underlying them. This definition allows us to analyse how different 
types of organisational and distributional conflicts at the level o f macro political 
economy has implications for the rationales employed by micro bargaining 
agents.
It is beyond the objective of this thesis to present a fully developed political 
economic theory o f LMIs, which would be a subject of future research. The 
objective of the present chapter is to outline some insights from political 
economic theories and discuss their implications, and to contrast the political 
economic framework for the analysis of LMIs to that o f the conventional models, 
by emphasising structural determinations reflected in the way in which extra- 
economic processes and agents intervene in LMIs. Every society has political 
entrepreneurs or social interest groups of different types competing for resources 
by penetrating a wider terrain of accumulation and political conflicts. Where these 
political entrepreneurs exercise external influence to LMIs, this wider process o f 
distributional conflict may constrain, as well as allow for, the choices of local 
bargaining actors such as trade unions and employers.
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Our political economic analysis of LMIs starts from the following insights on the 
capitalist production or labour process. First, labour process refers to the 
qualitative transformation in production of the means of production (objects and 
instruments of work) to an exchangeable product (or creation o f use value) by 
work, or the purposive and productive activity (Braverman 1974). Second, from a 
materialist perspective, the labour process is common to all human societies, but 
the capitalist labour process takes a particular form. The capitalist production 
process is understood as one o f producing surplus value, but unlike the 
neoclassical labour market models, it is not merely a technical relationship 
between inputs and outputs, but rather work is supervised, directed and 
controlled by the capitalist to ensure that the capacity to work is realised (Fine 
1998: 177). Third, however, the capitalist labour process is also determined by 
class struggle not only at the point o f production but also as system of social 
relations, and the capitalist control may not be complete or fully exercised (Wood 
1995; Mohun 1991). Fourth, class relations and class struggles are historical 
relations or ‘phenomena’, in the sense that while the structural basis of class 
relations is found in the antagonistic relations o f production and exploitation, 
how this actually operates and is expressed is to be resolved empirically within 
particular social and historical contexts (Wood 1995; Bensaid 2002).
The implication of these propositions is that the way in which the labour process 
is controlled and managed may differ under different historical conditions. The 
task is to identify a materialist explanation for the relation o f exploitation to take 
the ‘peculiar’ politicised and ‘involuted’ form o f LMIs in India’s historical and 
social contexts, as we have seen in Chapter 1. In developing countries such as 
India, the industrial capital and organised labour are numerically small and less 
established, redistributional conflicts at the macro political economy are
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dominated by patron-client networks3 organised by intermediate classes (Raj 
1973; Jha 1980; Khan 1998; 2005b; McCarthey and Harris-White 2000), and also 
the labour processes are managed or under significant influence of, sometimes 
even directly controlled by, external social and political agents.
As we shall discuss below, conventional models o f collective bargaining fail to 
make the social and political structure explicit. If  social structures are not merely 
an aggregation of micro agents, but in fact decision making by micro agents is 
almost always subject to the macro political economic structure, many of the 
efficiency implications drawn from these conventional models cannot be 
generalised without a careful examination o f the social context in which collective 
bargaining takes place. The purpose of the present thesis is not only to make the 
assumptions regarding political and social structure explicit, but refine political 
modelling in the sense of analysing the effect of different types o f macro political 
conflict in shaping the opportunities, incentives, and constraints of micro 
bargaining agents, while also taking into account the bargaining power o f various 
social actors.
2.2 Conventional models of collective bargaining
In the following sections, we will critically assess the conventional models of 
labour market institutions (LMIs) which appear to correspond to the ‘stylised
3 It is at this point important for us to reiterate the point made in Chapter 1 and clarify that the use o f  the 
terms such as patron-client networks or rents and rent-seeking does not mean that we are adopting the 
neo-Weberian analysis o f  neo-patrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Erdmann and Engel 2006; 
2007). Our intention is precisely the opposite. A  political economic analysis needs to engage with concepts 
such as patron-client relations and network, which are real and dominate political conflicts in developing 
countries, but offer materialist explanation o f  them as particular forms o f  capitalist exploitation. In other 
words, we must problematise why it is that political organisation is formed along personalised patron-client 
relations, rather than class lines. Although a fully developed political economic analysis o f  patron-client 
politics is beyond the scope o f  this thesis, we can point to the emerging literature on this subject as in 
Khan (2005b). Also in Chapter 1, we discussed that the colonial arrangements was a significant factor in 
the emergence o f  patron-client politics in India.
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image’ of trade unions and labour laws in the current policy debates, as discussed 
in Chapter 1. Rather than to provide an exhaustive literature review, here the 
objective is to use the literature survey as a way of developing our political 
economic approach through critical and constructive engagement with the 
mainstream models. We argue that, while various insights can be drawn from 
different models, the existing approach to the analysis of LMIs in mainstream 
economics underestimate structural factors, and as a result cannot explain why 
certain types o f LMIs that is apparendy inefficient and productivity-reducing 
persist. In contrast, our political economic approach treats the existing types of 
LMIs as reflection of, and constituent to, the social structure and relations, which 
are in turn systematic consequences of the particular patterns of accumulation 
and economic development.
As discussed already, it is difficult to draw up simplistic efficiency or growth 
implications of rents and rent-seeking without reference to the context in which 
such activities take place. Nonetheless conventional models of collective 
bargaining and LMIs can be grouped into 4 types depending on the differential 
efficiency and growth effects of the two types of bargaining agents involved in 
rent-seeking, as summarised in table 2-1.
T a b l e  2 - 1  F o u r  t y p e s  o f  e x i s t i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p r a o c h e s
T O  C O L L E C T I V E  B A R G A I N I N G
Efficiency implications o f labour- 
management relations
Negative Potentially positive
Bargaining 
agents 
considered in 
the model
Internal bargaining 
agents
Neoclassical
labour-market
models
(section 2.1)
Collective-voice
models
(section 2.3)
Internal and 
external bargaining 
agents
Rent-seeking
models
(section 2.2)
Hump-shaped
models
(section 2.4)
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Traditionally, conventional economic models of labour markets have tended to 
portray the existence o f ‘rents’ and rent-seeking as necessarily harmful to 
economic efficiency. For example in Section 2.1 of this chapter, we will discuss 
the neoclassical analysis of labour markets in which it is assumed that the labour 
markets function perfectly, in the sense that there is perfect factor mobility and 
that labour demand and supply are elastic to price and technological changes. The 
implication of such an assumption is that labour is employed and maintained at 
no additional cost beyond paying wages as the opportunity costs for hiring labour, 
production or labour processes are managed without non-market interventions, 
and no coordination over bargaining is necessary. All that is required for 
production to take place is for the owners or producers of production factors to 
receive their opportunity costs, and therefore any excess payment above this 
amount signals inefficiency. Here, collective bargaining is modelled as a process 
of wage-employment determination between two internal agents, the firm or 
employer on one hand, and the union or workers on the other.
The existence of rents may also motivate unions and employers to engage in 
activities beyond the choice of wages and employment levels assumed under the 
neoclassical labour market models involving internal and external agents, for 
example in lobbying or bribing state officials to influence the institutional 
framework o f collective bargaining in order to further create, maintain and 
redistribute these rents. These rent-seeking activities and the associated resource 
transfers typically take place outside the firm involving state officials and other 
external political actors, even if  the bargaining outcome may influence the size 
and allocation of the surplus at the firm level. With such additional activities that 
‘waste’ resources, the social costs due to collective bargaining can be greater than 
suggested in the neoclassical labour market models. We shall discuss some of 
these models in Section 2.2.
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While the first two groups of literatures tended to focus on the negative efficiency 
impact of collective bargaining, and therefore broadly reflecting the traditional 
‘distortionist’ perspective, the collective voice models discussed in Section 2.3 and 
the hump-shaped models covered in Section 2.4 highlight the potentially positive 
aspects of collective bargaining in enhancing productivity and efficiency, and 
hence represents the ‘institutionalist’ perspective. In recent years the two sets of 
literature seem to have almost blended into one synthesis as described in Boeri, 
Brugiavini and Calmfors (2001) and Aidt and Tzanattos (2002). We have 
nonetheless divided them into two groups for two reasons. The first is the 
difference in their intellectual roots, in which the focus of collective-voice models 
is primarily on micro level analysis with emphasis on information asymmetry 
between internal bargaining agents, workers and employers, whereas the hump­
shaped models emerged from the debate on macroeconomic issues, such as the 
role of trade unions in causing wage inflation and unemployment, thereby 
focusing on coordination with extra-firm agents. Second, the consequence of this 
difference in their initial focus meant that the mechanism through which LMIs 
can improve efficiency is different. Collective-voice models emphasise the role of 
union’s ‘voice’ in reducing information asymmetry or transaction cost, whereas 
the hump-shaped models focus on conditions under which unions can create 
pressure on firms to improve technology and production organisation, without 
causing excessive wage inflation. Nonetheless, both collective voice models and 
the neo-corporatist theories recognise that rent outcome can be very diverse and 
attempts to identify conditions under which collective bargaining can lead to 
efficiency improving industrial relations.
2.2.1 Neoclassical labour market models
Most of the existing modem economic literatures on trade unions and collective 
bargaining have focused almost exclusively on within-firm rents. For example, in 
standard neo-classical labour market models, economic rent exists because of
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some form of imperfection either in the product market or the labour market4. 
Product or labour market imperfection may stem from ‘natural’ monopoly or 
‘artificial’ government interventions, the former typically referring to economies 
of scale in production in the absence of interventions, such as artificial entry 
barriers. The definition of natural and artificial rents is, however, ambiguous, 
once we take into account the fact that ‘natural’ rent also depends on various 
institutional frameworks, especially property rights, which is artificially created. 
Nonetheless, whether it pre-exists naturally or is artificially created politically, the 
social effect of rent-seeking by unions is similar. Wage rates and employment 
levels determined by collective bargaining are inefficient compared to the 
‘market-clearing’ level, but the extent of allocative inefficiency is relatively small. 
This can be demonstrated by following a simple neo-classical labour market 
analysis.
Dunlop (1944: 4) famously argued that an “economic theory o f a trade union 
requires that the organisation be assumed to maximise (or minimise) something”.5 
In the case of conventional neo-classical labour market models, it is the 
maximisation of the share of profit or surplus, which are what we called ‘within- 
firm rents’, that drives the collective bargaining process. O f course, even in 
advanced industrialised countries, this is a gross simplification of the activities of 
bargaining agents such as trade unions. Most economists recognise that trade 
unions and other agents in collective bargaining often act from objectives not 
purely limited to maximising income and the utility o f their constituents. Indeed
4 TautologicaUy it is sometimes the introduction o f  labour union itself and its associated organizational change
that considered as the cause o f market imperfection! (for example, Booth 1995: 260).
5 This statement explicates the conventional economics approach to collective bargaining as driven by agents’
desire to maximise income or utility. It is not difficult to imagine such a simplified behaviour model o f  
trade unionism to be unpopular amongst political scientists and sociologists such as Ross (1948), who have 
analysed union policies as being formed through internal (by various factions within unions and within 
labour movement) and external (by employers, the state etc.) political processes, as opposed to assuming 
that there exists a simple utility maximising process.
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we will see some examples of such models in the following sections of this 
chapter.
In one o f the earliest neo-classical models to describe wage formation under trade 
unionism, Cartter (1959) applies the analogy of bilateral monopoly, where the 
employer is the monopoly purchaser of labour and the union is the monopoly 
seller (or agent) of labour. The diagrammatical presentation o f wage 
determination under the bilateral model is shown in figure 2-1.
F i g u r e  2 - 1  W a g e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  u n d e r  b i l a t e r a l  m o n o p o l y
MLC
MR
Quantity of labour
Source: Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), p.286.
Under perfect competition, the firm will seek the equilibrium wage rate We and 
employment level Qe by equating the short-run labour demand curve (Lf) and 
labour supply curve (Ls). The negatively sloped labour demand curve is based on 
the standard microeconomic assumption of diminishing return to labour in 
production functions. The labour supply curve is upward sloping, again reflecting
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the standard microeconomic assumption that more labour is supplied as the real 
wage increases6. Point E  is the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the labour 
market, which is clearly where the labour demand and supply balances. According 
to neoclassical labour market analysis, it is also the point at which the economy is 
at the most efficient resource allocation.
To see this, let us compare the perfectly competitive labour market equilibrium 
with two extreme cases of market imperfection: the case where the employers is a 
monopsonist in labour demand; and the case where the union who represents 
workers act as a monopoly in labour supply.
In traditional neo-classical analysis the monopsonist employer faces an upward 
sloping marginal labour cost curve (MLC). This curve indicates how much the 
employer needs to offer in addition, in terms o f the wage rate, in order to attract 
additional units of labour. The employer’s profit maximisation problem entails 
equating marginal labour costs to the marginal revenue product (MRP), which is 
the addition to the total revenue generated by the additional employment. So the 
employer sets the wage rate at Wm. and this results in the employment o f Qm due 
to the labour supply curve. Similarly, the union as a monopoly provider o f labour 
services seeks to equate the marginal revenue (MR), which is the total earnings o f 
members by providing the service, and their supply price which is shown as the 
labour supply curve (Ls). The union aims to achieve the wage rate o f Wu which 
leads to the employment o f Qu under the given labour demand curve. In the 
extreme case that the union successfully negotiates this target wage rate, the
6 To be precise, there are two ways in which labour supply can respond to real wage increase. The first, 
normally called the substitution effect, suggests that an increase in the real wage increases the relative 
return on working and this makes people want to work more. The second effect is the income effect, 
whereby increase in the real wage raises workers’ real income, which increases the quantity o f  leisure 
demand (because it is a luxury goods) and hence makes people work less. Here it is assumed that the 
substitution effect exceeds the income effects, which is depicted in the upward sloping Ls curve.
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additional wage increase associated with unionisation, measured by the difference 
between We and Wu, is called the union wage premium.
From the point of view of allocative efficiency the equilibrium point (Qe, We) is
better than either the manager’s desired solution (Qm, Wm ) or the union’s desired
solution (Qu,Wu)- This is because, at Wm there are still workers who are willing
to supply their labour service under the given wage rate, and similarly, at Wu 
employers are willing to hire more labour under the going rate.
F i g u r e  2 - 2  R e n t  a n d  w e l f a r e  l o s s  i n  t h e  b i l a t e r a l
M O N O P O L Y  M O D E L
Employer’s
surplus Deadweight 
welfare loss
Rent
Source: Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), p.286.
Figure 2-2 considers the case where the wage sought by the union is set and 
describes its efficiency implications. The area enclosed by the labour demand and 
supply curves, which indicates the net social surplus, is divided into employer’s
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surplus and union’s (workers’) surplus under the competitive wage level. Under 
the monopoly union wage, the surplus is now divided into employer’s surplus 
(FDWPj, union’s surplus (OBCA) and the rent (BCDWU). The triangle area to the 
right of rent CDE indicates the deadweight welfare loss due to the monopoly 
rent, which indicates the degree of allocative inefficiency.
Note that the social cost associated with unionisation is not necessarily the same 
as the deadweight welfare loss indicated by the triangle CDE. In addition to the 
relatively small direct cost and welfare losses, there may be rent-seeking costs 
associated with the additional resources expended in organising and maintaining 
such reallocation o f resources and rights. Also, traditionally the union wage 
premium has been seen in effect as a ‘tax’ in that it imposes higher labour costs in 
the unionised sector compared to the non-unionised sector and thus leads to 
factor market distortion and allocative inefficiency (Johnson and Mieszkowski 
1970; DeFina 1983). Successful wage increases in the unionised sector lead to a 
decline of demand for labour in that sector, which results in displacement of 
labour from the unionised to the non-unionised sectors. If, as often assumed in 
conventional models, workers are employed where their marginal productivity is 
lower than before, there may be further social welfare loss associated with 
unionisation (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993: 327). As discussed in Chapter 1 that 
this is precisely the ‘distortionist’ argument used in the on-going ‘jobless growth’ 
debate in India, whereby the slow employment growth in organised sector is 
attributed to trade union militancy and labour legislation constraining firms’ 
ability to adjust (Goldar 1987; Seth and Seth 1991; Anant and Sundaram 1998; 
Debroy 2004).
To be fair, the modem analysis of labour market models is much more 
sophisticated than the exposition based on Cartter’s model from half a century 
ago. Note, for example, that in this bi-lateral monopoly model o f wage
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determination, there is no analysis of bargaining. In order to derive a unique 
solution, additional information about the type o f bargaining needs to be 
incorporated in the model. This is the area that economists have actively debated 
in the 1980s.7 Also in Cartter’s model, the determination o f wages and 
employment levels appears friction-less, which of course is not realistic, and the 
incorporation of imperfect information has been another area in which the basic 
model has been modified and extended. For example, in the Hicksian theory o f 
industrial relations, frequency and duration of disputes manifested as strikes or 
lockouts occurs due to uncertainty of lack of information8 (Ashenfelter and 
Johnson 1969; Cohn and Eaton 1989). Nonetheless, the most important 
implication o f the neo-classical labour market model is that labour market 
distortions, which give rise to 'within-firm rents’, necessarily lead to loss o f 
efficiency, as captured in figures 2-1 and 2-2.
7 The simplest model is the so-called monopoly union model where the wage is set unilaterally by the union,
subject to the constraint that employment lie on the labour demand curve. In this model, the solution is 
the wage rate sought by the union in figure 2-1. Here the role o f  bargaining is ignored. A modified version 
o f  this is known as the ‘right-to-manage’ model, where bargaining takes place exclusively on the wage rate, 
and the employer is left to adjust employment level unilaterally. Both monopoly union model and ‘right-to- 
manage’ model was constraint so that the solution lies on the labour demand curve. However critiques o f  
the model pointed out that the solution is not Pareto efficient because there can be a point o ff the labour 
demand curve which may Pareto improve at least one o f  the bargaining agent’s utility. McDonald and 
Solow (1981) proposed an alternative model called the efficient-bargaining model, which considers 
bargaining over both wages and employment. Seniority model by Oswald (1987) considers the case where 
the union is indifferent about the level o f  member’s employment because the seniority mechanism is such 
that lay-offs are done according to the last in, first out’ principle.
Empirical studies offer mixed evidence on which model best describes the actual bargaining process, with 
Nickell and Wadhwami (1990) finding no evidence o f  union influence on employment in the UK  
manufacturing sector, while Hendricks and Kahn (1991) find support for efficient bargaining hypothesis in 
the employment o f  police in the US. Interestingly, according to Maloney and Ribeiro (1999) the data on 
labour demand and wage structure in Mexico are also in favour o f  the efficiency wage hypothesis.
8 In Hicks (1932) and his followers such as Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), strike frequency is a function o f
the extent o f  imperfect information. Under perfect information, strikes and costs associated with it can be 
averted because the potential losing party will foresee the defeat and offer a pre-emptive concession. 
However under lack o f  information or uncertainty about the economic environment in which bargaining 
takes place, say due to instability in the economic system, the parties cannot correctly assess the net costs 
associated with the strike, which would lessen the possibility o f  industrial solution through negotiation.
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The implicit assumption in the neo-classical labour market analysis is that the 
economy can operate in the absence of institutional or state interventions and 
produce the optimal level of output Qe in figure 2-1. For the firm to be operating 
at this optimal point, perfectly competitive labour and product markets are 
required, but paradoxically in such a situation, there is no reason for LMIs to 
persist, because if there is no barrier to the entry and exit of firms there is no 
super-normal profits or surplus for the union to extract in the long-run (Booth 
1995, p.54). This raises a fundamental theoretical question on the methodology of 
conventional economic analysis, whereby the benchmark of efficiency evaluation 
is empirically unrealistic, even in advanced industrialised economies, where rents 
as incentives for technical progress and dynamic X-efficiency gains (as opposed 
to the static allocative efficiency described in the above neo-classical models) may 
be more relevant in reality (Leibenstein 1966; Frantz 1990; Khan 2000). Even 
within the framework o f neo-classical economics, if there is imperfect 
information or uncertainty, LMIs such as trade unions can be efficiency- 
enhancing by reducing turnover and transaction costs (Freeman and Medoff 
1984; Booth 1995), as we will see in the collective voice models below. There may 
also be X-effidency effects of LMIs by forcing firms to introduce innovative 
production technology, improve productivity and reduce costs, which was 
highlighted in the neo-corporatist literature (Calmfors et al. 2001). At a more 
fundamental level, the transfer of resources to unions and other third parties may 
be necessary in order for production to take place in an ordered manner at all. 
For example, in Lindbeck and Snower’s (1988) insider-outsider model, ‘insiders’ 
who are incumbent employees have an advantage or ‘market’ power over the 
‘outsiders’ 9, the unemployed, in terms o f firm-specific skills and turnover costs.
9 Although insider-outsider model is often cited as a model o f  trade union, as Booth (1995, p.251) points out, 
Lindbeck and Snower’s insider-outsider model does not rely on the presence o f  trade unions, as long as the 
transaction costs associated with hiring, firing, and incorporating new entrants into the work organisation 
are sufficiently high.
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This gives ‘insiders’ the ability and opportunity to capture part of the firm’s 
surplus, thus extracting ‘within-firm rents’. The assumption here is that wage 
bargaining takes place between insiders and employers, and outsiders cannot 
influence the outcome of this process. It is also assumed that insiders are only 
interested in their own jobs and indifferent to the fate of the unemployed. Under 
such circumstances, the evaluation of whether the existence of rent and the rent- 
seeking that takes place is necessary inefficient is difficult.
For our purpose of the analysis of trade unions in developing countries such as 
India, this implicit assumption of well-established markets is even more 
problematic. The process of development is typically associated with the 
emergence or creation of industries and industrial labour, and therefore by 
definition such well functioning markets, or the well-defined property rights that 
underlie them, are previously absent in developing countries. In the early stages 
of industrialisation, when property rights are unstable and industries and 
industrial capitalism do not have a long history and are relatively underdeveloped, 
change or transfer of these emerging property rights are likely to be contested, 
especially if the state is politically weak and political clients are well-organised 
(Khan 1996: 16-19). In the context of collective bargaining over within-firm rent, 
players outside the legally defined bargaining parties may be involved and could 
effectively demand share over the surplus. We have seen in Section 3 o f Chapter 
1 that labour laws in India have failed to provide mechanisms for selecting and 
recognising representative unions. This also overlapped with the politicisation o f 
unionism and widespread involvement of ‘outsider’ leaders and external 
bargaining agents in giving rise to factionalism amongst multiple unions and 
political actors. Even if some process of recognition is legislated, this has 
sometimes resulted in contestation o f the legitimacy o f the recognised union, as 
in the case of the Mumbai textile strike in 1982-83.
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O f course, any model is an abstraction from reality, and neo-classical economists 
would recognise that their labour market models do not address some aspects of 
LMIs in developing countries. But the tendency would be to treat these 
politicised LMIs as exceptions or deviations from the norm, or as social and 
political constraints on economic or market process (Mazumdar 1989). In other 
words, neo-classical models assume the independence or separation of economic 
and social/ political processes, and further examine the equilibrium in the labour 
markets in isolation from the wider macro political economy.
In contrast, from our political economic perspective, such separation of 
economic from the politics cannot be taken for granted (Wood 1981; 1995). 
Politicised forms of LMIs in developing countries are reflections of the ways in 
which labour processes are managed by reliance on extra-economic agents, and 
more generally the particular processes of development and accumulation. 
Interventions by social and political processes are not mere external constraints 
that can be analysed separately from the economic processes, but integral parts of 
the way in which society organises and controls production and labour processes.
To sum up, the context in which LMIs engage in bargaining in developing 
countries such as India suggests that the assumptions under the neo-classical 
labour market models are invalid. Firstly, the rent-seeking costs can be very large 
due to this secondary contestation to the settlement and bargaining parties (Khan 
1996:16). But secondly, it also means that the net effect o f within-firm rent on 
efficiency and growth may be less clear-cut, given the possible efficiency and 
growth enhancing effects of LMIs, even within the conventional economic 
framework under imperfection information, uncertainty and unstable property 
rights, and more fundamentally in the context o f capitalist development where 
institutional take various forms, which are dynamic and unpredictable under 
different historical conditions. This further suggests that, thirdly, labour markets
116
Chapter 2  Theories of LM Is
cannot be analysed in isolation o f the wider macro political economy, particularly 
where political intervention to organising and managing production and labour 
processes is the rule rather than exception.
2.2.2 Rent-seeking m odels/ By-product theory
The traditional neo-classical labour market models as described above has been 
criticised from within the orthodoxy on the grounds that it underestimates the 
social cost of rent-seeking. According to neo-classical economists, rent-seeking 
does not lead to any net increase in resources, and due to the deviation o f wages 
from the marginal (revenue) product of labour, it creates allocative inefficiency in 
the form of the triangle of deadweight welfare loss (as shown in figure 2-2). Rent- 
seeking theory agrees that distributional conflict is a source of inefficiency, but 
argues that the inefficiency is greater than the deadweight welfare loss triangle. 
Rent seekers spend resources in lobbying and bribing people who can influence 
the allocation of the rent in order to increase the probability of capturing it, and 
this can be quite large, possibly exceeding the value of the rent itself. Moreover, 
rent seekers may spend resources not only to capture existing rents, but also to 
maintain them and even create new ones. In this sense, rent-seeking theory aims 
to ‘endogenise’ the process of rent creation and also focuses on diverse types of 
rent in addition to the monopoly rent derived from market imperfection 
considered in neo-classical models. For example, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) 
and Bronars and Lott (1989) argue that unionisation rent may be larger than the 
union/ non-union wage differentials because the union (or rent-seeking 
prospective members) may try to create entry barriers and as a result lower the 
implicit cost of union membership stemming from the long queue of applicants 
for unionised jobs. This is because once ‘insiders’ lose their jobs and become 
‘outsiders’, they find it difficult, or even impossible, to get back into employment.
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Rent-seeking can take place outside the businesses establishment as well as inside. 
Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen (1994) consider expenditures on labour 
union leaders bribing management, management bribing labour leaders, and both 
parties lobbying the government to influence labour legislation in their favour. 
Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen argue that if the rent-seeking over 
government legislation is taken into account, resources spent in rent-seeking is 
much higher than believed in standard collective bargaining models where only 
the rent-seeking over given monopoly rent is considered.
The reason rent-seeking costs can be higher than the monopoly union cost in 
neoclassical models is due to the mismatch between the private and social cost o f 
rent-seeking, a situation similar to the public goods problem. According to the 
rent-seeking literatures or the by-product theory (Mangel, DeLorme and 
Kamerschen 1994), the outcome of rent-seeking, such as legislative changes in 
favour o f labour, has a feature as a public good, because it has characteristics of 
non-excludable and non-rival goods. At the same time, provision o f the pubic 
goods is typically not the objective o f rent-seeking by agents. According to these 
models, trade unions’ involvement in bargaining to seek changes in policies or 
channels of transfers are ‘by-products’ o f union leaders’ private motive to attain 
income, power and prestige. Bargaining agents seeks rent when they can increase 
their private benefits. This private benefit may include “large salaries, big office in 
large buildings, fancy cars, expensive clothes, and many other fringe benefits” 
(Mangel et al. op cits. 409). These two aspects o f rent-seeking imply that the rent 
outcome may not necessarily be socially desirable even if it is beneficial to the 
bargaining agents, since bargaining agents would seek rent not to maximise the 
rent (the pubic goods) but to maximise the private benefit they receive.
Note that rent-seeking models clearly consider continued union leader 
involvement in what we called ‘outside-firm rent-seeking’ to be ‘political’ and
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typically ‘corrupting’. The charge that union leaders involved in outside-firm rent- 
seeldng become more ‘political’ implies that union activity focusing exclusively on 
within-firm rents is, in comparison, ‘economic’. This dichotomous view of 
within- and outside-firm rents is superficial since it might be argued that rent- 
seeking is by definition political in nature wherever and whatever form it takes. 
More fundamentally, the political vs. economic dichotomy assumes that social 
and political processes can be treated as independent or operational variables 
‘chosen’ by micro-level agents. This is in contrast to our political economic 
approach, whereby politicised bargaining or involvement o f extra-economic 
agents is a reflection of the particular process of accumulation.
The argument that union leaders’ involvement in outside-firm rent-seeking is 
‘corrupting’ and leads to a decline in the welfare o f workers is based on the 
assumption in neo-classical rent-seeking models such as Bhagwati (1982) that all 
expenditures and resources spent in rent-seeking are ‘directly unproductive profit- 
seeking (DUP) activities’. This implicitly assumes a trade-off between union 
leaders’ involvement in external rent-seeking and welfare improvement of its 
constituents. However if it is possible for rent-seeking to result in improving the 
welfare position of its members or o f society as a whole, whatever the legitimacy 
or legality of such activity, it would be difficult to maintain that outside-rent- 
seeking by bargaining agents is necessarily welfare reducing. This assumption is all 
the more paradoxical when we look at the United States, which has a large 
transactional sector in its economy, where productive groups are engaged in rent- 
seeking as much as unproductive groups, if not more (Wallis and North 1986; 
Laband and Sophocleus 1988). In fact it is difficult to establish that productive 
investment would be made in the absence of rent-seeking. While it is common to 
argue that had it not been for rent-seeking the US economy would be more 
productive, this tends to be an assertion rather than a claim with hard evidence.
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Once the potential for rent-seeking costs is acknowledged, the analysis in rent- 
seeking models turns to identifying factors that determines the extent of rent- 
seeking. Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen (1994) focus on the factors that 
motivate workers to take part in the collective action (or join the union), such as 
the private gains workers receive from joining a successful collective action10, the 
likelihood of union success in achieving its goal11, and the penalty the workers 
who participated in the collective action would suffer if the rent-seeking were 
unsuccessful12, amongst others13. Much of this analysis can be traced to Mancur 
Olson’s (1971) theory of collective action14. For Olson, the union faces a 
fundamental problem of free riding in mobilising collective action under 
compulsory membership. This is because according to him, what is produced as a
1(1 The private gain workers receive from joining a successful collective action is separate from the value o f  
rent captured, which is considered as public goods. Examples o f  private rewards are side payments 
received when union is successful or opportunity to become a union organizer. The amount o f private 
rewards that can be transferred to individual workers depends on various factors, including union strategy 
and the nature o f  leadership, but most importantly the size o f  the rent sought.
11 In a standard rent-seeking model the likelihood o f  success in capturing the rent depends on the expenditure 
or investment made for rent-seeking relative to expenditure made by other rent seekers (Mueller 2003). 
Thus, the likelihood o f  the i th bargaining party winning the rent can be expressed as: j _  , where
""IE,
E. is the expenditure o f  the i th bargaining party and £,  is the aggregated sum o f  rent-seeking
expenditures. If there are only two bargaining parties, the employer and the union, the likelihood o f  union 
success depends on the rent-seeking expenditure o f  the union relative to that o f  the employer.
12 Again this is the personal cost endured by the worker, not the social cost o f  rent-seeking. Examples o f  such 
personal penalty due to losing are dismissal, pay cut and demotion, which would depend on management 
strategy as well as the relative bargaining power o f  the management and the union.
13 Other remaining variables considered in Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen (1994) are: the likelihood o f  
suffering disutility (for example injury) by participating in the collective action; the disutility suffered in the 
collective action; and the psychological gain from participating in the collective action.
14 Olson (1971) questions why large trade unions are often associated with closed shop policies, such as 
compulsory membership and coercive picket line. H e declines the explanation that links union shop 
policies with workers’ reaction to employment insecurity. Historically, the periods when unions gained job 
control in the United States are not “when workers had the most reason to be pessimistic about shortages 
o f  employment opportunities” (p.82). Olson instead explains it “primarily from their [the union’s] desire 
for strength and survival” (p.85). For Olson, trade union’s strength and survival lies in its capacity to 
mobilise workers.
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result o f labour movement is a public good in the sense that there is non-rivalry 
(once the good exists the consumption of it by one individual does not prevent 
its consumption by another) and non-excludability (nobody can be excluded from 
consuming the good). In other words, if it is made available to anybody it is 
necessarily made available to all, for example when the bargained wage increase 
takes the form of flat rate increments (Iversen 1999: 42). In such a case, it is 
rational for potential members to try to take a ‘free-ride’, that is, not to actively 
participate in the collective action because the gains from mobilisation, such as 
increase of wage and non-wage benefits, and improvement of work conditions 
tend to be available to all members regardless of whether they have participated 
in the action or not. Because of this free-riding problem, “unless the number of 
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is a coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self- 
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest” 
(Olson 1971: 2). Given that the union’s basic function is to provide collective 
bargaining, the solution to the free riding problem is for trade unions to either try 
to enforce membership (McLean 2000: 4) or to provide sufficiently large amounts 
of selective incentives so that, for the cooperators who receive this selective 
incentive, cooperation is always a better strategy than to defect and thus the 
products becomes like private goods. Separate and ‘selective’ incentives are 
offered contingent on behaviour, which may take the form of rewards for 
cooperation or punishments for defection.
Hardin (1982) suggests that the union’s or union leader’s capacity to overcome 
the organisational problem of collective action in turn depends on their 
bargaining power which gives them access to resources. However note that 
conventional rent-seeking models implicitly assume that political power is 
ultimately proportional to the ability to mobilise economic resources. After all in 
models of collective action or the by-product hypothesis, union leaders or
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political entrepreneurs are motivated by their own personal gains and career 
interests, which is different from the gains from collective bargaining itself. 
Further, the implication is that, if the potential payoff is sufficiently large, political 
entrepreneurs would take on the task of mobilising workers. Critically, 
conventional rent-seeking models assume that political power is proportional to 
the economic power o f agents, i.e. their ability to raise resources to spend, which 
in turn is proportional to the net returns from rent-seeking. However, this is not 
always the case, particularly in developing countries, where the political power of 
groups does not always correspond to their economic gains and losses (Khan 
2000b). In this sense, rent-seeking models offer interesting insights in the 
engagement of internal and external bargaining agents in rent-seeking activities, 
but because they are reduced to individual optimisation by bargaining agents, they 
fail to analyse bargaining power as social relations.
Similarly, rent-seeking models assume that the extent to which bargaining agents 
such as union leaders engage in private rent-seeking is ultimately determined by 
the collective action o f the rank-and-file workers. In an extended model, 
Kamerschen, DeLorme, Mangel, and Morgan (2000) suggests a life cycle of 
unions and rent-seeking costs in three stages. In the first, union leaders are 
“dynamic and zealous” but once they gain workers’ support, in the second stage, 
union leaders become “skillful politically and more level-headed administrators” 
and “lose touch with the rank and file but continue to seek their own self- 
interest” . This leads to the third stage where “unions become ripe for corrupting 
influences such as racketeering [a US term for involvement in illegal or 
illegitimate business]” and start to decline. Workers, seeing that their wages and 
working conditions are affected, seek new leaders, and the first stage starts once 
more. Therefore the extent o f rent-seeking costs depends on the rank-and-file 
workers’ ability to monitor and contest rent-seeking activities, which assumes 
some form of democratic accountability and transparency, but more
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fundamentally, it depends on the balance of power between rent-seeking agents 
and rank-and-file workers. Once again, the relative balance of power between 
union leaders and rank-and-file workers is likely to depend on the wider social 
relations and their ability to organise or be accommodated in patron-client 
networks, not just on the voting or monitoring system.
These observations mean that a meaningful analysis of rent-seeking cannot be 
divorced from the wider macro political economic structure, which has important 
implications on how we use the insights from the literature. Conventional rent- 
seeking models offer possibilities of incorporating juridical and political forms o f 
distributional conflicts into the analysis of LMIs, but ultimately do not make the 
assumptions regarding the social structure explicit. The problem is not merely 
that the structural assumptions are kept implicit, but that these juridical and 
political relations are assumed to be exogenous to or a deviation from the 
behavioural models o f rent-seeking or their implications to LMIs. In contrast, our 
political economic analysis treats LMIs or labour relations as part o f the particular 
form of distributional conflict, which is constituent to the wider process o f 
accumulation and economic development.
Although it is not the objective of our political economic approach to derive 
efficiency or welfare criteria, we can argue that the evaluation o f the social costs 
of rent-seeking is impossible without analysing the structure and social relations 
in which bargaining relations are embedded. For example, much of the insights 
on the extent of rent-seeking and the social costs associated with it are drawn 
from US experience and its specific social and political contexts on which much 
of the existing literature is based. In particular, conventional rent-seeking models 
implicitly assume a dominant and ‘regulated’ industrial capitalist sector, on which 
even interest groups who are not directly part of the sector are dependent, and 
that political power is ultimately based on the ability to mobilise economic
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resources. In such case, although the rent-seeking costs associated with external 
bargaining agents involved in collective bargaining may be high, resource 
transfers that accommodate interest groups are more likely to be negotiated, 
which is less likely to be contested, as long as the capitalist sector can produce 
sufficient surplus (Khan 2000b). The outcome can even be potentially efficient 
and growth-enhancing if productive investment could not have taken place 
without the rent. In contrast, in many developing countries including India, 
political factions compete over public resources, organised around social and 
cultural symbols, rather than along economic class interests (Khan 1998). In such 
social conditions, the pattern of redistributive rents tend to correspond to the 
organisational power o f groups, rather than their economic power, and more 
importantly the negotiated transfer is likely to be unstable and continuously 
contested. This not only has implications to the extent of rent-seeking and its 
social cost, but also on the possible outcomes o f whether it leads to efficiency 
and growth enhancing investments at the firm level.
To summarise, rent-seeking models do incorporate macro political configurations 
such as constitutional, legal and regulatory frameworks in the analysis of 
collective bargaining to discuss different types o f political activities. It successfully 
points out that rent-seeking coalitions competing for resources tend to dominate 
the redistribution process. However it does not go far enough to discuss different 
political contexts and their effect on micro decision making, which limits its 
ability to make meaningful conclusions about the net effect o f rent-seeking in 
LMIs.
2.2.3 Collective-voice model
The intellectual roots of collective-voice models can be traced to series of studies 
done by Harvard University academics (particularly, Slichter, Healy and Iivem ash 
1960). Slichter et al. put forward the argument that information sharing between
124
Chapter 2  Theories o/LM Is
unions and management can be beneficial for the firm because it can remove 
“uncertainties in the minds of employees”, “evoke useful suggestions” (p.22) so 
that management can modify its plans, and also can potentially get union’s help in 
improving working conditions or reducing absenteeism. Richard Freeman and 
James Medoffs book (1984) What Do Unions Do, followed in this tradition to 
focus on empirical research on the efficiency enhancing role of trade unionism, 
while also offering a theoretical explanation based on Albert O. Hirschman’s 
(1970) theory of exit/voice, originally developed as a discussion of consumer 
behaviour and product market13, but here applied to the analysis of labour- 
management relations.
In the context of industrial relations, ‘exit’ corresponds to workers’ action to quit 
and seek new job opportunities in the labour market when they are dissatisfied 
with the conditions at the workplace. On the other hand, workers who remain in 
the workplace can exercise ‘voice’ and try to influence employers to change the 
conditions. Thus according to Freeman and Medoff, unions have two faces. The 
first is the face of ‘monopoly’ unions we encountered in the neoclassical labour 
market models, which uses ‘exit’ as a threat to extract within-firm rents. The
15 In Hirschman’s original exit/voice theory when consumers are ‘dissatisfied’ with a product, they have two 
choices: ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. Consumers can stop consuming the product and switch to another good. This is 
called ‘exit’ which is an action based on market mechanism. Alternatively, consumers can complain to the 
producer and try to influence it. This second course o f  action is called Voice’. For Hirschman inefficiency 
arises when both fails to have an effect on producers. For example, Hirschman uses this exit/voice 
framework to explain the poor performance o f  public transport sector in Nigeria. According to him, “exit 
did not have its usual attention focusing effect because the loss or revenue was not a mater o f  the utmost 
gravity for management, while voice did not work as long as the m ost aroused and therefore the potentially 
most vocal customers were the first ones to abandon the railroads for the trucks” (p.45). Also Hirschman 
argued that whether exit is chosen or voice is used depends on the “loyalty’ o f  consumers to the particular 
product. N ote that the situation considered in Hirschman is primarily non-conflict in nature. This is an 
implicit assumption shared in Freeman and M edoffs version whereby labour-management relations is 
treated as a problem o f  a choice and exchange between two equal parties, and thus understates the issue o f  
bargaining power.
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second is precisely to provide a mechanism for ‘voice’ to be utilised, by remaining 
in the firm and trying to influence the management to improve the conditions.
But, how do unions do this? And why would this be beneficial for the employer? 
Following Addison and Belfield’s (2003) summary we can divide the argument on 
collective-voice models into two types: the ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ versions.
The narrow version of the collective voice model is similar to the public goods 
problem or the problem in contract theory. When the workforce is not unionised, 
there may be asymmetry of information in the sense that (a) employer has 
imperfect information about employees, and (b) workers may have little incentive 
to reveal their preference. Even if there is a difference in the actual working 
conditions and the level workers desire, because this preference is not revealed to 
the employer, the employer may not be able to deal with it, and hence lead to 
unnecessarily high employee quit rates, given the labour market conditions. 
Unions can collect the information about preferences and aggregate it, so that it 
can be used for negotiation with the employers.
The same argument can be made from the point o f view of employers as well. If 
employers face problems in monitoring the ‘effort level’ o f workers, and if 
technology is such that there are significant complementarities in workers’ effort, 
collective organisation of workers, such as unionisation, can be beneficial if  it can 
collectively decide on the effort level and monitor it. In an extreme scenario, 
unions can act as an agent to collect information about ‘effort levels’ and share 
this with the employers.16
16 In fact there are two ways in which the new institutional economics (NIE) suggests employers can deal 
with the monitoring problem due to the asymmetry o f  information between employer and employee. First, 
employers can improve productivity (through further exploitation o f  workers) by introducing work 
organisation that would allow better monitoring o f  employees’ effort level (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
Alternatively, employer may share rent, which can be obtained by managing the work organization better,
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As can be seen from the above two arguments, the ‘narrow’ version o f collective - 
voice model emphasises the role of unions in solving or eliminating problems of 
information asymmetry. In contrast, the ‘broad’ version o f collective voice 
highlights the governance function of unionism that enables the establishment of 
a long-term relationship between employer and employees, and as a result 
facilitates higher accumulation of ‘firm-specific human capital’, better employee 
cooperation, and participation in generating efficiency enhancing practices. For 
example, Buchele and Christiansen (1999) argue that the promotion of LMIs 
encourages cooperative labour-management relations, which enables 
coordination o f work and organisation. This latter ‘broad’ version o f the 
collective-voice model also overlaps with the theory of internal labour markets 
(Doeringer and Piore 1976; Piore and Sabel 1984) which highlighted the 
development of internal bureaucratic rules and the control structure within firms 
governing hiring and firing, promotion and wage determination, and its role in 
the development of firm-specific skills and on-the-job training.
Collective-voice model sparked a series o f empirical studies mainly in North 
American and some in Western European countries on the efficiency 
implications of unionism and particularly the role of unions in reducing 
absenteeism and establishing employer-employee cooperation. As we have 
already discussed in Section 1.1, while the effect o f unionism in increasing job 
satisfaction and reducing labour turnover is widely observed17, its overall effect on 
productivity is difficult to generalise. However, it seems that there is a tendency
with the employees and increase the opportunity cost o f  shirking. The rent in this second scenario is more 
commonly known as the efficiency wage (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Rent due to unionisation can be seen 
as a special case o f  efficiency wage.
17 Even this assumed relations between union membership and job satisfaction is questioned by Bryson, 
Cappellari and Lucifora (2003) on the basis o f  selection bias.
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towards a consensus at this moment that the direct and short-term effect of 
unionism on productivity is on average small and perhaps close to zero.
A more powerful challenge to the collective-voice model focuses on its 
theoretical weakness. Addison and Belfield (2003) have argued that the separation 
of voice from power is artificial, especially in the ‘broad’ version of the collective 
voice model. This is because the union’s ability to impose and maintain a long­
term employer-employee relationship hinges on its credible ability to punish the 
employer if the managers renege the commitment and capture the rents 
generated from the productivity-enhancing ‘voice’ effect. This also implies that, 
the ‘monopoly’ and ‘voice’ effects of unionism are no longer separable, contrary 
to assumption under the collective voice model that these are two contrasting 
faces o f unionism, because a union that does not have sufficient bargaining 
power to extract within-firm rent cannot effectively deliver the governance effect 
either. This paradox was recognised by the proponents o f the collective voice 
model as well. In their study on works councils in Western Europe, Freeman and 
Lazear (1994) pointed out that the very mechanism that creates efficiency- 
improving environment actually leads to lowering profit rates because workers 
are able to demand higher share of the joint surplus. This observation is very 
important, because it shows that the mechanism of ‘voice’ which encourages 
sharing of information and knowledge, and enhance workers involvement in 
decision making, are indeed associated with the strengthening bargaining power 
of unions.
The observation is also interesting considering that, just as in the rent-seeking 
model, the majority o f the literature in the collective voice model is based on the 
experience of unionism and LMIs in the post-World War II United States, where 
there have been advanced capitalist sector dominating a growing economy, with 
weak class or group identity beyond narrow interests o f craft workers (Freeman
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and Medoff 1984; Friedman 1998). With limited capacity for broader union 
movement, let alone revolutionary aspirations, the strategic options available for 
the unions are to act as intermediary between workers and the employer in order 
to increase the productivity o f the firm, and to negotiate a greater share of the 
surplus generated by occasional use of labour withdrawal as a threat. However 
the role o f unionism is different in other countries with different social and 
political structure. Traditionally in many European countries, where the union 
movement was more united and inclusive, trade unions were accommodated as 
part of political coalitions, and therefore were able to lobby for workers’ interest 
in policy negotiation and gain concessions from the state which would not have 
been possible from local employers, as we shall see in the next section. In India, 
trade union leaders may engage in rent-seeking as part o f redistributive coalition 
over social resources, which may be ancillary to the collective goods it is 
supposed to seek. Hence the view that trade union merely acts as mediators for 
information exchange cannot be generalised, and the insights gained from the 
literature must be cautiously interpreted within the social and political context in 
which the LMIs operates.
The difference in social and political conditions is significant because the type of 
power that matters in labour-management relations may be different. In advanced 
capitalist countries such as the US, the bargaining power o f interest groups, 
including unions and firms, derives from their ability to influence or control 
regulatory structure to their favour, but subject to the economic viability o f the 
resulting redistribution o f resources. This means that even if the resulting 
distribution is different from what would have been achieved through the market 
mechanism alone, it is the economic power of bargaining agents that ultimately 
justifies their redistributive activities. In contrast, as we have already commented, 
in developing countries such as India, where distributional conflict is dominated 
by popular movements which do not immediately depend on the economic
129
Chapter 2  Theories o fT M ls
decline or underdevelopment, the bargaining power o f agents may be based on 
their ability to mobilise organised muscle power to disrupt or impose political 
costs to others (Khan 1998; 2005b). Once again, the collective voice models open 
interesting questions on the role o f power in determining the bargaining outcome, 
but fails to discuss the social and political conditions under which the stronger 
bargaining power leads to the combination of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ optimal to society.
Some researchers who write under the influence of the collective voice theory 
have attempted to focus on the quality or effectiveness of collective voice. For 
example, in the recent study, Luchak (2003) distinguishes between ‘direct voice’ 
and ‘representative voice’. Direct voice represents workers’ effort to affect 
changes through more-or-less direct two-way communication (for example, 
through another member o f workers, such as a team member). In contrast, 
representative voice refers to indirect mechanism of third-party intermediary 
process, such as union steward filing a grievance. Luchak then compares two 
types of labour-management relations: ‘affective commitment’ and ‘continuous 
commitment’. Affective commitment refers to “an emotional bond between 
workers and the firm that, among other things, leads that workers to contribute 
meaningfully to the organization while at the same time seeking dispute 
resolution that does not threaten the relationship with the firm”. Continuous 
commitment is “based on a calculation of the costs and benefits associated with 
staying with or leaving the organization, such as the sacrifice o f material firm- 
specific training investments and non-portable benefits”. Luchak argues that 
employees with affective bond to the organisation are more likely to use direct 
voice and less likely to rely on representative voice, and conversely for those with 
continuous commitment. Also, it is implied that employers may feel that it is not 
worth listening to collective voice if it coming from continuous committed 
employees. In other words, institutional response to collective voice is effective 
only if the voice is based on emotional bond to the organisation.
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This highlights a very important implication of the collective voice models, which 
is that the effectiveness o f collective voice ultimately comes down to the 
discussion on ‘commitment’ or ‘loyalty’. If  this hypothesis is true, the efficiency- 
improving role of unionism depends on the attitude of workers to the firm. I f  we 
follow the logic of Hirschman’s (1970) ‘model of loyalist behaviour’, the reason 
why the apparently rigid, confrontational and interest-driven LMIs in India 
cannot effectively exercise the ‘collective voice effect’ is due to the particular 
types of LMIs that do not lead to “the combination o f exit and voice which may 
be ideal from the point of view of society” (p.93). Loyalist behaviour is modelled 
as a function of subjective agreements or disagreements with the current and 
previous firm’s strategy and policy, but its effectiveness depends on the specific 
institutions that encourage or hinder ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. The issue is therefore one 
of institutional design, the policy implication o f which is to promote small-scaled 
micro-level reforms to promote stable property rights, transparency and 
accountability (as we have seen in the example of labour market reforms in India 
in Chapter 1). Thus, just as in the neo-classical labour market models (discussed 
in Section 2.1) and rent-seeking models (Section 2.2), the collective voice models 
assume that the outcome of collective bargaining can be reduced to cognitive 
problems of individuals, rather than on social relations and structure. This is 
consistent with the increasing influence o f the new institutional economics (NIE) 
as the analytical framework for “the economics o f everything” (Milonalds and 
Fine 2009), and the broader trend of post-Washington consensus in the 
development literature.
But we can take a different view about this issue. Is it not the case that 
‘commitment’ or ‘loyalty’ is more likely to be the outcome of a particular 
bargaining relations rather than a cause of it? Workers’ emotional attitude or 
satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with the firm may be reflecting the choice that is 
given to them. If workers are provided with choices for better pay or work
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conditions that the existing ones, they are likely to be dissatisfied with the firm. 
But if there are no alternative choices that improve pay or work conditions, they 
may express loyalty and satisfaction to the firm. In fact, it may be the role of 
union with strong bargaining power to cultivate alternative options18. If  this 
alternative view is correct, emotional commitment or loyalty can be seen as a 
reflection of the relative power of bargaining agents.
Again the insights gained here must be examined within the context o f the 
experience of the United States on which the model is based. The result o f the 
model that when workers’ bargaining power is weak workers are tied to firms has 
to be understood within the specific conditions o f the US industrial relations, and 
therefore cannot be generalised without considering the particular social and 
political context that determines opportunities, incentives, and constraints for 
micro level decision making. For example, in India in which the dominant form 
of macro political economic conflicts are between factions comprised of various 
classes and groups (Khan 1998), the relatively weak bargaining power o f the 
working class does not prevent the unions to engage in this distributional politics. 
This of course does not mean that the ‘collective voice effect’ cannot be realised 
in countries such as India, but rather that ‘what unions do’ depends on the 
opportunity, incentives, constraints and capacities determined by the social 
structure and relations of which LMIs are part of. Once again, this highlights the 
fundamental methodological difference between the conventional models o f 
LMIs and our political economic alternative. For the political economic 
approach, whether unions follow the ‘voice’ or the ‘exit’ strategies, or the extent 
to which workers express perceived ‘loyalty’ or ‘commitment’ to the firm, are not 
only reflexes, but constituent of production and labour processes.
18 This was in fact an aspect noted in the original Freeman and M edoffs (1984) work. They found that 
dissatisfaction tend to be expressed more in unionised labour, and they take the ‘voiced dissatisfaction’ as 
an indication o f  democracy rather than reflecting the ‘true dissatisfaction’.
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2.2.4 Neo-corporatist m odels/ hump-shaped hypothesis
Neo-corporatism or democratic corporatism refers to a political system in which 
interest groups are incorporated in the process o f policy formation and 
implementation within a non-authoritarian regime (Schmitter 1981, Von Beyme 
1983, Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; Siaroff 1999). The corporatist character is 
typically identified in the institutional structure of trade unions or the structure of 
industrial relations system whereby conflicts of interests are resolved by recourse 
to corporatism, as opposed to pluralism or majoritarian democracy.
literatures on the neo-corporatist model o f LMIs and industrial relations have a 
different intellectual origin from the collective voice literatures, but recent 
development of both literatures have been under significant influence of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). Neo-corporatist writers, inspired by the 
experience of Nordic countries and Austria where until recently there was a close 
relationship between social democratic governments and centralised trade unions, 
as well as the experience of countries like Japan, where bargaining relations was 
not centralised but real wage flexibility through cooperative union-management 
relations was achieved, emphasises the conditions under which unions can 
exercise wage restrain and help create efficiency enhancing working conditions. 
Neo-corporatist writers argue that trade unionism can increase efficiency through 
reducing information and transaction cost, as postulated in collective voice 
models. But they also emphasise that minimisation of transaction cost is not the 
only way in which unionism can influence efficiency. Particularly important is the 
Troduktivitdtspeitsche (‘productivity whip’) in Germany or Rehn-Meidner model in 
Sweden as discussed in section 1.1, whereby regulation and ‘rigid’ wage 
determination through centralised trade unions and employers association have 
“forced, induced and enabled management to embark on more demanding high-value 
added, diversified quality production strategies”. Streeck (1991: 51) go further to 
argue that “some form of institutionalised conflict would [...] be an indispensable
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condition of supply-side restructuring towards advanced forms of demand” 
(italics in the above two quotes as in the original). Thus, the neo-corporatist 
theory emphasises the close association between changes in labour-management 
relations and changes in production organisation and technology. This idea that 
the production of surplus value can be influenced by trade union pressures is an 
idea that can be traced back at least to Marx (1976) and has been applied to a 
variety o f economic theories such as Leibenstein’s (1966) X-efficiency hypothesis.
Neo-corporatist writers argue that the efficiency improving effect of collective 
bargaining can exceed the social cost (negative externalities) of unionism as 
highlighted in the rent-seeking models. In the neo-corporatist literatures, different 
institutional framework of bargaining provides various mechanisms through 
which the externalities of collective bargaining can be internalised. Externalities 
from bargaining can be positive as well as negative. Positive externality of 
organised labour is that once a particular union sets a higher pay standard or 
improved working conditions, those tend to positively influence the level at other 
unionised and non-unionised sectors. Another positive externality is that the 
pressure from collective bargaining leading to faster technological progress. 
Negative externalities o f collective bargaining includes inflation and 
unemployment
The theory of neo-corporatist literatures is closely associated with the analysis in 
the NIE, particularly that of Olson (1971). In Section 2.2, we saw that the unions’ 
dilemma in face o f free-riding problem is to devise institutional structure to deal 
with the agency cost o f collective action. One such solution would be to change 
the organisational size. For example, Olson argues that the larger the number of 
members in the group the greater the organisation costs because observation and 
punishment o f free-riders may be more difficult in large groups.
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F i g u r e  2-3 C a l m f o r s - D r i f f i l l  h u m p - s h a p e d  h y p o t h e s i s
Labour militancy
High
Low
Decentralised--------------------------------------- ► Centralised
Level of bargaining
Neo-corporatist literatures reverses Olson’s question and asks under what 
conditions unionism may be less harmful for the society. On the basis of 
Olsonian theory, unionism is most harmful when it can mobilise enough workers 
to cause disruption and not face the cost of collective action. Just like Olson, neo- 
corporatists focus on institutional size and structure as the key explanatory 
variable. The most influential model o f the relationships between institutional 
structure and bargaining outcome is Calmfors and Dnffill (1988), who argued 
that wage militancy and unemployment tend to be lower in highly centralized and 
decentralised bargaining relations, but higher in intermediate systems.
In highly centralized bargaining relations, such as in Sweden, Norway and 
Austria, even if unions have strong bargaining power, they are more likely to 
taking into account the negative externalities o f wage militancy, such as inflation 
and unemployment, because it becomes more difficult to pass on the price o f real 
wage increase (Calmfors and Dnffill 1988; Nelson 1991; Calmfors et al. 2001). 
Similarly, it is argued that centralised unions tend to focus more on reducing wage
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dispersion, which also contributes in keeping wage inflation under control (Hibbs 
and Locking 1996; Davis and Henrekson 2000).
In highly decentralized system, such as in Japan and Switzerland, unions have 
little market power (Nelson 1991; Calmfors et al. 2001) because the business 
establishment or firm where wage was raised may not be able to pass on the cost 
by raising the prices, and this is likely to be reflected in decline in employment. As 
a result, Marginson and Sisson (1998) suggest that decentralised bargaining 
enables firm management to have greater control over their costs, including 
labour costs, and revenue.
As a result, Calmfors and Driffill argue that there is hump- or inverted U-shaped 
relationships between centralisation of bargaining level and wage militancy, as 
sketched in figure 2-3, whereby low militancy is associated with moderate wage 
inflation and higher rate of employment. A similar hump-shaped relationship is 
also suggested for the degree of centralisation of bargaining level and firm 
incentives to invest, with highly centralised and decentralised modes of 
unionisation offering better incentive to increase productivity (Haucap and Wey 
2003).
How much the hump-shaped hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill is useful in 
understanding the relations between institutional framework o f bargaining and its 
outcome is a matter o f debate. Even amongst neo-corporatist writers, there is 
disagreement about Calmfors and DnffilTs conclusion. Especially, regarding the 
effect of decentralisation, many authors have argued that it may not necessarily 
lead to moderation and low unemployment (Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991; 
Fitzenberger and Franz 1999; Iversen 1999; Strachan and Burgess 2000). 
Nonetheless the idea that the efficiency enhancing effect o f LMIs is associated 
with specific system of bargaining coordination, and in particular the degree of
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workers inclusion in the policy making process has become influential in recent 
years.
In a recent World Bank publication, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) explained the 
efficiency implications of LMIs by focusing on the compatibility o f types of 
unions and government. Surveying 125 analyses in 25 papers, since the 
pioneering work by Calmfors and Driffill, Aidt and Tzannatos find that about 
60% of the empirical results support the view that bargaining coordination is 
associated with better economic outcomes, although the result is sensitive to the 
statistical techniques used and the definition of coordination. Trade unions 
sometimes accelerate introduction of new practices and reforms, while at other 
times trade unions can impede economic growth and efficiency and generate 
political opposition to reform.
T a b l e  2 - 2  A l v a r e z - G a r r e t t - L a n g e  m o d e l  o n  c o m p a t i b i l i t y
O F  U N I O N  A N D  G O V E R N M E N T  T Y P E S
Government
Left-wing
(interventionist)
Right-wing 
(market oriented)
Unionism
Powerful
(encompassing)
“Good”
economic
performance
“Bad” economic 
performance
Weak
(fragmented)
“Bad” economic 
performance
“Good”
economic
performance
Source: Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), p.117.
In explaining what institutional characteristics allows collective bargaining to play 
a positive role in economic efficiency and growth, Aidt and Tzannatos present a 
model of coordination between union bargaining power and government’s labour 
policies, based on Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991). In this model positive or 
negative economic outcomes are explained by the “interaction between the 
strength of labor, party control, and economic outcomes” . For example
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according to this model, the combination of a powerful or all-encompassing 
unionism and the government which takes a left-wing stance by committing to 
provision o f welfare goods results in voluntary wage moderation because “if 
unions organize the majority of workers, they are less likely to engage in wasteful 
rent-seeking”. This is an argument consistent with the models by Olson (1982) 
and Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Also the combination of a politically weak 
unionism and a right-wing government which does not actively regulate the 
labour market also leads to positive outcome because as in the hump-shaped 
model, the market effect over-takes limiting the market power of unions to make 
radical demands. In Albarez, Garrett and Lange model adopted by Aidt and 
Tzannatos, “bad” economic performance is a result of “a mismatch between the 
power of the labour movement and the political orientation of the government” 
(p.16).
We should note that, especially in early literatures of neo-corporatist theory, the 
logic to connect unionism to performance is slightly different from that o f the 
collective voice theory. While collective voice models focus on information and 
transaction cost in organisations, neo-corporatist models emerged from a 
macroeconomic debate between new classical economics and new Keynesian 
economics on wage restraint19, and therefore focuses on union’s ability to 
‘discipline’ industries. In other words, the efficiency-improving effect of trade 
unionism crucially depends on the ability of unions to inflict cost to firms.
But at the same time, the neo-corporatist models seem to suggest that the 
efficiency enhancing union-employer or union-state relations is possible because 
of unions’ inability to exercise their power in the form of militant wage demand,
19 The close association between the neo-corporatist literature and macroeconomic interest opens up debates 
on change in production organisation in manufacturing (Streeck and Matzner 1991), or trade openness and 
monetary regimes (Iversen 1999), amongst others.
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implying that the positive effect is unlikely to materialise if the union’s bargaining 
power is strong (McHugh 2002). This paradox is similar to the one we 
encountered in the collective voice model. For corporatist regime to function 
society needs strong labour unionism, but at the same time for it to function in an 
efficiency-enhancing manner without wage militancy, an institutional structure 
that constrains the exercise of union power has to be in place.
Neo-corporatist models and hump-shaped hypothesis thus deals with the degree 
of inclusion of the working class movement in the centralised redistributive 
politics, but fails to discuss under what condition this is possible or whether the 
inclusion leads to efficiency and growth enhancing outcomes. While it is perhaps 
correct that inclusion of trade unions in macro decision making means that 
unions have an incentive to increase the size o f surplus for the society as a whole, 
inclusion o f organised labour also means that workers have more options 
available to them, including rent-seeking activities and, in the extreme case, 
working class revolution. For neo-corporatist solution to work, there must be a 
guarantee that workers do not use the option of class conflict and militancy.
At this point, it is important to note that the neo-corporatist models assumes a 
particular type o f social structure which is associated with Northern and Western 
European economies on one side and Japan on the other in the post-World War 
II period. The social costs of trade unionism was kept low because o f a class 
compromise that is relevant in the context of a booming economy, population 
averse to conflict after the destruction of the W odd Wars, and ideology of 
industrial or social democracy. As Iversen (1999: 29) points out centralised 
bargaining is based on “coalition of diverse and conflicting interest” and hence 
how the centralised system works depend on whether political reconciliation of 
these interests can be achieved. For example, in many West European and 
Scandinavian countries, the centralisation of the union movement which took
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place after the First World War, which coincided with increased participation of 
union representatives in political parties and government, and with the 
establishment and expansion of state intervention mechanisms such as social 
insurance administration, unemployment benefits and pension schemes, allowed 
unions to take active part in the welfare state (Amadeo 1992). The end of the 
Second World War dramatically increased union membership, which further 
enhanced their political status (Calmfors et al. 2001: 12-13). Therefore the social 
democratic politics in Northern and Western European countries may have 
opened up redistributional activities by trade unions and other social actors to 
engineer particular income and consumption patterns, such activities were 
ultimately legitimate only as long as it did not seriously impair the economic 
viability of the industries and the survival of capitalism more generally, to which 
the welfare of most people in the society depends. It is at the backdrop of such 
socio-economic conditions that enabled corporatist solution to work in 
restraining wage militancy.
A close look at the experience of Japan is equally ifiuminating. Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988: 16) categorised Japan as an example o f decentralised bargaining 
structure based on the observation that “there are several national confederations 
of labour but their coordinating rules are minor, and the actual negotiations take 
place exclusively at the enterprise level” . However, it is difficult to characterise 
the Japanese system purely in terms o f a pluralist model. Although the formal 
wage bargaining takes place at the level of firm and enterprise, the bargaining 
coordination through informal negotiations and pattern setting cannot be 
underestimated (Sako 1997). In particular Shunto or the Spring Offensive system, 
which was introduced in 1955, became an established system for an informal 
‘synchronisation’ of wage bargaining during the 1960s. But again it is important to 
note that decade prior to 1955 was “the period of painfully forged modernization 
in the Japanese system of industrial relations” (Nakayama 1975, p.182)
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characterised by violent strikes, motivated by radical ideologies of anti­
establishment class struggle. This revolutionary labour orientation antagonised a 
large section of the population, as well as many politicians and business 
enterprises, and led to organisational split and conflict between radical and 
moderate groups. However a unified shift in union strategy as agent for 
pragmatic reformist agenda, accepting the market-based economic model and 
supporting parliamentary democracy, was only achieved in the mid to late-1960s, 
after the Japanese economy started to show a high rate of growth, and improving 
the welfare o f membership through interest politics became a realistic strategy 
(Shinoda 1997). To put differently, it was only once the class compromise was 
achieved that the organised system of collective bargaining and wage 
coordination that does not undermine the prospects of economic development 
and capitalist accumulation was able to function. Again the ‘corporatist’ solution 
based on decentralised enterprise unions actively participating in the production 
of surplus must be understood within the particular social and economic context 
of post-World War II Japan.
These social contexts are often implicit in the discussion of conventional 
literature, and even if  they are explicitly mentioned, much of the focus is on the 
difference in the nature o f political institutions. For example, when they apply 
Albarez, Garrett and Lange’s model, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) have OECD 
countries in mind. For Aidt and Tzannatos the main difference between the 
developed and developing countries is the well established liberal democracy and 
law in the former. They argue that “ [mjost industrial counties have stable, liberal 
democracies” but “ [t]his is not the case in many developing and middle-income 
counties”. They argue further that the “economic impact o f unions in an 
environment o f ill-designed labor \sici\ and product market in which rent-seeking 
is profitable is very different from the economic impact o f unions in a well 
designed environment” (all quotes from p. 15) implying that positive economic
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effect of collective bargaining may apply to advanced industrialised countries but 
may not be the case for developing countries.
In the absence of these social conditions, the institutional structure or the degree 
of inclusion is not sufficient to keep labour movement from becoming militant or 
anti-capitalist, let alone to establish wage coordination or cooperative labour- 
management relations that are productivity and growth enhancing. This is 
particularly important when analysing LMIs in developing countries such as 
India, where social and economic conditions are very different. Developing 
countries are by definition characterised by an underdeveloped capitalist sector, 
on which the majority of the population is, at best, indirectly dependent, even if 
activities such as petty commodity production, trade and subsistence agriculture 
take place within the wider process of capitalist development. In contrast to the 
experience of corporatism in Northern and Western Europe, industrial capital 
and labour are a relatively small section o f the society in developing countries and 
because property rights are not well established, much of the transfer of resources 
happens by political process outside the market, which makes political rent- 
seeking more profitable than economic appropriation by industrial 
entrepreneurship. This means that redistributional activities that are economically 
unviable or might be harmful for economic development are less likely to be 
constrained, and state intervention in developing countries to coordinate labour- 
management relations does not always lead to enhancing the prospects of 
productivity growth. Indeed, we have seen in Chapter 1 that it is precisely the 
‘clientelist’ accommodation of labour and the politics of redistribution that are 
seen to be hindering further industrial development and employment growth in 
India (Pencavel 1995; Banerji, Campos and Sabot 1995). In reality, it is difficult to 
find an example of a developing country with a comparable corporatist political 
structure (Nelson 1991), but even if we look at countries such as Argentina and 
Venezuela in the 1980s, where centralised unionism led to strong labour unions
142
Chapter 2  Theories of LM Is
with broad social support, while there are some evidence of wage concession 
(Nelson op cits. 52), overall rent-seeking by political entrepreneurs resulted in 
imposing cost to informal and agricultural sector, rather than leading to efficiency 
and growth-enhancing outcomes.
In contrast to the NIE-inspired literature on LMIs, such as Aidt and Tzannatos, 
we do not view the persistence o f failed LMIs in developing countries as an issue 
of institutional design or degree of inclusion, let alone as one of democratic 
accountability and well established property rights. From our political economic/ 
dialectical perspective, explaining the outcomes of bargaining by the types or 
forms of LMIs alone is limited. This is because the types and forms of LMIs are 
reflections of the way in which production and labour processes are managed and 
controlled, which may be through market and regulatory means or using extra- 
economic processes. Thus the same centralisation/ decentralisation of LMIs or 
their transparency and accountability may be associated with vastly different 
outcomes, both economically and politically, depending on their social and 
historical conditions. The implications of differential types of LMIs can only be 
fully analysed by focusing on the mutually determining interrelations between 
LMIs, the mode of managing the labour process, and the redistributional 
conflicts at the macro political economy, within the specific historical and social 
formations. Again this indicates that a careful analysis of the social context that 
determines opportunities, incentives and constraints for micro decision making is 
important.
2.3 Discussion and hypotheses
The objective of this chapter was to develop the framework for our political 
economic/ structural analysis o f LMIs in Indian industry. In Section 1, we 
discussed concepts of rent and rent-seeking, types of bargaining agents and some 
insights and propositions for the structural analysis of LMIs. The political
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economic approach was then contrasted with the conventional models in the 
literature review in Section 2, in particular the increasing influence of the N IE  as 
the analytical framework of mainstream theories.
In order to bring together the discussion, and as a way of conclusion, in this final 
section of the present chapter we shall consider some hypotheses that we will 
examine in the remainder o f this thesis.
2.3.1 Relationships between LMIs and growth
We have seen in section 2.1.1 of this chapter that the traditional debate on labour 
market institutions (LMIs) in mainstream economics was between what Freeman 
(1993) termed ‘distortionists’ and ‘institutionalists’, which focused on the possible 
social costs and benefits of LMIs. To put it differently what is common in the 
mainstream models we discussed in this chapter is their tendency to focus 
predominantly on the effects of LMIs on efficiency and productivity growth. We 
also have pointed out that, over the past two decades, there are indications to 
suggest that the mainstream debate has moved on from the traditional 
‘distortionalist’-‘institutionalist’ dichotomy to identifying the determinants of 
types of LMIs. This is not surprising given that the empirical evidence suggesting 
that LMIs are neither universally harmful nor efficiency and growth-enhancing, 
and that the net effect is associated with their differential types. The net effect o f 
collective bargaining is positive if the institutional intervention results in 
efficiency and growth enhancing effects that exceed the social costs incurred by 
rent-seeking activities, but negative if the monopoly effect does not produce a 
socially positive impact that is sufficiently large. For this emerging NIE-based 
literature on the “appropriate mix” of institutions, the important question is to 
identify when bargaining agents in I,Mis engage in socially productive activities 
and when they engage in unproductive activities. However, once again the 
interpretation o f many models, particularly those that inform policy, is that LMIs
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cause or precede efficiency or productivity growth. The tendency of mainstream 
theories to underestimate, if not ignore entirely, the socio-political and historical 
contexts of the model, another aspect o f conventional models we have 
consistently highlighted throughout this chapter, is consistent with this implied 
causality which in effect treats LMIs as ‘exogenous’ variables20. In policy-oriented 
literature, such as Booth (1989) which presents a model of the ‘choice’ of 
bargaining structure by the employer and trade union, causality is assumed in the 
interpretation of statistical correlation, such as described in Calmfors and 
Driffill’s (1988) hump-shaped curve (Figure 2-3).
In contrast, we have argued that a political economic analysis o f LMIs treats them 
as a systematic consequence of the patterns of accumulation and economic 
development in the specific historical and social context. In other words, LMIs 
are ‘endogenous’ variables in the sense that existing LMIs are understood as a 
reflection of how society organises the process of development and 
accumulation, and how labour processes are managed and controlled. O f course, 
this is not to argue that the types of LMIs do not have efficiency implications, 
since there are many layers o f potential causes and effects. Rather, our argument 
is that LMIs reflect the balance o f power and social relations, within which they 
are embedded, and which in turn affect the historically specific ways in which 
economic development proceeds. Thus, for a political economic analysis, 
causality cannot be imposed on empirically observed correlation without careful 
interpretation of the social and historical context from which it is drawn.
20 To be fair, there are examples o f  mainstream literature with focus on the transformation o f  LMIs in 
response to changes in industrial structure, technology and distributive politics, such as Iversen (1999). 
However, even in such subtle treatment, the emphasis is placed on the implications o f  LMIs on efficiency 
and productivity. More importantly, for the purpose o f  the present argument, the policy prescriptions that 
tend to be extracted from these theories predominantly focuses on the causality from the type o f  LMIs to 
growth, as we discussed in Chapter 1.
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2.3.2 Determinants of LMIs
Transaction costs, policy failure and cognitive determinants
Given the assumption in the conventional models that in effect treats LMIs as 
‘exogenous’ variables, some mainstream theories focus on a combination o f (i) 
informational and transactions costs, and (ii) policy failure as the main 
determinants o f LMIs. For example, according to collective voice models, such as 
Freeman and Medoff (1984), with imperfect information, different types of LMIs 
(understood as ‘voice institutions’) can contribute to efficiency gains by acting as 
intermediaries and brokers of information. Similarly, some models in the neo- 
corporatist literature such as Booth (1989) describe the ‘choice’ o f ‘optimal’ 
bargaining structure in terms of both the employers and trade unions minimising 
transaction costs involved in wage regulation. In a competitive industry with 
many small firms, it is thought that employers choose a more centralised 
bargaining structure because it is easier to regulate the wages (Booth op cit. 226). 
Similarly, firms with higher labour costs would choose centralised bargaining 
because of the concern to maintain wage regulation. On the other hand, weak 
trade union organisations, for example due to low union density or multiple 
unions, are thought to prefer centralised bargaining to maximise the economy of 
scale.
Information and transaction costs as the source of specifying the types o f LMIs is 
not sufficient in explaining why apparently inefficient LMIs persist, as generally 
perceived in the policy debates on India’s labour market reforms. We have seen 
in Chapter 1 that the existing types of LMIs in India are seen as a result of a 
particular policy of industrial relations management, whereby the collective 
bargaining institutions are highly politicised and trade unions affiliated to the 
ruling political party are deliberately promoted by the state, a situation 
characterised by Pencavel (1995) as a “patronage regime”.
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According to the logic of new institutional economics (NIE), both transaction 
costs and policy failures as determinants of LMIs can be traced to the cognitive 
beliefs and ideologies of bargaining agents. N IE  focuses on how the macro 
structure comes to equilibrium or evolves. Political and economic institutions, 
technology, demography, property rights, and the ideology of a society, which act 
as constraints to micro agents’ optimisation behaviour and interactions, are 
difficult to change partly because structure can be thought o f as a complex and 
‘nested’ hierarchy of rules, the renegotiation o f these rules and contracts is costly, 
partly because o f the free-riding problem (Olson 1971). However, there are 
moments in history in which even this structure is altered, often when the 
existing institutions are no longer efficient, for example, as a result o f 
technological change. North (1981; 1990; 1999) focuses on the role o f economic 
and political entrepreneurs who stand to improve their bargaining position and 
therefore attempt to devote resources to the restructuring o f these rules at the 
higher level, combined with changes in ideas, ideologies and beliefs, in 
overcoming the free-riding problem. He claims that “long-run economic change 
is the cumulative consequence of innumerable short-run decisions by political 
and economic entrepreneurs that both directly and indirectly (via external effects) 
shape performance” (1990: 104).
Given the framework of institutions as a ‘choice’ by micro-level agents, the 
following question naturally occurs: I f  the type of unionism is the problem, why 
don’t workers collectively try to change them?
We have seen that according to transaction cost models, the constraint to 
institutional change is what North calls legislative or political transaction costs, 
and that prevailing perceptions, ideas and preferences play important roles in 
overcoming it. For example, even if union involvement in rent-seeking is 
hindering efficient resource allocation and growth, which may increase the
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surplus of the economy as a whole, because micro-level agents form incomplete 
subjective perceptions based on local experiences and problems and not on 
information about complex macro political economy. Douglass North (1990: 51) 
calls this ‘rational ignorance’ and Oliver Williamson (1985) ‘bounded rationality’; 
the assumption is that economic agents are rational in their intentions but limited 
in their ability to decide the best strategy partly because information cannot be 
fully obtained and partly because the computation required to derive such a 
strategy is too complex. North (1990; 1999) explains that failed institutions often 
persist because (i) in a world o f uncertainty people often cannot grasp reality 
accurately; (ii) people rely on belief systems (religion, ideology, economic models); 
and, (iii) there are informal rules in society which take more time to change than 
formal ones. This leads to seeking explanation in cognitive problems. Even if 
rules and norms are path-dependent and therefore constrain the choices of 
micro-level agents, as perceptions of reality change, and with this new beliefs and 
ideology are formed, this can incrementally change policy and eventually the 
higher-level institutional structure itself. Therefore the persistence o f failed 
institutions is explained by imperfect information, belief systems and ideology, 
which hinders the ‘evolution’ o f institutions. This conclusion is not particularly 
surprising since an important source of transaction costs is the cognitive 
limitations of economic agents.
This hypothesis that perceptions and belief is important in explaining the 
persistence of inefficient institutions is reflected in recent analysis of LMIs by 
researchers linked with the World Bank, which traditionally were associated with 
the distortionist position. For example, in the Bank’s working paper, Banerji, 
Campos and Sabot (1995) contrast the economic performances o f East and 
South-East Asia with that of South Asia, in particular India, and suggest that the 
‘elites’ in India at least initially adopted a “distributional” strategy in dealing with 
the demands from wage labour because of the Nehruvian ideology of state-led
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development combined with controlled industrial relations guided by the state, 
while the organised labour followed “confrontational” strategy which followed 
from their own leftist stance.
Given the focus on the problem of cognitive psychology, the policy debate under 
the emerging consensus is centred on small-scaled micro-level reforms to 
improve economic incentives for productive activities; a set o f policy agendas that 
can be broadly called ‘good governance’, which includes issues such as stable 
property rights, transparency and accountability21. For example, in another recent 
World Bank publication, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) explain the efficiency 
implications of LMIs by focusing on the compatibility of types of unions and 
government, and yet argue that the potential positive effects o f LMIs may not be 
realised in developing countries which lack well designed labour and product 
markets as well as a stable, liberal democracy.
Freeman (1993) goes further to argue that effective LMIs may offer “social 
feedback to policy makers by forcing social intervention to buffer the costs of 
reform programmes, while enlisting popular support for the reforms”. Accepting 
that such a neo-corporatist model has not been found in developing countries, he 
argues that for such all-encompassing LMIs to work, it is necessary to have “a 
strong labor movement, with leaders able to assess the economic scene and 
convince workers to accept current consumption losses for future gains; a
21 A popular debate topic in the ‘good governance’ policy agenda is how to interpret the experience o f  China. 
The economic growth in China is difficult to explain within the traditional Washington consensus policy 
framework because economic growth does not accompany liberalisation, privatisation or democratisation. 
The largest non-state investment took place in the township and village enterprises (TVEs) which is 
neither private nor public in its ownership, and the legal framework for private property protection is 
underdeveloped. However the new policy consensus still sees China as a success case in which institutional 
reform was successful in improving economic incentives by ensuring informal property protection for 
existing and potential investors (North 1999; Qian 2003; Rodrik 2004). Even though formal property 
protections is lacking, investors and owners o f  TVEs can feel assured that their land will not be taken away 
by the government as long as they share their profits with the local government and the Communist Party.
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business community that accepts labor as a social partner; and a government 
willing to share some prerogatives with its social partners” (p. 138). Not 
surprisingly this argument is simply an extension of the collective voice model of 
trade unionism (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Again the implicit assumption here 
is that if there are social and political conditions that enable unions to use their 
‘voice’ and thus act as mediators o f information, then LMIs can contribute 
positively to economic development.
Scope for an alternative political economicframework
While there are clearly interesting insights to be found in the N IE  approaches and 
cognitive hypotheses and while it is arithmetically correct that the sum of micro 
activities aggregates to form the macro structure, it is not only simplistic but also 
an analytical cul de sac to assume that, at any point of time, structural problems can 
be explained by the decision or action of micro agents. Instead for a political 
economic analysis, whatever the subsequent efficiency implications o f the LMIs, 
in practice it is often political factors, most importantly class struggle over 
distribution o f (total) surplus value, which give rise to and bring about changes in 
LMIs. Therefore the reproduction and transformation of different types of LMIs 
may have nothing to do with the reduction o f transaction costs or increasing 
efficiency and productivity o f society as a whole.
We have already highlighted some peculiarities o f LMIs in developing countries. 
Developing countries can be characterised by unstable property rights and a lack 
of well established procedure o f dispute resolution over them. Much of the 
transfer of rights and resources are therefore determined by distributional 
conflicts between political entrepreneurs who organise factions and coalitions of 
various interests, rather than organised along classes. In India these distributional 
politics is dominated by conflicts between patron-client networks organised by 
the so-called ‘intermediate’ or ‘middle’ classes (Kalecki 1972; Jha 1980; Khan
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1996; 1998; McCartney and Harriss-White 2000), who are often themselves 
fragmented but could be politically powerful due to their ability to organise and 
mobilise the masses and contest political settlements which fail to accommodate 
them. LMIs and labour-management relations in India are formed within this 
context with other actors in the wider social context operate and compete for 
politically created incomes or resources — what we have termed ‘outside-firm 
rents’. The implication is that the types of LMIs and action of bargaining agents 
depend on the political constraints and settlements, under which LMIs are 
created and operate.
The importance o f ‘outside-firm rents’ as exogenous constraints to institutional 
change can be explained even within the framework of NIE, especially using the 
conventional literature on collective action problem. Because of the “public 
goods” nature of the outcome of structural change, the rational response for 
micro-level agents is to free-ride (Olson 1971). Bhattacherjee (1999: 18) argues 
that this is particularly so when the “costs o f collective goods” are substantially 
different across different sectors and it is difficult for the trade union movement 
to act as an “all-encompassing” organisation.
In addition, exogenous rents constrain micro-level choices because in this social 
context in which distributional conflicts are dominated by patron-client networks, 
management and labour in the organised industrial sector, who are a small 
minority in society, are more likely to benefit by seeking accommodation and 
changing their location within the patron-client networks, or even influencing the 
factional organisation, rather than by fundamentally challenging the power 
structure itself. In other words, the political and economic calculations o f 
bargaining agents would be to get the ‘insider’ out and get inside. This is not to 
say that power structure cannot be changed, but ultimately the only way in which 
this social organisation is changed is through coalition formation in order to
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challenge the legitimacy of factional mobilisation by insiders, as we shall illustrate 
in our case studies of Mumbai and Kolkata in Chapters 5 and 6. This may happen 
through historical and political processes, but it is simplistic to assume that this is 
achieved by economic and political calculations of micro-level actors at a 
particular point in time.
2.3.3 Analytical and policy implications
The contrasting hypotheses outlined above have important implications for the 
analysis o f LMIs. The point can be illustrated with reference to the comparison of 
LMIs in Mumbai (Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta), the site o f our field research, 
on which basis we analyse the reproduction and transformation of different types 
of LMIs in the remaining chapters o f this thesis.
Mumbai and Kolkata are two of the oldest industrial centres of India and until 
the 1960s shared similar patterns of industrial development and labour 
movement. However, since the 1980s Mumbai has been associated with relatively 
rapid economic growth accompanied by changes in industrial structure led by 
sectors such as textile garment, chemicals metal processing industries, as well as 
the vast expansion o f financial and other services. In contrast, economic 
performance in Kolkata was comparable to the all India average during the 1980s 
and 90s and, despite the recent industrial resurgence in the mid-2000s, its long 
term growth prospects remain unclear.
It is common to argue that industrial performance in Mumbai has been better 
because it enjoyed industry-friendly policies of the Maharashtra state government 
as well as a ‘good investment climate’, including the ‘rationalisation’ of labour law 
and promotion of professional company-based unions, compared to the ‘poor 
investment climate’ characterised by rigid regulation imposed by the communist 
state government of West Bengal and unions organised at industry-level and
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affiliated to political parties in Kolkata. This popular argument is consistent with 
some of the mainstream NIE-based theories we have outlined above, which 
emphasise the efficiency implications of LMIs, and seeks the “appropriate mix” 
of LMIs compatible with or giving rise to economic growth.
As we argue in Chapter 5, for a political economic approach, the causality is at 
least partially in the opposite direction. LMIs are understood as institutional 
forms o f capitalist social relations, which reflect the particular patterns of 
economic development and accumulation. In the context of India, the types and 
forms o f LMIs are explained in terms o f their location within changing patron- 
client politics. Therefore, LMIs in some modem sectors o f Mumbai represent 
cases in which the dynamic growth and changes in the industrial sector providing 
strong incentives for unions and other bargaining agents to organise to seek 
company based cwithin-firm rents’. In contrast, Kolkata represents a case in 
which ‘outside-firm rents’ are more attractive in a less industrially dynamic 
context. This does not mean that the LMIs in Mumbai are less influenced by 
redistributional conflicts within the macro political economy compared to those 
in Kolkata. Rather our argument is that the patterns of patron-client networks, 
and the locations of bargaining agents within it, differs reflecting the different 
ways in which industrial development proceeded in the two regions.
Clearly the two hypotheses on the determinants of LMIs would lead to different 
analytical approaches. If  we follow some of the mainstream models inspired by 
the NIE, given the technological and market conditions, differential types o f 
LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata are explained partly by the policy failure to address 
the extent of rent-seeking behaviour o f bargaining agents, and partly by cognitive 
beliefs and ideologies of such agents, who play key roles in influencing policies 
and institutions. In contrast, our alternative political economic approach requires 
us to examine the relationship between different types of macro political
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economic conflicts and the types and forms of LMIs at the micro-level, by 
categorising different coalitions o f redistributional conflicts. Thus our analysis of 
micro-level observations on labour-management bargaining in Mumbai and 
Kolkata is complemented by secondary evidence on the wider social and 
historical context in which the relationship takes place.
The two hypotheses also have important policy implications. The NIE approach 
to institutional change suggests the need for micro-level reforms, such as well 
established property rights, transparency and accountability, to allow agents to 
mobilise and collectively change inefficient and failed institutions. From this 
perspective, what is hindering the potential efficiency enhancing ‘voice’ effects of 
LMIs to function are the informality and lack o f clarity in the roles of bargaining 
agents in the labour process, which provides scope for rent-seeking by political 
entrepreneurs of various types, and the lack of transparency and accountability in 
the bargaining process and activities of bargaining agents, as we saw in Freeman 
(1993) or Aidt and Tzannatos (2002). In contrast, for our political economic 
analysis, civil society may not be the solution; it may actually be the problem. 
While democracy, accountability and transparency are all positive social goals of 
their own, micro-level reforms based on such a ‘good governance’ agenda are not 
only ineffective but also counter-productive as a means to change the behaviour 
of bargaining agents. If  opportunities, incentives, constraints and capacities of 
bargaining agents are significantly influenced by social and political structures, 
micro-level reforms can only reinforce existing structural problems rather than to 
eliminate them.
154
Chapter 3 Methodology
C h a p t e r  3
M ETH ODO LO GICAL ISSUES IN  AN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON 
POLITICAL ECONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LABOUR M ARKET 
INSTITUTIONS IN  INDIA
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will address some methodological issues related to our political 
economic analysis o f labour market institutions (LMIs) in Indian industries. 
Conducting an empirical research within the political economic framework poses 
a number of challenges, in terms of research design, interpretation and use of 
data collected.
First, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the political economic or dialectical 
approach requires us to analyse observed phenomena by focusing on the structural 
totalities. In Marx’s (1973: 101) widely-cited phrase, it is “the method of rising 
from the abstract to the concrete”. The abstract or “the essence is [...] a logical 
category that supplies the basic mediations for the reconstruction o f the concrete 
in thought” and they are “actual” and historically contingent (Saad-Filho 2002: 9). 
The essential relations in capitalism is “integral and whole, and this organic 
system of mutually conditioning things or phenomena is determining with regard 
to its parts, or moments” (Saad-Filho op tit:. 8). However, the appearance or 
“concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, 
hence unity of the diverse” (Marx op tit: 101) and therefore the essential relations 
are not immediately evident in the observed phenomena and social forms we 
investigate. The task for an empirical research is therefore to analytically reveal 
the essence "tin and through the phenomena” (Saad-Filho op tit: 10). In the context 
of the thesis, the objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the essential 
capitalist relations and problematise the observed types of LMIs as identified or
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categorised forms, rather than simply to take the identified and categorised 
typology of LMIs for granted as objective facts or seek explanation in concepts 
external to the objects.
Given this analytical framework, the methodology we employed is to combine 
the micro-level data collected from field research with secondary evidence on the 
wider social and historical contexts. However, the social and historical processes 
are not treated as separate macro-level phenomena external to the micro-level 
observations, and instead social relations are seen to be embodied in the micro­
level forms observed from the fieldwork. Therefore, the objective is to provide a 
dialectical analysis o f the ways in which types of LMIs are organised by 
bargaining agents at the micro-level in response to structural opportunities and 
constraints determined in the. wider process o f accumulation and redistributional 
conflicts. This requires a data collection strategy that places emphasis on the 
social and political contexts. It also calls for a data analytical approach that 
focuses on the interdependence amongst constellation of variables and provides a 
systemic analysis of LMIs.
Second, just like the observed labour relations must be understood as a systematic 
consequence of the wider process o f accumulation and the labour process, the 
data collection on LMIs must also be recognised as a social and political process, 
rather than as a impersonal and neutral process o f collecting ‘facts’, and therefore 
the interpretation and analysis o f data must take into account the conditions 
under which data were collected (Lockwood 1993). More profoundly, the data 
collection through fieldwork is constantly subjected to ethical and political 
questions, and requires “commitment and openness to others” (Armbruster 2008: 
12). This forces the researcher to engage with and contextualise their etihics in 
the particular political and social conditions. However, these dilemmas and 
challenges are also important reflections of the social relations and the political
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economic conditions under which LMIs are organised that provide important 
insights for our research.
A number of methodological issues can be raised from these analytical 
reflections. The objective of the first half of the present chapter is therefore to 
contextualise the data collection process and outline “the politics o f fieldwork”. 
Section 3.2 outlines the procedure of the field research conducted by the author 
in Kolkata (Calcutta) and Mumbai (Bombay) in 2001 \  and the problems and 
dilemma encountered in the data collection. With the context of the data 
collection described in mind, Section 3.3 discusses statistical and other techniques 
employed when analysing the data in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
3.2 Political Economy of LMIs and Politics of Field Research
3.2.1 Aims and Motivations of the Empirical Research
As developed in the previous two chapters, our political economic approach 
treats the existing types o f LMIs as systematic consequences of the patterns o f 
economic development and accumulation, rather than being ‘chosen’ by 
individual bargaining agents. We have also argued that redistributional conflicts in 
developing countries such as India are typically dominated by patron-client 
networks organised by political entrepreneurs o f different types, and that 
bargaining agents in LMIs operate within this context. The objective of the 
empirical research in the present thesis is therefore to identify differential types o f 
LMIs, problematise them as particular juridical-political forms of capitalist social 
relations, identify the social and political conditions that mediate them, and 
examine how the labour process is managed under them.
1 The author received financial support for the fieldwork by the Central Research Fund (CRF) grant, 
University o f  London and the Postgraduate Additional Fieldwork Award, SO AS.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the on-going policy debates on LMIs in Indian 
industry are often based on stylised images and popular perceptions about trade 
unions and organised labour. Much of the evidence on the apparently rigid and 
politicised LMIs draws on problematic macro-level statistics on unionisation2 and 
industrial disputes, media reports on labour unrests, and business perceptions 
about protective labour laws3, rather than on detailed empirical studies on what 
unions and other bargaining agents do, which is relatively lacking especially in 
economics4. While we do not pretend that our present research offers resolution 
to this gap in research, at least it is a contribution to the emerging list o f micro­
level studies that highlight the diverse and complex modalities o f trade unionism 
and organised industrial labour, such as those collected in Davala (1992) or Parry, 
Breman and Kapadia (1999), which challenge the perceived notion o f LMIs in 
India. More importantly, the objective of this thesis is not only to provide detailed 
empirical observations about the diversity o f LMIs, but also to explain the
2 For example, official statistics on trade unions and union memberships, as presented in Figure A1 -5 and A1 -
6 in Chapter 1, are known to be frustratingly unreliable. Official statistics on trade unions and union 
memberships in India, published in Indian Labour Year Book and Indian Labour Statistics by the Labour 
Bureau, rely on voluntary annual return by trade unions. It is known that trade unions often ignore the 
requirement to submit returns (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). Therefore there are three categories o f  
unions: unions that do not register; unions registering but do not report their membership size; and unions 
that register and submit returns. The first group o f  unions are invisible in official statistics. Rudolph and 
Rudolph {op tit.: 280-1) estimate that the number unregistered union is as significant as one-third to on-half 
o f  the number o f  officially recognised union. The second group o f unions is accounted for in terms o f  the 
number o f  registered unions but not in terms o f  union memberships, while the third group is reflected in 
both. From figure A l-5 , it is evident that increasingly large proportion o f  unions does not submit annual 
returns. Moreover it is often pointed out that even if  unions did submit returns, the submitted membership 
claims tend to be inflated. Therefore the number o f  unionised workers available from official statistics in 
figure A l-6  is the claimed number o f  memberships o f  unions that are registered with and submit returns to 
the government. The reason for not registering or submitting returns may be due to administrative inability 
to collect basic information about membership, but it may also be due to various social and political 
reasons.
3 We shall discuss some examples o f  these perception-based indices that are frequendy cited as evidence o f
market distortions and poor ‘governance’ in Chapter 5.
■* Compared to studies on rural labour or unorganised labour, where the majority o f  the research is based on  
detailed empirical work, the research on industrial labour in India seems to be concentrated around 
sociological/ psychological issues o f  union leadership or histories o f  trade unions and labour movements.
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different types of LMIs across sectors and regions by specifying the structural 
opportunities and constraints for bargaining agents, and thereby offer alternative 
analysis o f labour market reform priorities.
Given these aims of our thesis, it was necessary for us to carry out fieldwork in 
multiple sites, both geographically and sector-wise, interview managers and 
unionists, not only at the top of their organisations but also those closer to the 
point of production, and collect information on the ways in which bargaining 
agents and other social actors are involved in the process of controlling and 
managing the labour process. Also the collected data are used to evaluate, if not 
‘test’ in a strictly statistical sense, the hypothesis prevalent in the mainstream 
NIE-inspired theoretical literature as well as in the policy debates that the existing 
types of LMIs are explained by the preferences or ‘choices’ o f micro-level 
optimisation behaviour, as discussed in Chapter 2.
3.2.2 Research design: theory, practice and politics
Sampling frame and area
The fieldwork took place between 4 February and 12 June 2001; the first two 
months in Kolkata (Calcutta) and the last two and half months in Mumbai 
(Bombay). Within the 60 days in Kolkata, data on 11 establishments were 
collected. For these units, 66 interviews in total were conduced; amongst which 
35 were structured interview to unionists, 22 were structured interview to 
managers, and 9 to workers. In Mumbai, 27 individuals in total were interviewed, 
18 trade unionists and 9 managers, in 12 units. Table 3-1 lists the establishments 
covered in our fieldwork project.
Any field research involves two stages of sampling in the selection o f 
respondents: identifying a sampling frame and choosing the sample (Devereux 
and Hoddinott 1993). Given the objective of identifying and examining different
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types of LMIs in Indian industries, the fieldwork could not be confined to one 
single factory or even a particular location. The strategy employed by the author 
was to study a number of mills and factories in two cities, Kolkata and Mumbai, 
and in a variety of sectors that ranges from ‘traditional’ industries such as jute and 
cotton textile to more ‘modem’ light engineering and processing industries. 
Therefore the units in our sample can be broadly categorised into 4 ‘strata’ or 
‘clusters’: Kolkata ‘traditional’, Kolkata ‘modem’, Mumbai ‘traditional’ and 
Mumbai ‘modem’.
The selection o f Kolkata and Mumbai as locations of fieldwork was motivated by 
three factors. First, both Kolkata and Mumbai are amongst the oldest industrial 
centres where industrial capital and organised labour emerged during the colonial 
period, to the extent that the two regions were considered to have “dual 
dominance” (Singha 2005:44) in the early industrial development in India. 
Second, however, since the late 1970s or early 1980s there seems to have been a 
divergence in the patterns o f economic development in the two regions, with 
dynamic and ‘uneven’ process of growth led to structural change in the economy, 
whereas Kolkata is characterised by industrial stagnation. This divergence in 
economic performance is generally perceived to have been a result o f differing 
‘investment climate’ and ‘governance’ structure, with LMIs considered to be one 
of the key elements of them. In contrast, our hypothesis is that the causality is at 
least partially in the opposite direction, with types of LMIs reflecting the differing 
patterns of accumulation and types of redistributional conflicts. This last point 
takes leads us to the third factor in selecting these two regions as the site of 
fieldwork, which is the contrasting macro political economy in the two regions, 
within which labour-management bargaining takes place. We shall discuss these 
hypothesis further in Chapter 5.
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T a b l e  3-1 E s t a b l i s h m e n t s  c o v e r e d  i n  t h e  f i e l d w o r k
Number o f structured interviews with
Name of establishment Category Type o f industry Type o f ownership Union leaders Managers Workers Total
Orient Fans (Kl) Kolkata modem Engineering (eclectic fan manufacturing) Domestic private
3 2 0 5
State Bank o f India (TC2) Kolkata modem Banking Public 2 1 0 3
Wellington Jute Mill (K3) Kolkata traditional Jute manufacturing Domestic private 2 0 0 2
Alliance Jute Mill (K4) Kolkata traditional Jute manufacturing Domestic private 1 2 0 3
Hastings Jute Mill (K5) Kolkata traditional Jute manufacturing Domestic private 17 8 0 25
Vesuvius India Ltd. (K6) Kolkata modem
Engineering (steel 
refractory 
manufacturing)
Multinational 0 2 8 10
BOC (K7) Kolkata modem Engineering (oxygen 
processing?)
Multinational 2 1 0 3
Saregama India, HMV (K8) Kolkata modem
Engineering (music 
tape processing, 
dubbing)
Domestic private (previously 
multinational)
1 2 0 3
INDAL Belur (K9) Kolkata modem
Engineering
(aluminium
processing)
Domestic private (multinational 
until 2000)
4 4 1 9
Philips Taratolla luminaire 
unit (Kl 0) Kolkata modem
Engineering (lamp 
manufacturing)
Multinational 2 1 0 3
Lagan Jute Machinery (Kl 1) Kolkata modem 0
Engineering (jute 
machinery 
manufacturing)
Domestic private (pubic until 
2000)
0 0 0 0
INDAL Taloja (Ml) Mumbai modem
Engineering
(aluminium
processing)
Domestic private (multinational 
until 2000)
2 4 0 6
INDAL Kalwa (M2) Mumbai modem
Engineering
(aluminium
processing)
Domestic private (multinational 
until 2000)
2 1 0 3
NTC - Podar Mill (M3) Mumbai traditional Cotton textile manufacturing Public 5 1 0 6
NTC - India United Mill 
Nos. 3 and 4 (M4) Mumbai traditional
Cotton textile 
manufacturing
Public 2 1 0 3
NTC -  Sitram Mill (M5) Mumbai traditional Cotton textile manufacturing Public 2 0 0 2
Modem Mills (M6) Mumbai traditional Cotton textile manufacturing Domestic private
1 0 0 1
Philips Kalwa light factory 
(M7) Mumbai modem
Engineering (lamp/ 
light bulb 
manufacturing)
Multinational 1 1 0 2
Cipla (M8) Mumbai modem Pharmaceutical Domestic private 1 0 0 1
Century Textiles and 
Industries Ltd. (M9)
Mumbai traditional Cotton textile 
manufacturing
Domestic private 1 1 0 2
Hindustan Lever (M10) Mumbai modem Soap manufacturing Multinational 1 0 0 1
Fiat/ Preimer Automobil 
Ltd. (M il) Mumbai modem
Engineering (Car 
assembly)
Multinational 0 0 0 0
Kamani Tubes Ltd. (M l2) Mumbai modem Tube production Workers self-management 0 0 0 0
Total 52 32 9 93
Note: The unit code is given in the parenthesis, which denotes the location and the order in which 
the fieldwork was conducted amongst the surveyed units.
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Note that in this thesis we use the term Mumbai and Kolkata to include its 
surrounding districts in the outskirts o f the city. The geographical patterns of the 
site of our fieldwork can be illustrated by the map below, which has significance 
in their patterns of accumulation. On the one hand, in contrast to the jute mills 
that were located along both sides of the Hooghly River, mostly outside the city 
of Kolkata, the cotton textile industry was mainly set up in Girangaon, at the 
heart o f today’s Mumbai’s commercial area, which as we discuss in Chapter 4, has 
led to an increased focus on land speculation and commercial investments in 
recent decades. On the other hand, many of our ‘modem’ sector units are located 
closer to the centre of Kolkata, whereas in Mumbai increasing number of units 
have moved out o f the city into the industrial belt in Navi (New) Mumbai. We 
cannot claim to have a ‘representative’ sample that allows us to make statistically 
robust inferences about the industrial structure o f the two regions, as we discuss 
below. However, it does illustrate the greater success of Navi Mumbai not only in 
providing middle-class housings but also in attracting industrial investments 
(Shaw 1999), compared to say the Salt Lake district in suburban Kolkata, which 
once again reflects the contrasting patterns of accumulation in the two cities, as 
we discuss in Chapter 5.
Since one of the key purposes of the research was to investigate the role LMIs 
play in ‘mediating’ the labour process by influencing work organisation and 
establishing labour discipline, we decided to focus on manufacturing industries o f 
different types with factory production system5, although recognising that
5 Under the Factories Act 1948, a “factory” is any premises including its precincts (i) where ten or more 
workers work, or worked in the preceding twelve months, and where any manufacturing process is carried 
on with the aid o f  power; or (ii) where twenty or more workers work, or worked in the preceding twelve 
months, and where any manufacturing process is carried on without the aid o f  power; but does not include 
a mine under the Mines Act, 1952, or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces o f the Union, a railway 
running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.
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services and financial sectors are increasingly becoming important, as we 
comment below.
M a p  3-1 E s t a b l i s h m e n t s  c o v e r e d  i n  t h e  f i e l d w o r k
K.on C_-aon
Cipla (M8)
Premier Auto (M11); 
Kamani Tubes Ltd (M12)
Hindustan Lever (M10)
Podar (M3);
INDU Nos. 3 and 4 (M4) 
Sitram (M5)
Modern (M6)
Century (M9)
t G a n d h i  
N a tio n a l  P a r k
T h a n e
Thane
Creek
Dombivli
ediuane
Mjrnbai
NDAL Kalwa (M2) 
hilips Kalwa (M7)
NDAL Taloja (M1)
Ko k h e  
V l a g e
Alliance (K4)-
Wellington (K3)
Hastings (K5)
Lagan Jute Machinery (M11)
INDAL Belur (K9)
Bharyes
B airlyahatH chapt9in Id
o i  i a i  i u i i i  n  i c j t j r r r
H a b ra
Bartackpore j g |  Bamangachi 
Ko^agar Ba'asat
S o u th  
Dr. in
Vesuvius (K6);
BOC (K7);
Philips Taratolla (K10)
Howrah Kolkata 
aheshtala
U lu b en a  
R aipu r
Bishrv.jpiy
Rajpur
Barmpui
Tamiuk
Falra Stvranol 
Fatepur
N urpur
Magra Hay 
Ba^ asat
aregama (K8)
rient Fans (K1)
State Bank of India (K2) 
(Staff Association)
State Bank of India (K2) 
(Joka IIMC branch)
Note: Representational map; not to scale.
Source: Google Map (http://www.google.co.uk/).
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The category of ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’ (for want of a better term) was used as 
a measure to select units with comparable technological and production 
organisational conditions as well as industrial history. The jute manufacturing in 
Kolkata and the cotton textile industry in Mumbai provide interesting 
comparison in that both have their historical roots in the 1850s with significant 
influence of the British colonial rule, and were sites for the emergence o f 
industrial capital and organised labour, even if the subsequent development in the 
two industries are different as we discuss in Chapters 4 and 6. The term 
‘traditional’ can be used to characterise the labour-intensive nature o f production, 
with obsolete and ‘backward’ technology used in the majority in the units of these 
sectors, although as we shall see, there are a small number of ‘progressive’ units in 
Mumbai who have adopted new labour-replacing technology. More importantly 
for our purpose, the term can also refer to the perceived type of labour- 
management bargaining and unionism, which is characterised by ‘traditional’ 
state-dominated politicised LMIs. In our fieldwork, 3 units were covered for jute 
manufacturing: Wellington Jute Mill (K3) and Hastings Jute Mill (K5) located in 
the Hooghly district, and Alliance Jute Mill (K4) based in the Kalyani area, both 
in the northern outskirt o f Kolkata; whereas for the textile industry, we 
interviewed managers and union leaders from 5 units: Podar Mill (M3), India 
United (INDU) Mill numbers 3 and 4 (M4), Sitram Mill (M5), Modem Mills (M6) 
and Century Textiles (M9), all of which located in the Girangaun area in central 
Mumbai.
These two industrial sectors are contrasted with our ‘modem ’ sector, which 
includes a range of different types of manufacturing firms that are characterised 
by being new (in relative terms, some of these companies were established as
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early as the 1920s and 30s6), and being more capital-intensive: although none of 
these factories are ‘hi-tech’ in the sense of operating at the production frontier, 
many of the production processes require much higher-level of technology and 
skills than in jute and textile industries. Once again, however, the term ‘modem ’ is 
also used with reference to the so-called “new unionism” that emerged in these 
firms, especially in Mumbai, which is characterised by decentralised company- 
based bargaining and employees’ unionism, as we discuss in Chapter 4.
Given the diverse nature of our ‘modem’ sector category, we have tried to select 
companies that have production units in both Kolkata and Mumbai, with 
comparable production process. We studied 3 production units o f Indian 
Aluminium (INDAL), recently renamed as Hidalco Industries Ltd.: the Belur 
(K9) factory located in the Howrah district o f Greater Kolkata, and the Taloja 
(Ml) and Kalwa (M2) factories located in Navi (New) Mumbai. The Belur and 
Taloja units’ main operation is aluminium re-melting and rolling, whereas the 
Kalwa factory specialises in foil production, and the two production operations 
have differing technological-level and face different market conditions. Therefore 
comparison o f these three units offer interesting insights into the complex ways 
in which technological and market factors and political economic conditions 
interact in the determination of the types of LMIs, as analysed in Chapters 4 and 
5. Similarly, two units of Philips India were covered in our survey, Taratolla (also 
spelled Taratala) luminaire unit in Kolkata and Kalwa light factory in Mumbai, 
with both involved in lamp production, although with slightly different 
specialisation. Philips is particularly interesting as a case study of changes in LMIs
6 As possible reasons for the emergence o f  these ‘modern’ firms in the 1920s and 30s, Gooptu (2000) argues 
that during World War I there were disruptions in the import o f  commodity goods from Britain and 
overseas which led to high commodity prices, and gave incentive for investment in manufacturing goods. 
Goswami (1992: 256) suggests that the 1920s was also the period when the urban middle class “had 
become fairly prosperous and constituted a large market for consumer goods”.
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and managerial strategies that took place in the 1990s following the collapse of 
the union federation, as we examine in Chapter 6.
Other ‘modem ’ units in Kolkata included in our sample was Oriental Fans (Kl), 
an electric fan manufacturing factory located close to the Salt Lake City area o f 
the outskirt of Kolkata; BOC (K7), which produces compressed medical oxygen 
and located in Taratolla area; and Saregama India (K8), a music cassette ‘dubbing’ 
factory, located in South Dum Dum area at the suburban area o f Kolkata. In 
Mumbai, we also studied Cipla (M8), a pharmaceutical plant; a soap 
manufacturing factory o f Hindustan Lever (M10); and Premier Automobile 
(Ml 1), all located in the northern suburbs of the city. While it is clearly simplistic 
to categorise such diverse economic activities into a single sector, the grouping o f 
these units as the ‘modern’ sector is once again meaningful in comparison with 
the jute and cotton textile industries in the two regions.
The inclusion of several units requires some comment. Visiting and studying 
Lagan Jute Machinery (K ll), a jute machinery manufacturing company in 
Kolkata, was useful to get a sense of the technological conditions of machinery 
used in jute mills, but more importantly it provided our sample’s only public 
sector unit in the engineering industry. While the intention was to include both 
public and private sector units in our sample, this proved to be unfeasible for a 
number o f reasons, not least due to the fact that most operational public sector 
units had been privatised or ‘disinvested’. In fact, Lagan was also purchased by 
the owner of Hastings Jute Mill in 2000, just prior to our visit, but because the 
labour relations and managerial practices that studied were a continuation o f 
those established under state ownership, we have categorised and treated the unit 
as a public sector. Another public sector unit in our survey was the State Bank of 
India (K2) located in the Indian Institute o f Management Calcutta (IIMC) 
branch, where the author was based. In this case the inclusion was edifying, not
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so much of its public sector status, but as a glimpse into the labour-management 
bargaining in the banking sector, which is increasingly becoming important for 
the Indian economy. While the focus o f our analysis is on the labour- 
management bargaining in the manufacturing industries, the observation on the 
banking union offered a useful point o f reference to contextualise our analysis in 
the wider industrial relations scene in India, as we discuss in Chapter 4.
Vesuvius India (K6), a multinational industrial ceramics producing factory located 
on Taratolla road in Kolkata had no union representing the workers and staffs at 
the firm, and for this reason was not included in subsequent analysis of LMIs, but 
once again offered a point o f contrast in contextualising our findings. An extreme 
opposite o f Vesuvius was the visit to Kamani Tubes Ltd. (K12), a brass and 
copper tube manufacturer based in Mumbai, which has been managed by the 
workers’ cooperative since 1988 under the leadership of D. Thankappan. 
However, since 1997 the company has effectively been closed down, with the 
Kamani Employees Union (KEU) mainly acting to seek unpaid dues to workers. 
For this reason, again the unit has not been used in subsequent analysis for the 
types of LMIs, but the case offered important insights into the wider context o f 
labour movements in India.
Selection of samples and respondents
Given that the ‘object’ of our research is defined by our 4 ‘strata’ characterised by 
their regions and sectors, in theory we can take a census or large scale surveys 
such as the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) as the sampling frame and draw 
probability samples, for example by random, stratified, or clustering sampling 
methods, which has obvious advantage of being able to rely on statistical theory 
of sampling distribution, standard errors and confidence intervals in our analysis. 
In practice, however, field research o f this type relies heavily on the cooperation 
and goodwill o f key individuals in firms and organisations. The structured
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interview with managers and unionists take at least 30 minutes to conduct, and 
therefore it inevitability cause disruptions to their activities. The issue of 
confidentiality and privacy may also be a concern for many, and therefore finding 
respondents who are prepared to put up with such research process is in itself the 
greatest challenge of conducting a fieldwork (Kiyokawa 2003: 49). Therefore, the 
selection of the sample often depends heavily on recommendations by local 
personal contacts, and the feasibility of conducting the data collection.
At the same time, as already pointed out, the objective o f our field work was to 
include a wide variety of industrial activities, mainly in manufacturing, that are 
comparable in the two regions. Therefore, jute manufacturing in Kolkata was 
analysed with the comparison with cotton textile industry in Mumbai in mind, 
and companies such as INDAL and Philips were studied more closely than some 
of the other units because of the possibility to compare their plants located in the 
two cities. Also within a particular sector, we tried to survey units that reflect the 
range of technological and market conditions. For example in Kolkata jute, we 
attempted to study “performing” mills such as Alliance and Hastings, as well as 
less performing, if not “sick”, mills such as Wellington (categories according to 
the Indian Jute Mills Association or IJMA). Similarly, in Mumbai’s cotton textile 
industry, we surveyed a number o f public sector National Textile Corporation 
(NTC) mills as well as privately owned mills such as Century and Modem, which 
have contrasting patterns o f development. In this sense, our sampling method 
can be termed ‘judgemental’ or ‘purposive’ in the sense that the researcher selects 
the sample based on predetermined criteria.
Like any non-probability sampling methods, the sample selected in the purposive 
method may not provide ‘representation’ of the population. Therefore the 
conclusions reached on the basis of our sample must be carefully evaluated 
through comparison with other existing studies and interpreted within its social
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and political contexts. It is therefore important for us to clarify the character of 
the sample and the analytical implications of our sampling method.
Politics of ‘gate keeping’
It is our observation that the character of our sample significantly depended on 
the politics of access or ‘gate keeping’. In addition to our sampling method being 
dictated by feasibility, a further dilemma faced in a research on labour- 
management bargaining is the general atmosphere o f (mutual) distrust between 
union members and management. For example, in an early period of the 
fieldwork, having successfully obtained agreement to select the units by random 
sampling from the list of jute mills under the IJMA, once the sample was drawn 
the author encountered difficulty in gaining access to those chosen units on the 
ground that they were ‘trouble’ mills. This is just one episode that illustrates the 
difficulty of conducting research on industrial relations in an environment o f 
intense, sometimes violent, labour-management conflicts, as illustrated by the 
murder of mill workers and executive at the Baranagar jute mill (an incident 
discussed in Chapter 6) which happened a month before the start o f our 
fieldwork.
Breman (1985: 28) points out the difficulty of sustaining the ‘fiction’ o f researcher 
as a neutral ‘outsider’ in fieldwork on labour relations where there are “very 
unequal social distribution and sharp conflicts of interests”, and concludes that “a 
reflection o f social reality based on an image presented from above is inadequate 
if this is not at the same time supplemented and amended by illumination from 
below”. In our case, establishing contacts with employers and firm managers 
were vital for us to gain access to the firm or the factory in order to get a glimpse 
of the production and labour processes we were aiming to examine. However, 
gaining access through contacts with employers tended to lead to selection o f 
units with less intense industrial conflicts, as illustrated by the above mentioned
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episode of the employers association’s refusal to permit access to ‘trouble’ jute 
mills in favour of ‘performing’ mills, such as Alliance and Hastings. Similarly, the 
recommendation by the NTC that enabled us to gain access to public sector mills 
in Mumbai textile industry was vital, but also our access was heavily controlled 
and monitored by their officers. On the other hand, the comparative studies o f 
Philips and INDAL units in Mumbai and Kolkata, used extensively in Chapters 4 
and 6, would not have been possible without gaining contacts through 
recommendations by managers in other firms, and the trust developed through 
these relationships.
In some instances, having gained access to the firm or the factory, the author was 
offered to have the questionnaires intended for trade union leaders or workers to 
be filled in by the management, and a significant time at the field was often spent 
on explaining the importance of interviewing the unionists or workers outside the 
influence of the employers. The close connection with the employers and 
managers of different ranks that was necessary to gain trust and access for our 
research, thus often implied a vested interest on the side of the hosts to impose 
their viewpoint which obscure the antagonistic relations and inequality o f power 
that underpin the labour-management relations. The vested interest in preventing 
access is not confined to the relationship between the employer and unions, but 
also applies to access to middle and lower-ranked managers and supervisors, 
perhaps to a less serious extent. In some industries, the middle and lower-level 
management may take significant initiative in labour management issues, and the 
extent to which these decisions are subjected to management politics at the top- 
level differs across sectors. Especially in ‘traditional’ sectors as jute and cotton 
textile we observed a tendency for the middle and lower-level management to 
make decisions on labour management issues with relative independence from 
the top-level management, as we analyse in Chapter 6. This implies important 
conflicts of interests and perceptions even within employers and the
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management. Another aspect of management vested interest that we came across 
was on issues in which employers were involved in lobbying governments to 
influence policy in their favour, such as the debate in Kolkata jute industry over 
Jute Packaging Materials Act o f 1987 that imposes compulsory use o f jute in 
selected packaging commodities, or the ‘modernisation proposals’ in Mumbai’s 
textile industry that permits mills to raise funds by diversifying their land use.
Once access was obtained, interview was conducted mostly in factory or 
company premise but effort was made to conduct interviews, especially with 
union organisers and workers, in private setting, such as meeting rooms or 
reception rooms within the factory. While in most cases, such facilities were 
generously provided, sometimes this led to aggressive questioning about our 
intentions of the research, and in rare occasions to downright refusal to interview 
unionists and workers in the manner we requested. In some cases, we had to 
resort to group interviews or interviews outside the factory premise as solutions.
In response to this ‘gate keeping’ for external communication by employers and 
other actors in socially powerful positions, the strategy followed in this fieldwork 
was to establish separate contacts through unions and other social actors, 
sometimes to the same units, but more often to units to which access was 
restricted by employers, in order to study “both sides o f each relationship” 
(Olsen 1993: 58). The recommendations through unions and social activist were 
especially critical to gain access to units and organisations in intense industrial 
conflicts. The additional value o f establishing close connections with unions and 
other social actors was gaining access to living quarters and other working class 
areas, which was extremely informative to form a sense of the living and working 
conditions of workers. However, establishing contacts through unions often 
meant that it was difficult to gain access to the factory premise, let alone to the 
employers and managers, because of the (clearly not unjustified, given the
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contacts through unions) suspicion about the intent o f our research. Moreover, it 
is clear that unions and activists who give recommendations also have their own 
social and political horizons and vested interests, and as a result the units and 
organisations that led from these contacts often represented cases where the firm 
or factory have either closed down or operating with difficulty and lower capacity 
due to persisting disputes. Thus units selected through union or activist contacts, 
such as Wellington Mill in Kolkata jute, Modem Mill in Mumbai textile, Cipla, 
Hindustan Lever and Kamani Tubes, represented cases where labour- 
management relations have seriously deteriorated.
It is however also important to recognise that union leaders and activities in key 
positions themselves can act as ‘gate keepers’ of information flow as well. While 
all of the unionists interviewed are courageous dedicated individuals, they may 
still have interest in preventing access to lower ranked unionists and rank-and-file 
workers. In particular, we observed different perceptions and views at different 
level of union ranks on contentious issues, such as the use for the voluntary 
retirement scheme (VRS) and the role unions play in implementing it for 
restructuring the work organisation, the use o f casual labour and subcontracting, 
and the land selling in Mumbai textile to raise funds for ‘modernisation’. Given 
the challenge of overcoming a multilayer of ‘gate keepers’, we had to abandon our 
initial ambition to systematically interviewing workers who are not key union 
officers, but we tried very hard to interview both top-level and middle to lower- 
ranked unionists to draw out these subtle difference in their perceptions.
Given the lack of information on the relationship between our sample and the 
sampling frame, it is difficult to evaluate the extent of ‘representativeness’ of the 
data, but for the reasons discussed above, it is likely that our sample includes the 
two extremes of the industrial relations scene, with the access through the 
management providing data for relatively stable industrial relations in units with
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reasonably successful industrial performance, and in contrast, the units we gained 
access though union and political activists offering insights into cases o f intense 
industrial conflicts, and some overlap o f the two. In this sense, we may argue that 
our sample captures the diversity of labour-management relations in Indian 
industry, while we still have to be cautious about over-extrapolating the findings 
from our observations. Therefore, our empirical analysis combines the case study 
approach with survey data analysis.
The differential patterns of access have meant that our sample is somewhat 
uneven in terms of the coverage o f the number o f managers and union leaders, as 
shown in Table 3-1. From an exploratory analytical viewpoint, this unevenness 
itself is a manifestation o f the patterns o f accumulation and modes of managing 
the labour process.
Types of data collected
Three types o f data were collected for the purpose o f this thesis. The first was the 
data from questionnaire-based structured interviewed with the unionists, 
managers and workers. The second type of data was the collective bargaining 
settlements between the employer and the unions. The third was background 
information about industries, firms and unions, such as financial accounting data, 
court rulings, reports and policy documents by governments and industry 
associations.
The questionnaire for the structured interview was prepared in London before 
departing for the fieldwork. Three versions o f the questionnaire were prepared, 
for unionists, managers and workers, although as discussed in the previous 
section, the interview to workers was not systematically conducted. The template 
o f the questionnaire was based on a previous survey in 1998 conduced in Delhi 
(Kiyokawa 2003), for which the author was involved as a research assistant, with
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questions drawn from or inspired by several previous fieldworks such as Jaspal 
Singh’s (1980) study on trade union leadership in Punjab in 1967, Tulpule and 
Dutta’s (1995) study of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines in 
Mumbai manufacturing, Romijn’s (1999) study on technological capacity of firms 
in Pakistan Punjab in 1994, Wilkinson and White’s (1994) questionnaire in the 
Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) survey in the UK, and 
Reid’s (1993) survey of small business enterprises in Scotland, amongst others. 
However, since the intention of the fieldwork was not primarily to replicate or 
compare our findings with those from previous studies, the questions have been 
modified to reflect the particular focus o f the present thesis.
The questionnaires were prepared in English, with Hindi and Bengali versions 
prepared for a section of the questionnaires which lists attributes of union 
leadership (question 4.4.2 of the questionnaire for trade union leaders; see 
Appendix A3.1)7. Information collected during the structured interview was 
useful to understand the social background of managers and union leaders, their 
activities, the nature o f labour-management bargaining, and the conditions o f the 
industry. However, we often combined it with unstructured open-ended 
discussions about the history of industrial relations and general social and political 
conditions within which the relations take place. While all the data collected were 
used to form our analysis and narrative of LMIs in these units, some questions 
were included with particular analysis in mind. Specifically, the data collected 
from questions on the unionists’ self-perception on leadership (aforementioned 
question 4.4.2) is used in Chapter 6 Section 6.2 is used as part of our analysis o f 
types of union leadership, which was inspired by Singh’s (1980) work. Questions 
on union activities and their role in labour management (questions 4.16 and 4.17)
7 Research assistance from Nilanjan Ghosh who translated the questionnaire in Hindi and Bengali is gratefully 
acknowledged.
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are used in Chapter 6 Section 3 for the analysis of the role trade unions and other 
social actors play in controlling and managing the labour process.
T a b l e  3-2 S e t t l e m e n t s  a n d  c o u r t  a w a r d s  a n a l y s e d
Nam e o f Establishment Duration of negotiation (in months)
Duration o f  
settlement
Orient Fans (1999) 17 2-3
National Confederation o f Bank Employees (2000) 4 5
State Bank o f India (2000) 4? 5
IJMA (from Wellington) 9 3-5
Alliance Jute Mill 6 ?
Hastings Jute Mill 5 p
BOC 17 4
Saregama India 12 4-4.5
Philips Taratolla 6 3
INDAL Belur 24 3
Engineering industry in WB Public sector 16 3
Lagan Jute Machinery 35 3
INDAL Taloja (1999, Ninth) 21 2
INDAL Taloja (1995, Eighth) 15 2
INDAL Kalwa (1998, Tenth) 21 4
INDAL Kalwa (1994, Ninth) 16 4
National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North, 
1992) 12 ?
National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North, 
1990) 64 ?
Podar Mills 21 ?
Philips India, Kalwa (1993) 24 5?
Philips India, Kalwa (1998) 15 5?
Cipla (1979) 6 3
Cipla (1983) 6 3
Cipla (1987) 11 3
Cipla (1990) 4 3
Cipla (1994) 12 3
Cipla (1999, Award by Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai) 15 NAP
Fiat/ Preimer Automobil Ltd. (1998) 20 3-4
Fiat/ Preimer Automobil Ltd. (1999) 14 3-4
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In the course of our interaction with firms and unions we have collected 31 
bargaining settlements or court awards that provided the framework for the 
labour-management relations, which can be interpreted as the legal form o f the 
capitalist social relations. For the majority of the units covered in our survey we 
have been able to obtain the collective bargaining settlements, and this 
information was analysed extensively in Chapter 4 for our analysis o f the typology 
of LMIs, as well as in our analysis of pay-scales in Chapter 6 Section 6.3. 
However, there are several units, for which the collective bargaining settlements 
were not available, most notably in the Mumbai textile industry, where the 
‘traditional’ industry-wide collective bargaining collapsed in the 1980s and the pay 
is increasingly determined in ‘personalised’ and ‘ad hoc’ manner, as we discuss in 
Chapter 6. It should be noted that the content o f the bargaining settlements are 
extremely diverse reflecting the particular issues at the industry or unit.
For example, the majority of settlements publish the pay-scale agreed by 
managers and unions to reflect the different pay progression policies. However, 
in sectors such as the Mumbai textile, where the pay determination based on scale 
and grade is disappearing in practice, settlements are used to provide lump-sum 
pay or enforce changes in pay compositions. There are also settlements that 
primarily focus on reorganisation o f work or employment, over which disputes 
ensued and led to the collective bargaining. In fact, we have come across many 
cases in which the employers have used lockouts to create conditions to instigate 
the process to renegotiate settlements or as pretexts for restmcturing the work 
organisation. In Chapter 6, we shall focus on this role o f industrial conflicts in 
renegotiating bargaining relations and initiating institutional transformations. The 
different backgrounds that led to the negotiations of settlements and the diversity 
in bargaining issues are in part reflected in the varying duration of negotiation 
reported in Table 3-2. Once again our interpretation is that the diverse patterns of
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bargaining settlements are reflections of differential types of bargaining relations 
and the process of accumulation that underpins them.
Financial accounting data of units surveyed was also collected as part o f our 
fieldwork, especially in the course of our interaction with the management, with 
the intention of analysing the financial state of the units. This, however, proved 
to be difficult, with firms unable or refusing to provide relevant information. In 
some large ‘modern’ companies, financial accounting information for public 
purpose was only provided at company-level, and managers were unable to share 
financial data at the plant-level. On the other hand, in many of the jute and 
cotton textile industries, where these is relative independence of mill-level middle- 
ranked management from the top has meant that financial accounting data was in 
some cases easier to obtain, as long as sufficient trust was established. We also 
found difficulty in obtaining comparable data across units and sectors, due to 
different definition of accounting periods and methods. Therefore whatever 
fanatical accounting data collected was used to gain background information to 
the bargaining relations we analysed, apart from a couple of case studies in 
Chapter 6 in which we used financial accounting data to examine the implications 
of institutional transformations and changes in managerial strategies.
We have also collected reports, policy documents and court rulings to gain 
understanding o f issues in the industries and the wider economy. In addition to 
visiting employers association, union offices, factories and mills, we have also 
visited labour courts and industrial tribunals where court cases related to some of 
our surveyed units were discussed, and attended meetings and rallies in which 
workers and unionists participated. Newspaper cuttings on the industries and 
units before, during and after the fieldwork were also collected. Some of these 
materials are cited in our discussion, but much of these materials were important
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background information to contextualise our observations from the relatively 
limited sample size within the wider economic and political processes.
Being an ‘outsider’
In the context of studying traders, Barbara Harriss (1993: 142) comments on “a 
positive advantage to be strange”, and in a similar way being an ‘outsider’ may 
have helped in getting access to firms and unions who were sometimes in volatile 
labour relations, but our experience was that this also sometimes worked 
‘negatively’ as well. On the one hand, being an ‘outsider’ enabled the author to be 
seen as a ‘neutral’ observer without a direct stake in industrial relations, which 
sometimes allowed respondents to talk more freely about their strategies and 
thinking behind their actions. Being a Japanese researcher based in a UK 
university studying labour-management relations in Indian industry allowed 
perceived distance with the object of the research, and also seems to have 
attracted interest in broader comparison between India and Japan (as well as 
sometimes with the UK), which allowed the author to use other historical 
examples to open up conversations on sensitive issues. On the other hand, the 
relative ease with which the author was able to meet and talk not only to 
managers and unions, as well as other social and political actors involved in 
labour relations, sometimes drew suspicions from respondents, especially where 
the industrial relations were precarious.
Being an ‘outsider’ also means that a researcher must overcome the inevitable 
linguistic and cultural hurdles to engage with the respondents. Fortunately, 
interviews and interactions with the majority of managers and senior-level union 
leaders were conducted in English, but the use o f local languages was sometimes 
required for interview with unionists at the shop floor level and workers. 
Although the author received introductory Hindi language sessions prior to the 
fieldwork, not only this was an inadequate level required for interviewing
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purpose, but also the native language spoken by unionists and workers were 
typically not Hindi. In some cases, where required, local university students acted 
as research assistants or translators. However, in some cases we encountered 
hesitation or in extreme case complete refusal to bringing our own research 
assistants or translators to the site of interview, in which case we had to ask 
fellow unionists to act as translators on the site. Such practice is known to 
encourage untruthful or distorted responses (and translations), and while 
repeating questions and probing were used as interview techniques to verify the 
answers, these conditions created additional layers of challenge in interpreting the 
responses in the context of the interview settings.
We have already discussed the vested interest our respondents may have in 
projecting a particular image and viewpoint to the ‘outsider’ researcher. This was 
particularly important in question 4.4.2 of the questionnaire for trade union 
leaders (see Appendix A3.1), which we used for the analysis of types of union 
leadership, where our interpretation is that what was captured from the question 
was not necessarily the actual attributes of the leaders but their self-perception 
about their style o f leadership or the image o f leadership they wanted to project 
to others.
Also, in a climate of intense antagonism and mistrust between bargaining agents, 
we came across some respondents acting as informants for employers. The 
implication of this was that we had to be careful with our comments and 
conducts during interviews even in private settings, and showing active allegiance 
or solidarity with one or more groups could potentially lead to misleading 
impression, and worse make the research unfeasible. More importantly it meant 
that the data collected from interviews had to be constantly scrutinised within its 
specific social and political conditions.
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To sum up, researching labour-management bargaining relations has presented us 
with a number o f challenging issues on the way in which we interpret and use the 
data for our analysis. However, rather than to perceive these sampling and non­
sampling errors as ‘problems’, our approach has been to treat the resulting 
‘unevenness’ of the data as a reflection of the differential bargaining relations and 
the underlying economic, social and political processes. Therefore we argue that 
our data offer important information and insights into the types of LMIs and can 
be used to provide interventions in the theoretical and policy debates on labour- 
management relations in Indian industry.
3.3 Strategies of data analysis
3.3.1 Multivariate analysis in political economic approach
As discussed in the introduction o f this chapter, the analytical methodology of 
political economic approach requires examination of the type or form of LMIs in 
the totality of capitalist development in India. This means that observed variables 
(for example, different aspects of LMIs, the nature o f patron-client networks, or 
the mode of controlling and managing labour discipline) must be treated as 
interrelated factors in the relational totality of the patterns of accumulation. More 
specifically, a number o f concepts we are interested in, such as the type o f labour 
market institutions (LMIs) and the type of union leadership, cannot be directly 
observed, but are reflections of particular forms of social relations and the 
location of bargaining agents within them. These concepts are by their nature 
multidimensional determined by a number of consisting factors.
For this reason, dependence methods, such as multiple regression analysis, in 
which the dependent variable is predicted or explained by independent variables, 
are generally not appropriate for our purpose of political economic analysis, 
especially where causal relationship cannot be pre-determined theoretically. 
Interdependence techniques, which involve the simultaneous analysis of all
180
Chapter 3 Methodology
variables in the set, without distinction between dependent variables and 
independent variables, offer better alternatives for our purpose (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 2006). Amongst interdependence techniques, 
factor or principle component analysis is used in Chapters 4 and 6 as exploratory 
statistical method to describe the general characteristics o f the interdependence 
between variables, as is multidimensional scaling (MDS) in Chapter 4.
3.3.2 Factor and principle component analysis
In the literature, the term factor analysis can be used as a family of dimension 
reduction procedures, or as a specific procedure that imposes a model of 
distinguishing different types of variance. Thus, in the first usage, factor analysis 
can be broadly described as a statistical method used to simplify complex and 
diverse relationships between variables, as captured in a correlation matrix, and 
identify ‘structure’ within a set of observed variables (Dillon and Goldstein 1984: 
23). In the second more ‘narrow’ usage, (common) factor analysis refers to a 
particular technique that reduces dimensions in the correlation matrix of the 
original variables “by uncovering common dimensions or factors that link 
together the seemingly unrelated variables, and consequently provides insight into 
the underlying structure o f the data” {op at.: 53). We shall use the term ‘factor 
analysis’ to refer to its first ‘broader’ usage, and use the term ‘'common factor 
analysis’ to refer to its second more ‘narrow’ meaning.
Principal component analysis is one of the statistical techniques within factor 
analysis8 (in the first ‘broader’ sense o f referring to a family of dimension 
reduction procedures), which “linearly transforms an original set o f variables into
8 This usage is consistent with some textbooks such as Klein (1994) as well as computer packages such as 
SPSS treat principle component analysis as a special case o f  or one option for factor analysis. However, 
Jollifee (2002: 150) argues that this is misguided as principle component analysis and factor analysis are 
distinct techniques. However as discuss below, for large matrices the principle factor analysts is identical to 
principle component analysis.
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a substantially smaller set of uncorrelated variables that represents most o f the 
information in the original set of variables” (Dunteman 1994: 157). An important 
characteristic of the principle component analysis is that no underlying statistical 
model of the observed variables is imposed in its dimension reduction technique. 
To put differently, principle component analysis focuses on explaining the total 
variation in the observed variables on the basis o f maximum variance properties 
of principal components. In contrast, the common factor analysis imposes an 
underlying statistical model that partitions the total variance into common and 
unique variance, and focuses on explaining the common variance, rather than the 
total variance, in the observed variables on the basis o f a relatively few underlying 
factors.
The difference of the two techniques can be illustrated as below. Suppose that X 
is a vector of p  random variables. Although covariances and correlations are not 
ignored, the main focus of the principle component analysis is the variances of 
the original variables. The vector of principle components, z , is obtained as an 
orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated) linear combination of the observed variables x of 
denoted by the vector:9
z = A'x (3-1)
where A is the orthogonal matrix that have been chosen to maximise the ratio of 
the variance of each principle components to the total variations in the 
covariance matrix £ .  In theory, up to p  principle components can be found, 
but from the viewpoint o f dimension reduction, the objective is to account for 
most of the variation in x by m (< p )  principle components.
9 The notation of the exposition of the principle component model follows Jolliffe (2002: 2 and 11).
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In contrast, the (common) factor-analytic model expresses each of the p  
observable variable X as linear functions of m (< p )  hypothetical or 
unobservable common factors, denoted by f , and error terms, or some times 
called unique or specific factors (because is unique or specific to X - , whereas
f k are common to several X j), denoted by e :10
x = p + Af + e (3-2)
where E(x)=  |H and A are constant called the factor loadings.
Therefore, technically the two dimension reduction procedures follow very 
different logics. In equation (3-1) the principle component analysis treats the 
inherently unobservable variable as a function of its indicators (observable 
variables), where as in equation (3-2), the common factor analysis treats the 
indicators as a function of the unobservables. Principle components are thus “real 
factors” which are based on actual combinations of observed variables, whereas 
common factors are estimated from observed variables by using a presupposed 
mathematical model that distinguishes between common and unique variance 
(Klein 1994: 44). In principle component analysis, there is no error term, which 
implies that the observable variables are measured without error and that the 
unobservable latent principle component is a perfect linear combination of its 
measures (Dillon & Goldstein 1984: 57). In practice, however, it is known that 
the two dimension reduction techniques yield very similar results.
The choice o f whether to use the principle component or the common factor 
analysis therefore depends on our theoretical assumptions about the relationships
10 For the exposition of the factor model see Mardia, Kent and Bibby (1979: 256); Dillon and Goldstein 
(1984: 57); and Jolliffe (2002:151).
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between the original variables and the extracted factors. If a model such as 
equation (3-2) seems a reasonable assumption for the data set, then the common 
factor analysis rather than the principle component analysis is appropriate. 
However, if no such model can be assumed, Jolliffe (2002: 165) argues that 
common factor analysis should not really be used. In general, the principle 
component model is most appropriate when data reduction is used for 
exploratory purposes rather than to be used in subsequent analysis or testing 
hypothesis, whereas the common factor analysis model is best in well-specified 
theoretical applications. On the other hand, given the possible measurement 
errors highlighted in Section 3.2, the assumption implicit in the principle 
component analysis that observable variables are measured without error may be 
too restrictive for our purpose.
The approach we followed was in the end to attempt both types o f data reduction 
techniques. In all of our applications in this thesis, the resulting factors obtained 
from different extraction models were reasonably similar. O n the ground that we 
do not have a well specified model about the relationships about the variables and 
factors, and therefore the purpose of our analysis is exploratory in nature, we 
have presented the results of principle component analysis as the factor 
extraction method.
The issue of which factor extraction method to choose aside, an important 
methodological advantage o f the principle component and factor analysis is that 
they are statistical methods that examine and ‘map5 the systematic characteristics 
that exists within the observed variables, rather than identifying an underlying 
relationship with a separate external variable. Thus in our analysis o f the typology 
of LMIs in Chapter 4, we are able to examine how different units surveyed are 
‘clustered5 together according to structural characteristics of LMIs according to 
our fieldwork data. Similarly in Chapter 6, we use the factor analysis to examine
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the patterns in the perceptions about leadership using our data from interviews 
with unionists. In this sense, factor analysis is more consistent with our 
methodological approach and offers a better alternative to more conventionally 
used regression analysis and other dependence models that imposes a 
presupposed functional relationship between regressors (i.e. independent or 
explanatory variables) and regressand (dependent or explained variables), and in 
which regressors are impliddy assumed to be independent to each other.
Several additional data considerations should be noted at this point. Factor 
analysis is typically performed using metric variables, although specialised 
methods exist for a small number of dummy variables to be included in a set of 
metric variables (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 2006). Another issue 
of factor analysis design is that a large sample size is required to ensure the 
robustness o f the solution. Hair et al. recommend the minimum absolute sample 
size of 50 observations, whereas others such as Klein (1994: 180) argue that 
“ [s]amples o f less than 100 could produce misleading results”. These two data 
considerations are important in our applications. For example the variables used 
in identifying the typology of LMIs in our surveyed units in Chapter 4 are 
dichotomous and therefore a non-metric multidimensional scaling (MDS) is used 
as the main technique, with factor analysis used to confirm the result. In Chapter 
6, we analyse the data on the self-perceptions o f union leaders and part o f our 
analysis o f the type o f leadership, using a sample size of n  = 4 6 , which is not a 
small sample, but still falls short of the criteria set in the literature. We shall 
discuss these data considerations further in the appendices o f each chapter.
Whether we use the principle component or the common factor analysis as the 
factor extraction model, further solutions are found by the rotation of the 
variance-covariance matrix, typically (but not necessarily) by multiplying it by an 
orthogonal matrix, and the Best’ solution is obtained according to certain
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rotation criteria. Different rotation methods are used according to different 
theoretical assumptions about the data. However, once again, given the 
exploratory nature of our analysis, we have attempted the factor analysis with a 
range of rotation methods, including varimax, direct oblimin, quartimax, 
equamax, and promax. As before, having confirmed that our results are similar 
across different rotation methods, we have adopted the most widely used varimax 
method, which assumes that the factors are orthogonal or uncorrelated.
Regardless of the method or model, the objective of the analysis is to find a 
smaller number o f factors than the original variables that account for most of the 
variation. This raises the question of how many factors or components to extract. 
A widely used rule-of-thumb known as the Kaiser’s rule proposes an eigenvalue 
or varianace of 1 as the criteria o f selection. This is based on the idea that if all 
elements of x are independent, then the factors or components are the same as 
the original variables, and thus have unit variance in a correlation matrix. 
Therefore for the factor or component to be useful for the analysis it should 
explain at least as much variance contained in a single variable in the original 
matrix (Jolliffe op clt.: 114). An equally popular method is to use a ‘scree diagram’ 
which plots the factor or component against its eigenvalue, and decide on the 
number o f factors to extract on the basis of the ‘steepness’ of the function. Both 
data-driven criteria are considered in the factor analysis applied in this thesis, but 
we have also complemented these with judgements based on whether the factor 
or components are meaningful from our analytical perspective. These 
considerations on the selection of factors are once again discussed in detail in the 
appendices of Chapters 4 and 6.
Our approach to the exploratory data analytical method such as factor analysis is 
therefore interactive in the sense that the insights obtained from empirical 
observations are interpreted carefully within the wider contexts o f our political
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economic analysis, which again is consistent with our methodological approach 
and contrasts with conventional regression analysis which imposes a particular 
presupposed functional relationship on variables.
3.3.3 (Non-metric) Multidimensional scaling
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is, together with factor analysis in the previous 
section, another of data reduction techniques, in the sense that it aims to 
represent p  dimensional set of data in q (< p )  dimensional space, and uncover 
the ‘hidden structure’ of a set o f data (Dillon and Goldstein 1984:107). The 
technique is used for data that measures proximities, i.e. similarity or difference 
between pairs of objects, which is ‘mapped’ in a multidimensional space defined 
by unknown underlying dimensions, so that their relative positions in the space 
reflect the rank order of proximities between the objects.
In Chapter 4 we have employed the MDS to identify the typology of LMIs. As 
discussed in the previous section, dummy variables were used for this analysis, 
which do not conform to the assumption o f factory analysis that is mainly used 
for metric variables. The non-metric MDS on the other hand assumes that the 
level of measurement is at the nominal or ordinal scale, and for this reason is 
more appropriate for the type of variables analysed.
The MDS is widely used in psychology, sociology and political science, but 
underused in economics, partly because the technique is generally used to ‘m ap’ 
similarities or difference of perceptions, and partly because unlike more 
conventional statistical tools, the technique is “purely data analytical” (Mardia, 
Kent and Bibby 1979: 396) in the sense that no probabilistic framework is 
assumed. However, the fact that it is an explicitly data exploratory methods that is 
based on the relative ‘proximities’ of the observations and does not impose 
probabilistic models in its procedure made the MDS an appropriate technique for
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our analysis o f the typology o f LMIs in Chapter 4, given that we are interested 
only to examine the broad patterns of similarities and differences in unionism and 
bargaining relations amongst units in our fieldwork that are not obtained through 
probabilistic sampling. In this sense, once again our analytical methodology is 
exploratory in nature.
The data used in Chapter 4 contains information on different aspects of LMIs in 
our surveyed units, such as whether the collective bargaining takes place at 
centralised-level or at local-level, whether unions are politically affiliated, whether 
union leaders are external to the unit, etc. These variables measured at nominal 
level are then generates the distance matrix D , which is seen as a matrix o f 
‘similarity’ or ‘dissimilarity’. The elements o f matrix D is ordered, and then 
monotonically transformed by preset algorithm, and through numerous trials and 
iterations, arrive at the terminal solution B which improves the match o f the 
points in space to the original proximity values (Dillon and Goldstein 1984: 111). 
The final solution is obtained according to several indices of ‘fit’, including
where dtj are the distances between the units i and j  computed form the
coordinates in the derived space at a particular iteration, and dtj are the ‘fitted’
distances, and the process continues until another iteration fails to improve the 
value by a preset amount (Dillon and Goldstein op cit.: 127-130).
Kruskals’s STRESS index:
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Once the matrix B is obtained, the coordinates are derived from the eigenvalue-
eigenvector o f B , so that for a two-dimensional solution, the first two 
eigenvalues o f B , A, and X2, are used to find the coordinates o f objects in the 
derived two-dimensional space. The extent to which the k -dimensional MDS 
solution explains the proportion o f the original distance matrix D is evaluated by 
fit or agreement measures, the most widely used are Mardia’s fit measures 1 and 2 
(Mardia, Kent and Bibby 1979:408):
These statistics are used and interpreted in Appendix 4A.1 o f Chapter 4.
In the same appendix to Chapter 4, we show that the resulting dimensions that
coordinates obtained from the MDS is very similar to that from the factory 
analysis. In fact, the two methods are similar in that both are concerned with 
dimensions in a Euclidean space, even though the procedures and techniques are 
very different, most importandy, that the MDS is based on distances between 
points, whereas the factor analysis is based on the correlations between variables. 
That two methods based on different techniques both yields similar results 
implies that the typology of LMIs and the general patterns of institutional 
difference between sectors and regions are not sensitive to the statistical 
techniques employed.
More importantly, the use o f the MDS, together with the factor analysis, is 
consistent with our methodological approach of trying to seek patterns of social 
relations and political economic processes within the observed variables. Also
k k
and n
characterise the typology o f LMIs and the ‘clusters’ of surveyed units in the
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these techniques are used to explore systematic tendencies within the data that is 
then problematised and analysed within the context of the wider political 
economy. In this sense, statistical tools in this thesis are used to raise questions 
rather than to ‘fit’ a presupposed model or to confirm a hypothesis, which once 
again contrasts to conventional statistical analysis in economics.
3.3.4 Notes on other statistical techniques
While dimension reduction techniques such as factor analysis and 
multidimensional scaling are the main exploratory statistical tools used in this 
thesis, the analysis is complemented by other statistical tests to evaluate the 
association between variables. In Chapter 4 Section 4.2.1, a number of 
contingency or cross tables is examined using Pearson’s chi-squared test of 
independence, Kendall’s tau-C, and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
Pearson’s chi-squared test is also used in Chapter 6 Section 6.2.
The procedure of Pearson’s chi-squared test o f independence is applied in a 
standard manner, except that we have not followed the common practice of 
requiring that all expected frequency in the table to be at least 5, which is 
considered to be too conservative in practice (Howell 2002: 158-9; Kiyokawa 
2003: 197). Given the relatively small sample size (n = 21), most of our tables 
have small expected frequencies. We have followed Everitt’s (1977: 40) rule-of- 
thumb that “in the majority o f cases the chi-square criterion may be used for 
tables with expectations in excess of 0.5 in the smallest cell” and only pooled 
categories when this rule was violated. However, given that the chi-square test is 
likely to have low power to reject a false null hypothesis with small expected 
frequencies or small sample sizes (Overall 1980) we have complemented the 
analysis with other standard statistical procedures for symmetric measures such as 
Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to evaluate the statically 
association between the variables.
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In Chapter 6 Section 6.4, we have used a standard regression analysis of wage or 
employment cost function using the ordinary least square (OLS) method. The 
regression model in this context is used to examine the changing relationship 
between economic variables, and therefore the analysis is used for an exploratory 
purpose to see how the relationships between, say, employment costs and capital 
investment have changed before and after the process o f transformation in LMIs 
and the subsequent shift in managerial strategies. Therefore the use o f the wage 
function is not an uncritical acceptance o f such model and the objective o f the 
analysis is not to test the ‘fit’ of the presupposed linear wage function. Estimated 
coefficients are used to ‘simulation’ o f employment costs in the absence o f 
institutional change, which again is used to examine the implications o f the 
transformation of LMIs.
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A PPEN D IX  FOR CHAPTER 3
Appendix 3A.1 Questionnaire for TU leaders/core TU members
Name o f interviewer [ ]
Date and time o f interview [ ]
Serial number [ ]
The purpose of this survey is purely academic. It will never be used for other purposes. The 
strictest confidentiality will be upheld regarding the information you provide. Therefore, please 
feel free to answer the questions as you really think. If there are questions you do not want to 
answer, please say so.
0. Union background
0.1. Name o f the Union [ ]
0.2. Office address [ ]
0.3. Registered/ Unregistered
1. Registered
2. Unregistered
0.3.1 Does your Union submit information about the membership size to the government?
1. Yes
2. No
0.4. Affiliation [ ]
0.5. Year o f establishment [ ]
0.6. Who took initiative in establishing it?
Insider 1. Employer
2. One o f the employees
3. A group o f employees 
Outsider 4. A political party
5. Another trade union
6. An individual outsider [ ]
0.7. Eligibility o f membership
[ ]
0.8. Actual enrolment [ ]
0.8.1 Possible enrolment [ ]
0.8.1 What proportion o f the members is from the local town?
[ ]
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0.9. Any rival trade unions? 0 /1 /2 /3 /4 +
0.9.1 Their total membership
0.10 Annual subscription
0.10.1 When do members usually pay their annual subscription fee? 
0.11 Number o f active members
Insider Outsider
Full timer Part timer Full timer Part timer
Paid
Unpaid
0.12 How would you describe the attitude o f the following to TU movement in India on the 
whole? Are you (5) highly satisfied, (4) satisfied, (3) no response, (2) dissatisfied, (1) highly 
dissatisfied?
Party Response Please give reasons
What specific measures would 
you suggest to create more 
favourable climate forTUs?
Central government
State government
Top management
Middle management 
(include supervisors)
Workers
Intelligentsia
General Public
0.13.1 Is this TU recognised by the management? Y es/N o
0.13.2 Are TU notices allowed to be put upon the notice board? Y es/N o
0.13.3 Are replies to the TU letters regular and prompt? Y es/N o
0.13.4 Are TU representatives received by the management for negotiations? Y es/N o
0.13.5 Are you allowed to collect subscriptions within the premises? Y es/N o
Chapter 3 Methodology
1. Personal and Social background
1.1 Name
1.2 Office held
1.3 Sex: [Male/Female]
1.4 Marital status: Mamed/Unmarried/Any other
1.5 Age [ ]
Year o f birth [ ]
1.6 Where are you living? [ ]
1.6.1 Type o f the dwelling
1. Own house
2. Company house
3. Rental room
4. Dormitory
1.7 Where is your home/native community [ ]
1.7.1 Which is the nearest town to your home community?
[ ]
1.7.2 Give distance from this town [ ]
1.8 How long have you been living in this town? [ ]
1.9 What is your religion?
1. Hindu
2. Muslim
3. Buddhism
4. Christianity
5. Others [ ]
1.10 What is your caste? [ ]
1.11 Language known
1. Hindi
2. Bengali
3. Marati
4. Gujarati
5. Urdu
6. English
7. Any other [ ]
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1.12 What was your highest level o f schooling? (i) passed, (ii) incomplete, dropout
1. Primary school
2. Middle school
3. High school
4. Higher secondary
5. Graduate
6. Postgraduate
7. Technical or vocational school
8. None
1.13 At what age were you first employed?
1.14 Please give details o f your last five jobs.
job
Name of 
organisation Salary Period employed Reasons for leaving
1
2
3
4
5
1.15 At present, any source o f income other than the primary job? Y es/N o
1.15.1 If yes, what is thesource?
1-Job [ ]
2. Land [ ]
3. Business [ ]
4. Political office [ ]
5. Others [ ]
1.15.2 Amount [ ]
1.16 How would you rate the present economic condition o f your family?
(5) Very well off 
(4) Well off 
(3) Average
(2) Poor
(1) Very poor
1.17 To which social class, in this town, do you think you belong?
(3) Upper
(2) Middle
(1) Lower
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1.18 Please give the following information about your family
Relation with you Education Occupation Income Marital status
Living with 
you? (y/n)
Economically 
dependent on 
you? (y/n)
1 Father (alive/not alive)
2 Mother (alive/ not alive)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1.19 Has any relative o f  yours ever held a TU or political office? Y es/N o
______ If yes, please state ________________ _____________________ ____________
Relation with you Position attained Organisation Dates Sacrifices done
1
2
3
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2. Functioning
2.1 Approximately how many hours per week do you devote to TU work?
2.2 If you are a member o f any committees, please state.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
2.3 Which o f the TU activities make the greatest demand on your time?
1. Attending courts or offices
2. Meetings
3. Collecting subscriptions
4. Negotiations
5. Paper work
6. Helping members with individual problems
2.4 O f the persons/officials whom you have to contact in the course o f  your work, in which order 
do you spend more o f your time?
1. Members
2. Top management
3. Middle management
4. Government officers
5. Other leaders
2.5 During the last one year, how many o f the following activities did you engage in?
Court cases 1. Tribunals
2. Conciliation
3. Argued without lawyer 
Meetings 4. Executive meeting
5. General body meeting
6. Speeches delivered
7. Seminars/ conferences
8. Articles written
9. Rallies etc. organised
2.6 When was the last election held in your union?
2.7 How many general body meetings o f your TU were held during the last year?
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2.8 How many o f the members usually attend the general body meetings?
1. All or most
2. Three fourth
3. One half
4. A quarter or lesser
2.9 Apart from formal membership, are you satisfied with the actual participation o f the workers 
in the activities organised by your TU?
(4) Highly satisfied
(3) Satisfied
(2) Dissatisfied 
(1) Highly dissatisfied
2.10 Did your TU participate in any strike or agitation during the last three years?
0. N o
1. Once
2. Twice
3. Three times o f more
2.11 What was the proportion o f membership participating on the last such occasion?
1. All or most
2. Three fourth
3. One half
4. A quarter or lesser
2.12 What measures do you suggest for increasing existing members participating in TUs?
2.13 What considerations should you keep foremost in taking a strike decision?
2.14 D o you consider cooperation with the managers as a relatively costless method o f settling 
conflict inside an organisation (compare to, say, strike procedure)?
1. Yes
2. N o
2.7.1 What about in the past? D o you think it was costless to settle conflict through unions in the 
past compared to today?
1. Yes
2. N o
3. Recruitment and succession
3.1 At what age did you first become associated with a TU? [ ]
3.1.1 How did you come to be associated with that TU?
3.1.2 At what age did you first hold an office in a TU? [ ]
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3.2 Please give an account o f your association with various TUs.
Name o f the TU Office held Period Insider/outsider
If outsider, were you 
ex-worker in this line?
y/n If left, why?
1
2
3
4
5
4  Leadership and trend o f unionsim
4.1 Are you satisfied in general with your present and past services to the TU movement?
4. Highly satisfied
3. Satisfied
2. Dissatisfied
1. Highly dissatisfied
4.2 Which o f the following have contributed to your success?
1 .1 am an outsider so I am not afraid o f management
2 .1 belong to a political party, therefore I have more influence with management
3 .1 am an ex-worker, so I have first hand knowledge about worker’s problem
4 .1 have devoted full time to unionism
4.3 Which o f the following difficulty do you encounter as a leader?
1 .1 am an outsider so I do not know worker’s problem well.
2. Being an employee I cannot be free from management influence.
3. Workers expect too much from me.
4 .1 have not been able to devote full time because I have other occupations.
5 .1 have no political backing.
6. Because it is a small union not affiliated to any federation, has not much influence.
4.4.1 Please think o f an ideal union leader. Amongst the listed attributes, please give a ranking in 
order o f importance. If there is an attribute you think is not important, mark x.
4.4.2 Please give yourself marks on the following attributes. You can have a maximum o f five and 
a minimum o f one on each count.11
(5) Highly satisfied, (4) Satisfied, (3) In between, (2) Dissatisfied, (1) Highly dissatisfied
11 Singh (1980).
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Attribute
Order o f importance for 
an ideal unionist
Marks for 
yourself
Ability' to exercise control
Ability to make decisions
Ability to make speeches
Ability to negotiate with managers
Ability to organise agitations and demonstrations
Ability to take initiatives
Communication skill
Connections/negotiations with other trade unions
Connections with members o f the union
Connections with politicians, political party or state 
officials
Dedication to the cause
Honesty
Educational (schooling) attainment
Intelligence
Leadership skill
Persistence
Persuasiveness
Resourcefulness
Self-confidence
Skill in court work
Skill in negotiation with managers
4.5 D o you think you can serve the TU movement better in any other capacity, apart from being a 
Union leader? (e.g. being elected as an MLA or MP)? Y es/N o
4.6 D o you find if there is any change in the type o f people who are coming forward as trade 
union leaders (age, education, political affiliation etc.)?
4.7 D o you think there has been any particular change in the general strategies o f trade unions 
with regards to management?
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4.8 When somebody says “there is a need to upgrade worker’s skill in India”, which aspect of ‘skill’ 
is important? Please give an order.
1. Ability to produce more with the existing machinery
2. Knowledge on new machinery
3. Formal education and attainment
4. Consciousness o f productivity
5. Perception on technology
6. Capacity to control and maintain the work place
4.9 As far as you are aware, what is the most important recent advancement, say in the past 5 
years, in terms o f improving technology or productivity?
1. Introduction o f new machinery or equipment
2. Better product or quality control
3. Improvement in the ability and attitude o f  workers
4. Improvement in the ability o f managers and engineers
5. Others [ ]
4.10 What do you think was the reason for the advancement? Please rank the following.12
1. Need to improve quality
2. In order to increase output
3. To acquire higher technological capacity
4. To reduce labour input
5. To lower the unit cost o f production
6. To cope with competition
4.11 If advanced machinery or new technology is available, should it be introduced even if older
13machinery or equipment would have to be scrapped (replaced)?
1. Machinery with advanced technology should be introduced even if older machinery 
must be scrapped
2. Should not be introduced if older machinery is still in operation
3. Should be introduced only after the old machinery becomes totally obsolescent
4.12 D o you think that introducing the imported machinery is effective for increasing 
productivity?14
1. Yes, it is effective if it is better or more advanced machinery
2. N o, it is not effective because there will be more problems if it is introduced
4.13 When the new machinery is introduced, or new technological advancement takes place, then 
what do you think is the most important assets to cope with it?13
1. Experience
2. Formal technical education
3. On-the-job training (OJT)
12 Tulpule and Dutta (1995: 270)
13 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-D.
14 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-J.
15 Kiyokawa (2003)
201
Chapter 3 Methodology
4.14 What do you think is the general perception o f the workers when new machinery or 
equipment were introduced somewhere in their factory? (Assuming no wage or salary increases)16
1. They would want to undergo formal training and operate the new machinery
2. They would not want to change the present work, because satisfied with it
3. They would want to learn to operate the new machinery through informal training (for 
example, on-the-job training)
4.15 Thinking now o f all section o f employees, have any o f the following steps been taken over 
the past two years?17
4.15.1 An increase in shift working [Yes /N o]
4.15.2 Training of employees to cover jobs other than their own [Yes/No]
4.15.3 Increased use o f group or collective pay incentives [Yes/No]
4.15.4 Increased use o f work measurement or method study [Yes/No]
4.15.5 Replacement o f some full-time employees with part-timers [Yes/No]
4.15.6 Replacement o f some employees with contract or agency staff o f casual or temporary 
workers [Yes/No]
4.15.7 Reduction in the number employed surplus to requirements [Yes/No]
4.16 When you have difficulties in the workplace, whom do you consult?18
1. Supervisor/ middle manager
2. Higher ranked officers o f the trade unions (president, vice president, secretary etc.)
3. Colleague union members
4. Colleague workmates
5. Politician/ political leaders
6. My family
7. D o not consult anybody
Why not consult any o f the above? [ ]
16 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-E
17 Wilkinson and White (1994:129).
18 Acharji (1980)
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4.17 In the following items please mark o for persons who actually make the decision, and •  for 
the ranks which are entitled to participate in decision-making process. Also please mark ©  for the 
person you think should make the decision._________________________________________________
Politicians/
state
officials
Managing
directors/
chairman
Factory
(top)
manager
Middle
managers Engineers Supervisors
Trade
union
leaders
Workshop
leaders
Deciding and 
changing job 
allocations
Hiring workers
Disposing
workers
Promoting
workers
Training
workers
Training
engineers
Introducing new 
technology
Improving 
technology and 
equipment
Distribution of 
profits
Deciding wage 
increases (for 
workers)
Assessing bonus 
(for workers)
4.18 If you have any further comments and suggestions kindly state them. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
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Appendix 3A.2 Questionnaire for Top/middle/personnel managers
Name o f interviewer [ ]
Date and time o f interview [ ]
Serial number [ ]
The purpose o f this survey is purely academic. It will never be used for other purposes. The 
strictest confidentiality will be upheld regarding the information you provide. Therefore, please 
feel free to answer the questions as you really think. If there are questions you do not want to 
answer, please say so.
0. Establishment/factory background
0.1 In which category is your business? [ ]
0.2 How many people are working full time? [ ]
0.2.1 D o you have part time workers?
[Yes/No]
0.2.1.1 If yes, how many during the peak season? [ ]
how many during the slack season? [ ]
0.2.2 D o you have trainees? [Yes/No]
0.2.2.1 If yes, how many? [ ]
0.2.3 What percentage o f the workers is originally from this town?
Amongst full time workers? [ ]
Amongst part time workers during the peak season? [ ]
during the slack season?[ ]
Amongst trainees? [ ]
0.3 When did your establishment start operating? [ ]
1. Personal and social background
1.1 Name [ ]
1.3 Sex [Male/Female]
1.4 Marital status: Married/ Unmarried/ Any other
1.5 Age [ ]
Year o f birth [ ]
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1.6 Where are you living?
1.6.1 Type o f the dwelling
1. Own house
2. Company house
3. Rental room
4. Dormitory
1.7 Where are your home /  native community? [
1.7.1 Which is the nearest town to your home community?
[
1.7.2 Give distance from this town [
1.8 How long have you been living in this town? [
1.9 What is your religion?
1. Hindu
2. Muslim
3. Buddism
4. Christianity
5. Others [
1.10 What is your caste? [
1.11 Language k now n
1. Hindi
2. Bengali
3. Marathi
4. Gujarati
5. Urdu
6. English
7. Any other [ ]
1.12 What was your highest level o f schooling? (i) passed, (ii) incomplete, dropout
1. Primary school
2. Middle school
3. High school
4. Higher secondary
5. Graduate
6. Postgraduate
7. Technical or vocational school
8. None
1.13 At what age were you first employed?
1.14 How many years have you worked at this factory?____________years
Or from when did you start to work? From ____________
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1.15 What sort o f job do you do at this factory?
D ept._____________
Sect.______________
Status:____________
1.16 What is your employment status?
1. Permanent employee
2. Casual employee [ ] months per year
3. Part-timer [ ] hours per week
1.17 How much are your monthly earnings (including all allowance)?
[ ] Rs. per month
1.18 At present, any source o f income other than the primary job? Y es/ No
1.18.1 If yes, what is the source?
1-Job [ ]
2. Land [ ]
3. Business [ ]
4. Political office [ ]
5. Others [ ]
1.18.2 Amount [ ]
1.19 How would you rate the present economic condition o f your family?
(5) Very well off
(4) Well off 
(3) Average
(2) Poor
(1) Very poor
1.20 Please give details o f  your last five jobs.
Job
Name of 
organisation Salary Period employed Reasons for leaving
1
2
3
4
5
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1.21 To which social class, in this town, do you think you belong?
(3) Upper
(2) Middle
(1) Lower
1.22 Please give the following information about your family
Relation with you Education Occupation Income Marital status
Living with 
you? (y/n)
Economically 
dependent on 
you? (y/n)
1 Father (alive/not alive)
2 Mother (alive/ not alive)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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2. Conditions o f production, technolog and market competition
2.1 Please give the following information regarding the performance o f your factory in the past 
five vears.
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
Gross fixed assets
Plant and machinery 
(book value)
Annual sales
Profit before tax
Imports
Export
Employment
2.2 Suppose you sold different kinds o f hats and also different kinds o f gloves. ‘Hats’ and ‘gloves’ 
are what we call a product group. How many product groups do you produce/sell?
1. 1
2. 2-5
3. 6-10 
4.11-20
5. 21-50
6. More than 50
2.2.1 What would you say was your main product group in terms o f sales? 
[ ]
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2.4 Which o f the following products/items have you manufactured during the past three years? 
Which products/items did you manufacture when you started your business?
N o w / During past three years At start
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
2.5 Please list all the machinery and equipment (i.e 
well when the business was started.
Current year
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
2.6 What do you regard as the principal market for your main product/ product group?
1. The local community
2. The district
3. The state
4. India
5. The international economy Which country? [ ]
2.7 In terms o f your principal market, what is your market share?
0. Under 1%
1. 1-5%
2 . 6- 10%
3. 11-20%
4. 21-30%
2.8 How would you describe competition in your market?20
1. Very intense
2. Generally strong
3. Generally weak
4. Very weak
2.9 What is the dominant form o f competition by:
1. Price
2. Quality
3. Sales
4. Market share
5. Advertising
6. Other please specify [ ]
19 Romijn (1999: 303)
20 Reid (1993: 260).
. not tools) used by the enterprise at present as 
Starting year
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2.10 What do you think about the product or quality inspections o f your factory?21
1 .1 do not know much
2. Satisfied with it
3. It should be more strict
2.11 Who supervises the work in your enterprise?22
1. Self
2. Partner
3. Hired supervisor
2.12 Does your factory provide workers with training on new machinery installed in the factory?
[Yes/No]23
If yes, please describe the type o f training you provide.
[ ]
Is it limited to certain type o f workers?
1.Yes please specify [ ]
2. N o
3. Perception on technology and sk ill
3.1 As far as you are aware, what is the most important recent advancement in your factory, say in 
the past 5 years, in terms o f  improving technology or productivity?
1. Introduction o f new machinery or equipment
2. Better product or quality control
3. Improvement in the ability and attitude o f workers
4. Improvement in the ability o f managers and engineers
5. Others [ ]
3.2 What do you think was the reason for the advancement? Please rank the following in the order 
o f importance. 24
1. Need to improve quality
2. In order to increase output
3. To acquire higher technological capacity
4. To reduce labour input
5. To lower the unit cost o f production
6. To cope with competition
4.11 If advanced machinery or new technology is available, should it be introduced even if older 
machinery or equipment would have to be scrapped (replaced)? "
1. Machinery with advanced technology should be introduced even if older machinery 
must be scrapped
2. Should not be introduced if older machinery is still in operation
21 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-F.
22 Romijn (1999: 309)
23 Bhatacherjee (1989)
24 Tulpule and Dutta (1995: 270)
25 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-D.
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3. Should be introduced only after the old machinery becomes totally obsolescent
4.12 D o you think that introducing the imported machinery is effective for increasing 
productivity? ”6
1. Yes, it is effective if it is better or more advanced machinery
2. No, it is not effective because there will be more problems if it is introduced
4.13 When the new machinery is introduced, or new technological advancement takes place, then 
what do you think is the most important assets to cope with it? "
1. Experience
2. Formal technical education
3. On-the-job training (OJT)
4. Perception on work conditions, welfare and trade union
4.1 Thinking now o f  all section o f employees, have any o f the following steps been taken over the 
past two years? 28
4.1.1 An increase in shift working [Yes/No]
4.1.2 Training of employees to cover jobs other than their own [Yes/No]
4.1.3 Increased use o f group or collective pay incentives [Yes/No]
4.1.4 Increased use o f work measurement or method study [Yes/No]
4.1.5 Replacement o f some full-time employees with part-timers [Yes/No]
4.1.6 Replacement o f some employees with contract or agency staff o f casual or temporary 
workers [Yes/No]
4.1.7 Reduction in the number employed surplus to requirements [Yes/No]
4.2 When you have difficulties in the workplace, whom do you consult? 29
1. Supervisor/ middle manager
2. Higher ranked officers o f the trade unions (president, vice president, secretary etc.)
3. Colleague union members
4. Colleague workmates
5. Politician/ political leaders
6. My family
7. D o not consult anybody
Why not consult any o f the above? [ ]
26 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-J.
27 Kiyokawa (2003)
28 Wilkinson and White (1994: 129).
29 Acharji (1980)
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4.3 In the following items please mark o for persons who actually make the decision, and •  for 
the ranks which are entitled to participate in decision-making process. Also please mark ©  for the 
person you think should make the decision._________________________________________________
Politicians/
state
officials
Managing
directors/
chairman
Factory
(top)
manager
Middle
managers Engineers Supervisors
Trade
union
leaders
Workshop
leaders
Deciding and 
changing job 
allocations
Hiring workers
Disposing
workers
Promoting
workers
Training
workers
Training
engineers
Introducing new 
technology
Improving 
technology7 and 
equipment
Distribution of 
profits
Deciding wage 
increases (for 
workers)
Assessing bonus 
(for workers)
4.4 Are you satisfied in general with your present and past relations with the trade union 
movement?
4. Highly satisfied
3. Satisfied
2. Dissatisfied
1. Highly dissatisfied
4.5 D o you think workers benefit from trade union activities? [Yes/No] 
Apart from the workers, do any o f the following benefit from trade union activities?
1. Politicians/ government officials
2. Trade union leaders
3. Top managers
4. Middle managers
4.6 D o you consider cooperation with the trade unions as a relatively costless method o f settling 
conflict inside an organisation (compare to, say, strike procedure)?
1. Yes
2. N o
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4.7 What about in the past? D o you think it was costless to settle conflict through unions in the 
past compared to today?
1. Yes
2. N o
4.8 Please think o f an ideal union leader. Amongst the listed attributes, please give a ranking in 
order o f importance. If there is an attribute you think is not important, mark x.__________________
Attribute
Order o f importance for 
an ideal unionist
Marks for 
yourself
Ability to exercise control
Ability to make decisions
Ability to make speeches
Ability to negotiate with managers
Ability to organise agitations and demonstrations
Ability to take initiatives
Communication skill
Connections/negotiations with other trade unions
Connections with members o f the union
Connections with politicians, political party or state 
officials
Dedication to the cause
Honesty
Educational (schooling) attainment
Intelligence
Leadership skill
Persistence
Persuasiveness
Resourcefulness
Self-confidence
Skill in court work
Skill in negotiation with managers
4.9 If you have any further comments and suggestions kindly state them. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
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Appendix 3A.3 Questionnaire for workers (trade union members/non­
members)
Name o f interviewer [ ]
Date and time o f interview [ ]
Serial number [ ]
The purpose o f this survey is purely academic. It will never be used for other purposes. The 
strictest confidentiality will be upheld regarding the information you provide. Therefore, please 
feel free to answer the questions as you really think. If there are questions you do not want to 
answer, please say so.
1. Personal and social background
1.1 Name [ ]
1.3 Sex [Male/Female]
1.4 Marital status: Married/ Unmarried/ Any other
1.5 Age [ ]
Year o f birth [ ]
1.6 Where are you living? [ ]
1.6.1 Type o f the dwelling
1. Own house
2. Company house
3. Rental room
4. Dormitory
1.7 Where are your home /  native community? [ ]
1.7.1 Which is the nearest town to your home community?
[ 3
1.7.2 Give distance from this town [ ]
1.8 How long have you been living in this town? [ ]
1.9 What is your religion?
1. Hindu
2. Muslim
3. Buddism
4. Christianity
5. Others [ ]
1.10 What is your caste? [ ]
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1.11 Language known
1. Hindi
2. Bengali
3. Marathi
4. Gujarati
5. Urdu
6. English
7. Any other [
1.12 What was your highest level o f schooling? (i) passed, (ii) incomplete, dropout
1. Primary school
2. Middle school
3. High school
4. Higher secondary
5. Graduate
6. Postgraduate
7. Technical or vocational school
8. None
1.13 At what age were you first employed?
1.14 How many years have you worked at this factory?____________years
Or from when did you start to work? From____________
1.15 What sort o f job do you do at this factory?
D ept._____________
Sect.______________
Status:____________
1.16 What is your employment status?
1. Permanent employee
2. Casual employee [ ] months per year
3. Part-timer [ ] hours per week
1.17 How much are your monthly earnings (including all allowance)?
[ ] Rs. per month
1.18 At present, any source o f income other than the primary job? Yes /  N o
1.18.1 If yes, what is the source?
1-Job [
2. Land [
3. Business [
4. Political office [
5. Others [
1.18.2 Amount \
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1.19 H o w  would  you  rate the present econ om ic cond ition  o f  your family?
(5) Very w ell o f f
(4) W ell o f f
(3) Average
(2) P oor  
(1) V ery p oo r
1.20 Please give details o f  your last five jobs.
Job
N a m e o f  
organisation Salary Period  em ployed R easons for leaving
1
2
3
4
5
1.22 Please give the fo llow ing inform ation about your family
Relation w ith  you E ducation O ccupation Incom e Marital status
Living with  
you? (y /n )
E conom ically  
dependent on  
you? (y /n )
1 Father (a liv e /n o t alive)
2
M other (a live / n o t alive)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1.22 Are you  a m em ber o f  a trade union?
1.22.1 I f  yes, p lease specify the nam e o f  the un ion  [ ]
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2. Perception on technology and skill
2.1 W hen som eb od y says “there is a need to  upgrade worker’s skill in  India”, w h ich  aspect o f ‘skill’ 
is im portant? P lease give an order.
1. Ability to produce m ore w ith  the existing m achinery
2. K now led ge on  n ew  m achinery
3. Form al education and attainm ent
4. C onsciousness o f  productivity
5. P erception  on technology
6. Capacity to control and m aintain the w ork place
2.2 A s far as you  are aware, w hat is the m o st im portant recent advancem ent in your factory, say in  
the past 5 years, in  terms o f  im proving technology or productivity?
1. Introduction  o f  n ew  m achinery or equipm ent
2. Better product or quality control
3. Im provem ent in  the ability and attitude o f  workers
4. Im provem ent in  the ability o f  m anagers and engineers
5. O thers [ ]
2.3 W hat do you  think w as the reason for the advancem ent? P lease rank the fo llow in g  in the order 
o f  im portance. 30
1. N e e d  to  im prove quality
2. In order to increase output
3. T o  acquire higher technological capacity
4. T o  reduce labour input
5. T o  low er the unit cost o f  production
6. T o  cop e with com petition
2.4  I f  advanced m achinery or n ew  tech n ology  is available, should it be in troduced  even  i f  older  
m achinery or equipm ent w ould  have to  be scrapped (replaced)?
1. M achinery w ith  advanced technology should  be introduced even  if  older m achinery  
m ust be scrapped
2. Should n ot be introduced i f  older m achinery is still in operation
3. Should be introduced only after the old  m achinery b ecom es totally o b so lescen t
3 9
2.5 D o  you  think that introducing the im ported  m achinery is effective for increasing productivity “
1. Y es, it is effective i f  it is better or m ore advanced m achinery
2. N o , it is n o t  effective because there will b e  m ore problem s if  it  is introduced
2.6 W hen the n ew  m achinery is introduced, or n ew  technological advancem ent takes place, then
33w hat do you think is the m o st im portant assets to  co p e  w ith  it?
1. Experience
2. Form al technical education
30 Tulpule and Dutta (1995: 270).
31 Kiyokawa (2003), question IV-D.
32 Kiyokawa (2003) question IV-J.
33 Kiyokawa (2003)
217
Chapter 3 Methodology
3. O n-the-job  training (OJT)
2.7 W hat w ou ld  you prefer to  do i f  new  m achinery or equipm ent w ere in troduced  som ew here in  
your factory? (A ssum ing n o  w age or salary increases)
1. I w ant to undergo formal training and opera rate the n ew  m achinery
2. D o n ’t w ant to change the present w ork, because I am  satisfied w ith it
3. I w ant to learn to  operate the n ew  m achinery through inform al training (for 
exam ple O n -th e-job  Training)
2.8 W hat do you  think about the product or quality inspections o f  your factory?35
1 . 1 d o  n ot k n ow  m uch
2. Satisfied w ith  it
3. It should  b e  m ore strict
2.9 W h o  supervises the w ork  in your enterprise?36
1. Self
2. Partner
3. H ired supervisor
2.10 H ave you received training o n  n ew  m achinery installed in  the factory during your tenure?
[Y e s /N o ]37
3. Perception on work conditions, welfare and trade union
3.1 T hinking n o w  o f  all section  o f  em ployees, have any o f  the fo llow in g  steps been  taken over the  
past tw o years? 38
3.1.1 A n  increase in shift w orking [Y e s/N o ]
3.1.2 Training o f  em ployees to  cover jobs other than their ow n  [Y e s /N o ]
3.1.3 Increased use o f  group or collective pay incentives [Y e s/N o ]
3.1.4 Increased u se o f  w ork  m easurem ent or m ethod  study [Y e s/N o ]
3.1.5 R eplacem ent o f  som e full-tim e em ployees w ith  part-timers [Y e s/N o ]
3.1.6 R eplacem ent o f  so m e em ployees w ith  contract or agency sta ff o f  casual or tem porary  
w orkers [Y es/N o ]
3.1.7 R eduction in the num ber em ployed  surplus to  requirem ents [Y e s/N o ]
34 Kiyokawa Project, IV-E
33 Kiyokawa (2003), IV-F.
36 Romijn (1999: 309)
37 Bhatacherjee (1989)
38 Wilkinson and White (1994:129).
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3.2 W hen  you  have difficulties in the w orkplace, w h o m  do you  con su lt?39
1. M y su p erv isor/ m iddle manager
2. H igher ranked officers o f  the trade un ions (president, vice president, secretary etc.)
3. Colleague un ion  m em bers
4. Colleague w orkm ates
5. P o litic ian / political leaders
6. M y family
7. D o  n o t consult anybody
W hy n o t consu lt any o f  the above? [
3.3 In the fo llow ing item s please mark o  for persons w h o  actually m ake the decision , and •  for  
the ranks w hich  are entitled to participate in  decision-m aking process. A lso  please mark ©  for the  
person you  think should m ake the decision._________________________________________________________
P olitic ian s/
state
officials
M anaging
d irectors/
chairman
Factory
(top)
manager
M iddle
managers
E ngineers Supervisors
Trade
union
leaders
W orkshop
leaders
D ecid in g  and 
changing job 
allocations
H iring workers
D isp o sin g
workers
P rom oting
workers
Training
workers
Training
engineers
Introducing n ew  
technology
Im proving  
technology and 
equipm ent
D istribution o f  
profits
D ecid in g  w age  
increases (for 
workers)
A ssessin g  bonus 
(for workers)
3 .4  A re you  satisfied in  general w ith  your presen t and past services to  th e  trade un ion  
m ovem ent?
4. H igh ly  satisfied
3. Satisfied
2. D issatisfied
1. H igh ly  dissatisfied
39 Acharji (1980)
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3.5 D o  you  think w orkers b en efit from  trade un ion  activities? [Y es/N o ]
Apart from  the workers, do  any o f  the fo llow in g  benefit from  trade un ion  activities?
1. P o litic ian s/ governm ent officials
2. Trade u n io n  leaders
3. T o p  m anagers
4. M iddle m anagers
3.6 P lease think o f  an ideal un ion  leader. A m on gst the listed attributes, p lease give a ranking in 
order o f  im portance. I f  there is an attribute you  think is not im portant, mark x._____________________
Attribute
O rder o f  im portance for 
an ideal un ionist
Marks for 
yourself
Ability to  exercise control
Ability to  m ake decisions
Ability to  m ake speeches
A bility to  negotiate w ith  m anagers
Ability to  organise agitations and dem onstrations
Ability to  take initiatives
C om m unication  skill
C on n ection s/n egotia tion s with other trade unions
C onnections w ith  m em bers o f  the union
C onnections w ith  politicians, political party or state 
officials
D edication  to the cause
H on esty
Educational (schooling) attainm ent
Intelligence
Leadership skill
Persistence
Persuasiveness
R esourcefulness
Self-confidence
Skill in  court w ork
Skill in negotiation  w ith  managers
3.7 I f  you  have any further com m en ts and suggestions kindly state them . 
T H A N K  Y O U  F O R  Y O U R  C O O P E R A T IO N
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C h a p t e r  4
TYPES O F LABOUR M ARKET IN STITU TIO N S IN  MUMBAI A N D
ICOLKATA
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will identify and analyse the different types o f LMIs in 
Kolkata (Calcutta) and Mumbai (Bombay) using data obtained during field 
research in 2001. The comparison between two of the oldest industrial 
centres in India offers interesting case studies for our analysis o f the 
reproduction and transformation o f LMIs in terms o f their location within 
different types o f macro political conflicts. Despite the relatively similar 
experience o f industrial development and the labour movement until about 
the mid-1960s or early 1970s, Mumbai and Kolkata are often portrayed as 
contrasting examples o f LMIs positively or negatively affecting the process o f 
economic development since then.
Categorising differential types o f LMIs itself may be interesting in its own 
right as an indication o f the institutional diversity within India, which is often 
neglected in the on-going debates. However from the context o f this thesis, 
the typology o f LMIs and bargaining is o f particular interest because o f the 
widely held view in the debates, which relates LMIs to the efficiency and 
growth rates o f an economy. In Chapter 1, we reviewed the debates on labour 
market reforms in India, in which some mainstream theories that inform 
policy have attributed the extent o f the politicisation o f LMIs as one o f the 
alleged causes o f the persistently low productivity in the industrial sector and 
the relatively slow rate o f formal employment growth over the past few 
decades. In contrast, we have outlined an alternative political econom ic/ 
dialectical approach, which argues that the LMIs reflect the forms o f macro
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political conflicts, which in turn affect the historically specific ways in which 
industrial development proceeds. O f course, the relationship between LMIs 
and the patterns o f accumulation is dialectical, but also an asymmetrical one, 
in the sense that micro-level agents are caught up in the historical process, 
which they may help to shape, but the outcome need not be ‘chosen’ 
consciously by any micro-level agents (Callinicos 1988). Our argument is 
therefore that the causality is at least partially in the opposite direction to the 
one implied in the mainstream literature.
In Sections 2 and 3 o f this chapter, we will use observations from our survey 
to illustrate differential types o f LMIs in traditional and m odem  industrial 
sectors in Mumbai and Kolkata, which are ‘mapped’ in Figure 4-1. The types 
o f LMIs are identified by focusing on three interrelated aspects o f bargaining 
institutions: the level o f bargaining, the types o f agents who participate in the 
bargaining process, and the ownership o f firms. The three factors selected are 
by no means exhaustive, but cover aspects o f bargaining institutions that have 
been the focus o f debates on LMIs. We find that the bargaining structure is 
generally associated with the technological aspects o f the industry, whereas 
the extent o f politicisation of LMIs is related more with the specific social and 
political contexts within which labour-management bargaining take place. 
These findings from our empirical analysis are summarised, and further 
analytical issues are identified and discussed in Section 4.
4.2 Bargaining structure, bargaining agents and ownership
The objective o f this section is to identify the typology of LMIs that best 
represents the diverse forms o f labour-management relations observed in 
India. In Chapter 1, we have critically examined the ‘stylised’ image o f ‘state- 
dominated’ and ‘politicised’ LMIs in Indian industries, which is widely held in 
the on-going policy debates on labour market reforms. Within India, there are 
further stereotypes about LMIs and their relations to economic performance, 
for example that industrial areas in western India, such as Mumbai, have
222
performed better because they have had more ‘professional’ company-based 
unions compared to unions organised at industrial-level and based on political 
parties in eastern India, such as Kolkata. These perceived types o f LMIs are 
seen to feed directly into the governance capacity and investment climate o f 
different regions in India, as we discuss in Chapter 5 Section 5.2. Such 
perceptions are contrary to our political economic approach outlined in 
Chapter 2, in which LMIs are to be understood as a reflection o f how society 
organises the process o f development and accumulation, and how labour 
processes are managed and controlled.
While these ‘stylised’ images and perceptions do capture some aspects o f 
LMIs, they are generally unhelpful as a starting point for a systemic analysis o f 
existing LMIs, because they underestimate the considerable diversity in 
bargaining relations and unionism within India. This is partly due to the 
lamentable lack o f detailed micro-level studies on LMIs in India. With some 
pioneering work such as those collected in Davala (1992), we are only starting 
to understand the diverse and complex ways in which bargaining relations and 
unionism are organised differently across regions and industrial sectors. The 
aim of this section is to address this gap in the literature by empirically 
identifying diverse types o f LMIs in the sampled units from our field-work. 
O f course we do not claim to provide a comprehensive picture o f LMIs in 
Indian industries with this single study alone. Given that we do not have a 
representative sample o f the industry in India, or in Mumbai and Kolkata, we 
must naturally be cautious about over-generalisation, although as we discussed 
regarding the field-work methodology in Chapter 3, attempts were made to 
ensure that a wide range o f industrial relations are captured to reflect the 
diverse types o f LMIs in the two cities.
The variables that characterise our typology are drawn from the existing 
economic literature on LMIs. As we have seen in Chapter 2, in the simple 
neo-classical labour market models, the type o f bargaining institutions is not a
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major concern, since any institutional intervention in the labour market is 
treated as ‘distortion’. But once it is recognised that different institutional 
characteristics o f collective bargaining are associated with different incentives 
and payoff structures for bargaining agents, we find that institutions become a 
key variable in analysing the implications o f collective bargaining.
The first aspect o f LMIs we focus on is the level o f collective bargaining or 
bargaining structure, which is directly related to the concern o f the neo- 
corporatist literature, such as Calmfors and Driffill (1988), that focuses on the 
relations between the centralisation o f bargaining and the wage militancy o f 
unionism. It is also related to rent-seeking theory, for instance Mangel, 
DeLorme and Kamerschen (1994), which look at the distinction between 
rent-seeking that takes place at micro firm-level and rent-seeking at macro 
policy-level. The second aspect o f LMIs is the nature o f agents that participate 
in the bargaining process, particularly the involvement o f the state in 
collective bargaining, which is also an important issue for both collective- 
voice models, such as Freeman and M edoff (1984), as well as rent-seeking 
theories. The third aspect we focus on is the ownership o f firms, which is 
another variable related to the debate in the neo-corporatist literature, where 
the nature o f unionism is thought to be related to the stability o f employment 
and employer opposition (or absence of) to unionism (for example, Calmfors 
et al. 2001: 25-26).
Which factors or aspects o f the LMIs best characterise the general pattern o f 
bargaining relations and unionism is ultimately an empirical question and 
cannot be pre-determined theoretically. From our analytical approach, LMIs 
are organised differently reflecting the balance o f power and the historically 
specific ways in which industrial development proceeded in different regions, 
and therefore the identification o f the typology of LMIs is in part socially and 
empirically contingent. Table A4-1 lists the 21 surveyed units together with 
the bargaining structure, the type of bargaining agents, and the ownership of
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the firm, which will be used to empirically identify the typology of LMIs in 
Section 4.3 and is summarised in Figure 4-1. However, before proceeding to 
our ‘mapping’ o f the typology o f LMIs, let us first examine each o f these 
aspects o f LMIs in turn.
4.2.1 Centralisation of bargaining level and structure
The first aspect o f bargaining relations we consider here is the bargaining 
structure or the level/ locus where collective bargaining takes place. The level 
o f bargaining is direcdy related to the concern o f the hump-shaped hypothesis 
or the neo-corporatist literature (Calmfors and Driffills 1988), which focuses 
on the extent o f centralisation o f collective bargaining and the degree to 
which labour in different firms and sectors coordinate their demands, and 
thereby control wage militancy and influence the wage-employment trade-off 
at the level o f the macro-economy. In the rent-seeking models, a distinction 
was made between bargaining within the business unit, which focuses on 
economic ‘rents’ (or using our terminology from Chapter 2, ‘within-firm 
rents’), and rent-seeking that takes place over resources outside the unit, such 
as the legal framework, public finance, and political power (i.e. ‘outside-firm 
rents’). We have also seen in Chapter 1 that the on-going policy debate on 
LMIs in India is strongly influenced by a stylised image o f heavily centralised 
and politicised unionism, as discussed in the Second National Commission on 
Labour (SNCL) (GOI Ministry o f Labour 2002), although collective 
bargaining at the national level only occurs in selected public sector firms. 
Indeed, we came across only one case o f national level bargaining, in the 
public sector State Bank o f India (K2), and in all other cases the level o f 
bargaining was either at the industry-cum-state level or at the firm or 
establishment-level, or a combination o f the two. Difference in the level o f 
bargaining is thought to influence the incentives, opportunity and constraints 
for bargaining agents, and thus is seen to be associated with different types o f 
bargaining behaviour. Generally, the more centralised the bargaining 
structure, it is thought that the collective bargaining is more likely to be
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influenced by the political agenda, and in turn make bargaining agents less 
concerned with enterprise-level issues (Pencavel 1995; Bardhan 1984; 
Hossain, Islam and Kibria 1999).
T a b l e  4-1 L e v e l  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n
OF U N I O N  L E A D E R S H I P  IN S U R V E Y E D  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S
Level of bargaining
Type of union 
leadership Industry-level Mixed Plant-level Total
Independent n 1 0 3
(internal)
Independent n 0 4 4
(external)
Politically 3 4 7 14affiliated
Total 3 5 13 21
Note: Pooling the “type o f union leadership” into a dichotomous category (political affiliated 
vs. independent), Pearson’s chi-square test was computed as ^  = 1.325 < Zoosip1^ ’
the minimum expected count o f 0.71, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are 
statistically independent 1 . In addition, Kendall’s tau-C was calculated as
T  = —0.200 < T q q5 , and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient as f s  = —0.235 ,
indicating that the statistical association between the two variables is weak at best.
Source: Author’s fieldwork
From  table 4-1 we can see that the level o f bargaining in our surveyed units is 
diverse. In our field survey, we collected data from 21 units (factories or 
business establishments), 10 from Kolkata (Calcutta) and 11 from Mumbai 
(Bombay)2. In terms o f the level o f collective bargaining, only 3 out o f 21 had 
exclusively centralised settlements negotiated and signed at national, regional, 
or even industry levels. Even if we included units that had a mixed policy, that 
is they had two separate settlements, one negotiated at a centralised level and 
one at the plant-level, only 8 units participated in industry-wide settlements. 
The remaining 13 units had a settlement signed at the plant-level.
1 For table 4-1, Pearson’s chi-square test was computed after pooling the categories, since in the original
table the expected count in the smallest cell was 0.43, less than the criterion set by Everitt (1977: 40). 
In all other tables in this chapter (4-2 to 4-4) we have computed the chi-square statistics without the 
pooling o f  categories. See Chapter 3 Section 3.3.4 for further discussion on small expected frequencies 
in contingency tables.
2 Survey methodology and the basic characteristics o f  the surveyed units are discussed in Chapter 3.
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O f course, even if the settlement is signed at the plant-level, the bargaining 
strategies o f unions may be influenced by extra-firm issues, particularly if the 
unions are affiliated to centralised political parties, or if the transfer o f 
resources from the state accounts for a significant proportion o f gains from 
industrial activities. Interestingly, table 4-1 shows that amongst the units that 
concluded plant-level settlements 7 out o f 13 had party affiliated unions3. This 
is somewhat contrary to the conventional wisdom widely assumed in the 
policy debates in India that decentralisation of collective bargaining would 
make unions less dependent on political parties (Hossain, Islam and Kibria 
1999: 77; G O I Ministry o f Labour 2002). Our field observations suggest that 
the politicisation o f unionism is not determined by the extent o f centralisation 
alone, as confirmed by the statistical insignificance association (see note o f 
table 4-1), but depends on various other economic and political factors. Our 
hypothesis is that the involvement o f political parties and external agency in 
unionism are closely associated with the relative size o f ‘within’ and ‘outside- 
firm rents’. As will be discussed in Section 4.3 and further elaborated in 
Chapter 5, we suggest that in industrially stagnant sectors, party-affiliation is 
sought by both unions and employers to secure wages and employment in 
return for a ‘disciplined’ industrial relations, whereas in more industrial 
dynamic sectors, changes in the type o f union leadership reflects the extent to 
which they succeed in extracting greater share o f ‘within-firm rents’. 
Furthermore, shifts in the bargaining structure are often used as means to 
secure more favourable conditions for rent appropriation by bargaining 
agents, as we discuss regarding cases o f decentralised collective bargaining in 
Chapter 6.
3 Our categorisation o f  the type o f  union leadership is not strictly a measure o f  ‘politicisation’ or 
‘extemalisation’ o f  unionism, but more an indication o f  the ‘formal’ links with political parties or other 
external organisations. N ote that this means that, where there are multiple unions, the unit is 
categories as “politically affiliated” i f  at least one o f  the unions recognised at the plant have formal 
links to political parties, even if  there are other unions which may be ‘independent’, as in the case o f  
Philips Taratolla (K10). A lso even if  union leaders and activists are members o f  political parties, if  the 
unions are not ‘formally’ affiliated to political parties, the unit is not categories as “politically 
affiliated”, as in the case o f  State Bank o f  India (K2).
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At this point o f our discussion, we may at least say that independent non­
political unionism is more likely to be found in establishments where at least 
part o f the bargaining takes place at the plant-level. We may also say that in 
centralised collective bargaining, unions are more likely to be politically 
affiliated. The final observation is consistent with the experience in much of 
the Continental and Nordic countries, which suggests that the centralisation 
o f collective bargaining and the unitary labour movement tends to strengthen 
union ties with political parties and ruling governments, whether such 
relations takes the shape o f formal political affiliation or informal associations. 
Such political ties are important not only for unions who may influence the 
political agenda o f allied political parties, but also for incumbent parties who 
may seek support from affiliated unions on unpopular reforms or wage 
restraint (Brugiavini et al. 2001, pp. 175-7).
4.2.2 Types of bargaining agents
Let us next consider the bargaining agents who participate in the process o f 
collective bargaining in our surveyed units. The type o f agents who participate 
in the bargaining process, particularly the involvement o f extra-firm actors in 
collective bargaining, is highlighted in rent-seeking models, in which the 
extent o f rent-seeking by bargaining agents is explained in terms o f the types 
o f trade union leadership and their bargaining strategies (Mangel, Delorme 
and Kamerschen 1994). The bargaining strategy may be reflected in whether 
the unions are affiliated with political parties (Pencavel 1995; Hossain, Islam 
and Kibria 1999), or in the types of bargaining agents involved, for example 
whether external agents dominate the rent-seeking process (Kamerschen, 
DeLorme, Mangel and Morgan 2000). Again these types o f union leadership 
and their bargaining strategies are thought to be associated with different 
types o f rent-seeking activities.
Similarly, in the collective voice model (Freeman and M edoff 1984; Luchak 
2003), it is suggested that the types o f union leaders may have implications on
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the extent to which workers’ voice effectively contributes to improved 
productivity. The implication o f the conventional analysis is that, as the union 
leaders become more skilful politically and administratively, they tend to seek 
self interest and lose touch with the rank-and-file, making the institutional 
response to collective voice ineffective.
In our surveyed units, two forms o f participation to collective bargaining are 
found: bi-partite bargaining, where the agents consist o f management and a 
labour union, and tri-partite where the central or local governments enter as 
an additional bargaining party, sometimes in a supportive role to one o f the 
other two agents (i.e. management or labour) or as a participant with its own 
bargaining agenda. From Table 4-2 we can see that amongst the 21 units, for 
which we were able to identify the nature o f bargaining agents, 8 units had tri­
partite bargaining and setdement between management, labour and the state, 
9 had bi-partite bargaining and 4 had both bi-partite and tri-partite bargaining 
for different settlements. All 3 units that had only industry-level settlement 
had tri-partite bargaining. Amongst the 13 units that had plant-level 
bargaining 9 had a bi-partite bargaining and 4 had tri-partite bargaining. 
Generally the two variables are correlated with each other, as confirmed by 
the statistically significant association.
T a b l e  4-2 L e v e l  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  a n d  b a r g a i n i n g  a g e n t s  i n
S U R V E Y E D  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S
Level of bargaining
Bargaining
agents Industry-level Mixed Plant-level Total
Bi-partite 0 0 9 9
Mixed 0 4 0 4
Tripartite 3 1 4 8
Total 3 5 13 21
N o te: P earson ’s chi-square test w as co m p u ted  as ^  — 21.969 >  To 001 (^ 0  > th e
m in im u m  ex p ected  cou n t o f  0 .57 , rejecting the null h yp oth esis that the variables are 
statistically in d ep en dent. In  addition, K endall’s tau-C w as calculated as
T  =  —0.463 >  Tqqj , and Spearm an’s rank correlation co effic ien t as Vs  = —0.534 ,
con firm in g  statistically sign ificant association  b etw een  the tw o  variables.
Source: A u th o r’s fieldw ork
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In our surveyed sample, 9 our o f 13 units with plant-level bargaining had 
bipartite bargaining, while in 4 cases we observed that the state may have a 
role in determining bargaining outcomes even in units that have plant-level 
bargaining. The latter observation is again somewhat contrary to the 
perception held in the Indian policy debate that plant-level collective 
bargaining is associated with bilateral negotiations between the firm 
management and labour unions, whereby the main focus o f the negotiation is 
over the share o f potential surplus generated from firm-level production, 
what we have earlier called ‘within-firm rents’, and that decentralisation o f 
bargaining makes settlements less subject to political intervention. Such an 
assumption is also held by some mainstream theories, such as the collective 
voice and rent-seeking models, where bargaining at the plant-level is ‘chosen’ 
by bargaining agents because significant additional supernormal profit or rent 
can be extracted either through union-management cooperation or through 
rent-seeking. Neo-corporatist models also predict plant-level bargaining to be 
found in industries where the cost o f rent-seeking is difficult to externalise 
because o f competitive pressures, mainly due to technological and market 
conditions. Therefore conventional models predict the plant-level collective 
bargaining to have the limited involvement o f extra-firm agents.
It is therefore o f interest that there were 4 establishments4 in our sample 
where the plant-level bargaining at the time o f the field research entailed 
significant and constant state involvement, and all 4 units experienced 
negotiation over settlements with disputes over the reorganisation of 
production. This does not mean that industrial disputes always invite 
regularised mediation by the state, as there were other firms with strongly 
disputed settlements, but without direct state intervention becoming the norm
4 Am ongst these, 3 units, IN D A L  Belur, Philips Toratolla and BOC, were located in Kolkata (Calcutta) 
and one, IN D A L  Taloja, in Mumbai (Bombay).
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for their industrial relations5. However, it does suggest that industrial conflicts 
often provide opportunities for external actors, including the state, to 
intervene in the bargaining process, which may result in the same plant-level 
bargaining involving different actors depending on their specific economic, 
social, and political conditions.
Once again, our hypothesis is that the involvement o f external bargaining 
agents in LMIs depends on the extent to which bargaining agents can exploit 
their economic or organizational power to capture politically created income 
(i.e. ‘outside-firm rents’) compared to the gains from labour-management 
bargaining over the surplus at the point o f production (‘within-firm rents’). 
This is a question o f the location o f bargaining agents in the redistributional 
politics, which depends on the balance o f power at the macro level and how 
the coalition o f rent-seeking is organised. As we elaborate further in Chapter 
5, we suggest that the state and other external agency are more likely to be 
involved in LMIs where either (i) there is greater size o f state resources 
available for appropriation and the logic o f political mobilisation is such that 
the accommodation o f  industrial capital and labour within the redistributional 
coalition is critical; and /o r (ii) the involvement o f external actors provides 
means for transforming the LMIs to create favourable condition for further 
rent appropriation.
4.2.3 Ownership o f firms
Some mainstream theories predict difference in the behaviour o f bargaining 
agents in public and private sectors. The textbook neoclassical model o f 
labour markets, as discussed in Section 2.1 o f Chapter 2, assumes labour- 
management bargaining in the private sector, and given perfectly competitive 
product and labour markets, whereas in the public sector, ‘market forces’ 
reflected in the state o f labour supply and demand may only have an indirect
5 For example, the 2000 settlement at the Hindustan Lever plant in Maharashtra was settled through the 
court, due to disputes over production reorganisation, but the involvement o f  extra-firm actors in this 
case was not regularised in a tri-partite structure.
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role in setting pay rates. Similarly, in the new institutional economics (NIE)- 
inspired models and neo-corporatist literature, the ownership structure is 
considered to be an important variable that is correlated both with the 
institutional structure o f the organisation and its efficiency implications. This 
is partly because wages and employment in the public sector are determined 
within a budgetary framework constrained by the government’s fiscal policy, 
rather than a mere maximisation o f profits at the firm level as assumed in 
standard economic models o f private firms (Calmfors et al. 2001: 25-26; Falch 
and Strom 2003). Additionally, some politicians may establish patron-client 
relations with public sector workers and unions, resulting in political 
intervention in the LMIs and increased rent-seeking (Nelson 1991: 45; 
Brugiavini et al. 2001:175-7).
Let us first consider the relationship between the ownership o f business 
establishments and the level o f bargaining in our sample. Table 4-3 shows that 
out o f 21 units, 11 were owned by private domestic capital, 5 were 
multinationals and 5 were public sector units6. Amongst the 11 units owned 
by domestic private capital, 8 had collective bargaining at the plant-level, one 
had an industry-level setdement, and 2 had a mix o f both bargaining levels. 
All 5 units owned by multinational capital negotiated settlements at the plant- 
level. Hence, regardless o f domestic or foreign ownership, it appears that 
private companies had a tendency to hold at least part o f the bargaining at 
plant-level. This can be contrasted with the observation that amongst 5 units 
under public ownership 2 had regional or industry-level settlements, while 3 
had both plant and industry level bargaining. Generally we find a strong 
correlation between the two variables, as confirmed by the statistically 
significant associations.
6 One o f  the units classified as “public” in our categorisation, Lagan Jute Manufacturing (K ll)  was a 
public sector firm until its privatisation in 2000, which was just prior to our field survey. Given that 
the observed bargaining relation was established when the firm was still government-owned, and in 
particular the settlements effective at the time was those negotiated in 1997, w e have categorised 
Lagan as a public sector unit.
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T a b l e  4 - 3  O w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f i r m s  a n d  l e v e l  o f
B A R G A I N I N G  I N  S U R V E Y E D  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S
Level of 
bargaining
Ownership
Private Private p ... 
(domestic) (multinational) u 1 Total
Regional/
Industry-level
Mixed
Plant-level
1 0 2
2 0 3 
8 5 0
3
5
13
Total 1 1 5  5 21
Note: Pearson’s chi-square test was computed as ^  =  11 . 7 9 9  >  05 ( 4 ) , with the 
minimum expected count o f  0.71, rejecting the null hypothesis that the variables are
statistically independent. Pooling the “type o f  ownership” into a dichotomous category 
(public vs. private), Kendall’s tau-C was calculated as T — —0 . 5 9 9  >  T 0 0 o5 > and
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient as Vs =  —0 . 7 0 4  , indicating statistically strong
association between the two variables.
Source: Author’s fieldwork
The finding that none o f  the public sector firms enter collective bargaining 
exclusively at plant-level is consistent with the conventional theories and is 
not surprising. The experience o f many neo-corporatist countries with highly 
centralised bargaining structures suggests that public sector unions have 
tended to play a central role, even if the bargaining agenda in the corporatist 
political system, such as the provision of social benefits, unemployment 
insurance and pensions, concern private sector employees as well (Calmfors et 
al. 2001). W hat is perhaps interesting to note is that some public sector units 
also engage in plant-level bargaining and combine it with more centralised 
forms o f bargaining. Such mixed modes o f bargaining are also commonly 
found in the private sector. This indicates that the dichotomist and static view 
o f centralised vs. localised bargaining may be too simplistic and must be 
discussed with caution. Especially since the 1980s there has been a tendency 
to hold decentralised plant-level bargaining alongside firm-level or industry- 
cum-national negotiations with each focusing on different bargaining issues 
(Bhattacherjee 1999; Ramaswamy 2000). O ur hypothesis is that this increased 
role o f decentralised bargaining reflects the ‘uneven’ pattern o f economic 
development in India since the 1980s, which has made it more difficult to
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justify and sustain ‘traditional’ industrial-level bargaining that homogenise pay 
structure for similar work across the sector. We shall discuss the implications 
o f this process o f decentralisation and such mixed mode of collective 
bargaining in Chapter 6.
T a b l e  4 - 4  O w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f i r m s  a n d  b a r g a i n i n g
A G E N T S  IN  S U R V E Y E D  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S
Type of ownership
Bargaining
agents
Private
(domestic)
Private
(multinational) Public Total
Bi-partite 6 3 0 9
Mixed 2 0 2 4
Tripartite 3 2 3 8
Total 11 5 5 21
Note: Pearson’s chi-square test was computed as ^  = 5.918 < %qq5 (4) , with the
minimum expected count o f 0.95, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are 
statistically independent However, after pooling the “type o f ownership” into a dichotomous
category (public vs. private), Kendall’s tau-C was calculated as T =  0 . 3 7 2  <  T005 , and
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient as — 0 . 4 0 8  , indicating statistically s igni f i c a n t
association between the two variables.
Source: Author’s fieldwork
Next, if we consider the relationship between the type o f bargaining agents 
and the type o f ownership, we see from table 4-4 that amongst the 5 public 
sector units, all o f them had some type o f tri-partite bargaining, although 2 
units had a plant-level bi-partite bargaining as well. The bargaining agents in 
the private sector appear to be quite diverse, although the majority had some 
form o f bi-partite bargaining.
The dominance o f tri-partite bargaining in the public sector is not surprising 
given that wage determination in public sector firms is subjected to the 
government’s fiscal policy. Furthermore in India, central and state 
governments generally followed policies o f moderating conflict and imposing 
uniform wages and benefit amongst public sector firms even after 
liberalisation (Ramaswamy 2000). In contrast, the extent o f extra-firm agency 
involvements in the bargaining processes o f private firms is diverse,
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suggesting that the types o f agents involved is not dependent on the type o f 
ownership o f the firm alone. Once again, our hypothesis is that the 
involvement o f different actors depends on the relative size o f ‘within’ and 
‘outside-firm rents’ available to bargaining agents in LMIs. We argue that the 
involvement o f the state and other external agency is more likely when 
industrial capital and labour can appropriate ‘outside-firm rents’ through 
accommodation in redistributional coalition with other actors in the wider 
social context, which in turn reflects the broader patterns o f accumulation 
within which labour-management bargaining takes place.
4.3 Typology of labour market institutions in Mumbai and Kolkata
We have so far considered several aspects o f the types o f unionism and 
bargaining: the level o f bargaining, the types o f union leadership and external 
bargaining agents, and the ownership o f the firm. As we have already pointed 
out these aspects o f the bargaining institutions are naturally not independent 
o f one another. For example, collective bargaining in public sector firms is 
usually, if not exclusively, settled at the centralised level, since an investment 
decision in the public sector is typically not based on factors at the plant-level 
alone, but also takes into account costs and benefits at the level o f society. 
Similarly, centralised bargaining tends to be associated with tri-partite 
bargaining, sometimes because management and unions have an interest in 
using the link with the state and political parties to influence the settlement in 
their favour, and sometimes because the state has its own political 
motivations for entering the bargaining process.
While empirical research on the diversity o f India’s LMIs across regions and 
industrial sectors is still limited, two sharply contrasting typologies can be 
extracted from the existing literature. O n one hand, influential writers such as 
Pencavel (1995); and Banerji, Campos and Sabot (1995) in the current policy 
debates on LMIs are concerned with ‘traditional’ unionism and bargaining 
relations characterised as “state-dominated” or “involuted pluralism”
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(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bhattacherjee 1999), which is thought to have 
followed from the state-led industrialisation strategies o f the 1950s. This 
model o f LMIs is characterised by politically affiliated unionism, and in some 
cases multiple unions fragmented along political party and factional lines, 
centralised bargaining structure at the region-cum-industry level and tri- 
partitism with the central or regional governments acting as active participants 
in collective bargaining. Despite the general perception that the state is 
increasingly curtailing its role in mediating industrial relations, regularised state 
intervention continues in some industrial sectors, most notably the jute and 
engineering industry in W est Bengal (Venkata Ratnam 1996: 79; Sen 1992a; 
1992b) and the public sector cotton textile industry in Maharashtra 
(Ramaswamy 1988: 215; Bhattacherjee 1989; 1999; Dash 1996).
O n the other hand, since the 1980s ‘independent’ unionism and ‘m odem ’ 
bargaining relations have become more prevalent, especially in Mumbai, 
which was previously limited to a few multinational companies. This type o f 
LMI is characterised by a ‘decentralised and fragmented’ bargaining structure, 
whereby employees in different units are covered by separate agreements 
even within the same enterprise, and in some cases even between different 
departments within the same unit; and enterprise-level or company-based 
unions representing the whole workforce at the unit led by internal employee 
activists or outside trade unionists who avoid being politically labelled. This 
‘m odem ’ sector covers a wide range o f economic activities ranging from 
consumer goods to capital goods and intermediate goods industries, but this 
type o f unionism is most well-known in multinational companies such as 
Hindustan Lever and Philips, as well as the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry (Ramaswamy 1988; 2000; Banaji and Hensman 1990: 47; Davala 
1992; Dash 1996: 313; Bhattacherjee 1999)
These two typologies that emerge from existing studies represent the polar 
extremes in Indian industry within which we would expect diverse
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combinations o f differential types o f bargaining structure, union leadership 
and bargaining agencies. How these different aspects o f collective bargaining 
and unionism link to one another to form differing types o f bargaining 
relations in a particular unit, and more importantly how the types o f LMIs 
interact with structural factors can only be examined empirically.
As a statistical m ethod to characterise the typology of LMIs in our surveyed 
units, we have used multidimensional scaling (MDS) and factor analysis (FA) 
to reduce the number o f dimensions in our data and categorise the types o f 
LMIs in our surveyed units7. MDS is a mathematical tool that enables us to 
represent the proximities between variables spatially as in a ‘map’ (Dillon and 
Goldstein 1984: 108), as explained in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3, with details o f 
the procedure outlined in Appendix 4A.1 at the end o f this Chapter. Factor 
analysis is used as an additional procedure to evaluate the relevance o f the 
variables and identified typology, which is presented in Appendix 4A.2. The 
resulting typology of LMIs and the ‘mapping’ o f surveyed units is presented in 
figure 4-1.
O ur analysis from both the MDS and FA indicates that the typology o f LMIs 
in our surveyed units is characterised by two aspects: (i) the extent o f 
centralisation o f bargaining and (ii) the extent o f ‘politicised’ or external 
unionism, which are the two dimensions identified from the MDS procedure8. 
As we have already indicated in our discussion so far, our hypothesis is that 
the different types o f LMIs can be explained by the relative size o f ‘within’ 
and ‘outside-firm rents’ available to bargaining agents. Centralised bargaining 
is more like to be found in sectors with limited scope for achieving significant 
gains from increasing productivity and bargaining over plant-based ‘within-
7 While FA is a more widely used data reduction technique, it assumes quantitative/metric variables.
Here, all o f  our variables are categorical dichotomous variables, and therefore the (non-metric) M DS  
is preferred. Nonetheless, as we show in the Appendix, the two techniques arrive at broadly similar 
typologies o f  LMIs.
8 The interpretation o f  the two dimensions is justified in our explanation o f  the M DS procedure in
Appendix 4A.1.
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firm rents’, whereas decentralised bargaining is more likely to be found in 
industrially dynamic (even if the pattern o f accumulation is ‘uneven’) regions 
and sectors. Also, we argue that party-based or external union leadership are 
more likely to be found when gains from ‘outside-firm rents’ outweigh that o f 
‘within-firm rents’ and /o r external actors can effectively redress grievances or 
securing benefits which others cannot be achieved.
Recall that in Chapter 1, we saw that many o f the policy debates on labour 
market reform in India have focused on these two aspects. In this sense, the 
factors that characterise types o f LMIs in our data are consistent with the 
observations from the wider Indian context At the same time, our analysis 
suggests that there are at least three or four different types o f LMIs that can 
be characterised by these two factors, rather than a single stylised type o f 
LMI, an aspect underestimated in the mainstream debates. In particular we 
have indicated four ‘clusters’ o f units categorised by their region (Mumbai and 
Kolkata) and broad industrial sectors (modem and traditional)9.
9 The ‘clusters’ outlined in the diagram are meant to illustrate broad groupings o f  units that is meaningful 
for our interpretation rather than a result o f  statistical clustering procedure (for example, Dillon and 
Goldstein 1984: 109).
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Chapter 4 TjpesofLM Is
Figure 4-1 illustrates the mapping o f our surveyed units and summarises the 
results o f the two-dimensional MDS solution, with the extent o f centralisation 
on the horizontal axis, and ‘politicisation’ or ‘extemalisation’ o f union 
leadership on the vertical axis. Therefore, observations located to the right o f 
the diagram indicate the tendency for collective bargaining to be negotiated at 
industry-level, typically with the involvement o f the state, whereas 
observations located to the left o f  the diagram imply more localised plant- 
level settlements. Similarly, observations located at the top o f the diagram 
indicate that the union is affiliated to political party or have union leadership 
from outside the unit, whereas observations at the bottom  suggest company- 
based unions with internal leadership.
The typology identified here is a useful way for us to illustrate the diversity o f 
LMIs in Indian industries. It is however misleading to treat these types as 
being a static characteristic or portray them as exogenously determined, as 
often implied in the mainstream theories and policy debates. For example, a 
static reading o f Figure 4-1 may lead to attributing the typology o f LMIs to 
“tradition and culture” (Ramaswamy 1988: 215). This is inadequate since the 
typology o f LMIs is reduced to subjective classification rather than 
explanation based on material reality. Instead, our objective is to interpret the 
typology o f LMIs in our surveyed units as dynamic and systematic 
consequences o f specific economic and political conditions within which the 
labour-management bargaining takes place. In Chapter 5, we focus on the 
type o f patron-client politics and examine how industrial capital and labour 
are positioned within the redistributional coalition in Maharashtra and West 
Bengal, within which Mumbai and Kolkata are located, which in turn affects 
the historically specific ways in which industrial development proceeded in 
the two regions. From our ‘mapping’ in Figure 4-1, we find that in both 
‘traditional’ and ‘m odem ’ sectors, the types o f LMIs in Kolkata units are 
similar, relatively easier to characterise them in a ‘cluster’, whereas we find 
more diversity in the LMIs for Mumbai units. Our interpretation is that the
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dynamic but ‘uneven’ economic development in Mumbai provided incentives 
for bargaining agents to organise to seek company-based ‘within-firm rents’ 
and therefore to organise LMIs differently according to their local conditions, 
rather than to seek politically created ‘outside-firm rents’ that are more 
attractive in less industrially dynamic regions such as Kolkata, where industrial 
capital and labour are more keen to secure wages and employment in return 
for a ‘disciplined’ industrial relations through politically controlled unionism.
4.3.1 ‘Traditional* sectors in Mumbai and Kolkata
Several observations can be highlighted from our mapping in Figure 4-1. 
First, let us focus on the units we categorised as ‘traditional’ sector10 units, the 
majority o f which are located in the upper-right comer o f our diagram, 
indicating that the LMIs in these units are characterised by centralised tri­
partite bargaining and union affiliation to political parties. From Figure 4-1 we 
can see that all three o f the privately-run jute manufacturing mills in Kolkata 
are positioned close to each other in the diagram, reflecting similarity in their 
collective bargaining patterns and unionism. In all o f these jute mills, multiple 
(as many as 14) unions co-existed in each unit divided along political party 
and factional lines, and industry-level collective bargaining was negotiated, 
which deals with issues such as wages, fringe benefits, and dearness 
allowances. A t the same time, in some mills, including Alliance (K4) and 
Hastings Jute Mills (K5) in our sample, separate mill-level settlements were 
signed between the mill management and the unions, with bargaining 
revolving around discipline, workload, working complement and productivity 
issues. Table 4-5 shows the signatory unions in tri-partite industry-wide
10 Cotton textile industry in Mumbai and jute manufacturing industry in Kolkata were selected as one o f  
the comparable sectors in the two cities. W e categorised them as ‘traditional’ sectors to refer to the 
state regulated industrial relations prevalent in these industries, which is typically refered to as the 
traditional model o f  unionism in the literature (for example, Bhattacherjee 1999). However it is 
possible to also characterise them in terms o f  their industrial history, since many o f  these mills go 
back to the second half o f  19th century or early 20th century, although the subsequent development 
was not always uniform, as we see in som e o f  our cases studies in Chapter 6. While our category is not 
related to the notion o f  ‘traditional’ sector in the dual economy model (Lewis 1954), which typically 
refers to the rural or the agrarian sector, both o f  our industries are manufacturing activities based on  
agricultural commodities. See Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2 for the ‘strata’ in our survey data.
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settlements between 1969 and 1995, which was the latest industry-level 
settlement at the time of field research, together with the mill-level 
settlements in Alliance and Hastings mills in 1999 and 1998 respectively. The 
table illustrates the increasingly fragmented nature of unionism in Kolkata jute 
industry. As Sen (1996: 48-9) reports the number o f unions that signed the 
industry-wide settlement in 1969 were 4, which have gradually increased over 
the past three decades up to 18 in 1995. The Centre of Indian Trade Unions 
(CITU), the union federation o f the Communist Party o f India (Marxist) or 
CPI(M), which has ruled West Bengal since 1977, is by far the largest o f them 
with the estimated membership strength o f around 35 percent o f unionised 
workers in the jute industry (Sen op cit.: 79), followed by the Congress- 
affiliated Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC). Many o f the other 
unions, which emerged as splinter or dissident unions o f these two major 
union federations, are relatively small in number, and either take ultra-left 
stance or declare to be unaffiliated to political parties. For example the 
INTUC have at least three major industry-wide unions, the ‘official’ INTUC 
with Subrato Mukherjee as the State President, another splinter union 
registered as its Kali Mukerjee faction, and another led by a veteran INTUC 
leader Sisir Ganguly. Furthermore, table 4-5 shows that there are a number o f 
unions recognised as bargaining agents at the mill-level, but are not signatories 
at industry-level. Once again, some o f these local-level unions are formed by 
rival groups divided by party factional lines, or by geographical locations, with 
some even rumoured to be set up by the mill management to control and 
monitor workers.
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T a b l e  4-5 S i g n a t o r y  u n i o n s  i n  i n d u s t r y - w i d e  a n d  m i l l -
l e v e l  S E T T L E M E N T S  IN  K O L K A T A  JU T E  IN D U S T R Y
Unions
Bengal Chatkal Mazdoor Union 
(CITU)
National Union o f  Jute Workers 
(INTUC - Subrata Mukherjee) 
Bengal jute Mills Workers Union 
(UTUC - Lenin Sarani)
Jute Workers Federation (FIMS)
Jute Textile Workers Union 
(NFITU)
Bengal Provincial Chatkal Mazdoor 
Union (UTUC - Bowbazar) 
Pachimbanga Bengal Chatkal 
Mazdoor Federation (TUCC) 
Federation o f  Chatkal Mazdoor 
Union (AITUC)
Bharatiya Jute Mazdoor Sangh 
(BMS)
Rastnva Chatkal Mazdoor Union 
(INTUC - Kali Mukherjee)
All India Jute Textile Worker's 
Federation (HMS)
West Bengal Chatkal Srimik 
Karmachari Union (unaffiliated) 
West Bengal National Jute Mill 
Sramik Union (FB - Marxist) 
National Union o f  Jute Textile 
Woerkers (INTUC - Sisir Ganguly) 
All India Jute Workers Federation 
(CITU)
National Union o f  Jute Workers, 
Shramik Bhavvan (INTUC - Subrata 
Mukherjee)
Indian National Jute Workers 
Federation
Indian Federation o f  Jute Textile 
Workers
Barrackpore Mahukuma Chatkal 
Mazdur Sangh, Alliance Unit
Alliance Chatkal Mazdur Union  
Jute Textile Workers Union,
Alliance Unit
Jagatdal Thana Chatkal Mazdul 
Union
Alliance Jute Mills Labour Union 
(Behara Pada Rd.)
Alliance Jute Mills Labour Union 
(South Labour Line)
Alliance Jute Mills Sramik Sangh 
Flastings Jute Mill Workers Union 
(AITUC)
Hastings Mill Workers and 
Employees Union 
Hastings Jute Mill Ltd Mazdoor 
Sangh
Hind Mazdoor Kishan Panchayat 
(unaffiliated)_______________________
Tri-partite Jute industry-wide agreement
1969 1974/5  1979 1984/8 1995
Bi-partite m ill-level 
settlem ents
Alliance Hastings
Mills Jute Mill
(1999)________(1998)
Number o f  signatory unions 11 1 5 1 4 10
Source: Sen (1992: 53) and author’s fieldwork.
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We also can observe from Figure 4-1 that all o f the nationalised cotton textile 
mills in Mumbai under the control o f National Textile Corporation (NTC) are 
also identified in a similar area o f the diagram, characterised by centralised tri­
partite bargaining and party-affiliated unions. In all o f these Mumbai textile 
mills, the ‘representative’ union is the Congress-affiliated Rashtriya Mill 
Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), due to the Bombay Industrial Relations (BIR) Act 
o f 1946, which imposes an industry-cum-regional settlement with the sole 
‘representative’ union, although, as in Kolkata jute, a mill-level settlement is 
negotiated separated in some mills, including Podar Mills (M3) in our sample. 
In reality other unions exist in the industry, including the Gimi Kamgar Sena 
(GKS) affiliated to the communal Shiv Sena party, Datta Samant’s 
‘independent’ Mumbai/Maharashtra Gimi Kamgar Union (MGKU), and 
more recently Gimi Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS), but given their 
‘unrecognised’ status as bargaining agents, many of these unions function as 
organisations to voice grievances not taken up by the RMMS or as workers 
co-operatives.
The type o f LMIs represented here corresponds to one that is often portrayed 
as “state-dominated” or “involuted pluralism” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; 
Bhattacherjee 1999), characterised by state intervention at every stage o f the 
labour-management relations, whereby the “state is armed with the power to 
take note o f industrial disputes, force labour and management to give notice 
o f their intention to strike or lockout, conciliate to resolve their difference, 
decide whether the dispute should be referred for a judicial decision if 
conciliation fails, set up the courts which will adjudicate disputes, hand out 
interim solutions pending final disposal by the courts, ban strikes and 
lockouts, and compel labour to get back to work and the management to run 
the enterprise on pain o f prosecution” (Ramaswamy 1988: 212-3). It is 
however simplistic to assume that labour and management have no active role 
to play in this state-controlled system of industrial relations. While the state 
intervention has sometimes meant promotion o f political muscle o f the party
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in power and its allies in the labour movement, Ramaswamy (op cit: 214) 
argues that the employers also have been ‘politically opportunistic’ building 
relationship with the political party in power at the time, whilst using tactics 
such as lockouts against their union federations, and exploiting the procedure 
o f conciliation and adjudication to buy time when it suits their purpose. Also 
some workers have similarly become allegedly “shrewdly calculative” creating 
opportunistic alliances with political parties in order to “extract the m ost out 
o f the system” for example by securing patronage and protection in the case 
o f personal grievances. This is particularly the case in the Kolkata jute 
manufacturing where workers may declare ‘loyalty’ to several o f the multiple 
trade unions active in their mill. Sen (1992a: 47) reports that at least 14-15 
percent o f workers admitted having dual or triple membership, in the sense o f 
paying membership dues to more than one union, in the two jute mills she 
surveyed, which is broadly consistent with the information collected during 
our fieldwork.
This ‘state patronage’ approach to industrial relations takes place in the 
economic context in which the industry is afflicted by ‘sickness’ characterised 
by low productivity, “backward” and outdated technologies, and general 
deceleration in the growth o f demand for their products (Chandrasekhar 
1984). All o f our studied units in the ‘traditional’ sector had negative profits, 
with very low sales and export performances, combined with low 
capital/labour ratio. This is consistent with table 4-6, taken from a study on 
the jute industry based on a larger sample, whereby profit per sales and profit 
per asset were both negative for most o f the 1990s. The poor demand for the 
jute goods is also reflected in the stagnant (but fluctuating) production and 
declining ratio o f export shown in figure 4-2. The decline in demand for the 
jute goods is partly due to competition from alternative synthetic packaging 
materials, such as ‘polysacks’, as well as trade competition from Bangladesh 
and China. In addition, the poor financial performance o f jute mills is also 
due to the low productivity, which measured in man-days per tonne is
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reported to be 45-46 man-days per tonne in Kolkata’s jute industry 
(Government o f West Bengal 1999), which the Indian Jute Mills Association 
(IJMA) compares with the reported figure o f 25 man-days per tonne in China.
T a b l e  4-6 F i n a n c i a l  r a t i o  o f  s e l e c t e d  j u t e  c o m p a n i e s :
1990-91 TO 1996-97
Year N o of com panies
Profit after tax /  
N et sales
Profit after tax 
/  Assets
Value of production /  
Total assets
1990-91 15 - 8 . 8 - 1 9 . 9 2 . 2 8 3
1991-92 19 - 6 . 9 - 1 4  . 0 2 . 0 2 0
1992-93 19 0 . 3 0 . 5 2 . 0 4 5
1993-94 2 3 - 1 . 7 - 3 . 0 1 . 8 1 9
1994-95 2 6 i o -o - 1 . 3 1 . 8 4 1
1995-96 2 2 - 2 . 0 - 3 . 4 1 . 7 4 4
1996-97 14 - 3 . 3 - 4 . 2 1 . 2 6 8
Source: Government o f West Bengal (1999: 2)
F i g u r e  4-2 S h a r e  o f  e x p o r t  i n  d e s p a t c h e d  j u t e  g o o d s  
f r o m  m i l l s ,  1944-5  t o  1997-98
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T a b l e  4 - 7  I n d i a ’s p r o d u c t i o n  o f  f a b r i c s
Year Mills Powerlooms Handloom s Hosiery Total
1988-89 2 9 0 2 1 0 9 7 4 3 9 9 3 2 1 4 9 2 0 0 1 8
1989-90 2 6 6 7 1 1 6 3 2 3 9 2 4 2 3 7 5 2 0 5 9 8
1990-91 2 5 8 9 1 3 3 4 8 4 2 9 5 2 6 9 6 2 2 9 2 8
1991-92 2 3 7 6 1 3 2 6 2 4 1 2 3 2 8 2 7 2 2 5 8 8
1992-93 2 0 0 0 1 3 4 9 4 5 2 6 2 3 2 0 7 2 3 9 6 3
Note: Units in million square meter. Fabric includes cotton, blended and non-cotton. 
Source: Dalmia (1994)
T a b l e  4-8 I m p a c t  o f  n e w  s p l i i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  o n
P R O D U C T I O N  CO ST S A N D  L A B O U R  U T I L I S A T I O N  IN M U M B A I
T E X T I L E  MILLS
Old Technology N ew  Technology
Utilisation (per cent) 9 7 . 3 97 . 5
Spindles/rotors 3 2 , 2 5 6 4 ,  5 6 0
Average employment per day 2 4 8 5 9
Average wage rate (Rs/month) 4 ,  1 8 4 4 , 0 4 0
Output (kg/day) 1 5 , 6 0 0 2 6 , 0 0 0
Output/worker/day (kg) 6 2 .  9 4 5 7 .  6
Power (kWh/day) 2 8 , 5 0 0 4 8 , 0 0 0
Power consumption per unit o f  output (kWh) 1 .  82 1 . 8 4
Cost per machine (Rs lakh) 2 0 1 2 0
Source: Datta (1999: L-42)
In the case o f textile industry, the competition comes from the decentralised 
hand-loom and small-scale power-loom sectors, which accounts for about 80 
percent o f the total production o f fabrics in India, as shown in Table 4-7. In 
response to this, several oligopolistic “progressive companies” have 
modernised and expanded their production capacities by introducing new 
technology in dyeing and other processing facilities, and have diversified a 
significant component o f their output by concentrating on quality products 
for the domestic upper class and export market (Chhachhi and Kurian 1982; 
Chandresekhar 1984; Bhattacherjee op at.). However because the cost o f new 
technology is very high, such ‘modernisation’ has not been introduced in the 
majority o f the textile mills. In Datta’s (1999) study on the impact o f new 
technology in the Mumbai textile industry, it is reported that the cost o f new 
technology in the spinning process is around 6 times o f that o f the old 
technology, as shown in table 4-8. Similarly in the same study, Datta estimates
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that the cost o f new technology in weaving is also approximately 10 times 
more than in the old technology. Note also that the new technology reduces 
the labour requirement in production process as indicated by the lower 
average employment per day under the new technology. Datta reveals that the 
introduction o f new technology also coincides with elimination o f certain 
production process, such as winding, in which the employment o f women has 
been drastically reduced. He also observes that the modernisation process 
intensifies the labour process because many of the skill-intensive tasks 
involved in spinning are carried out by the new machines, and workers are 
reduced to an ‘operator’ whose main task is to “take care o f the machine” (op 
tit;. L43).
The outcome o f this productivity increase driven by new technology since the 
1970s in the Mumbai textile industry is a dynamic but highly ‘uneven’ 
development, with a large gap emerging between the “better-off’ and 
“backward” mills. The implication for LMIs is the collapse o f the industry­
wide collective bargaining in the Mumbai cotton textile industry after the 
Datta Samant-led Mumbai textile strike o f 1982-83, when division emerged 
amongst private sector mills in the employer association, the Bombay Mill 
Owners’ Association (BMOA), between the oligopolistic and non-oligpolistic 
mills (Bhattacherjee 1989: M-70).
T a b l e  4-9 S a l e s  p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  C e n t u r y  T e x t i l e  &  
I n d u s t r i e s  L t d .  d u r i n g  2000 ( u n i t  i n  c r o e s  R s . )
Cloth Yarn
Export
Local
2 0 2 . 7 2  
1 2 9 . 0 1
2 . 3 8
4 . 9 6
Note: 1 crore is unit o f  10 million = 10,000,000. 1 crore = 1 0 0  lakh.
Source: Author’s fieldwork.
This is reflected in two units, Century Textile & Industries Ltd. (M9) and 
M odem Mills (M6), which do not fit into the ‘cluster’ o f Mumbai ‘traditional’ 
sector in Figure 4-1. Both o f these units are privately-owned or privatised
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cotton textile mills in Mumbai, characterised by localised mill-level labour- 
management relations. Century Textile (M9) is one o f the several 
abovementioned oligopolistic “progressive companies” with ‘modernised’ 
production capacities and focus on fabric production for the high-end 
market. The company claims a share o f 10.1 percent in the India’s cotton 
textile export, which is also consistent with Table 4-9, which shows the sales 
o f cloth and yam produced at the Century mills during 2000, with export 
accounting for the majority o f sales. Century’s sales figure is over 40 higher 
than that in any o f the NTC mills surveyed in our survey, as shown in table 3- 
2, which gives an indication o f the disparity in the economic performance 
within the industry. In contrast, M odem Mills (M6) represents the opposite 
case o f ‘weaker’ private sector mills characterised by obsolete technology, low 
levels o f productivity and ‘industrial sickness’ in the face o f competition from 
hand-loom and power-loom sectors. Many o f these ‘sick’ mills have either 
closed down or been operating irregularly with partial capacity, and the focus 
o f the owners has shifted to speculative activities in real estate investment and 
the construction o f residential and amusement facilities for the urban upper 
class in Mumbai. Indeed, M odem Mills has not been operating regularly since 
the mid-1990s, with the company submitting ‘rehabilitation scheme’ to the 
Board o f Industrial Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industries 
and Companies Act o f 1986. O ut o f M odem Mill’s 49,599 square meters o f 
land at the Byculla district at the heart o f Mumbai, 23,066.07 square meters 
was still retained for the mill, with the rest o f land given permission for 
recreational, residential and commercial development (Pinto and Fernandes 
1997: 62). D ’Monte (2002: 183) reports that the gross profit from the sale for 
yam is estimated as Rs. 2.9 crore compared to Rs. 26 crore from real estate, 
with the preservation o f around 3-400 workers and continuance o f spinning 
activity at the mill used as “a fig-leaf to cover what is a full-fledged diversion 
into real estate”. While the real estate investment is clearly lucrative given the 
production condition o f these non-oligopolistic mills, this profit figure can be
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compared to 339.07 crore raised from sales o f cloth and yam (from both 
export and domestic) by Century during 2000 as shown in Table 4-9 .
We shall further examine the impact o f this ‘uneven development’ in the 
textile industry on LMIs and the labour process in Chapter 6. However, for 
the present purpose o f characterising the typology of LMIs, note that the 
decentralised bargaining, indicated by these two units being located to the left 
along the horizontal axis in Figure 4-1, has not necessarily meant 
‘internalisation’ o f union leadership, as observed by these units being located 
at a similar level or higher to the NTC mills along the vertical axis in the 
diagram. This implies the so-called ‘independent’ or ‘new’ unionism in 
Mumbai is in fact diverse in their character, as we shall discuss further below.
Our hypothesis is that the centralised tri-partite collective bargaining in the 
majority o f ‘traditional’ sectors reflects the state controlled industrial relations, 
whereby workers are provided with relatively stable wages and employment in 
return for ‘disciplined’ unionism, at the backdrop o f limited scope o f ‘within- 
firm rents’ in the industry. However, the decentralisation o f bargaining-level 
in private textile mills in Mumbai, where the opportunity to appropriate ‘rents’ 
specific to local conditions was provided, either through productivity growth 
driven by the introduction o f capital-intensive technology and the 
intensification o f the labour process, or due to ‘rehabilitation’ by exploiting 
the rising prices for mill land in the commercial districts. Note that even in 
the private Mumbai mills where the industry-wide bargaining collapsed, 
significant involvement o f external agency in trade unions has remained, 
rather than the ‘employees’ unionism’ that emerged in other sectors o f 
Mumbai. N o doubt, legislation such as the BIR Act that prevents unions 
other than the RMMS to be recognised as bargaining agents limits the scope 
for alternative labour movement. Also, as van Wersch (1992: 404-413) have 
argued, many o f the workers’ preference for mill-level negotiation as a mean 
to seek economic demands, over developing an alternative political
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movement, may imply weak class consciousness, a hypothesis we examine in 
Chapter 6. From our analytical perspective, the reproduction and 
transformation o f LMIs are explained by the location o f industrial capital and 
labour in the changing patron-client politics, which in turn reflects the 
particular patterns o f accumulation. Therefore the failure o f the rank-and-file 
unionism to make significant impact in Mumbai textile industry, and more 
generally the decline o f the politically articulated working class movement in 
the city, must be understood within the wider social context o f the region’s 
redistributional politics that has increasingly become mobilised along caste 
and communal lines, as we shall expand further in Chapter 5.
4.3.2 Kolkata’s ‘modem’ sector
Let us next turn to the type of LMIs in the ‘m odem  sector’. From  figure 4-1, 
we can confirm that all except one o f the ‘m odem ’ sector11 units based in 
Kolkata are ‘clustered’ at the top o f the diagram, indicating a strong 
orientation towards politicised unionism, but without centralisation o f 
bargaining. Following our discussion in the previous sections, our hypothesis 
is that the decentralised bargaining structure in Kolkata ‘m odem ’ sector can 
be explained by the greater opportunity for bargaining agents to make 
significant gains from seeking ‘within-firm rents’ compared to their 
counterparts in ‘traditional’ sectors such as jute. Similarly, we argue that the 
politicised LMIs in Kolkata are better understood as a reflection o f the 
politically created ‘outside-firm rents’ in the context in which the state and the 
Communist Party o f India (Marxist) or CPI(M), which has controlled over 
West Bengal since 1977, actively and continuously controls the industrial
11 Our category o f  ‘m odem ’ sector is in contrast to our ‘traditional’ sectors, which included cotton textile 
industry in Mumbai and jute manifesting in Kolkata. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is recognised that 
this is a very broad category that includes a wide range o f  different econom ic activities, but the 
intention is to capture the emerging ‘new’ forms o f  unionism and bargaining relations since the mid- 
1980s, particularly in Mumbai, which stand out against the ‘traditional’ state-dominated industrial 
relations. However it is also possible to categorise these units as comparatively ‘m odem ’ in the sense 
that m ost were established around the time o f  Independence and developed at the time o f  
‘Indianisation’ o f  industries. While none o f  the industrial activities w e study are ‘hi-tech’ in the sense 
o f  being close to the technological frontier, they nevertheless involve higher level o f  technological and 
skills than in m ost o f  cotton and jute textile manufacturing.
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relations, and its trade union wing, the Centre for Indian Trade Unions 
(CITU). As we shall explain in Chapter 5, this state controlled bargaining 
relations and unionism are outcome of the state’s accumulation strategy, 
which relies on subsidies and direct intervention, at the backdrop o f the 
fragmented redistributional coalitions and the need to accommodate a wide 
section o f the society for the state to maintain its political legitimacy.
Returning to Figure 4-1, it is striking how these units with very different 
products, technology and production organisation all have similar aspects to 
their LMIs: Orient Fans (Kl) is a light engineering firm that produces 
electronic ceiling and portable fans for the domestic market, with 357 workers 
and staff at the time of the survey; BOC India (K7) is a multinational firm 
that supplies industrial and medical oxygen, with 59 workers; Saregama India 
(previously Gramophone Company o f India and part o f the international 
music group, HMV) (K8) is a music cassette tape factory with about 540 
workers; the main operation in INDAL Belur (K9) factory is the remelting 
and rolling o f aluminium sheet with about 800 operators; and Philips 
Taratolla (K10) is a light engineering factory that produces lamps with 144 
workers at the time of survey. All 5 o f these units are private firms with 
company-based, in many cases multiple, unions affiliated to political parties. 
That units based in Kolkata with diverse operations have similar LMIs implies 
the importance o f the local political context in which the labour-management 
bargaining takes place.
The comparison between the ‘traditional’ and ‘m odem ’ sector units in 
Kolkata is important in understanding how technological and political factors 
interact in a complex way to provide opportunities, incentives and constraints 
for bargaining agents, while also determining their capacity for different 
mobilisation strategies. The difference in the type o f LMIs in the two sectors 
in Kolkata is in the extent o f centralisation o f bargaining and the ‘formal’ role 
o f the state in tri-partite collective bargaining, but not in the extent o f the
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politicisation o f unionism. The tendency o f industry-level bargaining or wage 
settlement through conciliation and adjudication is towards levelling and 
homogenising the compensation structure for similar work across the sector, 
with reference to traditionally agreed pay required for labour to sustain and 
reproduce itself. In this sense, our hypothesis is that the decentralised 
collective bargaining reflects the more favourable economic conditions these 
‘m odem ’ sector firms enjoy, which on the one hand allow trade unions to 
extract potentially greater pay and benefits for their members, and on the 
other hand enables firms to reorganise their workforce according to their local 
needs, which in turn reflects the market forces and pressures more closely 
(Ramaswamy 1988: 217-8). In Chapter 6 Section 6.3.3, we shall analyse the 
pay schedule data to show that indeed in these decentralised settlements the 
pay is more steeply structured to reflect seniority and performance o f 
workers, whereas the pay pattern is more flat in industry-wide settlements. O f 
course, such comparison must be interpreted with caution, given the very 
different products, technological and market conditions amongst these units. 
However, the pay schedule data leads us to hypothesise that the 
decentralisation o f bargaining-level at least partly reflects the greater potential 
to achieve higher earnings.
However, such potential for greater gains from localising the bargaining 
structure have not led to the ‘depoliticisation’ o f unionism in these ‘m odem ’ 
sector units in Kolkata. Our hypothesis is consistent with Ramaswamy’s (op 
tit.: 175-188) observation that workers in Kolkata are less likely to disclaim 
alliances with political parties, particularly with the party in power, as long as 
they redress workers’ grievances and secure gains. He also suggests that, 
although managers in Kolkata often complain about the political opportunism 
of such unionism, they also tend to support the trade union o f whichever 
party is in power, since the parties can exercise control and discipline over 
their unions and their members, a sentiment we have come across during our 
field research as well.
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In this context, it is important to note that the difference between the 
relatively similar types o f LMIs amongst Kolkata’s ‘m odem ’ sector and the 
more diverse types o f unionism amongst their Mumbai counterparts, as we 
point out in the next section. Our hypothesis is that this relative similarity in 
the LMIs amongst units based in Kolkata can be understood by the pattern of 
economic growth in the region, whereby the accumulation within the sector 
has been relatively homogenous, compared to the more ‘uneven’ pattern of 
development in the industrially more dynamic Maharashtra, combined with 
the type o f redistributional coalitions in West Bengal whereby middle and 
low-income groups are mobilised along partisan lines to capture politically 
created state resources. Once again, we shall examine these hypotheses in 
Chapter 5, when we discuss the comparative macro political economy of the 
two regions and its implications for the LMIs. At this point, we shall put 
forward a hypothesis that, in Kolkata, where the opportunity for productivity 
growth through the drastic reorganisation o f labour-management relations at 
the plant-level is balanced against gains from ‘staying with the regime’, both 
industrial capital and labour are more likely to sustain their link to politically 
created ‘outside-firm rents’ by being accommodated in the nexus o f patron- 
client relations and utilising their position within the wider distributive 
conflict.
Before turning to the observations on the ‘m odem ’ sectors in Mumbai in the 
next section, let us briefly comment on two ‘outliers’ in relation to the cluster 
of Kolkata ‘m odem ’ units in figure 4-1: State Bank of India (K2) and Lagan 
Jute Machinery Co. Ltd (K ll), both o f which place our previous observation 
in context and which indicate how the difference in the economic activities 
relates to the types o f LMIs in a complex way. Although the focus o f our 
current field research was on the manufacturing industry, the inclusion o f a 
branch o f the State Bank of India (SBI) located in Kolkata was an important 
point o f reference for us to gain a broader understanding o f LMIs, not least 
because o f the increased ‘financialisation’ o f capitalist development. Indeed
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the position o f the SBI in our two-dimensional mapping indicates that the 
types o f LMIs may be very different in the banking sector, which is 
characterised by a combination o f centralised national-level bargaining and 
employees’ unionism with no directly declared affiliation to political parties or 
external organisations, although many of the union activists at the Kolkata 
branch were active members o f the Communist Party o f India (Marxist) or 
CPI(M). Traditionally, wages and employment conditions in banking were 
under direct state control, and collective bargaining only started in 1966 with 
negotiation taking place at the national-level (Mankidy 1997). SBI negotiates a 
separate company-level setdement with the employees’ federation since the 
dispute over computerisation in banking operation in the 1990s, but again at 
the national-level (Ramaswamy 2000: 179). Given the increasing
diversification o f banking activities, it is likely that the bargaining relations and 
institutions vary significandy within the sector, which is an area under­
researched and a task for future research. For example, the mode and issues in 
labour management in the nationalised SBI which primarily focuses on 
traditional roles o f financial intermediaries (bank credit provision, deposit 
erasing and lending) may be different from banks that are venturing into 
diverse business, such as mutual funds, venture capital, portfolio management 
and credit cards (Khandelwal 1997). A t the least, the inclusion o f SBI in our 
sample, allows us to put our typology o f LMIs in context o f the wider 
industrial relations scene in India.
In contrast, the observation from Lagan Jute Machinery Co. Ltd (K ll)  is 
interesting because, as the company name suggests, it is an engineering firm 
that produces machinery for jute manufacturing, and despite it being a 
machinery manufacturing factory, the type o f bargaining relations and 
unionism is very similar to that o f ‘traditional’ sectors such as Kolkata jute 
manufacturing and Mumbai cotton textile mills. Lagan was a public sector 
firm until 2000 when it was privatised (or ‘disinvested’) and when the author 
visited the factory, was run by the family who owns Hastings Jute Mills (K5).
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However, the labour-management agreement in effect at the time was still the 
tri-partite industry-level settlement for public sector engineering firms in West 
Bengal and a separate plant-level bi-partite setdement, both signed in 1997, 
which is reflected by its high degree o f centralisation o f bargaining in Figure 
4-1. While an inclusion o f one unit does not allow us to generalise about the 
type o f LMIs in public sector engineering firms in Kolkata, the observation 
offers us a point o f reference with the private engineering firms with plant- 
level bargaining. As discussed earlier, our hypothesis is that the extent o f 
centralisation o f collective bargaining at least in part reflects the relative size 
o f ‘within-firm rents’ and the potential for bargaining agents to appropriate 
greater share o f the surplus generated from production. This o f course needs 
to be understood in the wider context o f the accumulation strategy at the 
macro-level in West Bengal, where there has been reliance on subsidies and 
direct state intervention to maintain industrialisation as a mean to create 
employment and sustain the legitimacy of the political regime, as we discuss 
further in Chapter 5.
4.3.3 Mumbai’s ‘modem’ sector
Having commented on the ‘m odem ’ sector industry in Kolkata, let us now 
turn to its Mumbai counterpart. From figure 4-1, in contrast to the relatively 
concentrated ‘cluster’ that characterised the Kolkata m odem  industry, we can 
observe a greater diversity in the types o f LMIs in Mumbai. We suggest that 
the diverse types o f LMIs reflect the vitality and volatility o f labour- 
management relations in Mumbai’s ‘m odem ’ sector, whereby labour and 
employers seek to reorganise the bargaining relations and unionism in 
response to local economic conditions. INDAL Taloja (Ml) and Philips 
Kalwa (M7) represent one side o f the ‘stylised’ image o f “the m ost evolved 
Indian version o f business trade unionism” in Mumbai (Ramaswamy 1988: 
17), characterised by a combination o f decentralised plant-level bi-partite 
bargaining and company-based unionism and union leaders “who disclaim 
allegiance to political parties”. In contrast to these two units, INDA L Kalwa
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(M2), Hindustan Lever (M10), F iat/ Premier Automobile Ltd. (M il), and 
even more notably, Cipla (M8) ail have either politically affiliated unions or 
external union leaders, while still retaining the aspect o f plant-level collective 
bargaining. The diversity in the types o f LMIs in the Mumbai m odem  sector 
reflects another aspect o f the “voluntarism” in the more profitable sectors o f 
the economy, which is the increasing volatility of union leadership, whereby 
“free-floating workers not only shift easily from one union to another but 
even choose different unions for different purposes” driven by a “heightened 
sense o f economism, [the] absence o f ideology not merely o f a political kind 
but also o f a trade union one, [and] competitive bidding by-leaders for labour 
support and handsome benefits coupled with return commitments” 
(Ramaswamy 1988: 42-3). The types o f bargaining relations and unionism in 
these units have been unstable over much of the period since the 1960s.
Our hypothesis is that this diversity in the type o f unionism in Mumbai can be 
explained by the opportunities, incentives and constraints for, as well as 
capacities of, bargaining agents to focus their mobilisation strategy to localised 
bilateral bargaining as a result o f a combination o f two factors at the macro 
political economy of the region. On the one hand, a ‘bureaucratic liberalist’ 
approach to accumulation, whereby the state provides infrastructure and 
institutions to facilitate and ‘guide’ development, rather than to intervene 
direcdy in productive activities, led to dynamic but highly ‘uneven’ economic 
growth in the region. O n the other hand, the logic o f redistributive politics in 
Maharasthra was such that factional coalition has been organised along caste 
and communal lines. While there are examples such as the emergence o f the 
Shiv Sena in the 1980s that played significant role in mobilising workers on 
linguistic grounds against immigrants from southern States and Muslims, and 
more broadly recruitment o f organised and unorganised workers as well as 
increased number o f self-employed for militant communal groups and street 
gangs (Pendse 2003), generally the organised labour movement has not been 
at the centre o f such factional mobilisation. Similarly, while industrial capital
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have employed mafia gangs for private protection o f their business, the logic 
of political mobilisation is if anything driven by the decline and sickness o f 
many of the ‘traditional’ industrial sectors, and the increasing 
commercialisation and financialisation o f the economy. Thus we suggest that 
the scope for industrial capital and organised labour to appropriate ‘outside- 
firm rents’ was relatively limited in Mumbai, which led to greater compulsion 
for bargaining agents to increase their gains from ‘within-firm rents’. In 
Chapter 5, we argue that this dynamic but contradictory pattern o f 
accumulation in Mumbai can be explained by the balance o f power amongst 
social groups, which led to a coalition o f the ‘elite’ cluster o f castes and classes 
that enabled the state to promote ‘business-friendly’ economic policies and 
opened space for a range o f accumulating activities, including organised 
crime. The purpose o f the discussion here is to examine the implication of 
this pattern o f capitalist development and the shifting balance o f power in the 
region that led to the continuous restructuring o f unionism and bargaining 
relations by industrial capital and organised labour in Mumbai.
Hindustan Lever (M10) is a well documented case o f workers shifting its 
alliance with a number o f external leaders almost continuously since its 
formation (Banaji and Hensman 1990; Banaji 2000; Hensman and Banaji 
2001; Ramaswamy 1988; 2000). The company was initially formed in 1933 as 
Lever Brothers India Limited, as a subsidiary o f the Anglo-Dutch company 
Unilever, which still owns the majority stake, and became Hindustan Lever 
Limited in 1956 before being renamed as Hindustan Unilever Limited in 2007. 
The Sewree factory in Mumbai was established in 1934 and is the largest unit 
o f the company both in terms o f production and manpower, and 
manufactures soap, detergents, chemicals and personal care products. The 
union Hindustan Lever Employees Union (HLEU) was founded in 1948 by 
socialist leaders, which then came under the Communist Party o f India- 
affiliated AITUC. When the internal leaders with leanings to the management 
controlled the union, it was affiliated to the Congress’s INTUC. Later it came
258
Chapter 4 Types of LM Is
under the Bombay Labour Union led by the socialist and left leaning George 
Fernandes, before moving further ‘left’ to the CPI(M) affiliated CITU, and in 
1980 became an independent union led by the external leader, Datta Samant. 
In the background o f this transition o f union leadership was a dispute over 
sub-contracting and the problem of temporary workers, which the CITU 
leadership treated with indifference, and which led young militant activists to 
campaign to expose the unpopularity o f the CITU. Since the murder o f Datta 
Samant in 199712, the union is led by another external leader D. Thankappan 
who gained fame from the worker take-over of Kamani Tubes (Ramasaway 
1988: 50-8; 2000: 67).
Cipla Ltd. (M8) offers an interesting case o f an ‘independent’ union that 
recently shifted its alliance to a political party. Originally founded in 1935 as 
the Chemical, Industrial and Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Cipla is a 
pharmaceutical company known internationally for producing low-cost anti- 
AIDS drugs in developing countries. From 1979 to 1994, the representative 
union, Cipla Employees Union, formed in 1979, had external leadership 
affiliated to the Socialist Party. A new group o f radical activists emerged 
around 1991 and eventually took over the union leadership in 1994. The new 
Employees Union was initially under the control o f  a non-political external 
leader Datta Samant and then affiliated to TUCI under the influence o f the 
‘ultra-left’ Communist Party o f India (Marxist-Leninist) or CPI-ML in 2000. 
This transition o f the union leadership and political affiliation took place as 
the backdrop to intense industrial conflicts, characterised by prolonged 
lockouts, over productivity issues and the reorganisation o f the work force.
12 After the Mumbai textile strike o f  1982-3, which we discuss in Chapter 5, Datta Samant continued his 
involvement in politics and trade unionism during the 1980s and 90s. O n the 16th o f  January 1997 
Samant was murdered outside his hom e in Mumbai by gunmen w ho are believed to be contract 
killers. However, the background o f  the murder remains a mystery, not least because one o f  the 
alleged assassin, Vijaykumar Chaudhary who was a gang member working for the underworld don  
Chotta Rajan, was also gunned down by the police on the 30th o f  October 2007 in Kolhapur.
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Philips Kalwa plant (M7), which manufactures light bulbs, offers a contrasting 
case to Lever and Cipla in that management contributed much more 
significantly to the changes in unionism (Banaji and Hensman 1990; Hensman 
and Banaji 2001; Ramaswamy 1988; 2000). Philips Workers’ Union was 
formed at the Kalwa factory in 1968, having separated from the staff union 
Philips Employees’ Union which was formed in 1962. In the mid-1980s, 
when disputes over productivity demands led to prolonged lockouts, new 
company management was brought in which instigated a split in the Philips 
Workers Union and encouraged supervisors to join a management-sponsored 
staff union called the Peico Employees’ Union. This coincided with the 
Philips Federation that was formed in the 1960s and brought together the 
units in Mumbai, Kolkata and Pune, being legally dismembered in 1986, and 
bargaining decentralised to the plant-level. A t the time of the survey, the two 
unions, Philips Workers Union and Peico Employees’ Union, were active in 
both Kolkata’s Taratolla (K10) and Mumbai’s Kalwa (M7) plants, but whereas 
the Peico Employees’ Union was affiliated to the CITU in Kolkata, it 
maintained ‘independence’ in Mumbai, reflecting the distinct political 
conditions in which the labour-management relations take place in the two 
regions.
Premier Automobiles (M il), a Mumbai-based vehicles manufacturer founded 
in 1944, which has entered into a technical collaboration with the Italian Fiat 
Automobiles, is another case where the company-based union was led by 
Datta Samant in the 1980s but was later removed by labour-management 
conflict. In the mid-1990s the company experienced industrial conflicts over 
productivity demands as well as poor dealer services that led to several high- 
profile criminal cases, which continued into the early 2000s. Following a 
prolonged lock-out in 1998, a new internal union leadership at Kamgar Ekta 
Premier Sanghatana are representing the workers at the plant.
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W hat is common in all o f these cases is that the transition o f LMIs is 
associated with struggles over the mode o f controlling the labour-process; in 
the form of linking wages to productivity, or using subcontracting and 
temporary workers. In the background o f such disputes is the potential o f 
productivity growth and thus extracting further surplus value, especially in the 
context o f dynamic economic growth in the region. This provides strong 
incentives for bargaining agents to organise their labour-management 
relations to seek company-based ‘within-firm rents’, especially in the context 
o f the macro political economy in which the scope for industrial capital and 
organised labour to gain from ‘outside-firm rents’ was limited. O n the one 
hand, employers have tried to engineer unions arid union leadership who 
commit to and enforce revision o f work norms, reorganisation o f manning 
levels (including promotion o f ‘voluntary’ retirement) and the enhancement 
o f productivity. O n the other hand, workers have sought leaders who can 
effectively voice the significant issues that concerns workers and win them 
greater potential pay and benefits.
The comparison o f the three INDAL factories provides further illustration o f 
the dynamic and complex ways in which economic and political conditions 
determine the type o f LMIs. Indian Aluminium Company Limited (INDAL) 
was established in 1938, and enjoys a leading market position in aluminium 
production in India with its operation covering all stages o f aluminium 
production, from mining, refining and smelting, to the manufacturing o f 
semi-fabricated products o f sheet and foil. After the acquisition o f the 
Kolkata plant in 1998, the company formally came under the control o f 
Aditya Birla Group’s ‘business empire’ in 2000, just before the time of our 
field research, and was later merged into the Hindalco Industries Limited in 
2005. At the time o f our survey, INDA L’s Belur plant in Kolkata (K9) had 
two unions: one union, Indian Aluminium Belur Works Employees’ Union 
claims to be independent and apolitical, but many o f its core members are 
CPI(M) party members and unofficially participating in many political events
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organised by its labour wing CITU. The other union, Indian Aluminium Belur 
Works W orkmen’s Union was affiliated to the congress-led INTUC. In the 
Taloja plant (Ml) in Mumbai, there was a unique independent union, INDAL 
Karmachari Sangamata Taloja, led by internal leaders and representing 
workers at the plant level. Leaders and core members o f the union were 
linked with various political parties but as a union, they did not have any 
specific political linkage. In contrast, workers in the Kalwa factory (M2), also 
located in Greater Mumbai, were represented by an external union, 
Association o f Engineering Workers, which was a regional non-political 
federation set up by Datta Samant in 1978.
Although our fieldwork data is not sufficiently equipped to offer a 
comprehensive analysis o f the determinants o f LMIs, we can propose some 
hypotheses by interpreting the diverse types o f union leadership in different 
plants o f the same INDAL company in the context o f their technological and 
market conditions, and political factors within which labour-management 
bargaining takes place. Both the Belur (K9) and Taloja plants (Ml) operate in 
relatively ‘up-stream’ production process, where aluminium is re-melted and 
rolled into a sheet. O n the other hand, the Kalwa plant (K2) buys rolled 
aluminium sheets, some from INDAL sister plants and some from outside, 
further roll them into foil and convert them into aluminium packages used in 
pharmaceutical products, tobacco, sweets, ice creams and other consumer 
goods.
In this sense the Kalwa plant operates in a much more ‘down-stream’ 
operation compared to the other two units, and because o f this, capturing 
new market and adapting to new market conditions becomes important for 
the survival o f the plant. N ot only are bargaining agents in the Kalwa plant in 
a more favourable position to extract a greater share o f the surplus or ‘within- 
firrn rents’ generated, due to their advantageous position in the production 
‘stream’, but also the technological and skill levels involved in the production
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process is much higher compared to their Belur and Taloja counterparts. The 
implication is that workers in the Kalwa are able to exercise a far greater and 
credible threat to impose significant costs on the company’s operation, which 
provides incentives for the external union leadership to use their power, 
which comes from them not being on the payroll o f the firm, to extract 
substantial benefits for their members in the long-run. This proposition can 
partially be illustrated by our analysis o f pay scale in Chapter 6 in which we 
show that the pay structure is much ‘steeper’ in the Kalwa unit, implying 
greater return for seniority and performance. At the same time, external 
leadership may be preferred at Kalwa from the management’s viewpoint as 
well, since external unions are less likely to interfere in the day-to-day 
operation once the setdements are negotiated, even if  it means monetary costs 
in terms o f buying workers support at times o f settlement.
In contrast, the implications o f a more ‘up-stream’ operation in Belur and 
Taloja plants are that their immediate welfare is less direcdy subjected to the 
opportunities and compulsions from the consumer market, and that the scope 
for bargaining agents to extract a significant long-term share o f the surplus or 
‘within-firm rents’ is relatively smaller. Gains are more likely to be secured 
from ‘everyday struggles’ to extract the most out o f the system, rather than 
engaging in belligerent negotiation or the exercise o f their power. This may 
take the form o f utilising the linkage with political parties as in the Belur 
factory, or the form o f internal union leadership as in Taloja plant, depending 
on the role o f the state and other political actors in controlling and managing 
the labour process in the wider context. This o f course does not mean that 
the industrial relations are necessarily more ‘harmonious’. In fact none o f the 
three INDAL plants have experienced major strikes or lockouts since the 
mid-1980s. Rather our interpretation o f the observations is that the different 
economic and political conditions offer opportunities, incentives and 
constraints for LMIs to be organised differently, as well as provide structural
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capacities o f bargaining agents to adopt different mobilisation strategies 
accordingly.
4.4 Summary and discussion
This chapter examined the typology of LMIs in our surveyed sample in 
Mumbai and Kolkata, and pointed out that the types o f LMIs can be broadly 
classified by reference to two dimensions: (i) the extent to which collective 
bargaining is centralised and involves state interventions in the form o f tri­
partism; and (ii) the extent to which trade unions are formally affiliated to 
political parties or external leadership are involved in unions. We have also 
identified that types o f LMIs within our surveyed units are broadly ‘clustered’ 
around regional (Mumbai vs. Kolkata) and sector (‘traditional’ vs. ‘m odem ’) 
categories. Our broad categorisations are consistent with the findings in other 
studies such as Ramaswamy (1988; 2000), Davala (1992), Venkata Ratnam 
(1996), Venkataratnam and Verma (1997) and Bhattacherjee (1999).
At one level, this attempt to empirically identify the diverse types o f LMIs 
that exist in Indian industry is in and o f itself an important intervention in the 
on-going debates on LMIs in India, where much of the policy prescriptions is 
discussed with the particular ‘stylised image’ o f Indian LMIs, as we 
demonstrated in Chapter 1. O ur analysis in this chapter at the least suggests 
that labour market reforms o f the type considered in the policy circle must 
pay careful attention to the diversity o f labour-management relations and 
unionism across regions and sectors.
However, the purpose o f our empirical examination in this thesis is not 
merely to provide typologies and classifications, but to provide a materialist 
explanation o f these differential types o f LMIs. In line with our argument in 
Chapters 1 and 2, we have hypothesised that types o f LMIs are to be 
interpreted as reflections o f the historically specific ways in which industrial 
development proceeded in different regions and the balance o f power at the
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macro-level that underpins them. Several findings can be summarised here for 
further discussion in the remainder o f this thesis.
We have argued in Section 4.3 that the typology o f LMIs can be interpreted as 
a consequence of bargaining agents organising labour-management relations 
and unionism differently in response to technological, economic and political 
factors, which interact in complex and dynamic ways. For example, we have 
pointed out that the bargaining structure is more likely to be centralised, say, 
at the industry or regional-level in units where the scope for bargaining agents 
to achive substantial gains from plant-level bargaining is limited, especially in 
the context o f low productivity, “backward” technologies, and a decline in 
demand for their products. This was exemplified by the majority o f cotton 
textile mills in Mumbai and Kolkata jute manufacturing clustered in this 
category. In addition, the decentralisation of collective bargaining to mill-level 
in private sector cotton textile units in Mumbai demonstrates the strong 
incentive for bargaining agents to seek ‘within-firm rents’ as a result o f uneven 
development in the sector.
We have also interpreted the political affiliation o f unionism or the presence 
of external union leadership as a manifestation o f differential organisations o f 
distributional conflicts over politically created ‘outside-firm rents’ at the 
macro political economy, against which the potential gains from bargaining 
over potential ‘within-firm rents’ are weighed. The comparison o f ‘m odem ’ 
sector units in Kolkata and Mumbai is illustrative. In Kolkata, where the 
general pattern o f industrialisation and accumulation is less dynamic, and 
where both industrial capital and labour are accommodated within the 
organisation o f redistributional conflict over politically created resources, 
‘m odem ’ sector unions have tended to maintain formal affiliations to political 
parties even when collective bargaining is typically o f a bi-partite nature and 
takes place at the plant-level. In contrast, in the Mumbai ‘m odem ’ sector, 
where industrial development is more dynamic but also ‘uneven’, the types o f
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union leadership is found to be extremely diverse, reflecting the complex and 
particular ways in which technological, economic and political factors interact.
Our findings highlight an important fact that the political affiliation o f 
unionism or presence o f external union leadership on their own cannot 
distinguish between very different industrial relations. For example, the 
domination o f political affiliated unionism in Kolkata is a reflection o f a 
stagnant labour movement explained by the comparatively less dynamic 
industrial development in the region, and its particular factional organisation 
o f distributive politics that enables bargaining agents to seek ‘outside-firm 
rents’ and gives them political capacity to resist change. In contrast, when 
political labels and /o r external leadership are sought or abandoned by 
bargaining agents in Mumbai this can be interpreted as a sign o f a vibrant but 
volatile and fragmented industrial relations whereby ‘reshuffles’ o f union 
leadership is a form in which workers and /or employers express their 
disapproval (Ramaswamy 1988: 42; 1992: 9). This suggests that bargaining 
agents perceive greater scope for negotiating significant gains from 
reorganising the bargaining relations, and to put it differently, the macro 
political conflicts are such that it cannot offer sufficient payoffs to bargaining 
agents and there is a greater compulsion for increasing productivity and 
maximising the ‘within-firm rents’. This raises important questions with 
regards to the validity o f some policy prescriptions promoted in the on-going 
debates in India, say in the Second National Commission o f  Labour (SNCL), 
whereby considerable attention is paid in curbing union’s linkages to political 
parties or influence over external leaders. Our analysis suggests that the issue 
is not so much whether there is affiliation to political parties or involvement o f 
external unionists, but how and why this occurs.
If our interpretation gives the misleading impression of overemphasising the 
structural determinants o f LMIs, this is because o f the immediate objective o f 
our analysis to provide an intervention in the mainstream theoretical and
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policy debates dominated by methodological individualism and rational choice 
framework, as we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. O f course, the relationship 
between the structural factors and the types o f LMIs should be understood to 
be a dialectical one. Structure constrains and contains agents, as well as 
enables agents’ action (Callinicos 1988). LMIs are not simply ‘imposed’ by 
macro political economic factors, since it is the bargaining agents that shapes 
and organises LMIs.
In addition, caution must be thrown against over-extrapolating our findings 
and interpretations drawn from our survey data with relatively limited number 
o f observations, especially in the light o f the difficulty in statistically 
establishing the ‘representativeness’ o f our sample, as we discussed in Chapter 
3. Therefore, in the remaining chapters o f this thesis, we shall complement 
our findings here in two ways in order to further our understanding o f the 
diverse typology o f LMIs in Indian industry.
First, we need to evaluate our interpretation o f the observed typology of 
LMIs in our surveyed units in the wider economic, social and historical 
contexts within which these labour-management relations take place. In 
Chapter 5, we shall therefore examine the macro political economy of 
Mumbai and Kolkata with the objective o f identifying the differential types o f 
‘rents’ and the different types o f political conflicts over them in shaping the 
opportunities, incentives and constraints o f micro bargaining agents in the 
two regions.
Second, we need to examine the implications o f the different types o f LMIs in 
terms o f the mode o f managing the labour process. We have argued that the 
type o f LMIs reflects the particular patterns o f industrial development, and in 
particular the specific ways in which the labour process is managed and 
controlled. In Chapter 6, we shall examine the different ways in which 
productivity is ensured under different types o f LMIs. W hat we are concerned 
with is not the technological relation between inputs and outputs, or even
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whether these technological relations are productive or no t as such, but rather 
the particular ways in which elements that make production possible (i.e. 
productive forces) are brought together, and the role bargaining agents play in 
this process. In the terminology of political economy, the objective is to 
interpret the different types o f LMIs as a particular type o f (social) relation of 
production.
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A PPE N D IX  TO  CH APTER 4
4A.1 Multidimensional scaling (MDS) of the typology of LMIs
The typology o f LMIs in this Chapter was empirically analysed by using our 
survey data measured at the level o f business or industrial units (offices, 
factories, plants and mills). While this is a necessary simplification to carry out 
our analysis, this implicitly assumes homogenous bargaining relations and 
unionism within each unit, which may not be the case especially in a unit with 
multiple unions.
Table A4-1 lists the 21 units surveyed in our fieldwork together with their 
bargaining structure, bargaining agents and ownership o f surveyed units. As 
explained in Chapter 3, these units were obtained through non-probabilistic 
sampling, which means that strictly speaking, the use o f inferential statistics 
has no basis in statistical theory, even if attempts have been made to cover a 
wide variety o f bargaining relations and unions within our sample. Therefore, 
the aim of the analysis in this chapter is not to come up with an exhaustive 
typology o f LMIs that can be generalised across Indian industry, but rather an 
exploratory exercise to provide information or a ‘picture’ on the perceived 
relationships amongst different aspects o f bargaining relations and unionism 
in our sample.
As we discussed in Section 4.2 o f this chapter, LMIs are multidimensional 
concepts with different aspects o f bargaining relations and unionism 
interacting in complex ways. In addition, these interactions between different 
aspects o f labour-management bargaining cannot be theoretically assumed 
and must be determined empirically. Therefore, data reduction techniques are 
employed to empirically identify underlying dimensions that represent the 
patterns of correlations within the set o f observed variables.
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T a b l e  A 4-1 B a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e , b a r g a i n i n g  a g e n t s
A N D  O W N E R S H IP  O F S U R V E Y E D  U N IT S
N am e of unit Category Bargaininglevel Union leadership
Bargaining
agents Ownership
Orient Fans (K l)
Kolkata
modern
Plant-level Politically affiliated Bi-partite
Private
(domestic)
State Bank o f  India (K2)
Kolkata
m odem JMixed Independent (internal)
Tripatite Public
Wellington Jute Mill (K3) Kolkatatraditional
Industry-
level
Politically affiliated Tripatite
Private
(domestic)
Alliance Jute Mill (K4)
Kolkata
traditional Mixed
Politically affiliated Mixed
Private
(domestic)
Hastings Jute Mill (K5) Kolkatatraditional Mixed
Politically affiliated Mixed
Private
(domestic)
BOC (K7) Kolkata
m odem
Plant-level Politically affiliated Tripatite
Private
(multinational)
Saregama India, HMV (K8) Kolkata
m odem
Plant-level Politically affiliated Bi-partite
Private
(domestic)
IN DA L Belur (K9) Kolkata
m odem
Plant-level Politically affiliated Tripatite
Private
(domestic)
Philips India Taratolla
(K10)
Kolkata
m odem Plant-level
Politically affiliated Tripatite
Private
(multinational)
Lagan Jute Machinery (K ll) Kolkata
m odem
Mixed Politically affiliated Mixed Public
IN DA L Taloja (Ml) Mumbai
m odem
Plant-level Independent (internal) Tripatite
Private
(domestic)
IN DA L Kalwa (M2) Mumbai
m odem Plant-level
Independent
(external)
Bi-partite Private
(domestic)
NTC Podar Mill (M3)
Mumbai
traditional Mixed Politically affiliated Mixed
Public
NTC India United Mill 
N os. 3 and 4 (M4)
Mumbai
traditional
Industry-
level
Politically affiliated Tripatite Public
NTC Sitram Mill (M5) Mumbaitraditional
Industry-
level Politically affiliated
Tripatite Public
M odem Mills (M6) Mumbai
traditional
Plant-level
Independent
(external)
Bi-partite Private
(domestic)
Philips Kalwa light factory
(M7)
Mumbai
m odem
Plant-level Independent (internal) Bi-partite
Private
(multinational)
Cipla (M8)
Mumbai
modem
Plant-level Politically affiliated Bi-partite
Private
(domestic)
Century Textiles and 
Industries Ltd. (M9)
Mumbai
traditional
Plant-level Politically affiliated Bi-partite
Private
(domestic)
Hindustan Lever (Ml 0) Mumbai
m odem
Plant-level Independent
(external)
Bi-partite
Private
(multinational)
F iat/ Preimer Automobil 
Ltd. (M il)
Mumbai
m odem Plant-level
Independent
(external) Bi-partite
Private
(multinational)
Source: Author’s fieldwork.
Amongst various interdependence methods and dimension reduction 
techniques, (non-metric) multidimensional scaling (MDS) is employed instead 
o f more widely used techniques such as factor analysis (FA), due to the
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following two data considerations. First, our sample size is not very large 
(«  = 21), which is far smaller than what is assumed in other dimension 
reduction methods such as FA: for example, Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson 
and Tatham (2006) recommend a minimum absolute sample size o f 50 
observations. Second, our variables on aspects o f bargaining relations and 
unionism listed in table A4-1 are all qualitative at either nominal or ordinal 
scale, which for the purpose o f statistical analysis are transformed into 
dichotomous dummy variables (see table A4-2 below). Again this does not 
conform to the data assumptions in FA, which are typically used for metric or 
quantitative variables. Non-metric MDS assumes only rank-order data and 
therefore more suited for our purpose. However, in the next section we have 
also provided the result o f factor analysis o f our data on LMIs, which 
produces very similar results and shows that our typology is no t sensitive to 
the choice o f statistical technique.
Table A4-2 lists the definitions and descriptive statistics o f the 6 variables 
used for our factor analysis. As we have already pointed out, all 6 variables are 
dichotomous dummy variables generated from the qualitative variables in 
table A4-1. Two variables (CENTRAL and PLANT) are related to the level o f 
collective bargaining.13 Two variables (POLITICA L and INTERNAL) are 
related to the nature o f unionism or the type o f union leadership. 
TR IPA R TITE reflects whether the state participates as one o f the bargaining 
agents in the formal settlement, or to put it differently, indicates whether the 
settlement was reached through tti-partite or bi-partite negotiations. The last 
variable PUBLIC provides information on the ownership structure o f the 
establishment.
13 There are three categories in the level o f  bargaining: centralised bargaining only, plant-level bargaining 
only, and the mix o f  the two. Establishments that have collective bargaining only at centralised 
(industry, regional or national) level are given 1 for CENTRAL and 0 for PLANT. Establishments 
with bargaining only at plant-level have 1 for PLANT and 0 for CENTRAL. Establishments with 
mixed bargaining level are allocated 1 for both CENTRAL and PLANT.
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T a b l e  A 4-2  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  f o r  t h e  M D S
A N D  FA  O F  T H E  T Y P E S  O F  LM IS
Variable name Definition Sum Mean
Standard
deviation
CENTRAL Dummy variable on the level o f  
collective bargaining. 1 i f  centralised 
bargaining takes place; 0 if otherwise.
8 .3 8 . 4 9 8
PLANT Dummy variable on the level o f  
collective bargaining. 1 if  bargaining 
takes place at plant-level; 0 if  
otherwise.
18 .8 6 . 3 5 9
POLITICAL Dummy variable. 1 if  there is a union 
affiliated to a political party; 0 if  
otherwise.
14 . 67 . 4 8 3
INTERNAL Dummy variable. 1 if  the union 
leadership is internal to the unit; 0 
otherwise.
3 .1 4 . 3 5 9
TRIPARTITE Dummy variable. 1 if  tri-partite 
bargaining takes place; 0 otherwise
12 .5 7 . 5 0 7
PUBLIC Dummy variable: 1 if  the 
establishment is in the public sector; 
0 otherwise.
5 .2 4 . 4 3 6
Note: number o f  observations: 77 =  2 1 .
T a b l e  A 4-3  C o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  o f  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  f o r  
t h e  M D S a n d  FA o f  t h e  t y p e s  o f  L M Is
CENTRAL PLANT POLITICAL INTERNAL TRIPARTITE PUBLIC
CENTRAL 1
PLANT - . 5 2 0 * 1
POLITICAL . 3 4 7 - . 2 8 9 1
INTERNAL - . 0 4 0 . 1 6 7 - .  577** 1
TRIPARTITE . 679** - . 3 5 4 . 4 0 8 . 0 7 9 1
PUBLIC . 71 3* * - . 4 1 1 . 1 5 8 . 0 9 1 . 4 8 4 *  1
Note: Figures are Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
* indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, and ** indicates that the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Table A4-3 presents the pair-wise Pearson’s correlation coefficient for our 
variables. We find a strong positive correlation between CENTRAL and 
P u b l i c  ( r  = 0.713 ), and between CENTRAL and TR IPA R TITE 
(r  = 0 .679), as we observed from the contingency tables 4-2 and 4-3. We also 
find negative correlation between PO LITICA L and INTERNAL, which is
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again unsurprising since the two variables capture opposing aspects o f union 
leadership.
T a b l e  A 4 - 4  A p p r o x i m a t e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  i n  t w o - 
d i m e n s i o n a l  E U C L I D E A N  S P A C E
N am e of unit Dim ension 1 Dim ension 2
Orient Fans (K l) - 0 . 3 1 0 9 0 . 3 0 6 1
State Bank o f  India (K2) 0 . 3 2 9 4 - 0 . 7 9 9 1
Wellington Jute Mill (K3) 0 . 4 9 2 5 0 . 1 4 8 3
Alliance Jute Mill (K4) 0 . 3 3 4 1 0 . 1 3 4 3
Hastings Jute Mill (K5) 0 . 3 3 4 1 0 . 1 3 4 3
BOC (K7) 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 2 4 0 6
Saregama India, HMV (K8) - 0 . 3 1 0 9 0 . 3 0 6 1
IN D A L Belur (K9) 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 2 4 0 6
Philips India Taratolla (K10) 0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 2 4 0 6
Lagan Jute Machinery (K ll) 0 . 5 7 2 0 - 0 . 0 5 1 2
IN D A L Taloja (M l) - 0 . 2 4 0 6 - 0 . 5 0 7 3
IN D A L Kalwa (M2) - 0 . 5 1 5 9 - 0 . 1 0 9 5
NTC Podar Mill (M3) 0 . 5 7 2 0 - 0 . 0 5 1 2
NTC India United Mill N os. 3 and 4 (M4) 0 . 7 3 0 4 - 0 . 0 3 7 2
NTC Sitram Mill (M5) 0 . 7 3 0 4 - 0 . 0 3 7 2
Modern Mills (M6) - 0 . 5 1 5 9 - 0 . 1 0 9 5
Philips Kalwa light factory (M7) - 0 . 5 5 3 6 - 0 . 4 4 1 8
Cipla (M8) - 0 . 3 1 0 9 0 . 3 0 6 1
Century Textiles and Industries Ltd. (M9) - 0 . 3 1 0 9 0 . 3 0 6 1
Hindustan Lever (M10) - 0 . 5 1 5 9 - 0 . 1 0 9 5
Fiat/ Preimer Automobil Ltd. (M l 1) - 0 . 5 1 5 9 - 0 . 1 0 9 5
T a b l e  A 4 - 5  E i g e n v a l u e s  a n d  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  v a r i a n c e
Dim ension Eigenvalue
abs (eigenvalue)
CumulativePercentage°  percentage
(eigenvalue) 2
_  Cumulative Percentage°  percentage
1 4 . 1 1 1 2 8 5 52  . 0 1 5 2 . 0 1 7 9 .  63 7 9 .  63
2 1 . 7 5 3 5 4 3 2 2 . 1 8 74 . 1 9 14 . 49 9 4 . 1 2
3 0 . 8 6 7 8 6 8 1 0 .  98 8 5 . 1 7 3 . 5 5 9 7 .  67
4 0 . 5 4 1 3 3 9 6 . 8 5 9 2 .  02 1 . 3 8 9 9 . 0 5
5 0 . 3 5 5 8 2 1 4 . 5 9 6 .  52 0 . 6 9 9 .  64
6 0 . 2 7 4 9 0 5 3 . 4 8 1 0 0 0 . 3 6 1 0 0
The objective o f data reduction techniques such as MDS is to uncover the 
"hidden structure’ o f a set o f data (Dillon and Goldstein 1984: 107). In the 
context o f our analysis, the goal is to find the underlying dimensions that best 
describe the general patterns o f proximities, i.e. "similarities’ and 
"dissimilarities’, o f various aspects o f LMIs. Intuitively, variables with positive
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correlation, such as CENTRAL and P u b l i c ,  have ‘similarities’, whereas 
variables with negative correlations, such as POLITICAL and INTERNAL, 
are ‘dissimilar’. MDS tries to find a spatial configuration of low dimensionality 
where the rank-order of the distances in the space most clearly corresponds 
with the rank-order of the proximities. MDS is a purely ‘data-analytic’ 
descriptive or exploratory technique to provide a ‘picture’ which can be used 
to give a meaningful interpretation o f the data, rather than derived from any 
pre-determined probabilistic models (Mardia, Kent and Bibby 1979: 396). The 
final solution is obtained after numerous trials or iterations (Dillon and 
Goldstein op cit.: 111). Further details o f the MDS procedure are discussed in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.3.3.
The algebraic equivalent o f the two-dimensional map shown in Figure 4-1, 
which we discussed in detail in this chapter, is the matrix o f stimulus 
coordinates shown table A4-4. Since there are 6 original variables used for the 
analysis, in theory 6 dimensions can be obtained, and yet only two are retained 
from our final solution. Table A4-5 presents the eigenvalues and (cumulative) 
proportion o f the total variance explained. Note that about 74 percent o f the 
total variance is accounted for by the first two dimensions, which is an 
indication that the two retained dimensions sufficiently capture the general 
structure o f the original data. O ur final solution can also be evaluated by 
Kruskal’s STRESS index, presented in table A4-5, which is a ‘goodness-of-fit’ 
measure, small values o f which indicate little error between the fitted 
distances and the original proximity values from which the space was derived. 
The MDS arrives at the ‘terminal’ solution when the improvement in fit 
measured by STRESS after another iteration does not exceed the 
predetermined value. ‘Agreement’ measures also indicate a very good fit o f 
our final solution to the original data set: Mardia’s fit measure 1 was 
computed as 0.7419, and Mardia’s fit measure 2 was 0.9412, indicating that 
the proportion o f a distance matrix explained by our two dimensions was 
about 74 per cent and 94 percent, respectively.
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T a b l e  A4-6 K r u s k a l ’s  STRESS b e t w e e n  a d j u s t e d
D I S S I M I L A R I T I E S  A N D  E U C L I D E A N  D I S T A N C E S
N am e of unit Kruskal’s STRESS index
Orient Fans (K l) 0 1 3 6 0
State Bank o f  India (K2) 0 0 8 6 2
Wellington Jute Mill (K3) 0 2 4 5 1
Alliance Jute Mill (K4) 0 1 7 7 2
Hastings Jute Mill (K5) 0 1 7 7 2
BOC (K7) 0 1 5 8 7
Saregama India, HMV (K8) 0 1 3 6 0
IN D A L Belur (K9) 0 1 5 8 7
Philips India Taratolla (K10) 0 1 5 8 7
Lagan Jute Machinery (K ll) 0 1 9 6 0
IN D A L  Taloja (Ml) 0 1 3 2 8
IN D A L  Kalwa (M2) 0 1 2 0 8
NTC Podar Mill (M3) 0 1 9 6 0
NTC India United Mill N os. 3 and 4 (M4) 0 1 5 1 0
NTC Sitram Mill (M5) 0 1 5 1 0
M odem Mills (M6) 0 1 2 0 8
Philips Kalwa light factory (M7) 0 0 8 9 5
Cipla (M8) 0 1 3 6 0
Century Textiles and Industries Ltd. (M9) 0 1 3 6 0
Flindustan Lever (M10) 0 1 2 0 8
Fiat/ Preimer AutomobilLtd. (Mi l ) 0 1 2 0 8
Total 0 1 4 8 7
F i g u r e  A4-1 S h e p a r d  d i a g r a m  o f  t h e  m a t c h  b e t w e e n  sfJ
a n d  d tj
Shepard diagram
in
in0)ocjg</> in 
T3
o
0 1 1.5-.5 .5
transformed dissimilarities
Classical MDS
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Figure A4-1 shows the Shepard diagram corresponding to this solution, 
another standard m ethod to evaluate how well the retained dimensions 
represent the original data, whereby the data is plotted against the proximities 
along the horizontal axis and the distances along the vertical axis. We can see 
that a good linear fit is obtained, if not perfect.
T a b l e  A4-7  P a i r - w i s e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e
D I M E N S I O N S  A N D  T H E  V A R I A B L E S
Variable
name
Dimension 1:
Centralisation
ofLM Is
Dimension 2:
Politicisation/ 
extemalisation o f 
leadership
CENTRAL 0 . 9 0 7 5 - 0 . 1 8 9 7
PLANT - 0 . 6 0 0 7 - 0 . 0 3 4 8
PO LITICAL 0 . 5 7 7 2 0 . 7 6 4 2
INTERNAL - 0 . 1 4 2 9 - 0 . 8 2 3 3
TRIPARTITE 0 . 8 3 9 6 - 0 . 1 1 4 8
PUBLIC 0 . 7 4 1 4 - 0 . 3 7 7 6
Finally, let us comment on the interpretation o f the two retained dimensions. 
Since the primary objective in MDS is to map the objects in a 
multidimensional space, it is customary to interpret the dimensions using the 
two-dimensional map, as we did using figure 4-1. In section 4.3, we 
interpreted dimension 1 (on the horizontal axis) as the extent to which 
collective bargaining is centralised and involves state interventions in the form 
of tri-partism; and dimension 2 (on the vertical axis) as the extent to which 
trade unions are formally affiliated to political parties or external leadership 
are involved in unions. Our interpretation can be justified by examining the 
correlation between the two dimensions and the variables used in the analysis 
presented in table A4-7. Dimension 1 is most strongly correlated with 
CENTRAL, followed by TRIPARTITE,  and PUBLIC.  It is also negatively 
correlated with PLANT. In contrast, dimension 2 has a strong negative 
correlation with INTERNAL, and a positive correlation with POLITICAL.
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4A.2 Factor analysis of the typology of LMIs
In the previous section, we have argued that the characteristics o f the data are 
such that multidimensional scaling (MDS) is more suited for the analysis o f 
this chapter. We have nonetheless provided a factor analysis o f the same data, 
as a way to back up the result obtained and discussed in Section 4.3 o f this 
chapter. Despite the limited sample size and the non-metric scale o f our 
variables, we can still justify the use o f factor analysis on the ground that (a) 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure o f Sampling Adequacy (MSA) is 
0.645, which at least satisfies the absolute minimum criteria14; and (b) 
Bartlett’s Test o f Sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that all eigenvalues or 
‘roots’ of the covariance matrix E are equal o f our data, suggesting that 
sufficient correlations exist among the variables to proceed
( Z 2 = 43.215 > ooo Q 5 ))15- Therefore, we proceed with the use o f factor
analysis o f our data, as a mean to compare our result from the MDS 
procedure, and also to evaluate the relevance o f the dimensions extracted.
Factor analysis is similar to MDS in that it is also “concerned with the 
identification o f structure within a set o f observed variables” (Dillon and 
Goldstein 1984: 53-4). The objective o f factor analysis (and principle 
component analysis employed as the extraction method here) is to identify 
factors (or principle components) in order to explain as much o f the variation 
in the data as possible with as few o f these factors as possible. Factors are 
extracted by ‘rotating’ the correlation between variables, as shown in table A4- 
3, and iteration based on statistical criteria. The procedures o f factor and 
principle component analyses are discussed further in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2. 
Here let us focus on the result o f  applying factor analysis to our data.
14 Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006) argue that KM O-M SA value must exceed 0.50 for 
both the overall test and each individual variable. Acton and Miller (2009) suggest a value o f  at least 
0.60.
15 These statistical tests are discussed further in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.
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T a b l e  A 4-8  R o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t  m a t r i x  
Principle components
PCI: PC2:
Centralisation o f Internalisation o f 
 LMIs__________ leadership
CENTRAL . 9 0 9 - . 1 1 0
PLANT - . 6 3 1 . 2 7 3
POLITICAL . 3 2 4 - . 8 3 2
INTERNAL . 1 1 4 . 9 1 5
TRIPARTITE . 8 0 3 - . 0 8 4
PUBLIC . 8 3 3 . 1 0 7
Note: (1) Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
(2) Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization Rotation converged in 3
iterations.
(3) Cumulative variance explained by the 2 extracted components: 71.942%.
The extracted factors are summarised in the rotated component matrix in 
table A4-8. Note that just as in the result obtained from MDS, we have 
extracted two dimensions (principle components), which we shall comment 
on below. Also note that the general patterns of correlation between the two 
dimensions are also similar to our result from MDS, except that the second 
principle component appears to be the inverse o f the second dimension from 
the MDS. The first principle component is m ost highly correlated with 
CENTRAL, as well as with TRIPARTITE and PUBLIC, indicating that this 
factor is associated with the extent o f centralisation and state involvement in 
LMIs. It is also negatively correlated with PLANT, which confirms this 
interpretation. This first principle component captures a similar tendency in 
the data set to the one covered by the first dimension from the MDS.
The second factor is most highly correlated with INTERNAL, indicating that 
union leadership comes from within the unit, and negatively correlated with 
POLITICAL, which indicates affiliation to political parties. The two variables 
to which this second component is correlated describe the linkage or 
otherwise to political party and other external organisations. This is the same 
to the second dimension from the MDS, except that the signs o f the 
correlation are opposite, indicating an inverse relationship.
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T a b l e  A 4 - 9  E i g e n v a l u e s  a n d  a c c o u n t e d - f o r  v a r i a n c e
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
% of
Total Variance Cumulative %
1 2 .  8 2 7 4 7 . 1 1 9 4 7 . 1 1 9 2 .  6 8 2 4 4 . 7 0 0 4 4 . 7 0 0
2 1 . 4 8 9 2 4 . 8 2 3 7 1 . 9 4 2 1 .  6 3 5 2 7 . 2 4 2 7 1 . 9 4 2
3 0 .  7 0 5 1 1 . 7 5 8 3 . 6 9 1
4 0 . 5 1 2 8 . 5 2 9 9 2 . 2 2 0
5 0 . 2 7 0 4 . 5 0 7 9 6 . 7 2 7
6 0 . 1 9 6 3 . 2 7 3 1 0 0 . 0 0 0
Rotation Sums o f Squated Loadings 
% of
Total Variance Cumulative %
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
F i g u r e  A 4 - 2  S c r e e  p l o t
Scree Plot
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Component Number
As we have already suggested, the outcome o f the factor analysis is similar to 
that obtained from MDS earlier in this chapter. Table A4-8 presents the 
eigenvalues and (cumulative) proportion o f the total variance explained. As in 
the previous section, since there are 6 variables, theoretically there are 6 
principal components extracted. However, we found that the eigenvalues 
(total variation) are greater than one only for the first and second
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components. A commonly used decision rule to determine the number o f 
principal components to extract is to find the components with total variation 
greater than 1. Also the two components explain about 72 per cent o f the 
total variation in the original variables. This means that by using these two 
components, we are able to represent the data with about 28 per cent loss o f 
information. Another commonly used criterion for selecting the num ber o f 
factors or principle components is to examine the scree plot, shown in figure 
A4-2, whereby the eigenvalues o f each component are plotted in successive 
order o f their extraction (Dillon and Goldstein 1984: 48-9; Jolliffe 2002: 112- 
7). Here we can identify a fairly sharp ‘elbow’, or change o f slope, in the graph 
at the second principle component. For these two reasons, we shall consider 
the first two principal components as the variable that summarises the 
information contained in the original 6 variables relatively efficiendy.
Finally, figure A4-3 shows the two-dimensional ‘mapping’ o f our surveyed 
units along the two extracted principle components. We can identify a similar 
typology o f LMIs as well as ‘clusters’ o f units by regional and sectoral 
categories from this diagram to those found from figure 4-1 in Section 4.3 o f 
this chapter. In fact figure A4-3 is more or less the same mapping in figure 4- 
1 but flipped upside-down vertically, which is explained by the ‘inverse’ nature 
o f the second dimension obtained from the two techniques.
That we are able to find a very similar underlying structure from the same 
dataset using different data reduction procedures shows the ‘robustness’ o f 
our empirical results. In fact we have attempted to apply factor analysis with 
different extraction methods (principal components, unweighted least 
squares, generalized least squares, maximum likelihood, principal axis 
factoring, alpha factoring, and image factoring) as well as rotation methods 
(varimax, direct oblimin, quartimax, equamax, and promax.) and still obtained 
very similar results.
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MACRO PO LITICA L EC O N O M Y  A N D  LABOUR M ARKET 
IN STITU TIO N S IN  MUMBAI A N D  ICOLKATA
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we identified and examined the differential types o f labour 
market institutions (LMIs) in Kolkata (Calcutta) and Mumbai (Bombay) using 
data obtained during our field research. From the objective o f this thesis, the 
typology o f LMIs is not merely a subjective classification, but interpreted as a 
systematic and dynamic consequence o f the way in which economic 
development and accumulation preceded in these regions.
The objective o f this chapter is therefore to place these findings within the 
economic, political and historical contexts in Maharashtra and West Bengal, 
within which Mumbai and Kolkata are located. If  we use the term introduced 
in Chapter 2 Section 1.2, this is an attempt to empirically illustrate the role of 
within- and outside-firm ‘rents’ in determining the opportunities, incentives, 
and constraints o f bargaining agents, and analyse the way in which LMIs are 
organised differendy. For this purpose, an empirical measurement o f the type 
and extent o f within- and outside-firm ‘rents’, which does not direcdy refer to 
the type o f LMIs, is important. While there have been studies focusing on the 
political and social factors in shaping bargaining relations, such as Nelson 
(1991); Banerji, Campos, Sabot (1995); and Pencavel (1995), these studies 
tended to use the politicised nature o f LMIs as evidence o f politically created 
rent-seeking regimes. This conventional approach is inadequate and 
tautological since comparing the ex-post facto bargaining relations in itself 
cannot provide insights into the extent o f particular types o f rents, or their 
influence over bargaining relations. For example, the observation that
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politicised unionism dominates industrial relations in Kolkata compared to 
Mumbai does not immediately indicate that the size o f politically created 
‘outside-firm rents’ are greater in W est Bengal than in Maharashtra. Therefore 
the particular pattern o f distributional conflicts at the macro political 
economic level in Mumbai and Kolkata is evaluated using secondary evidence 
on the economic, social and historical contexts as well as the ‘evolution’ o f 
LMIs in the two cities.
In Section 5.2, we shall examine the ‘divergence’ o f economic growth and 
patterns o f industrialisation in Maharashtra and W est Bengal. Until the early 
1960s, it was widely perceived that Mumbai and Kolkata had “dual 
dominance” in industrial development arising out o f their colonial heritages 
(Sinha 2005: 44). Since the mid-1960s we have seen a departure in patterns of 
economic growth and industrial development in the two regions. The popular 
explanations that attribute this discrepancy in economic performance to 
exogenous factors such as culture and ideology or to ‘central discrimination’ 
are not so much wrong as inadequate from our materialist analytical 
approach. An alternative explanation is proposed to focus on the importance 
o f different types o f macro political conflicts in shaping the opportunities, 
incentives, constraints and capacities o f micro agents in the two regions, 
which in turn has implications for the types o f LMIs.
As case studies o f the way in which distributional politics created incentives 
for LMIs to be organised differently, in Section 5.3 and 5.4, we compare the 
labour laws and the distribution o f State budgets in Maharashtra and West 
Bengal. From a political economic perspective, labour laws can be understood 
as a legal form o f capitalist social relations, in the sense that laws reflect the 
particular ways in which labour is organised, the labour process is controlled 
and managed, and labour is able to contest the total surplus value. By defining 
the rights o f employers to control the labour process and the rights o f labour 
unions to contest employer’s policies, labour law can significantly influence
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strategy o f both management and labour unions. Also by defining the process 
through which such contestations are made, labour law influences the cost o f 
actions by bargaining agents. Similarly, the configuration o f the State budget 
allocation reflects the particular pattern o f accumulation by informing us how 
the state acts as rent provider to various stake holders within society, 
including, but not restricted to, labour and management. Once again, the 
pattern o f resource transfer from the state significantly affects the type o f 
patron-client accommodations o f and rent-seeking by bargaining agents by 
influencing their opportunities, incentives and constraints.
In Section 5.5, we take our hypothesis further to describe the historical 
‘evolution’ o f LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata with a focus on the balance o f 
power at the macro political economic level o f the two regions. Following our 
argument in Chapter 2, the task for this thesis is to provide political models 
on the relationships between different types o f macro political economic 
conflict and the type o f micro-level strategies by LMIs. Here, political 
modelling is not only about the size o f political constituency or the degree o f 
inclusion, which has been the focus o f existing models, such as Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988); Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991); Banerji, Campos and Sabot 
(1995); Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) amongst others. Instead, we are interested 
in categorising different forms o f conflict o f coalitions o f rents, when the 
ability to mobilise popular support is different. To put it differently, our 
argument is that LMIs and collective bargaining can be better modelled by 
taking into account a range o f social interest groups, and not merely focusing 
on the bargaining agents internal to LMIs.
Finally, note that in this chapter the term ‘state’ with a small s is used to refer 
to the general concept o f the state as “the architecture o f bureaucratic 
institutions” (Sinha op at.: xvii), whereas ‘State’ with a capital S is used to 
denote the ‘provinces’ or ‘regional states’, such as Maharashtra or W est 
Bengal.
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5.2 Development and distributional politics in Mumbai and Kolkata
5.2.1 A tale of two cities: from ‘dual dominance’ to divergence
Since the early stages o f industrialisation in the 19th century under British 
colonial rule until the mid-1960s, Maharasthra (called Bombay State before 
1960) and (West) Bengal were two of the most industrially advanced regions 
in India. The first cotton textile mill was established in 1851 by a Bombay 
merchant C. N. Davar, and by the end o f 1860 at lest ten mill companies had 
been organised in the city (Morris 1983: 574). In Bengal, George Acland, an 
English entrepreneur established the first m odem  jute-spinning firm in 1855. 
Importantly, while the majority o f the shareholders o f cotton mills in Bombay 
were local merchants such as Parsis, the jute mills were predominantly 
controlled by British investors. Morris suggests that “much smaller quantities 
o f native capital in Bengal were available for industrial ventures than was the 
case in Bombay. This may have something to do with the fact that the scale o f 
Indian commercial enterprise in eastern India before 1914 also was relatively 
small” (op cit.: 567-9). This difference in the early pattern o f industrial capital 
is important, since it partly explains the relatively weak political power o f 
industrial capital in Kolkata today as we argue in the next section.
Nonetheless, Sinha (2005: 44) points out that there was a “clear ‘dual 
dominance’ o f Bengal and Bombay in the industrial field arising out o f 
colonialism”. She cites that in 1913-14, the total number o f companies in 
Bengal was 973, and the same for the Bombay province was 613, which 
accounted for about 35 per cent and 22 per cent respectively o f the industrial 
and commercial activities in India. Also Bombay had the highest productive 
capital employed, closely followed by Bengal, and the two regions employed 
about 62 per cent o f the total productive capital in India during this period. A 
decade after Independence, in 1956, the share of all India productive capital in 
West Bengal was 21 per cent, while Bombay state’s was 30 per cent. Move 
forward to 1997-98, and Maharashtra’s share o f productive capital is 18.81 per 
cent, whereas the same for W est Bengal is 6.03 per cent. Although these
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figures cannot be directly compared1, and o f course the declining share partly 
indicates the widespread distribution o f industrial and commercial activities 
across India since Independence, one can immediately note the contrasting 
tales o f the two cities.
The divergence in the economic status between Maharashtra and West Bengal 
was certainly evident by the end o f the 1970s. Figure 5-1 shows that in 1980 
the average per capita income in Maharashtra was 2675.5 rupees compared to
1913.4 rupees in West Bengal, which was marginally favourable to the all 
India average o f 1808.1 rupees. We can also observe that since the second 
half o f the 1980s, economic growth in Maharashtra has accelerated much 
faster than that in West Bengal, which followed the all India trend closely, 
resulting in a wider economic gap in the two states.
F i g u r e  5-1 P e r  c a p t i a  i n c o m e  i n  M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t
B e n g a l ,  1980 -  1996
6000
M a h a r a s h t r a  
■  W e s t  B e n g a l  
—/v— All I n d ia
5000 ■
5  4000
~  3000
2000
1000  -
1980 1985 1990 1995
Source: World Bank (2000: 142).
1 Significantly, Bombay province included Maharashtra and Gujarat until 1960. Gujarat’s share o f  
productive capital in 1997-98 was 13.90 per cent, which put together with Maharashtra’s share o f  
18.81 per cent, compares favourably to the 1956 figure.
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A closer inspection o f the state-level economic data reveals that, not only had 
the growth rate and the average income level diverged in the two regions, the 
composition o f the economic activities in the two states differed over time as 
well. Note that the two graphs in figure 5-2, which shows the net state 
domestic product (NSDP) at factor cost measured in 1980-81 constant prices, 
have different vertical scale reflecting the gap in economic wealth between the
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two States. From the figures we also notice a contrasting pattern in the 
contribution o f manufacturing production to the overall domestic economy 
between the two states. If  we compare the State-level product o f the 
manufacturing sector in Maharashtra, the net product o f the manufacturing 
sector in 1980 was Rs. 415,197 lakh, which grew to Rs. 1,132,605 lakh in 1995 
(measured at constant 1980-81 price). This implies that the output in the 
manufacturing sector has increased by 172.9 per cent in 15 years. However, if 
we consider the proportion o f manufacturing production in NSDP, we find 
that it only has risen from 27.4 percent in 1980 to 29.2 percent in 1995. 
Nonetheless, this is a more significant growth that the industrial performance 
in W est Bengal. The manufacturing production in W est Bengal has increased 
from Rs. 201,619 lakh in 1980 to Rs. 325,853 lakh in 1995, implying a 61.6 
percent growth, which in terms o f the proportion o f manufacturing 
production to NSDP has declined from 21 percent in 1980 to 16.6 percent in 
1995.
N ote that in both Maharashtra and West Bengal, but particularly in 
Maharashtra, the type o f economic activity that rapidly expanded in recent 
decades is banking and insurance. In Maharashtra, the output from the 
banking and insurance sector increased from Rs. 81,177 lakh in 1980 to Rs 
582,748 lakh in 1995, more than 7 times o f the output 15 years before. 
Proportionally, the contribution o f the bank and insurance sector to N SD P in 
Maharashtra has increased from 5.4 per cent to 15 percent. Similarly, in West 
Bengal, the output from banking and insurance has increased by nearly 200 
percent, and the proportional contribution to NSDP has increased from 5.4 
percent to 7.7 percent.
In the context o f this thesis, which focuses on the differential types o f labour 
market institutions (LMIs) in Mumbai and Kolkata, this observation of 
contrasting economic performance and industrial development generates two 
opposing hypotheses regarding the relationships between the LMIs and
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economic growth. The first hypothesis emphasises the impact o f LMIs on 
economic efficiency and productivity, and postulates that the particular types 
o f LMIs in the two regions account for their diverging economic 
development. As we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this perspective is 
influential in the mainstream economic literature that informs the on-going 
policy debates in India. In contrast, an alternative hypothesis can be proposed 
with a focus on LMIs as a reflection o f the particular patterns o f economic 
development. In this thesis we have pointed out the importance o f the second 
structuralist approach, pardy as an intervention into the current debates, even 
if in reality, the relationship between the two are likely to be dialectic. More 
fundamentally, we have argued that the many mainstream models that assume 
that LMIs precede growth as in the first hypothesis misleadingly treats them 
as ‘exogenous’ variables. We shall elaborate on these contrasting hypotheses 
in the following sections.
5.2.2 Contrasting ‘investment climate’ in Maharashtra and West Bengal
In this section, we shall examine several popular hypotheses which focus on 
the issue o f governance in explaining the differing patterns o f investment in 
Maharasthra and W est Bengal. In recent years, a number o f indices on 
‘economic freedom’ and the ‘investment climate’ have been published, and 
have been used as evidence o f institutional ‘distortion’ to the ‘efficient’ 
functioning o f market mechanisms, which can then be used to justify 
institutional reforms.
It is therefore not a coincidence that one o f such indices was developed by 
Bibek Debroy, who is amongst the most vocal proponents o f labour market 
reforms. The Economic Freedom Index for India (Debroy, Gangopadhyay 
and Bhandari 2004) evaluates “the unfettered ability o f an individual to make 
economic choices” in 20 states in India, measured in 50 variables, grouped
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into 13 categories2, which includes industrial relations as a constraint on 
control over business. Perhaps not surprisingly, the constructed index 
corroborates with the popular perception that Maharashtra is associated with 
a business-friendly outlook, while West Bengal is allied with the image o f 
being ruled by radical left-wing parties and less attractive to private investors. 
Indeed, from table 5-1, we can see that the index gives Maharashtra the 
highest mark for its ‘good investment climate’ which includes better industrial 
relations scenario, a larger number o f regulated and unregulated markets, and 
lower taxation, while West Bengal is given a low mark for its low work- 
participation rates and poor law and order situation.
T a b l e  5 - 1  D e b r o y ’s E c o n o m i c  F r e e d o m  I n d e x  f o r  I n d i a
Rank State Economic 
Freedom Index
Rank State Econom ic 
Freedom Index
1 Tamil Nadu 0.44 11 Jammu & Kashmir 0.27
2 Maharashtra 0 .44 12 Haryana 0.26
3 Gujarat 0.40 13 West Bengal 0 .22
4 Punjab 0.39 14 Uttar Pradesh 0.21
5 Andhra Pradesh 0.36 15 Madhya Pradesh 0.19
. 6 Karnataka 0.35 16 Orissa 0.18
7 Kerala 0.35 17 Assam 0.17
8 Uttaranchal 0.29 18 Jharkhand 0.16
9 Himachal Pradesh 0.29 19 Chhattisgarh 0.14
10 Rajasthan 0.27 20 Bihar 0.11
Source: Debroy, Gangopadhyay and Bhandari (2004: 585).
A similar attempt to measure the differential business environment can be 
found in the World Bank’s Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey 
(FACS) o f India, carried out by the employers association, the Confederation
2 Variety o f  social and econom ic indicators are included such as (1) the ability to make a choice (poverty 
levels, health indicators, type o f  houses, electricity and sanitation); (2) social and family biases (sex and 
literacy ratios as well as caste differentials in education); (3) lack o f  available choices (rate o f  econom ic 
growth, employment, work participation levels etc); (4) lack o f  information (access to newspapers, 
telephone, mobile phones and television); (5) lack o f  physical mobility (access to roads, availability o f  
buses and ownership o f  cars/two-wheelers); (6) lack o f  ability to process information (access to 
education and teacher-pupil ratio); (7) safety, law and justice; (8) efficiency o f  governance; (9) limits on  
trade (market fees, licence fees for traders, the number o f  haats/mandis and regulated markets); (10) 
constraints on realising full returns from effort (essentially, taxes); (11) limits on control over own  
business (industrial relations and power shortage); (12) issues in buying and selling o f  land/assets 
(taxes on property and capital transactions, stamp duty rates etc); and (13) availability and cost o f  
capital.
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of Indian Industry (CII), in 2000 and 2002, in which business managers and 
accountants are asked to identify states that they thought had a better or 
worse business climate than their own state. Figure 5-3 shows the result of the 
2000 survey in terms of the percentage of respondents who identified a state’s 
investment climate as better or worse than that of their current state in the 
2000 survey, which lists Maharashtra as the most favoured state in terms of 
the perception of the investment climate, whereas West Bengal is considered 
as one of the least favourable in this regard.’
F i g u r e  5 - 3  P e r c e p t i o n  o f  b u s i n e s s  m a n a g e r s  o n
I N V E S T M E N T  C L I M A T E  O U T S I D E  T H E  S T A T E
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Source: Dollar, David, Iarossi, Giuseppe, and Mengistae, Taye (2002: 27).
Such attempts to measure the extent of market distortions, economic 
freedom and the investment climate are evidently related to the so-called 
‘good governance’ agenda in the current development literature, whereby
3 The scope of the survey expanded from 10 provincial states in the 2000 survey to 12 in 2002. However, 
the ranking of the states in the two surveys is “not significandy different from one another” 
(Yecramani and Goldar 2004:3). Indeed in FACS 2002, Maharashtra again receives the more 
favourable score on perception of investment climate, whereas West Bengal is the least favourable 
only after U.P.
Maharashtra
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improving transparency and democratic accountability, tackling corruption 
and anti-competitive practices, and empowering the 'citizens’, together with 
the traditional ‘Washington consensus’ agendas such as market liberalisation 
and decentralisation, are seen as key reforms to enhance growth and alleviate 
poverty (Fine 2001).
These indices suffer from various measurement issues. For example, the 
publication o f the economic freedom index provoked debate on what 
‘economic freedom’ actually means in a society such as India. It is not clear 
whether the lack o f roads or power, or social restrictions on women and 
those from the lower castes are indications o f a lack o f economic freedom, or 
whether they simply signal low level o f development. The resulting indices are 
sensitive to how economic freedom is defined, and therefore to small changes 
in the data (Seetha 2004). Similarly since the index on investment climate is 
based on the opinion o f business managers and accountants, it suffers from 
the obvious problem o f the index ultimately being based on subjective 
perceptions.
A more significant concern is one o f interdependence and causality between 
the variables. Studies such as Dollar et al. (2002) and Debroy et al. (2004) 
implicitly assume a causal relationship between the business environment, for 
example represented by the volatility o f industrial relations, as the 
independent variable and economic efficiency and growth as the dependent 
variable. However it is also likely that high income and rapid economic 
growth lead to a reduction o f the perceptions o f distortion to the market and 
good business environment. The key issue is not that the perception is 
subjective, which it is, but that it is tautological because perceptions on good 
governance, economic freedom, and a good business environment are closely 
connected to successful economic growth. Managers and investors are more 
likely to complain about industrial relations constraining their activities if the 
business is not doing well. I f  this is the case, it is not surprising that indices on
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market distortion, economic freedom and a good investment climate appear 
to be positively correlated with economic growth. Indeed from a political 
economic perspective, the type o f industrial relations or LMIs should not be 
treated as independent or ‘exogenous’ variables that can be ‘chosen’ by agents, 
but rather are seen as reflections o f structural problems which constrain the 
opportunities and incentives, as well as facilitate the actions, o f bargaining 
agents.
Despite these problems, these indices are very popular and influential in 
policy circles, to the extent that recently the CPI (M)-led government invited 
the World Bank to visit W est Bengal and get recommendations on improving 
its investment climate rating (Kamboj 2005). More importantly, the difference 
in investment climates or governance capacities, which includes LMIs such as 
trade unionism and state and institutional interventions in industrial relations, 
are perceived as explanatory factors that influence and explain the difference 
in economic status and performance across regions, say the divergence 
between Maharasthra and West Bengal. This is for example reflected in a 
series o f newspaper articles authored by prominent Bengali economists, in 
which labour market policies as well as the political economy of organised 
labour were identified amongst the reasons for the industrial decline in West 
Bengal (cited in Bhattacherjee 2001b). The critical question is, then, what 
determines the investment climate or ‘good governance’? The tendency in the 
mainstream literature is to implicitly refer to some cultural difference, such as 
the Bengali mentality and their sub-nationalism, or the communist ideology 
that is supposed to be guiding the regulatory framework and state 
intervention by the Communist Part o f India (Marxist), or CPI(M), 
government, which are contrasted with the Congress-rule in Maharashtra 
based on the political dominance and “elite-pluralist hegemony” o f the 
Maratha caste (Lele 1990; Harriss 1999). While cultural differences and 
ideological traditions no doubt exist, they are inadequate as an explanation for 
the divergence in the two regions on their own, without examining how such
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culture and ideology are rooted in the particular balance o f power in the two 
regions.
A related hypothesis regarding the diverging trends in investment and 
industrial development in Maharashtra and West Bengal is that the patterns o f 
investment inflow into the regions differed because o f the national-level 
redistributional politics. Especially popular amongst political actors, firm 
managers and trade unionists in West Bengal to account for the lack o f 
investment into the state is the notion o f ‘central discrimination’ towards 
states ruled by opposition parties, which is perceived to have occurred 
through uneven distribution o f licences or o f public sector spending 
controlled by central ministries (Sinha 2005: 55-56).
Despite the well documented tensions between the centre and West Bengal 
government, the centre’s discrimination is at best a partial explanation for the 
lack o f investment, not least since the centre-state tension existed even before 
the CPI(M) came into power during Congress rule between 1947 and 1967 
(Jha and Mishra 1993; Banerjee 1996) with issues ranging from refugee 
problems after the second partition o f Bengal to the jute tax. Once again, in 
order to explain the uneven distribution o f resources at the national-level, we 
need to go beyond the ideology-based assertions, and explain why 
Maharashtra was able to extract or attract investments better than West 
Bengal over time, by focusing on the particular balance o f power and types o f 
distributional coalitions that dominate the internal politics o f the two regions.
5.2.3 Types of distributional politics in Maharashtra and West Bengal
In this section, we shall focus on an alternative approach to the macro 
political economy o f Maharashtra and West Bengal by focusing on the types 
o f macro political conflicts and the material conditions that underpin them, 
rather than reducing it to cultural and ideological differences. In the context 
of this thesis which focuses on the types o f LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata, we 
are concerned with the different coalitions o f distributional politics that
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shapes the opportunities, incentives, constraints and capacities for micro 
bargaining agents to organise labour-management relations. 'Therefore the 
intention here is not to develop a full account o f the political process in the 
two states, on which there has been development in scholarly understating 
over the past two decades.
The political economy o f the Indian state was developed by Bardhan (1984), 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), and Chibber (2003) who have described the 
state as being constrained by the compromise of power between dominant 
classes. In contrast, Harriss-White (2003) has focused on the existence o f  a 
‘shadow state’, which functions alongside the ‘formal’ state, dominated by the 
patron-client networks o f traders, small businessmen, petty commodity 
producers and richer farmers. Reviewing the lively debate on the m odem  
Indian state, Fuller and Harhss (2001: 10) point out that there is an emerging 
consensus that the state-system in India, whether real or imagined, is 
“profoundly penetrated or influenced by social forces”.
The question for our purpose is how the balance o f power and organisations 
o f macro political conflicts give rise to different types o f distributional politics, 
and in turn how they affect the rent-seeking strategies o f bargaining agents. 
Sinha (2005) points out that there is an important difference in developmental 
strategies adopted across State governments within India. O n the one hand, 
there are States, including Maharashtra, whose strategy might be termed 
‘bureaucratic liberalism’, whereby the state focuses primarily on institutional 
and infrastructural development and the monitoring o f performance. O n the 
other hand, others including the State government in West Bengal have been 
known for their dependence on central subsidies and ad hoc industrial 
strategies. These differences in state distributional strategies cannot be 
explained by the difference in ideological leanings or culture alone, but m ust 
be explained in terms o f the class and caste coalitions that constrain and 
penetrate them.
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The different ways in which the redistributional coalition emerged and was 
reproduced in Maharashtra and West Bengal is an important topic for future 
research which deserves a fuller treatment. Here we can sketch several 
features o f the state-level politics in the two regions as propositions.
5.2.3.1 Distributional politics in Maharashtra
We have already seen that Parsi entrepreneurs and merchants, who were 
placed under the protection o f the Dutch and English East India Companies, 
played an important role in developing early industries in Bombay such as the 
cotton textile mills. It was these Parsi merchants, along with Gujarati Hindus, 
Jain and Muslim capitalists, as well as Baghdadi Jews and Marathi and 
Konkani speaking traders, who controlled a wide range o f business activities 
from shipping to joint-stock banking (Chandavarkar 1994: 58-63; Hansen 
2001: 38). In this sense, Bombay was “dominated by the non-Maharashtran 
business communities” in the 19th century (Gupta 1982: 47). The political 
movements in this ‘old’ Bombay was characterised by the nationalist 
movement on the one hand, which “presented the interface o f the indigenous 
elites o f migrants from various parts o f the country, principally non-Marathi 
speaking, with the English speaking colonial elite”, and the working class 
movement, which articulated the aspirations o f “the Marathi-speaking middle 
and lower strata o f the city, the darks and workers” (Patel 2003: 4).
In contrast, the state politics in Maharashtra, for most o f the post- 
Independence period, has been dominated by the Congress party, which has 
only been out o f power in 1978-80 and 1995-994, by seeking “to combine the
4 The period 1978-80 can be characterised as a consequence o f  factional infighting within the Congress. 
In 1978 Sharad Pawar, an ex-Congress politician, w ho formed the Progressive Democratic Front 
(PDF) became the youngest Chief Minister, only to be routed by the Congress two year later. Pawar 
then formed Congress (S), then returned to the Congress (I) in 1990 to form a minority government, 
and then split again to form the National Congress Party (NCP). In this sense the event in 1978-80 
was not necessarily an effective challenge to the Congress rule. The only real challenge to the 
Congress rule happened in 1995, when the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance formed a non-Congress 
government for the first time. Vora (1996) suggests that the reasons for the election success o f  BJP- 
Shiv Sena in 1995 were the inner fighting within the Congress and Congress’s loss o f  support from  
the Muslim community particularly after the 1992-93 riots.
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aspirations o f the Marathi-speaking populations with the material interests o f 
the non-Marathi traders and industrialists” (Vora and Palshikar 2003: 161-2)
Indeed, in the late 19th century, the majority o f labour employed in industries 
such as cotton textile was local Marathi speaking residents in Mumbai (Mehta 
1954: 116). However as industrial development proceeded in the first half o f 
the 20th century, and as labour demand increased, the number o f migrants 
from outside the State, such as Uttar Pradesh, increased (Morriss 1965: 63-5). 
This influx o f migration did not however lead to segmented labour markets 
between local and migrant workers, but rather to a ‘continuous and 
multilayered’ labour market structure (Sato 1994: 103), with the relatively high 
level o f education o f migrants and the migration by family unit given as some 
o f the reasons for the relatively high level o f integration into local labour 
markets. The existence o f a relatively integrated labour market structure is, 
together with the early development o f local industrial and commercial 
capital, another important structural condition that characterises capitalist 
development in the region.
A t the heart o f the Congress domination in Maharashtra, which is 
predominantly an agrarian society, was the incorporation o f the rural 
dominant caste group Maratha (-Kunbi) caste as the symbol o f the political and 
social identity o f Maharashtra (Lele 1990: 177-8). The ‘elite’ cluster o f this 
dominant caste is mainly owner-cultivators with medium to large-size land 
holdings in predominantly the western Maharashtra region (Jadhav 2006). The 
Maratha gained political dominance in the country-side after the land reforms 
initiated in the 1950s significantly weakened the political power o f Brahman 
absentee landlords. When the Maratha non-Brahman political leaders started 
joining the Congress party in the 1930s, there was initially antagonism 
between the Brahman and non-Brahman movements. In the 1950s, the 
Congress party was reorganised along linguistic lines, at the backdrop o f a 
popular cultural and political campaign that portrayed Marathi speakers,
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Marathas as well as Brahmans, as those who constituted the majority o f the 
Bombay province but were exploited by “alien Shethjis and Banias, that is, 
moneylenders and urban capitalists belonging to Parsi, Gujarati, and Marwari 
communities” (Hansen op cit 41-2). This established the solid foundations of 
the Congress party which is perceived as “an expression o f the dominance o f 
the Maratha caste” (op cit:. 35).
John Harhss (1999) cites Lele (1990) and Jenkins (1996) to argue that that the 
Congress-Maratha political dominance constructed “a system o f elite-pluralist 
hegemony”, which, despite its rhetoric, enabled the greater accommodation 
o f ‘elites’ from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other religious groups, 
including the Muslims, than elsewhere. Lele argues that the Maratha caste has 
“shown, historically, the kind o f flexibility and openness which effectively 
conceals substantial economic and cultural disparities and emphasizes kinship 
and community” (p. 179), which led to caste dominance that allows 
competitive and flexible accommodation o f various segments o f the dispersed 
middle classes, from the rich and middle farm ers/ peasants to professionals, 
traders and money-lenders. The early Congress leaders also “won the 
confidence o f industrialists as well as labour leaders in urban centres” (p. 182). 
An alternative way to interpret the stability of the coalition is that the prospect 
of alternative political action was limited to the extent that the accommodated 
groups “developed a vested interest in the maintenance o f the system” (p.188). 
Various mechanisms of patronage, most notably the employment guarantee 
scheme (EGS), were used to channel benefits to the Congress-Maratha 
interests, while the system also created space for contestation and class/ caste 
conflicts in later years (Patel 2006; Joseph 2006; Jadhav 2006). A possible 
consequence o f this was the political unity o f economic and political interests 
under this Congress system in Maharashtra at the time o f its creation, which 
formed a loose coalition o f economic interests which enabled the 
accumulation o f the pro-rural dominant Maratha caste/class in conjunction 
with urban capitalists. It is important to note however that this did not
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necessarily mean that the state was able to focus on industrialisation, 
especially given the predominantly rural-support base of the Congress.
Under this party-caste domination, capital accumulation in western 
Maharashtra, and Mumbai in particular, took three interrelated trajectories, 
especially since the 1970s (Appadurai 2000; Patel 2003: 11-24). The first was 
the flight o f capital away from the old centre o f the city to shift the 
production to the suburbs and satellite towns such as Thane, Kalyan, and 
New (Navi) Mumbai areas, which are within the Mumbai Metropolitan 
Region, and sometimes still further to nearby cities such as Pune and Nasik. 
This shift was also combined with a move from a labour-intensive orientation 
o f the region’s industry to capital-intensive production, as well as the 
casualisation o f the work force, the developments we shall discuss further in 
Section 5.5 below. Second, mirroring this trend o f ‘de-industrialisation’ o f old 
Bombay, there has been a growth o f service industries, including finance, 
tourism, retailing, and entertainment. The increased influence o f financial 
capital is particularly important for our purpose, which includes the 
speculative capital operating in illegal and black markets, fuelled by 
consumption and speculative real estate investments. Third, following the 
expansion o f the illegal or black markets, there has been indication that Mafia 
gangs have entered into land and housing markets, and forged alliances with 
sections o f the Shiv Sena movement, which we discuss below. These 
trajectories o f accumulations in Mumbai and other industrial areas are 
interesting because while Mumbai tends to be associated with the positive 
pro-developmental or pro-business image, in fact an important aspect o f the 
accumulation process in the region is the shift o f ‘elite’ interest from attracting 
resources to industries and extract kickbacks from industrialists to capturing 
resources from various forms o f organised crimes.
Setting aside the moral and welfare implications o f this ‘dynamic’ yet 
contradictory nature o f capitalist development, what we are concerned with
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here is the type o f distributional politics in Maharashtra, within which LMIs in 
industries based in Mumbai are located. O n the ‘supply-side’ o f rents, the 
state in Maharashtra, with the backing o f the dominant groups and interests, 
adopted a strategy o f ‘guiding the market’ by facilitating firms and industries 
to operate rather than to directly participate in productive activities (Sinha 
2005). For example, Sankar, Mishra and Nandagopal (1994: M-115) argue that 
the State-level public enterprises (SLPEs) in Maharashtra were set up as area 
development or “promotional enterprises in view of their strategies to 
accelerate the pace o f economic development through helping the private 
sector enterprises”. As we shall see in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below, the 
economic policy o f the Congress government in Maharashtra has meant that 
the type o f ‘rents’ available to the bargaining agents in industrial relations took 
the form o f ‘within-firm rent’ by supporting the operation o f industrial capital 
and providing institutional and infrastructural capacity, rather than the form 
of politically created ‘outside-firm rent’ through direct state intervention or 
government subsidies.
This does not mean that politically created ‘rents’ did not exist, or even that 
they were less important, in Mumbai. In fact, given that the legitimacy o f the 
Congress rule depended on accommodating a wide range o f social groups and 
interests, particularly those in the ‘elite’ cluster o f various castes and ethnic 
groups, distributional conflicts over political resources dominated politics in 
Maharashtra, which were led by factional coalitions organised along 
communal and linguistic lines. The intra-dominant class factional division 
within the Congress started to emerge since the late 1980s between the 
western Maharashtra Maratha ‘elite’ and other groups such as lower Maratha- 
Kumbi groups, as well as Maratha elites from eastern Maharashtra, which 
weakened the political legitimacy o f the Congress (Jadhav 2006: 5160). The 
Dalit movem ent and the rise o f Shiv Sena (Shivaji’s Army), which emerged in 
1966 as a radical son-of-the-soil movement against south Indian migrants, are 
also reflections o f this decline o f the Congress hegemony especially after the
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1990s and the competitive accommodation of newly emerging middle classes, 
which further strengthened the caste-based political mobilisation in the state. 
N o doubt, industrial capital and labour are also part o f these factional 
coalitions, but given the caste-based organisation o f the distributional politics, 
they have not been at the centre o f this mobilisation, with the exception o f 
Shiv Sena affiliated trade unions and other caste and religious organisations, 
which rallied workers around their linguistic and religious symbols, and 
business classes engaging neighbourhood mafia gangs for private protection 
o f their commercial activities (Patel 2003: 23-4). Working class politics, which 
was one o f the dominant expressions o f modernity in old Mumbai, has come 
to be overshadowed by linguistic and communal political movements by the 
1990s. The militant ‘independent’ trade unionism since the 1980s may be 
interpreted as a so-far unsuccessful attempt to challenge this caste-based 
distributional politics in Maharashtra.
It is our hypothesis that the limited scope for bargaining agents in industrial 
relations to impose political settlements in their favour at the macro political 
economic level has meant that the scope for seeking ‘outside-firm rents’ was 
limited, while there was greater compulsion for them to focus on ‘within-firm 
rents’ at the backdrop o f dynamic but uneven pattern o f accumulation in the 
region. The particular pattern o f redistributional politics in Maharashtra helps 
us specify the structural opportunities and capacities for a mobilisation 
strategy by unions to mobilise workers for long-term firm-specific action, 
rather than to seek ‘rents’ beyond the firm, as we argue in Chapter 6 Section
6.3 in our analysis o f  the labour process under different types o f LMIs. Also, 
as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, it is our hypothesis that the types o f LMIs 
can be understood at least in part as a reflection o f the balance o f power at 
the macro-level and the specific patterns of accumulation. It is therefore our 
argument that the diverse types o f LMIs in Mumbai observed in Chapter 4 
can be explained in terms o f this mobilisation strategy by bargaining agents to 
organise LMIs according to local conditions to maximise their share o f
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‘within-firm rents’ in the long-run. The perceived image o f Business 
unionism’ in Mumbai is therefore understood as reflecting the economic, 
political and social conditions o f the region.
The communal, linguistic and ethnic fragmentation o f Maharashtra politics is 
another of the consequences o f the aforementioned linguistic movement, 
which “claimed a political voice, public visibility, and perhaps more important, 
political ‘property rights’ to the city based on its numerical strength and 
allegedly purer Maharashtrian cultural heritage” (Hansen op tit:. 69). Leaders o f 
factional organisations would cultivate, if not create, clientelist networks and 
paternalism, by say, sponsoring youth clubs or providing jobs for lower 
middle class and working class men in Mumbai (pp. 72-74). Communal 
political movements such as the Shiv Sena increased its support by its 
“ritualized systematic and excessive violence as a political instrument” (p.231) 
and penetrating “the intricate connections between politics, real estate 
brokerage, and industrial investments” (p. 104).
T a b l e  5-2 P o s t - P a r t i t i o n  H i n d u - M u s l i m  R i o t s  I n  
M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
State 1991 Total Pop
1991
Hindu-
Muslim
Deaths in 
Hindu- Deaths Per
Muslim% Riots 1950- 
1995
Muslim  
Riots, 1950- 
1995
Million
Maharashtra 7 8 , 9 3 7 , 1 8 7 9 .  67 1 9 5 1 4 5 6
00 
i—i
West Bengal 6 8 , 0 7 7 , 9 6 5 2 3 . 6 1 89 2 8 7 4 . 2
Source: Wilkinson (1998)
O n one hand, the particular social structure in Maharashtra enabled ‘dynamic’ 
economic accumulation to take place, which is reflected in the perception that 
it is the state with one o f the best ‘investment climate’ and ‘governance’ 
capacities, as we saw in Section 5.2.2. The other side o f this capitalist 
development in Maharashtra is however the violent ways in which communal 
tensions are politicised, the m ost famous o f which was the 1993 riots in 
Mumbai (of which Shiv Sena is accused as the key perpetrator). Table 5-2
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shows the number o f Hindu-Muslim riots and deaths in such riots since 1950, 
which reveals in a crude manner the distinctively brutal aspect o f capitalist 
development that has unfolded in Maharashtra, which relate to the communal 
and ethnic dimensions o f redistributional conflicts over external rents in the 
region.
5.2.3.2 Distributional Politics in West Bengal
The industrial stagnation that characterised the state o f West Bengal and the 
relative decline in the economic status o f Kolkatta since the mid-1960s (at 
least until the early 1990s) are often attributed to the ideological leanings o f 
the Left Front governments led by the Communist Party o f India (Marxist) or 
CPI(M), which has been influential since the mid-1960s and has controlled 
state resources since 1977. For example, Crook and Sverrisson (2001: 48) 
argue that West Bengal represents a case whereby not only has the ruling 
CPI(M) had ideological commitment to accommodate the poor in the 
political process but also “was prepared to engage actively with local politics 
(even if for its own politically self-serving reasons), to challenge local elite 
resistance if  necessary and to ensure implementation o f policies” . However, 
Kaviraj (1997: 259) points out that the CPI(M) has also “sought to increase 
their appeal to social groups not traditionally considered their usual social 
base”, including business groups by assuring them o f “firmer control over 
trade union movements”.
While the ideological commitment o f the Left Front government was no 
doubt an important factor that promoted pro-poor policies, Sinha (2005: 184- 
200) offers a different interpretation by focusing on a socio-economic 
coalition o f ‘non-productive middle-class hegemony’ that has dominated the 
state politics o f West Bengal. Kohli (1990: 367) argues that “m odem  Bengal 
politics has been dominated by an upper caste, well-off, educated minority” 
known as the Bengali bhadralok. The bhadralok or ‘respectable people’, is a 
term that refers to a multitude o f upper and middle castes originally from the
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“rentier class who enjoyed intermediary tenurial rights to rents from the land” 
(Chatterji 1994: 1-5) but over time “came to be removed from productive 
activities in both agriculture and the urban sector”. Many o f the bhadralok can 
be connected to the \amindars, who were revenue collectors under the British 
colonial rule, many o f whom were absentee landlords (Kohli 1990). Instead o f 
being involved in agricultural production or participating in village life, 
through access to English education, the bhadralok formed the bureaucratic 
and professional classes around the late 19th century, and controlled m ost o f 
the political positions under the Congress as well as the CPI(M) governments. 
This ‘non-productive hegemonic elite’ radicalised under the Bengali sub­
nationalism “did not represent the commercial interest o f either the agrarian 
or the industrial sector” (p.188). In fact, Chatterji (1994) points out that the 
bhadralok movement was able to appeal to other less privileged sections o f 
Bengali Hindu society or to other caste, ethnic and tribal groups. However, 
crucially, Kohli points out that “ [cjlass hegemony was never well established 
within West Bengal and caste affiliations have not provided the basis for 
state-wide political mobilization” (p.368), which is a contrasting situation to 
the one found in Maharashtra.
We already discussed in Section 5.2.1 that the early industries in Calcutta were 
established and controlled mainly by the British. During the 1910s, the 
number o f establishments increased, mainly controlled by Bengali-Hindu 
traders and other groups such as the Marwalis5, but these early indigenous 
capitalists suffered from their subordinate position o f being collaborators o f 
the British capitalists (Bagchi 1972; 2002). However, Sinha (2005) argues that 
the weak position or ‘non-organic character’ o f the indigenous business
5 A  com m on perception is that urban commerce and industry in West Bengal has been dominated by 
non-Bengalis: first the British and then Parwafis and Parsis, which is seen to be “partially responsible 
for the failure o f  capitalism to becom e an integral part o f  Bengali social structure” (Kolhi 1990: 375- 
6). This view underestimates the increase o f  Bengali commercial and industrial capital in the early 20th 
century (Bagchi 2002: 168-71). Nonetheless, Bagchi agrees that, regardless o f  their social backgrounds, 
these ‘Indian’ capitalists were constrained by the colonial arrangements o f  industrial developments in 
the early period.
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classes alone is not sufficient in explaining the lack o f ‘pro-developmental’ 
consensus in West Bengal. She suggests instead that the critical factor was the 
lack o f “incorporation o f the industrially relevant class into the party-state 
system” (p. 191) which contrasts to the coalitions o f upper classes across 
society and the alliance between economic and political powers in western 
India6.
Another structural condition that is worth noting is the ‘segmented’ labour 
market structure in Kolkata. Just as in Mumbai, at the early period the 
majority o f workers hired in industries such as jute manufacturing was local 
Bengali, but this composition o f labour in terms o f their areas o f origin 
changed markedly from around 1895 manifested as “a consistent switching 
from local to non-local labour” (Gupta 1976: 299), especially from Bihar, U.P. 
and Orissa. More importantly there are indications to suggest that there was a 
higher share o f Bengali workers in skilled labour, whereas the majority o f 
migrant workers were uneducated unskilled labour, resulting in a more 
segmented labour market structure compared to that in Mumbai (Gupta op 
tit:. 302; Sato 1994: 103). The combination o f ‘non-organic’ industrial and 
commercial capital and segmented labour market structure in Kolkata 
contrasts to the initial conditions in Mumbai, and is likely to have led to the 
different trajectory o f accumulation in the two regions.
It is possible that these structural conditions partly contributed to the inability 
o f the dominant caste movement to form stable coalitions with the ‘elites’ in 
other sections o f the society, and because o f this the CPI(M) government had 
to appeal to a wider social base to sustain their power. This is reflected in land 
reforms and various social welfare programmes that were intended to mitigate 
poverty in the State, and to some extent succeeded in “penetrating the
6 It is also possible that the dominant class or caste structure is less cohesive in Bengal, as suggested by 
Kohli (1987). Such inference is consistent with contestations to rural dominant castes such as the 
Tebhaga m ovem ent in 1946 (Alavi 1965), but requires further discussion which is beyond the scope 
o f  this thesis.
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countryside without being captured by the propertied groups” (Kohli 1984: 
228), although there are evidence to suggest that propertied classes obtained 
disproportionately greater benefits (Mallick 1993). Still the less cohesive 
dominant class and caste in West Bengal is in contrast to the experience o f 
Maharashtra we discussed above. It is also interesting that caste and 
communal identities play a much less important role in political mobilisation 
in West Bengal. Instead, CPI(M) generates political support in part by 
appealing to the Bengali regionalism or ‘sub-nationalism’. Kohli (1990: 375) 
argues that the CPI(M) “is conceived o f not only as a communist party; it is 
also a Bengali party”. Sinha (2005: 197) goes further to suggest that the “Left 
Front crafted a long-term, coherent political strategy at enhancing this 
regional sentiment and regionally located political support”.
The weak socio-economic coalition combined with the ideology o f ‘sub­
nationalism’ that is needed for electoral advantage meant that the West Bengal 
took a very different ‘developmental’ strategy to that o f Maharashtra. We have 
already seen that after 1977 the Left Front has reformed their ideological 
position in favour o f business and monopoly capitalists (Mallick 1993). The 
CPI(M) also revised the strategy o f their trade union wing, the Centre o f 
Indian Trade Unions (CITU), from being ideologically committed to 
militancy in the 1960s and early 70s to taking the view that “strikes were not 
essential for [the] redressal o f workers’ grievances nor [...] the only 
manifestation o f the militant attitude o f the workers” as declared in the state- 
level conference o f the CITU in 1980 (Ramaswamy 1984: 177-8). Despite 
these and other gestures, the industrial strategies o f the Left Front 
governments at least until the early 1990s “came to be characterized by an 
apparent ad hoc nature” (Sinha 2005: 198). More specifically, “the Left Front 
governments have chosen the soft option o f depending on New Delhi for 
subsidies” (Banerjee 1996: 218-9) in order to sustain industrial growth and 
create employment through direct state interventions. Kohli (1990: 376) 
instead attached the blame to the industrialists and moneyed urban interests in
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Kolkata who “have preferred to intervene in Bengal’s politics through New 
Delhi”, which has further strengthened the sentiments for Bengali sub­
nationalism. In contrast to the neo-liberal developmental strategies o f ‘guiding 
the market’ in Maharashtra, West Bengal governments focused on setting up 
“more manufacturing enterprises in view of their strategy to participate in 
direcdy productive activities” (Sankar, Mishtra and Nandagopal 1994: M-115).
In the context o f our discussion on the organisation o f distributional politics 
within which labour-management bargaining takes place, the implication o f 
the fragmented caste/class structure, which requires the CPI(M) to 
incorporate wider social groups, particularly the middle and lower classes, and 
the developmental strategy with its orientation to direct state intervention, is 
that redistributive competition in West Bengal took at party-political form. In 
the organised-sector commerce and industry, this is reflected in the multiple 
unions divided not only along partisan lines but also by factions within parties. 
Sen (1992) in her study on the jute industry, points out the difficulty of 
identifying the relative strength o f each union because while the majority o f 
workers do not pay a membership fee to unions in normal times, while some 
declare support for two or more unions. Ramaswamy (2000: 65) argues that 
many such unions, especially in older industries such as jute textiles, “are 
more like strike committees” which “lend an existence centred around 
conflict, mobilizing mass support during strikes”. In addition, these party- 
affiliated unions act as one o f the important means for political parties to 
mobilise mass support for political rallies and elections. Similarly, outside the 
industrial and commercial sectors, the party-controlled panchayat, the local 
government positions o f which were opened up to party political competition 
in 1979 by the CPI(M) government for the first time, became the mechanism 
through which rural credit and employment are allocated, again giving rise to 
party-based distributional conflicts in the countryside. Thus our hypothesis is 
that the balance o f power and the type o f macro political economy in West 
Bengal have meant that both  industrial capital and labour had a greater scope
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for participating in the distributional politics in Kolkata compared to those in 
Mumbai.
It is therefore our hypothesis that the dominant class led process o f industrial 
development has created a greater structural opportunity and capacity for 
bargaining agents to mobilise workers to capture a greater share o f politically- 
created external ‘rents’ as part o f patron-client networks organised by political 
entrepreneurs who have no direct links to productive activities, even if the 
State politics has been ‘elitist’ in nature (Mallick 1993). A t the same time, the 
relatively stagnant process o f accumulation until the 1990s meant unions had 
limited scope for increasing gains through mobilising to maximise ‘within- 
firm rents’. Thus our argument is that the politicised nature o f LMIs in 
Kolkata as observed in Chapter 4 can be explained in terms o f the 
mobilisation strategies by bargaining agents to seek external rents beyond the 
firm, or at least to ‘stay with the regime’.
Finally let us briefly comment on the political economy of W est Bengal after 
the 1990s. Between 1978 and 1981, the CPI(M) government implemented an 
extensive land reform which (i) vested surplus land after the imposition o f a 
ceiling on family landholding; and (ii) recorded the names o f sharecroppers in 
the record o f rights in order to give them the protection and benefit to which 
they were entitled under the law as amended by the predecessor government, 
known as ‘Operation Barga7’ (Bandyopadhyay 1995; 2000; 2003)8. In addition, 
since the 1980s, West Bengal has experienced rapid growth in agricultural 
production, in particular rice. Overall economic growth since the 1990s has 
improved, despite the continued stagnation in industrial development, mainly 
led by the expansion o f the service sector (Guruswamy 2005). It is possible
7 hargadars’ = sharecroppers
8 However, there are evidences to suggest that Operation Barga only managed to put 30% o f  tenants and
16% o f  landless tenants on record. From this observation, it appears as if  the benefit o f  Operation 
Barga was greatest amongst rich peasants — 71% o f  tenants in the 4-10 ha ownership category 
(Shankar 1999).
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that the emergence o f the ‘new’ middle classes as a result o f economic growth 
has made the alliance between the upper caste bhadralok and the middle and 
lower classes, which gave the CPI(M) political dominance during the 1980s, 
less stable. Kohli (2006b) hypothesises that the communist parties may have 
“demobilised their organised supports” from the desire to attract investment 
and improve its growth performance. More recendy, the worse defeat o f the 
CPI(M)-led Third Front in the 2009 Indian general election, and the peculiar 
alliance o f the armed guerrillas o f the CPI(Maoist), Ttinamool Congress and 
the Indian National Congress that emerged as opposition to the CPI(M) 
around the issue o f police repression against the tribals in Lalgarh, may 
indicate the changing coalition o f politics in West Bengal. W hether this leads 
to the formation o f a stable upper and middle class/ caste alliance through the 
accommodation o f landed middle classes as seen in Maharashtra, and whether 
it leads to long-term industrial development and economic growth in the 
region remains to be seen.
5.2.3.3 Summary and implications
There are clearly very similar patterns in the early industrialisation and 
economic development in Mumbai and Kolkata. In both regions, the 
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie were outside the politically dominant 
groups, at least in the early period. In both regions, a relatively stable party 
politics emerged, albeit o f very different ideological leanings, which was 
possible by establishing a broad coalition o f interests. However, while in 
Maharashtra a particular political/caste unity emerged in the early phase o f 
Independence, which allowed the dominant political groups to form coalition 
that enabled the state to carry out ‘liberal’ developmental management (but 
also with violent consequences), in W est Bengal the incorporation o f 
accumulating classes did not happen to such a great extent, and economic 
development was not pursued as a significant agenda o f social and economic 
coalitions (Sinha 2005: 184-200). We have suggested several contrasting social
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and political factors that may led to this difference, which are summarised in 
table 5-3, but clearly there is scope for further research.
In particular, it seems that the critical difference in the political history of the 
two regions lies in the establishment o f the nature o f political alliances during 
the early period o f Independence. A possible factor is the contrasting agrarian 
structure at the time. As we have seen, a reasonably successful land reform in 
the 1950s led to the abolition of absentee landlords, who then formed part o f 
the professional classes in the urban area, and to the dominance o f landed 
middle caste Marathas to form a coalition o f ‘elite pluralism’ in Maharashtra 
(Lele 1990: 177). Such effective land reform did not happen until the late 
1970s in West Bengal, and the absentee landlords amindaris) lacked the 
political legitimacy to mobilise support o f the productive groups in the region. 
O f course the timing o f the land reform m ust be understood as a reflection o f 
the specific process o f early accumulation and industrialisation in the two 
regions, rather than as an operational instrument (Grinberg and Sartosta 
2009). Another possible factor is that the radicalisation o f the political classes 
around issues such as nationalism and regionalism in around the period o f 
Independence (and significantly the partitions o f Bengal) meant that caste 
played less role in Bengali politics compared to western India. However, 
focusing on these factors alone would be misleading since “there is a danger 
that one may recreate the past so as to make the present an inevitable 
outcome o f the past” (Kohli 1990: 385). These and other possible questions 
would have to be developed in future research projects.
For the purposes o f this thesis, however, we are concerned with the 
implications o f the different balances o f power amongst social groups and 
their political trajectories on the differential types o f ‘rents’ and rent-seeking, 
which provide incentives for bargaining relations and unions to be organised 
differently. In the following two sections, we shall examine the differential 
types o f rents by focusing on the labour laws and state budget allocations.
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5.3 Labour legislation in Maharashtra and West Bengal
5.3.1 Labour law as a legal form  of capitalist social relations
In this and the next sections, we shall examine some evidence o f the 
differential types o f ‘rents’ available to the bargaining agents in industrial 
relations, which shape the opportunities, incentives and constraints o f 
organising labour market institutions (LMIs) differently in Maharashtra and 
West Bengal. In particular, we shall focus on the role o f the state in the two 
regions providing these differential ‘rents’.
The state may become a rent provider to industry and actors in industrial 
relations for various reasons. For example, if  ensuring industrial growth and 
providing employment is the major factor for the legitimacy o f the 
government, the state may provide a certain amount o f excess earnings to 
attract production of goods and services. However, as we have seen in 
Section 5.2.3, the ability o f the government to form such developmental 
stratigies is often fundamentally constrained by the distributional politics in 
the wider society. In such a case, provision o f ‘rents’ is likely to be motivated 
by the political survival o f the government and state officials.
The motive behind the state’s provision o f ‘rents’ is important in 
understanding the patterns o f macro rent allocation. If  the State is allocating a 
large portion o f the macro rent to the industrial labour market because o f the 
importance o f inducing industrial development, the state will do so as long as 
state intervention is important and effective for the growth o f the industrial 
sector. O n the other hand, if ‘rents’ are allocated for the motive o f 
accommodating different groups to prevent challenges to the legitimacy o f 
the government and state officials, then the type and amount o f ‘rents’ 
allocated to agents o f LMIs would depend on their location within the 
coalition o f macro political economic conflicts, and their relative bargaining 
power within the wider society.
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Labour laws and legislation are important aspects o f LMIs9 since they can 
shape labour-management relations (i) by influencing the way in which labour 
unions may form and grow; and (ii) by regulating the process o f collective 
bargaining and labour disputes. In this sense, labour legislation signals the 
possible gains, in the form o f monetary and non-monetary payoffs, including 
employment, security, and fringe benefits, all o f which, according to our 
broad definition10, can be considered as ‘rents’ from labour-management 
bargaining.
Moreover, from a materialist perspective, labour legislation is an expression o f 
the way in which society as a whole controls the labour-process, not just at 
the point o f production. It tells us the how the labour movement is 
differentiated, the political representations developed, and alliances forged 
(Bensaid 2002: 112). It articulates the scope and limits o f cooperation and 
conflicts in the labour-process. It conveys the model o f how the total surplus 
value is to be distributed within society. In other words, labour legislation can 
be understood as a legal form o f capitalist relations o f production.
However, we have seen in Chapter 1 that labour legislation covers less than 
10 per cent o f the total workforce in India. Given this limited scope and 
coverage o f ‘formal’ state regulation, modifying the labour laws and other 
state regulations is typically not the primary target o f the redistributive 
coalitions o f the type discussed in Section 5.2.3 (Khan 2005). Nevertheless, 
we can still expect the resulting legislation and regulatory practices to broadly 
reflect the types o f macro politics conflicts in the region.
Therefore by comparing the labour laws in Maharashtra and W est Bengal, our 
aim is to analyse the differential modes o f managing and controlling the 
labour process and the patterns o f capitalist development in the two regions,
9 See our definition o f  LMI in Chapter 1 Section 1.2.
10 See our definition o f ‘rents’ in Chapter 2 Section 1.2.
312
which in turn have determined the emergence, reproduction and 
transformation o f the types o f LMIs.
5.3.2 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA)
As a comparison of the legal framework for LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata, 
and the particular mode o f managing the labour process in the two regions it 
reflects, we shall consider the State amendments made to the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter IDA). Being an Act passed by the central 
government, the IDA extends to the whole of India. However under the 
Indian Constitution both centre and State governments are empowered to 
legislate the issue o f industrial disputes, and thus various State governments 
have passed their own State Act on industrial disputes. Section 31 o f Act No. 
38 o f 1956 provides that the operation o f the State Act in that State shall not 
be affected in relation to the matters covered by the State Act, but for the 
matters not covered by the State Act the provisions o f the Central Act shall 
apply. Further, the State legislators have amended the central Act from time 
to time (Srivastava 1985: 20-28). Hence, while the IDA has been passed at the 
centre (and occasionally has been amended at the centre, sometimes reflecting 
the way in which the Act is received at the State level) State-level legislators 
have a considerable degree o f freedom changing the legal framework of 
collective bargaining.
State legislators change the legal framework of collective bargaining and 
labour disputes because o f the particular conditions o f their region. That 
condition may come from the economic realities o f the industrial sector. For 
example, labour unions’ ability to disrupt industrial peace may necessitate 
legislators to give concessions to workers. O n the other hand, the need for a 
flexible labour market may lead legislators to push for pro-employer 
amendments to the Act. The particular conditions at the State-level are also 
likely to be related to the social structure and the type o f distributive conflicts. 
Labour laws may be designed in favour o f labour if workers and trade unions
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are accommodated and strongly represented in a coalition o f social actors in a 
such a way that they can exercise organisational power to contest the 
legitimacy o f the government or state officials may result in passing pro­
labour amendments. Or, the same condition may lead the state to take a more 
interventionist approach to the labour m arket In contrast, if industrial capital 
is accommodated in a social coalition of the ruling classes, or if there is a 
social base for supporting industrial capital, the state may relax labour laws in 
their favour or at least modify the type o f state intervention in the industry.
Therefore as a starting point for our analysis o f the State amendments to the 
IDA in Maharashtra and West Bengal, we have categorised the type o f state 
amendments on the IDA as pro-labour, or pro-employer, pro-govemment, or 
others. A similar treatment of the State amendments to the IDA is done by 
Besley and Burgess (2002), in which 121 State amendments in 15 States are 
classified as pro-worker, pro-employer or neutral. This classification reflects 
the view that the state merely intervenes into the bi-partite bargaining 
relations between labour and management by passing labour market 
regulations. In contrast, our categorisation is based on the understanding that 
the state’s role in intervening to the LMIs goes beyond merely mediating the 
industrial relations. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), amongst others, have 
suggested that in countries like India, the state has a much more active role in 
shaping the bargaining relations between labour and management, and may 
behave as a bargaining agent with its own agenda as well. In addition, we have 
argued in Section 5.2.3 that the state may intervene in LMIs when the 
accommodation o f industrial capital and labour are important in controlling 
the mobilisation o f political conflicts.
In addition, the different assumptions regarding the role o f the state in LMIs 
have implications as to how we interpret the observations on State-level 
amendments to labour legislation. Besley and Burgess implicitly assume that 
the de jure legal framework immediately implies de facto labour market
314
regulations (Bhattacharjea 1996), since for them the state is ‘choosing’ ‘p ro­
worker’ or ‘pro-employer’ changes to labour law and regulation according to 
their political positions. In contrast, if we argue that the legitimacy o f political 
regime depends on accommodating the coalitions o f patron-client networks, 
the state’s labour market policies may be subjected to the particular location 
o f industrial capital and labour in this patron-client politics. In this latter 
scenario, the state’s passing o f de jure ‘pro-worker’ legislation may be 
combined with the de facto ‘pro-employer’ policies and implementations. We 
must therefore interpret labour legislation in the context o f the wider state 
policy on LMIs.
Another methodological difference is that where B&B treat labour law as an 
operational variable o f the state, we see State-level amendments as a reflection 
o f a particular structural characteristic o f the local political economy. In 
Chapter 2 we have seen that the conventional economic models have been 
mainly concerned with analysing the pay-off structure within a given 
institutional framework, which sets the ‘rule’ o f bargaining. However, 
increasingly economists are becoming aware that the institutional framework 
itself may be a result o f a particular bargaining process. Labour law reform is a 
classic example o f such institutions. Moreover from our understanding o f 
labour law as the legal form o f capitalist social relations, LMIs including labour 
legislation are an expression o f the particular mode o f managing and 
controlling the labour process.
Besley and Burgess’ methodology also suffers from the problem o f focusing 
only on the state amendments o f the IDA in characterising the type o f labour 
legislation in each State (Bhattacharjea 1996). Besides having the right to 
amend the central Act, States have the right to pass their own labour laws that 
can override the central Act. From  table 5-3, we can see that the number o f 
State-level amendments in West Bengal far exceeds that o f Maharashtra. One 
o f the reasons States like Maharashtra does not have many State amendments
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to the IDA is because they have their own labour laws, which supersede the 
central IDA. The relatively small number o f state amendments in Maharashtra 
should not be taken as an indication that Maharashtra has less industrial 
disputes or that state intervention in the labour market is relatively 
unimportant in Maharashtra. We shall therefore also comment on additional 
legislation and the wider juridical environment within which labour- 
management relations take place in Maharashtra and West Bengal.
T a b l e  5 - 3  T y p e s  o f  s t a t e  a m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  
D i s p u t e s  A c t  i n  M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
Maharashtra WestBengal
Pro-labour amendments 0 16
Pro-employer amendments 3 0
Pro-government amendments 1 3
Other types o f amendments 3 8
Total number o f state amendments 7 27
Note: Types o f amendment categorized by the author. For detailed discussion on the criteria o f categorization, see the 
Appendix o f  this chapter.
From table 5 - 3 ,  if we focus on the types of amendments that have been made 
in the two states, we find that while the majority of state amendments in W est 
Bengal can be characterised as ‘pro-labour’ in its nature, the state amendments 
in Maharashtra have no such distinctive feature. According to our 
categorisation, in W est Bengal 16 out o f 27 State-level amendments are ‘pro­
labour’, 3  are ‘pro-govemment’, and none is effectively de jure strengthening 
the bargaining position o f employers11. In contrast, in Maharashtra, out o f  7 
State-level amendments we have categorised 3  as favouring employers, while 
none could be considered as pro-labour. However, this does no t mean that 
industrial relations are necessarily de facto ‘pro-labour’ in W est Bengal. As we
11 The W est Bengal amendment on section 25C in 1981 can be seen as pro-labour i f  considered on its 
own, which states that if  being laid o ff  is not due to electricity problems then the workers receive 
100% o f  their wages as compared to the normal 50% (this is how Besley and Burgess categorise). 
However we argue that this amendment needs to be considered in relation to another amendment 
(section 2) that took place in 1981 which allows employers to lay-off workers at time o f  electricity 
problems without government permission. For more discussion on this, see the Appendix o f  this 
chapter.
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point out below, since 1977 when the CPI(M) government came to power, 
West Bengal has been characterised by one o f the highest incidence o f 
lockouts in India, while the incidence o f strikes has fallen, implying that the de 
jure legislative changes did not reflect the changes in de facto industrial relations. 
Also the observations on Maharashtra’s state amendments on IDA must be 
interpreted within the wider legal framework and juridical scenario in the 
region. As we shall elaborate below, our interpretation o f the seemingly 
paradoxical state policy on LMIs in West Bengal is that the state takes a direct 
and detailed interventionist approach to industrial relations, rather than the 
legalistic' or bureaucratic approach that characterises industrial relations in 
Maharashtra.
F i g u r e  5-4 T i m e l i n e  o f  s t a t e  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  ID A
Maharashtra state amendments West Bengal state amendments
-1950s BIR Act 1946
1960s
1970s 1974 — 2 neutral amendments
1958 - 1 neutral amendment
1959 - 1 neutral amendment
1974 - 1 neutral amendment
1975-77 Indira Gandhi’s Emergency Regime
MRTU&PULP Act w .e.f 1975
1977 CPI(M) government sworn in
1980s
1990s
1981 -  3 amendments (2 pro­
employer;
1 pro-government)
1982-83 Mumbai textile strike
1983 -  2 amendments (1 pro-employer 
and 1 pro-govemment)
1980- 12 pro-labour amendments;
3 pro-government amendments
1981 -1  neutral amendment
1986- 1 pro-labour amendment
1989 - 3 pro-labour amendments;
3 neutral amendments
1990 - 1 neutral amendment
Notes: MRTU&PULP Act was initially passed in 1947 and was amended in 1971 but it came 
effective horn 1975. “w.e.f “ stands for “with effect horn”.
In addition to the content o f amendments, it is also important to consider the 
timing o f the state amendments. As we can see from figure 5-4, many of the 
important amendments to the IDA that significantly influenced the
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opportunities, incentives and constraints o f bargaining agents occurred in the 
1980s. One o f the possible factors is the changing political climate 
surrounding industrial relations after Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime 
(1975-77), when attempts were made to impede labour militancy, which we 
discussed in Chapter 1. However, Besley and Burgess’s analysis that covers 15 
States across India suggests that there was not a uniform response in terms o f 
State-level amendments to the IDA. Therefore we must also consider the 
region-specific factors that led to the changes in the legal framework in 
Maharashtra and West Bengal.
In Maharashtra, the significant factor was the emergence o f the ‘m odem ’ or 
‘independent’ militant unionism led by non-political external leaders such as 
Datta Samant, made most famous by the Mumbai textile strike o f the 1982- 
83, which happened as a backdrop to the dynamic but uneven industrial 
development in the region. Out o f 7 state amendments that were passed in 
Maharashtra, 5 were in the early 1980s. The predominantly ‘pro-employer’ 
tendencies o f the IDA amendments can be interpreted in the light o f the 
political climate o f the time.
Similarly, the changes in legal form of social relations in West Bengal in the 
1980s cannot be explained without the political dominance o f the CPI(M) and 
the reorganisation o f the redistributive coalition in the region. The bulk o f the 
state amendments took place after the CPI (M) was sworn in to the state 
government in 1977. 15 out o f 27 W est Bengal state amendments were in 
1980, three years after the entrenchment of the left front government, 12 o f 
which were ‘pro-labour’ in nature. The state government under CPI (M) rule 
was committed to reversing “the trend towards industrial stagnation” while at 
the same time “increasing the control o f the actual producers or workers over 
their industries” (Das Gupta 1995). The ‘pro-labour’ nature o f W est Bengal 
amendments to IDA in the 1980s can be seen as a reflection o f this rhetoric 
of the state government’s attempt to appeal to its middle and lower income
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groups, while in practice restraining union militancy to reassure the business 
classes.
To sum up, the comparison o f the number, content and timing o f state 
amendments to IDA in the two states shows that labour law reforms are very 
sensitive to the local political economic conditions, especially when the state 
policy is constrained by the need to maintain the political legitimacy o f the 
regime.
5.3.3 Additional labour legislation and juridical institutions
In addition to the central Acts such as the Trade Union Act o f 1926 and the 
Industrial Disputes Act o f 1947, three labour laws that are specific to 
Maharashtra are relevant to our discussion on the LMIs: The Bombay 
Industrial Relations (BIR) Act o f 1946; Maharashtra Recognition o f Trade 
Unions (MRTU); and Prevention o f Unfair Labour Practices (PULP) Act o f 
1971.
We have discussed in Chapter 1 that the Trade Union Act of 1926 (central 
legislation) provides for the registration o f trade unions, that any seven 
members can register a union, but does not mention recognition. However 
the MRTU o f 1971 provides for voluntary recognition o f a specific trade 
union as the sole bargaining agent (Bhardwaj 1996: 268). However, because 
the method o f determining the representative bargaining agents, such as 
through secret ballot, is not established, the selection o f the sole bargaining 
agent has often been contested.
The BIR Act of 1946 preceded the IDA by one year, and applies to textile, 
sugar, transportation industries, cooperative banks and the Bombay Electric 
Supply and Transportation (BEST). The BIR Act imposes an industry-wide 
bargaining in these industrial sectors with the ‘representative’ union 
(Bhattacherjee 1999: 20) and requires that the dispute be placed for arbitration 
whenever conciliation fails. Under the BIR Act, the representative union is
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defined as the registered union with at least 25 percent membership in an 
industry in a local area. However, once again, the majority union can be 
determined on the basis o f membership dues, rather than through election by 
secret ballot. O n the one hand, this forced the reluctant management to deal 
with workers through arbitration binding on both parties, and attempts to 
eliminate inter-union rivalry (Ramaswamy 2000: 50), which were important to 
stem the industrial unrest in the period around Independence. However, the 
combination o f the BIR and MRTU Acts also means that, “by providing for a 
single recognised union, the BIR Act saddled the workers with an 
organisation and leadership they could not rid themselves of, once they 
realised it was not working in their interests” (Krishnan 2000: 11). In the 
textile industry in Mumbai, the Congress-affiliated Indian National Trade 
Union Congress (INTUC) union, called the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh 
(RMMS), has been recognised as the sole bargaining agent o f workers. Many 
observers including Morris (1955) have questioned the legitimacy o f the 
RMMS as the dominant union in the industry, given that the status was 
established without an election to ascertain workers support. This has been 
one o f the sources o f many disputes, including the Mumbai textile stfike o f 
1982-83, in which the leader o f the ‘independent’ trade union movement 
Datta Samat presented a charter o f demands which included derecongition o f 
the RMMS.
Finally the PULP Act o f 1971 provides for preventing unfair labour practices, 
including the right o f the officers o f the unrecognised union or any member 
to meet and discuss with the employer their grievance or to go to the Labour 
Court, and in this sense it counter-balances the MRTU Act. However, under 
the MRTU and PULP Acts, a settlement signed with the ‘representative’ 
union will bind all workmen (Bhardwaj 1996: 269).
It is difficult to make a general comparison o f these Maharashtra-specific laws 
in relation to the central Acts to classify whether they are ‘pro-worker’ or
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‘pro-employer’. Venkata Ratnam (1996: 65-6) argues that “BIR Act is 
generally hated by unions and MRTU & PULP Act is equally disliked by the 
employers”. Note that the BIR Act which imposes industry-wise settlement 
and dispute resolution through arbitration applies to sectors related to vital 
public services or industries such as textiles that we categorised as ‘traditional’ 
in Chapter 4. In contrast, in the majority of the industrial sectors, “the state 
has a tradition o f relative non-intervention” in Maharashtra (Ramaswamy 
1988: 214). However, this has not necessarily meant a harmonious bi-partite 
collective bargaining exists in the ‘m odem ’ sector in Maharashtra, as indicated 
by the industrial relations which have increasingly taken a legal and 
bureaucratic form.
T a b l e  5-4 T h e  n u m b e r  o f  l a b o u r  c o u r t s  (LC s) a n d
IN D U S T R I A L  T R I B U N A L S  (ITS), A N D  T H E  N U M B E R  O F
I n d u s t r i a l  D i s p u t e s  P e n d i n g  w i t h  L C s /  I T S  i n  
M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
Total number of labour Total number o f industrial
N am e of courts and industrial disputes pending during
State tribunals 1989
Maharashtra 68 9 1 , 9 2 4
West Bengal 11 3 ,  6 0 0
India total 3 2 3 3 3 8 , 0 4 7
Source: Venkata Ratman (1996: pp.114-5)
Table 5-4 shows the number o f labour courts and industrial tribunals in 
Maharashtra and West Bengal, together with the number o f industrial 
disputes pending before them. We can see that Maharashtra has set up the 
highest number of labour courts and industrial tribunals, and also has the 
second highest number o f disputes pending before labour courts and 
industrial tribunals in India after its neighbouring state, Gujarat. Bharadwaj 
(1996: 270-1) argues that this is because “the courts tend to accept the 
litigant’s plea for adjournment on the flimsiest o f grounds” and reports that 
“9 out o f 10 cases” get adjournment on some pretext or the other. W hat 
emerges from this is an industrial relations scenario in which labour-
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management disputes are increasingly setded through the courts rather than 
by collective bargaining.
One o f the reasons for this legal form of industrial relations in Maharashtra is 
that the “culture of bilateralism” (Hensman and Banaji 2001: 4) that 
characterised the collective bargaining in the Mumbai ‘m odem ’ sector has 
always been a contested terrain, and much o f this contestation took place in 
the labour courts and industrial tribunals. As we have seen, collective 
bargaining in the Mumbai m odem  sector is bipartite in nature, but from the 
very early period there have been attempts by employers to resist this “culture 
o f bilateralism” {op tit.: 4). In the 1950s and early 60s when employers often 
resisted bi-partite bargaining, this culture of collective bargaining had to be 
forced by unions through “the machinery o f litigation” . After the 1970s, when 
it became common for the management to submit demands for negotiation, 
“litigation was now used by employers to codify and lend legality to sets of 
management objectives which were not easily secured through collective 
bargaining. But insofar as the Courts upheld the union’s stand, companies 
were now increasingly unabashed about flouting Court orders” (p.5). In 
Chapter 6 we shall see how these differing forms o f industrial relations have 
influenced the type o f union leaderships as well as their strategies and 
activities.
To recap, in this section we have interpreted the labour legislation in 
Maharashtra and West Bengal as a \tg 2l f 0rm o f capitalist social relations, and 
therefore as a reflection o f the particular patterns o f accumulation in the two 
regions. Our interpretation therefore contrasts with the methodology implicit 
in Besley and Burgess (2002) as well as in many o f the mainstream models 
that inform the on-going debate on labour law reforms in India, whereby 
labour legislation is assumed to be an ‘exogenous’ variable ‘chosen’ by the 
state or policy makers. Our alternative interpretation suggests that the 
apparent ‘pro-employer’ legislation and the legal form of industrial relations in
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Maharashtra is a reflection o f the ‘liberal’ developmental management, 
underpinned by the broadly ‘pro-developmental’ coalition o f social groups as 
argued in Section 5.2.3, combined with the dynamic but uneven development 
in the region. Similarly, the paradoxical combination of the dejure ‘pro-labour’ 
legislation and the de facto disciplining o f industrial relations in West Bengal 
reflects the fragmented class/ caste structure and the accommodating strategy 
perused by the state to pursue pro-labour policies while maintaining stable 
industrial relations.
5.4 Allocation of state resources in Maharashtra and West Bengal
In this section we consider the role o f budget allocation in influencing the 
bargaining relations between labour and management in Mumbai and 
Kolkata, with a special focus on the redistribution o f State-level planning 
expenditure in Maharashtra and West Bengal. As in our discussion on labour 
legislation in Section 5.3, we interpret the patterns o f planning budget 
allocation as reflections o f different types o f macro political conflicts, which 
in turn reflects how industrial development proceeded in the two regions.
Once again, this is o f course not to suggest that the transfer of state resources 
typically takes a budgetary form, or even that the fiscal transfer is the m ost 
important focus o f redistributional politics in India. In fact, we would expect 
that the majority o f the politically created ‘rents’ are transferred through non- 
or off-budget channels, sometimes even through illegal means (Khan 2005b). 
However evaluating the size and patterns o f these off-budget transfers are 
difficult by their own nature. Moreover, even if the scope o f fiscal transfer is 
limited, we can still expect the resulting budge allocation to reflect the political 
conflicts and the patterns o f accumulations in the region, as long as we make 
the comparison while placing the findings in the wider social context.
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F i g u r e  5 - 5  M a j o r  s e c t o r  w i s e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e
BY C E N T R A L  A N D  S T A T E  G O V E R N M E N T S  IN  T H E  7 T H  PLA N
( 1 9 8 5 - 9 0 )
■
Agriculture 
Rural development 
Special area programs 
Irrigation and flood control 
Energy
Industry and minerals 
Transport 
Communications 
Science and technology 
Social services 
Others
0 20 40 60 80 100
Note: numbers in percentage.
Source: Sato (1994: 113)
From the early period, the issue o f the level o f decision-making has been one 
of the critical aspects o f the discussion on the Indian planning process. It has 
been widely argued that one amongst a list o f  problems with the centralised 
planning in a large and heterogeneous country like India is the issue o f 
regionally uneven development. Chakravarty (1987: 46) points out that the 
inability o f central planning or the market to deliver “balanced regional 
growth” was recognised since the mid-1950s. Where there is a large regional 
diversity in the factor endowments, technology, and social and cultural 
practices, centralised planning has a tendency to polarise regions rather than 
equalise them. This is somewhat paradoxical since one o f the justifications for 
planning in India was precisely because o f the advantage o f scale in a large 
market. Nonetheless, such concerns about regional diversity, combined with a 
long tradition o f regionalism since the colonial period, led to development o f 
a detailed mechanism o f division o f tasks in terms o f planning projects. From 
figure 5-5 we can see that the State-planning budget was generally important 
in areas like special area programs and irrigation, whereas in communication, 
science and technology much of the planning budget was carried out by the
Expenditure 
by the central 
government
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centre, with further pressure for greater regional autonomy intensifying in 
recent years. Therefore, the State-level budget is increasingly becoming an 
important terrain for redistributional politics in India.
T a b l e  5 - 5  B u d g e t  o u t l a y  o f  s t a t e  p l a n s  i n  M a h a r a s h t r a
a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
Major heads o f development projects West Bengal 9th plan (1997-2002)
West Bengal 10th plan 
(2002-07)
Maharashtra 9th plan Maharashtra 10th plan 
(1997-2002) (2002-07)
I. Agriculture & allied activities 7 1 , 2 1 3 9 1 , 4 6 3 1 8 2 , 8 2 0 4 2 4 , 8 6 2
Ii. Rural development 1 1 0 , 7 7 6 3 7 9 , 7 6 9 3 1 7 , 3 4 0 6 9 1 , 9 7 2
Iii. Special area programmes 2 1 , 6 8 2 1 0 6 , 3 7 9 1 9 , 1 9 0 3 7 , 3 2 2
Iv. Irrigation & flood control 1 4 0 , 3 5 7 1 8 9 , 8 6 6 1 , 0 9 2 , 8 8 0 1 ,  5 2 5 ,  5 0 1
V. Energy 5 6 3 , 6 8 8 7 8 5 , 5 5 0 5 5 9 , 6 9 0 1 , 0 1 6 , 3 5 1
Vi. Industry & minerals 1 3 2 , 6 3 0 1 5 0 , 9 8 4 9 0 , 2 6 0 7 1 , 6 5 6
Vii. Transport 1 0 6 , 4 3 2 2 7 9 , 9 1 7 3 4 0 , 2 5 0 5 2 1 , 7 2 1
Viii. Communications 0 0 0 0
Ix. Science, technology & environment 5 ,  8 9 6 1 5 , 5 1 9 1 ,  3 2 0 5 , 5 2 5
X. General economic services 2 0 , 5 7 0 2 5 , 8 4 7 1 0 0 , 1 1 0 2 8 4 , 9 5 1
Xi. Social services 4 7 9 , 8 2 7 7 8 6 , 7 8 0 8 7 3 , 3 7 0 1 , 9 2 3 , 3 2 1
Xii. General services 3 6 , 9 3 1 5 2 , 0 2 6 3 0 , 9 5 0 1 6 0 , 0 1 8
Other programmes NAP NAP 6 1 , 8 2 0 NAP
Grand total 1 , 6 9 0 , 0 0 0 2 , 8 6 4 , 1 0 0 3 , 6 7 0 , 0 0 0 6 , 6 6 3 , 2 0 0
Note: Figures for the 9th plan are approved outlay, while the figures for the 10th 
plan are projected outlay. Units in Rs. Lakh. NAP = N ot applicable.
Source: Planning Commission, Government o f  India.
In this section we shall focus on the State-level budget and its allocation in the 
9th (1997-2002) and 10th (2002-2007) 5 years plan. We can observe from 
table 5 -5  that the total budget o f the 5 year plans in Maharashtra is higher 
than in West Bengal; Maharashtra’s budget was about 70 percent higher in the 
9th plan and 82 percent higher in the 10th plan. This probably reflects the fact 
that Maharashtra is the state that has the capacity to finance projects with 
their own tax revenues whereas West Bengal depends on central assistance 
and suffers from shortfalls o f resources (Bagchi and Sen 1992).
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F i g u r e  5-6. P e r c e n t a g e  o u t l a y  o f  s t a t e  p l a n s  i n  
M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
Maharashtra 9th plan 
(1997-2002)
Maharashtra 10th 
plan (2002-07)
West Bengal 9th plan
(1997-2002)
West Bengal 10th 
plan (2002-07)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
N otes and source: same as table 5-5
Let us next consider the proportional allocation of planning budget in the two 
States. From figure 5-6, several differences between Maharashtra and West 
Bengal can be found in terms of the proportion of planning budget allocation. 
First, the budget allocated to irrigation and flood control is proportionally 
higher in Maharashtra than in West Bengal. While in West Bengal irrigation 
and flood control only accounts for 8.3 percent of the budget in the 9th plan 
and 6.6 percent in the 10th plan, in Maharashtra it comprises 29.78 percent in 
the budget of the 9th planning and 22.89 percent m the 10th planning. The 
much higher number of major irrigation projects in Maharashtra further 
confirms this difference. Under the tenth five-year plan, there are 47 projects 
currendy ongoing in Maharashtra, while only 4 are in progress in West Bengal. 
This, of course, pardy reflects die geographical differences of the two states, 
with Maharashtra located in the arid or semi-arid Deccan plateau in which the 
large part of the region receives less than 600 mm of annual rainfall, 
compared to West Bengal in the Sunderban delta with higher annual rainfall 
often exceeding 1500 mm (Singh 2005). Flowever we should also note the 
fact that stakeholders of major irrigation and water resource projects are not
E l  AGRICULTURE & ALLIED ACTIVITIES
■  II RURAL DEVELOPMENT
□  IV. IRRIGATION & FLOOD CONTROL
■  V. ENERGY
□  VI. INDUSTRY & MINERALS
□  XI. SOCIAL SERVICES
□  OTHER PROGRAMMES (III + VII + VIII + IX + X + XII + XIII)
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necessarily people in the agricultural sector or the rural area. Benefits o f major 
water projects include generating power, providing drinking water and 
sanitation to the urban area, together with irrigation, command area 
development, flood control and watershed programmes. In fact many o f the 
benefited areas by major water projects are urban industrial areas such as 
Bombay, Pune, and Thane districts in Maharashtra, Calcutta and Howrah 
districts in West Bengal. The higher proportion o f resources allocated to 
irrigation and flood control projects reflects the fact that there is a strong 
demand to establish urban infrastructure as well as providing the basis for 
productive m odern agriculture in Maharashtra.
F i g u r e  5 - 7  P e r  c a p i t a l  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  i n  
M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
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Source: Planning Commission, Government o f India (2001) 10th Five Year Flans, Volume III, 
Chapter 3, p. 87, Annexure 3.10.
Second, if we focus on the budget allocated to energy related projects, while 
in West Bengal this made up for 33.35 percent in the 9th plan and 27.43 
percent in the 10th plan, in Maharashtra it only represented 15.25 per cent in 
the 9th plan and 15.25 per cent in the 10th plan. O f course, since the total 
budget o f the planning outlay is much higher in Maharashtra than in West 
Bengal, this does not necessarily mean that West Bengal government spends
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more on energy than in Maharashtra. In fact, from table 5-5, we can see that 
in fact the budget for energy in the 9th plan were almost the same in the two 
States, and in the 10th plan Maharashtra is planning to spend more on energy 
related projects than West Bengal. The greater emphasis on irrigation and 
energy investments in Maharashtra reflects the higher energy consumption in 
the State. From figure 5-7 we may see that W est Bengal’s per capita energy 
consumption level is lower and grew slower than the all India average, 
whereas in Maharashtra it grew much faster throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
It is o f course difficult to distinguish to what extent this difference in the 
pattern of State budget allocation to infrastructure projects is due to resource 
endowments in the two regions and to what extent it can be attributed to 
state policies, which in turn reflects difference in accumulating class dynamics 
in redistributional politics. W hat is important for our purpose is that the 
allocation o f public resource to infrastructure projects in Maharashtra can be 
interpreted as ‘outside-firm rents’ o f a particular type that can be captured by 
accumulating classes both in the rural area, which increasingly have shifted 
their focus to energy-intensive agricultural activities such as floriculture, 
horticulture, viticulture, food processing for the export market and related 
service activities, as well as by accumulating interests in urban unorganised 
sector, which has increasingly developed into “a new constituency” for the 
Congress since the 1980s (Jadhav 2006: 5160). This is in contrast to the type 
o f ‘outside-firm rents’ in West Bengal that involve direct state involvement 
and subsidies, as we discuss below.
Third, development policies and projects related to industry and mineral 
sectors occupy a higher proportion o f the planning budget in West Bengal 
than in Maharashtra. In West Bengal, industry and mineral development 
projects formed 7.85 percent in the 9th 5 years plan and 5.27 percent in the 
10th plan. In Maharashtra, it covered only 2.46 percent in the 9th plan and 
1.08 in the 10th plan. From  table 5-5 we may observe that, not only the
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proportion o f the budget allocated to the industrial sector was higher in West 
Bengal, but the absolute amount o f the budget was higher in W est Bengal 
than in Maharashtra in both  the 9th and the 1 Oth plans. Further, if we look at 
the composition o f budget within the industry and mineral category, we see 
that there is a difference in the types o f projects funded under the 5 years 
plans in these two states. From table 5-6 we may notice that in Maharashtra 
40 percent of the budget in the 9th plan and 72 percent in the 10th plan were 
set aside for village and small scale industries (VSI), while 59 percent o f the 
planning budgets in the 9th plan and 28 percent in the 10th plan were 
allocated to non-VSI projects. In contrast, about 80 percent o f the 
development budget was invested in non-VSI projects in West Bengal.
T a b l e  5 - 6  T y p e s  o f  p r o j e c t s  i n  i n d u s t r y  a n d  m i n e r a l
S E C T O R S  F U N D E D  BY T H E  5 Y E A R S  P L A N S
Minor heads of 
development projects
West Bengal 
9th plan (1997-2002)
West Bengal 
10th plan (2002-07)
Maharashtra 
9th plan (1997-2002)
Maharashtra 
10th plan (2002-07)
1. Village & Small Industries
2. Industries (Other than VSI)
3. Minerals
2 1 , 3 0 6 . 2 9  
( 1 6 . 0 7  %) 
1 0 9 , 9 7 4 . 6 5  
( 8 2 . 9 2  %) 
1 , 3 4 8 . 6 1  
( 1 . 0 2  %)
2 8 , 3 0 2 . 0 0  
( 1 8 . 7 5  %) 
1 1 9 , 6 1 4 . 0 0  
( 7 9 . 2 2  %) 
3 , 0 6 8 . 0 0  
( 2 . 0 3  %)
3 6 . 2 3 0 . 0 0  
( 4 0 . 1 4  %)
5 2 . 8 3 5 . 0 0  
( 5 8 . 5 4  %)
1 , 1 9 5 . 0 0  
( 1 . 3 2  %)
5 1 . 6 4 6 . 0 0  
( 7 2 . 0 8  %)
2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0  
( 2 7 . 9 3  %)
0 . 0 0  
( 0 . 0 0  %)
TOTAL - (VI. Industry and 1 3 2 , 6 2 9 . 5 5 1 5 0 , 9 8 4 . 0 0 9 0 , 2 6 0 . 0 0 7 1 , 6 5 6 . 0 0
minerals) ( 1 0 0 . 0 0  %) ( 1 0 0 . 0 0  %) ( 1 0 0 . 0 0  %) ( 1 0 0 . 0 0  %)
Notes and source: same as table 5-5
One possible explanation for this greater share o f resource allocation to the 
non-VSI projects in W est Bengal may come from its high number o f public 
sector enterprises. From  table 5-7, we see that West Bengal has 82 State level 
public enterprises (SLPEs), which is the second highest number o f SLPEs 
after Kerala. These 82 SLPEs are making a net accumulated loss of Rs. 5,068 
crore, which is the highest figure amongst Indian States and an overwhelming 
71.951 percent o f SLPEs in W est Bengal are loss-making SLPEs, which is 
also the highest. Despite this, only 6 SLPEs (7.32%) are non-working. This is 
in clear contrast with the public sector enterprises in Maharashtra.
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Maharashtra also has a high number o f SLPEs attracting the third highest 
amount o f total investment after Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. Amongst these 
SLPEs in Maharashtra, 66.15 percent are categorised as loss making; this rate 
is lower than West Bengal but still higher than the all India average (40.36%). 
However, what makes Maharashtra different from  W est Bengal is the 
relatively high number o f non-working SLPEs; 26.15 percent o f the SLPEs 
are non-working, which is higher than the all India average (19.88%).
T a b l e  5 - 7  S t a t e  L e v e l  P u b l i c  E n t e r p r i s e s  ( S L P E s ) i n  
M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
State Approx. No. of SLPEs
Estim ated 
total 
investment in 
SLPEs 
(Rs. crore)
N et. , Approx. no. accum ulated. ofloss-
„  . m aking SLPEs (Rs. crore) ^
Approximate 
no. o f non­
working 
SLPEs
All India 8 3 5 1 6 7 , 7 1 8 2 0 , 6 9 1 3 3 7 1 6 6
Kerala 1 0 9 9 , 8 0 5 1 , 2 8 0 52 13
West Bengal 82 1 8 , 2 4 1 5 , 0 6 8 59 6
Karnataka 7 6 1 9 , 2 9 5 8 1 1 37 13
Orissa 68 9 , 7 9 6 1 ,  1 8 0 18 34
Maharashtra 65 1 9 , 1 8 6 NAV 4 3 17
Tamil Nadu 59 6 , 1 9 2 NAV NAV 12
Gujarat 54 2 3 , 4 3 8 9 6 5 NAV NAV
Punjab 53 1 2 , 4 2 5 84 7 25 2 3
Uttar Pradesh 45 2 4 , 7 5 3 3 ,  11 0 NAV NAV
Assam 42 3 , 6 4 9 2 ,  7 9 2 28 10
Madhya Pradesh 2 6 7 ,  9 2 3 NAV 8 15
Himachal Pradesh 21 3 , 1 4 3 3 6 9 12 2
Goa 12 4 , 8 6 9 7 3 0 NAV NAV
Note: N A V  =  N ot Available.
Source: Planning Commission, Government o f  India (2001) 10 th Five Year Plans, 
Volume II, Chapter 7, p.706, Table 7.1.15.
This can of course be because the loss making establishments in Maharashtra 
are more severely unprofitable than in W est Bengal, which we cannot verify 
here since we do not have information on the loss figures o f Maharashtra’s 
SLPEs. However, it appears that the loss making establishments in West 
Bengal face less likelihood o f terminating operations, either voluntarily or by 
facing less pressure to do so compared to those in Maharashtra. The 
observation here is consistent with our discussion in Section 5.2.3 that the
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public sector enterprises in West Bengal are set up with a strategy to intervene 
in and manage direcdy productive activities, which was contrasted with the 
development management in Maharashtra whereby public investments are 
used as a means to supply infrastructure and accelerate the pace o f economic 
development by assisting and guiding private sector enterprises.
T a b l e  5 - 8  S o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  p r o j e c t s  i n  s t a t e  p l a n n i n g
West Bengal 
9th plan 
(1997-2002)
West Bengal 
10th plan 
(2002-07)
Maharashtra 
9th plan 
(1997-2002)
Maharashtra 
10th PLAN  
(2002-07)
1. General Education
5 6 1 6 9 . 6 8  
( 1 1 . 7 1 %)
7 9 7 8 9  
( 1 0 . 1 4 %)
1 8 3 8 1 1
( 2 1 . 0 5 %)
2 5 3 8 1 1
( 1 3 . 2 0 %)
2. Technical Education
1 7 1 2 4 . 8 4  
( 3 . 5 7 %)
1 0 6 5 2
( 1 . 3 5 %)
2 6 4 3 2
( 3 . 0 3 %)
4 3 8 3 7
( 2 . 2 8 %)
3. Sports & Youth Services
4 3 5 1 . 1 2  
( 0 . 9 1 %)
1 0 1 0 6
( 1 . 2 8 %)
8 1 3 3  
( 0 . 9 3 %)
5 7 0 0 0
( 2 . 9 6 %)
4. Art & Culture
2 6 3 0 . 9 8  
( 0 . 5 5 %)
3 3 1 6  
( 0 . 4 2 %)
4 2 7 8
( 0 . 4 9 %)
7 1 5 7
( 0 . 3 7 %)
Sub-Total (Education)
8 0 2 7 6 . 6 2  
( 1 6 . 7 3 %)
1 0 3 8 6 3
( 1 3 . 2 0 %)
2 2 2 6 5 4
( 2 5 . 4 9 %)
3 6 1 8 0 5
( 1 8 . 8 1 %)
5. Medical & Public Health
9 7 8 6 3 . 9 0  
( 2 0 . 4 0 %)
1 0 3 6 1 8  
( 1 3 . 1 7 %)
9 1 8 2 3
( 1 0 . 5 1 %)
1 1 0 6 6 6
( 5 . 7 5 %)
6. Water Supply & Sanitation
4 3 5 4 4 . 8 3  
( 9 . 0 8 %)
7 3 3 1 7  
( 9 . 3 2 %)
2 9 3 5 7 8  
( 3 3 . 6 1 %)
7 7 6 2 7 6
( 4 0 . 3 6 %)
7. Housing (incl. Police Housing)
2 2 6 8 8 . 1 0  
( 4 . 7 3 %)
1 3 7 2 3
( 1 . 7 4 %)
2 1 3 5 5
( 2 . 4 5 %)
9 6 2 1 4
( 5 . 0 0 %)
8. Urban Development (incl. State 
Capital Projects & slum Area 
Development)
1 8 0 8 0 7 . 7 4
( 3 7 . 6 8 %)
3 4 8 1 0 2  
(44  . 24%)
8 4 0 0 3  
( 9 . 6 2 %)
3 0 9 3 3 6
( 1 6 . 0 8 %)
9. Information & Publicity
1 3 0 5 . 8 3  
( 0 . 2 7 %)
2 1 4 8
( 0 . 2 7 %)
5 4 2
( 0 . 0 6 %)
4 6 0
( 0 . 0 2 %)
10. Welfare o f SCs, STs & OBCs
1 7 2 3 2 . 6 1  
( 3 . 5 9 %)
4 1 0 3 4
( 5 . 2 2 %)
1 1 0 1 2 7  
( 1 2 . 6 1 %)
1 5 8 9 1 1
( 8 . 2 6 %)
11. Labour & Employment
1 2 5 8 0 . 3 4
( 2 . 6 2 %)
5 4 4 4  
( 0 . 6 9 %)
2 5 1 4 2
( 2 . 8 8 %)
5 7 9 5 6
( 3 . 0 1 %)
12. Social Security & Soda! 7 9 5 4 . 7 1 4 6 7 7 6 6 2 5 4 1 2 7 9 0
Welfare ( 1 . 6 6 %) ( 5 . 9 5 %) ( 0 . 7 2 %) ( 0 . 6 7 %)
13. Nutrition
7 2 9 1 . 3 2
( 1 . 5 2 %)
3 1 4 2 9  
( 4 . 0 0 %)
1 7 8 9 2
( 2 . 0 5 %)
3 4 7 0 7
( 1 . 8 1 %)
14. Other Sodal Services.
8 2 8 0 . 7 7
( 1 . 7 3 %)
1 7 3 2 6
( 2 . 2 0 %) ( 0 . 0 0 %)
4 2 0 0
( 0 . 2 2 %)
TOTAL - (XI. Soda! services)
4 7 9 8 2 6 . 7 7
( 1 0 0 . 0 0 % )
7 8 6 7 8 0  
( 1 0 0 . 0 0 % )
8 7 3 3 7 0
( 1 0 0 . 0 0 % )
1 9 2 3 3 2 1
( 1 0 0 . 0 0 % )
Notes and source: same as table 5-5.
331
Fourth, if we compare the proportion o f the planning budget that is allocated 
to social services, the proportion is about 27-8 percent in both Maharashtra 
and West Bengal. I f  we compare the proportion o f the budget within the 
category o f social services (table 5-8), we find that budget allocated to 
education is constantly higher in Maharashtra than in West Bengal. We also 
find that the budget allocated to water and sanitation, and Welfare o f 
Scehdule Castes (SCs), Schedule Tribes (STs) and the Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) is systematically higher in Maharashtra. The systematically higher 
spending on water supply and sanitation once again reflects the focus on 
infrastructure provision, while the latter focus on SCs, STs and OBSc reminds 
us of the predominantly communal-based redistributional politics in 
Maharashtra. In contrast, West Bengal has a significantly higher budget 
allocation to projects related to urban development, which includes State 
capital projects and slum area development. The latter is particularly 
important in relation to the accommodation o f lower and middle income 
groups, which have been part o f the political coalition that ensured the 
dominance o f the Left Front regime until very recendy. However, 
interestingly, we do not find a clear difference in the budget allocated to 
labour and employment category. It is possible that this reflects Malhck’s 
(1993) argument that the economic policies o f CPI(M) government was 
limited in delivering improvements in the standard o f living o f the lower 
classes because o f the ‘elitist’ nature o f its political base, despite the 
revolutionary rhetoric, although this requires further discussion on this area, 
which is beyond the scope o f this thesis.
These observations extracted from the comparison o f the State planning 
budget again reinforce our hypotheses on the contrasting patterns o f 
redistributional politics and the process o f industrial development in the two 
regions. The greater emphasis placed on infrastructure building, especially in 
irrigation, provision o f energy and water, and education in Maharashtra 
reflects the neo-liberal developmental policy pursued in the region as a
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backdrop to the relatively stable and broadly ‘pro-developmental’12 coalition 
based on the Maratha-Kunbi caste cluster. In contrast, the much more direct 
interventionist orientation with reliance on State level public enterprises 
(SLPEs) can be understood in terms o f the political coalition between the 
dominant Bhadralok castes and the m iddle/ lower income groups that enabled 
the dominance o f the CPI(M) since the mid-1970s, but also reflects the lack 
of a stable coalition o f ‘elite clusters’ o f social groups.
Having established the macro political economic contexts in which labour- 
management bargaining takes place over the last three sections, we shall now 
analyse the implications on how it lead to the emergence o f differential types 
o f LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata.
5.5 ‘Evolution and involution* revisted: LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata 
in a historical perspective
So far in this chapter, we have analysed the macro political economy of 
Maharashtra and West Bengal, with the aim o f characterising the 
opportunities, incentives, and constraints o f bargaining agents to organise 
LMIs differently in the two regions. Mumbai (Bombay) and Kolkata 
(Calcutta) are two o f the oldest industrial centres o f India, as we saw in 
Section 5.2, and are also the birthplace o f the organised labour movement in 
Indian industries. In the early Independence period, both cities experienced 
militant labour unionism galvanised by the anti-colonial struggle, but which 
‘evolved’ into differential types o f LMIs. While Kolkata saw the establishment 
o f patron-client networks between the communist state government and its 
labour wing, the LMIs in Mumbai followed differential paths, ranging from 
industrial relations controlled by the state-business nexus, to the “m ost 
evolved Indian version o f business trade unionism” (Ramaswamy 1988: 17).
12 This refers to the economic policies that facilitate accumulating activities but does not imply that the 
‘elite’ interest was necessarily ‘developmental’ in nature, as discussed in Section 5.2.3.
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This section aims to contrast the historical development o f the labour 
movement in the two cities.
Despite the contemporary perception of professional company-based 
unionism, in the pre-Independence period, communist labour leaders 
dominated the labour movement in Bombay. The support to the communist 
leaders, for example illuminated by the general strike o f 1928, was partly a 
response to the ambivalent attitude o f the Congress party to the labour 
movement. For example, Gandhi declared in 1921 “we seek not to destroy 
capital or capitalists but to regulate the relations between capital and labour. 
We want to harness capital to our side” (cited in R. Chandavarkar 1994: 413). 
However once the communist leaders discredited themselves by supporting 
the British during the Quit India campaign, which resulted in the split 
between communist All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) and 
nationalist Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), and the 
Congress gained power after Independence, the influence o f the red unionism 
gradually declined. In 1960 attempts to revive the Marxist movement saw the 
rise o f the Centre o f Indian Trade Unions (CITU) which failed to establish 
itself as the dominant force in Mumbai’s labour scene.
As in the rest o f India, the ruling Congress government adopted a policy o f 
patronage to the labour unions through the Congress affiliated INTUC. As 
we have seen in Section 5.3.3, in industries such as Mumbai textile industry 
the space for state-patronage strategy was ‘legally’ created by the Bombay 
Industrial Relations (BIR) Act o f 1946, which allows for a single union with 
more than 25 percent o f the total workforce to be selected as the 
representative union for the entire industry. However because the employer 
can unilaterally determine the majority union on the basis o f membership 
dues, without an election by secret ballot, the system was open to 
manipulation (Bhattacherjee 1999: 6). The Congress government and business 
leaders in some industries exploited this to select INTUC unions as the
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‘representative’ union, including in the cotton textile industry, where 
communist unions traditionally dominated. During the independence struggle, 
the Indian National Congress, seeking to accommodate textile mill workers, 
set up the Mill Mazdoor Sanbha, which was transformed into the Rashtriya 
Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS) in 1945, and was approved as the representative 
union under the BIR A ct
Opposition o f the RMMS claims that there is a frequent corruption between 
the mill management and the RMMS union activists. For example, it is often 
thought that the RMMS receive payment for consenting to VRS schemes and 
the closures o f departments and mills. Also the RMMS has alleged links to 
mafias and gangs that are used to convince reluctant workers to support such 
agreements (Pinto and Fernandes 1996). Other unions active in the industry 
have consistently contested the representative status o f the RMMS on various 
occasions. In 1960, the CPI-affiliated Gimi Kamgar Union forced the 
registrar to admit that the RMMS membership has declined. Yet, the 
industrial court ruled in favour o f the RMMS on the grounds that the 
appointment o f the Gimi Kamgar Union’s general secretary S. A. Dange’s 
appointment was not in accordance with the union’s constitution. As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, in 1981 an independent trade union activist Dr. 
Datta Samant formed the Mumbai/Maharashtra Gim i Kamgar Union 
(MGKU) demanding wage increases and for badli (casual) workers to be made 
permanent, and calling an indefinite strike. This led to the 1982-3 Bombay 
textile strike supported by a loose coalition o f various non-Congress unions. 
A t the height o f its popularity, the M GKU filed an application for recognition 
submitting a petition to show that the RMMS’s membership had fallen below 
the 25 per cent criteria. Again the court dismissed the challenge ruling that the 
“ [s]udden changes o f fortunes o f membership may not be allowed to disturb 
the status quo” (quoted in Pinto and Fernandes 1996). It is also important to 
note the role the Congress government played in preventing mill owners from
335
reaching a settlement with Samant “with the sole intention o f saving from 
collapse the INTUC, which was under challenge” (Ramaswamy 1988: 215).
By the 1980s the Shiv Sena affiliated Gimi Kamgar Sena (GKS) emerged and 
gained popularity through its ability to deliver economic and social benefits 
(Shaikh 2005). For example, Shiv Sena is famed for its ‘sons-of-the-soil’ 
campaign, demanding preferential treatment for Marathi-speakers, which 
appealed to the resentment shared by the local Maharashtrans towards 
migrants and Muslim communities. Also, Shiv Sena is known to be successful 
in offering ranges o f social services, including settling family matters, securing 
water and electricity connections, and helping individuals with job searches 
(Gupta 1982). From the beginning Shiv Sena has taken a pro-management 
and pro-govemment stand, which enabled them to utilise the patronage they 
receive from the ruling parties to deliver public goods, but at the same time 
this has implied that the union does not directly oppose the restructuring 
policies. The ineffectiveness o f the ‘traditional’ party-based unionism led to 
the emergence of new types o f ‘independent’ unions such as the Gimi 
Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS) union, which was formed in 1996 as an 
organisation to represent workers o f closed mills. The GKSS’s main activities 
include the take-over o f closed mills by workers’ co-operative, various 
protests including hunger strikes and marches demanding the revival o f mills, 
and the provision o f legal support to workers.
If  the ‘independent’ unionism o f the M GKU or the GKSS in textile industry 
have ultimately been unable to m ount a credible threat to the ‘traditional’ 
Congress-RMMS nexus, the more characteristic face o f the labour movement 
in Mumbai has been the employees’ unionism13, which goes back to the early
13 The term employee’s unionism is used in confusingly various meanings, but in this thesis we follow  
Hensman and Banaji (2001) to  indicate trade unions with “the words ‘Em ployees’ U nion’ or 
‘Workers’ U nion’ or ‘Staff and Workers Union’ in their name”. In this thesis we distinguish between 
employees’ unionism and independent unionism, which implies independence from political parties. 
W e also make distinction between these two and internal unionism, which refers to unions without 
outsiders as their President/ leader(s). In reality there are a large overlap between these three 
categories (Ramaswamy 1988: 17), but there are by no means identical.
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1940s, and has constantly increased until the 1960s or early 70s. Employees’ 
unions are almost exclusively based on large firms, many of which are in 
multinational companies. In the early stages, m ost o f the leadership came 
from within the company staff, whereas the 1960s saw some employees’ 
unions inviting external leaderships. Until this period, employees’ unions in 
Mumbai had a relatively strong bargaining power to force employers to accept 
employees’ unions and to hold bipartite collective bargaining with them, 
which sometimes required legal interventions, as we saw in Section 5.3.3.
This employer’s attitude toward employees’ unions started to change in the 
1970s. Management started to seek the ability to alter work organisations 
without union restriction. Lockouts came to be commonly used as 
management’s bargaining tactics. Another tactic that was employed, especially 
in the 1980s onwards, was to divide employee between contract and 
permanent workers, or between staff and workers. An example o f this is 
found in Philips, where the strong enterprise-based Philips Federation was 
legally dismembered in 1986, and then the management attempted to split the 
Philips Workers Unions by setting up a staff union called the Peico 
Employees’ Union. These management offensives in Philips occurred in 
connection to changes in senior management who explicitly takes an anti­
union attitude, which was another characteristic feature o f labour- 
management relations in Mumbai in this period. In response to these changes 
in the industrial relations environment, some employees’ unions began to 
adopt a militant direct action based strategies, from the late 1970s to the 80s. 
For example, in Hindustan Lever young workers took control o f the union 
and created a unionism o f “direct action” in the early eighties with the modus 
operandi o f  resorting “to illegal strike, category-wise, in different sections o f the 
establishment on different days and thereby paralyse the functioning o f 
(other) sections/departments” (quoted in Hensman and Banaji 2001: 5-6).
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T a b l e  5 - 9  N u m b e r  o f  u n i t s  a n d  m a n - d a y s  i n v o l v e d  i n
L A B O U R  D I S P U T E S  I N  M A H A R A S H T R A
Strikes
xt i r Man-days Number o f  , , involved 
units .. .... .(in millions)
Lockouts
i r Man-days Number o f  . , 
involved 
units .. .... .
(m millions)
Labour disputes (total)
x t i  r Man-days Number o f  • , , involved 
units .. .... .(in millions)
1961 2 7 4 0 .  5 7 6
1966 7 8 1 3 .  5 4 2
1971 69 0 2 . 0 5 3
1976 3 3 7 0 . 4 2 1
1981 6 3 6 9 . 5 0 5
1986 3 0 0 5 . 2 9 8
1988 1 6 3 1 . 8 0 7 53 4 . 6 7 6 2 1 6 6 . 4 8 3
1989 1 5 3 1 . 1 6 9 40 2 . 5 0 1 1 9 3 3 .  6 7 0
1990 1 4 6 1 .  6 8 0 47 2 . 3 2 8 1 9 3 4 . 0 0 8
1991 16 0 1 . 4 3 8 57 3 . 2 1 1 2 1 7 4 .  6 4 9
1992 144 0 .  9 7 6 64 3 . 7 5 7 2 0 8 4 . 7 3 3
1993 15 1 1 . 5 2 3 43 2 . 4 3 5 194 3 .  9 5 8
1994 1 0 9 1 . 5 2 9 47 2 . 1 6 3 1 5 6 3 .  69 2
1995 20 0 . 1 7 3 5 0 . 4 9 8 25 0 .  6 7 1
Source: Bharadwaj (1996: 284-286)
This historical experience o f employees’ unionism is reflected in the overall 
statistics o f labour disputes in Maharashtra. From  Table 5-9, we observe that 
the number o f units involved in labour disputes saw its peak between the late 
1960s and early 70s, and after a temporary decline around the period o f the 
Emergency (1975-77), it rose again in the early 1980s. After the 1980s there is 
a continuous declining trend in the number o f labour disputes. However, if 
we look at the composition o f labour disputes, we see that while the number 
o f units involved in strikes has declined, there has not been a clear declining 
trend o f the number o f lockouts.
At this point, we should remind ourselves that employees’ unions are but only 
a small fraction within the Mumbai labour scene, in terms o f their num ber or 
their membership. Also we should point out that the bilateral or legal route 
for dispute resolution is not always achieved, despite the time and effort 
union leaders spend in courts and tribunals, as we discussed in Section 5.3.3. 
Nevertheless, it is important to explain the employees’ unionism in large
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‘m odem ’ companies in Mumbai, not least because o f their ability to influence 
the overall pattern o f labour-management relations in the region14 much more 
than the industry-wise or national-level general union federations.
A possible argument is that the reason employees’ unionism may have been 
popular in Mumbai is because the employers preferred them. It is true that at 
the early stage, when communist trade unionism was a major threat, many 
large companies did encourage employees’ unionism because o f their 
‘independence’ from political rivalry and ‘external’ influences. However, if  we 
look at the historical experience o f employees’ unionism, the rank-and-file 
control over union leadership often led to stronger bargaining power and at 
times militant union strategies, which was mirrored by company management 
employing various tactics to break the bargaining power o f employees’ 
unionism, especially since the 1970s.
Hensman and Banaji (2001: 2) take the view that employees’ unionism 
flourished because o f “the level o f education and self-confidence o f 
employees, especially white-collar groups within those companies” . This again 
is an important factor. For example, the new generation o f young educated 
labour leaders, such as Bennett D ’Costa o f Hindustan Lever Employees 
Federation and Thankappan o f Kamani Tube Union, had a major influence in 
driving the upsurge o f labour militancy in the 1980s onwards. But it can only 
provide part o f the explanation as to why employees’ unionism was successful 
in Mumbai and not in other parts o f the country. After all, it is not very 
uncommon to have educated potentially inspiring labour leaders in places like
14 This was characteristically observed in the bandh (general strike) o f  2001. For the first time in decades, 
major central trade unions ranging from the CPI(M)-backed CITU, the CPI-supported AITUC, the 
pro-Congress INTUC, up to the RSS-backed BMS and Shiv Sena unions, all dropped their ideological 
differences and political rivalry to protest against the economic policies o f  the government. This bandh 
was called by the Joint Action Committee o f  Trade Unions (JACTU), a loose coalition o f  independent 
unions, left-wing labour leaders, and various other social activists. The large mobilisation observed in 
this bandha was possible because the strike was organised around econom ic concerns by labour leaders 
who have battled fiercely over these demands. It is in this sense that we argue that the labour- 
management bargaining relations in Bombay is characterised by business unionism, despite its limited 
coverage.
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Kolkata, but strong bi-partite bargaining led by rank-and-file workers is still 
exceptional, if not unique, in other parts o f India.
The argument we developed in this chapter suggests that, together with 
employer’s attitudes and workers’ education, we must understand the 
emergence and dominance o f ‘independent’ or employees’ unionism by 
focusing on the wider social and historical context within which labour- 
management bargaining takes place. In particular, we have argued that the 
state’s ‘bureaucratic liberalist’ approach to development management that 
emphasised the state’s role in providing infrastructure and facilitating 
accumulation, rather than to directly intervene and manage productive 
activities, created space for bilateral collective bargaining and allowed 
‘independent’ or employees’ unionism to flourish. In the terminology defined 
in Chapter 2, we can characterise the collective bargaining in Mumbai as being 
predominantly driven by ‘within-firm rents’, that is, surplus generated from 
direct productive activities at the firm-level. However, our point was that this 
was a result o f the emergence o f a relatively stable political coalition o f 
dominant castes and classes at the critical early phase o f development, and not 
a product o f policy ‘choice’ alone.
Let us next turn to labour-management relations in Kolkata. Labour unionism 
in Kolkata cannot be discussed without considering the nexus between the 
Communist Party o f India (Marxist) or CPI(M) and its union federation the 
Centre o f Indian Trade Unions (CITU). The CITU is an explicitly political 
organisation committed to the Marxist-Leninist ideology that views that 
unions must function under the directive and control o f the radical political 
party and only then is it possible to overthrow the capitalist system. Although 
not all o f unionists are party members o f the CPI(M), many of them share the 
Marxist ideology, which is ensured by strategically locating party stewards in 
key offices in unions and through regular programmes o f political education 
o f industrial workers (Ramaswamy 1988: 175).
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Until the mid 1970s, there was litde contradiction between the ideological 
positions of the party and its labour wing. The CITU was committed to 
militant tactics including violence protest, agitation, and assaults on managers 
to force their demands, and this was defended and ideologically supported by 
the CPI (M). However once the CPI (M) was sworn in to power in 1977, this 
harmonious relationship between the party and unions started to change. We 
have already discussed the change in the strategy o f CITU as declared in the 
1980 State-level conference, in which strikes were deemed not to be ‘essential’ 
and instead to settle for modest wage gains but enhance employment. In 
order to diffuse labour disputes, “the government has played a major role in 
practically every important settlement since the late seventies” (Ramaswamy 
1988: 191).
It is perhaps not surprising that some managers are satisfied with this nexus 
between the CPI(M) and the CITU, and prefer to deal with the CITU because 
they have the ability to impose settlements and control workers with 
minimum wage gains. This has to be understood within the particular context 
in which CPI(M) came to power. After the death o f B. C. Roy and the 
disintegration o f the Congress, West Bengal saw the emergence of the ultra 
left Naxalite movement. Labour relations were extremely violent to the extent 
that “the assault and murder o f managers became an every day occurrence”. 
In the early 1970s, some employers tried to swing the labour movement 
towards the Congress by providing higher wages and benefits in settlements 
with the INTUC, which did have an effect o f eliminating radicalism. But the 
CPI(M)-CITU solution was a much better alternative for the employers not 
only to the extreme militancy o f Naxalism but also to the bounty driven 
INTUC.
Having said that, the domination o f the CITU is also considered problematic 
by many employers in the sense that, with everyday interventions into daily 
shop floor operations by unions and close monitoring by the state,
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management has much less control over the work organisation. Particularly, 
the CITU has consistently resisted introduction o f productivity-linked 
payments. This is understandable considering that the enhancement o f 
employment and the spread o f political support to the union (and the party) 
was the source o f their bargaining power. However for the employers, the 
refusal to introduce incentive schemes and other work reorganisation implies 
inflexibility, and led to the acceleration o f ‘capital-flight’ that already started in 
the 1960s, as discussed in Section 5.2.
T a b l e  5-10  N u m b e r  o f  u n i t s  a n d  m a n - d a y s  i n v o l v e d  i n
L A B O U R  D I S P U T E  I N  W E S T  B E N G A L
Strikes
x t ! r Man-days Number o f  .
involved 
units ,. .... .(in millions)
Lockouts
x t ! r Man-days Number o f . .involved 
units ,  .... .(in millions)
Labour disputes (total)
x t ,  r Man-days Number or . . \  
involved 
units .. .... .(in millions)
1973 2 0 4 2 . 6 1 5 8 3 .4 3 6 2 6 . 0
1974 1 6 3 7 . 3 1 7 3 3 . 1 3 3 6 1 0 . 4
1975 1 1 1 1 0 . 8 1 6 6 2 . 8 2 7 7 1 3 . 6
1976 1 2 9 1 . 0 15 2 7 . 5 2 8 1 8 . 5
1977 2 0 6 1 . 1 1 9 1 7 . 8 3 9 7 8 . 9
1978 172 5 . 1 1 9 9 6 . 9 3 7 1 1 2 . 0
1979 1 4 6 1 5 . 5 14 4 2 . 9 2 9 0 1 8 . 4
1980 78 1 .5 1 3 0 4 . 7 2 0 8 6 .2
1981 43 0 . 6 11 7 9 . 9 1 6 0 1 0 . 5
1982 29 0 . 3 1 1 7 1 5 . 5 1 4 6 1 5 . 8
1983
1984
32 1 . 0 1 3 9 1 5 . 1 1 7 1 1 6 . 1
1985 39 0 .2 1 6 5 1 5 . 1 2 0 4 1 5 . 3
1986 29 0 . 3 1 7 8 1 3 . 3 2 0 7 1 3 .  6
1987 39 1 . 6 1 9 7 2 1 . 5 2 3 6 2 3 . 1
1988 34 3 . 3 2 1 2 2 8 . 5 2 4 6 3 1 . 8
1989 16 0 . 3 2 0 7 2 7 .  6 2 2 3 2 7 .  9
1990 16 0 . 3 1 7 9 2 0 . 7 1 9 5 2 1 . 0
1991 21 0 .1 1 9 2 1 9 . 9 2 1 3 2 0 . 0
1992 2 9 9 . 3 2 1 4 2 0 . 3 2 4 3 2 9 . 6
1993 20 0 .2 18 8 1 9 . 7 2 0 8 1 9 . 9
1994 12 0 . 1 1 2 1 1 2 . 7 1 3 3 1 2 . 8
Sources: Ramaswamy (1988: 178) and R. Sen (1996: 446).
Perhaps as a response to the inability to control labour at the shop floor level, 
management strategy became increasingly hostile. Tactics such as lockouts
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and delays in signing settlements have become very common, especially in 
industries like jute. This can be confirmed from the overall statistics o f labour 
disputes at the state level summarised in table 5-10, in which we can observe a 
general decline in the number o f units involved in disputes as a whole, and 
more evidently a dramatic decline in the number o f strikes after 1977, 
reflecting organised efforts to restrain labour militancy by the CITU. This is 
reflected in the change in the composition o f labour disputes between strikes 
and lockouts. In the early 1970s, strikes accounted for more than 50 percent 
of total labour disputes in terms o f the number o f units involved in disputes 
and about 70 percent in relations to man-days involved. By the mid 1990s 
these proportions have declined to about 9 percent and 1 percent.
Against this backdrop, the reluctance o f the CITU to take up direct action, 
together with slow wage and employment increases, have led to dissatisfaction 
with ‘traditional’ party-affiliated unionism amongst workers. In the jute 
industry, “a large number o f small, ultra left and even unaffiliated unions have 
emerged” in the 1980s and 90s (Sen, 1992, p. 48). While there have been 
organisations such as NFITU which commit themselves to non-political 
unionism, unlike in Mumbai, these new forms of unionism have not come to 
dominate the labour scene in Kolkata. Paradoxically the decline o f the 
credibility o f the CPI(M) as a radical working class party, have contributed to 
the return o f the INTUC by projecting a more radical image, but not to an 
extent to challenge the dominance o f the CITU. However the CPI(M) 
government is increasingly finding it difficult to control their own affiliated 
unions at the grass-roots level, reflected in incidents such as the standoff 
between like the CITU-backed Great Easter Hotel union and the government 
over the privatisation o f the hotel (Bhattacherjee 2001b: 451). In these 
disputes the CPI(M) government has tried to change the ‘signal’ by explicitly 
suggesting that the party will not support their unions. A t one instance, it is 
reported that a CPI(M) minister stated that “in the name o f trade unionism,
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we have allowed many things. But enough is enough” (quoted in 
Bhattacherjee 1999: 27).
Although there has been some positive outcomes o f the CPI(M) rule, such as 
securing stable wage increase and working conditions for unorganised and 
agricultural workers and achieving less extreme inequality amongst the 
working population, generally speaking the welfare o f industrial labour has 
not improved, and this has led to the dissatisfaction o f workers (Mallick 
1993). This contradiction together with the general decline of Calcutta as an 
industrial centre has led some people to argue it as a case o f “the failure o f 
state controlled unionism” (Bhattacherjee op at.:28).
Once again, the emergence and persistence o f a highly politicised industrial 
relations regime in Kolkata, despite its problems, can be understood within 
the context o f the ‘ad hoc’ development strategy that relies on central 
subsidies and direct state interventions, in the political condition in which the 
dominant political classes in West Bengal failed to incorporate the 
accumulating classes in the ruling coalitions. Instead the political stability o f 
the CPI(M) rule has been based on the accommodation o f middle and lower 
income groups in urban and rural areas. Therefore, politically created ‘outside- 
firm rents’ have dominated the collective bargaining, and the politically 
affiliated unionism in Kolkata reflects the macro political conditions, in which 
redistributional conflicts take a particular partisan form, and the broader 
patterns o f accumulation in the region.
5.6 Synthesis and further hypotheses
This final section provides a synthesis o f our arguments, not only in this 
present chapter, but also with discussions from the previous chapters in this 
thesis, particularly our observations from the typology o f LMIs in Chapter 4. 
Let us first summarise the findings from our discussion in this chapter, which 
can be summarised in table 5-11 below.
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T a b l e  5-11 M a c r o  p o l i t i c a l  e c o n o m y  i n  M a h a r a s h t r a
a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
Maharashtra
(since the 1950s)
West Bengal
(1977 to early 1990s)
Politically dominant 
caste/class Maratha (-kunbi) caste Bhadralok
Political alliance ‘Elite’ cluster o f other castes, tribes and religion
Middle and lower 
income groups
Upper class/ caste 
hegemony Strong Weak
Political 
accommodation o f the 
productive classes
Strong Weak
Logic o f political 
mobilisation
Caste/religion/language-
based Partisan
Labour legislation and 
regulatory framework
Broadly ‘pro-employer’ 
with legal’ form o f 
industrial relations
Tro-labour’ in rhetoric 
combined with direct 
state control over 
unionism
Development strategies
‘Bureaucratic liberalist’ 
state facilitating 
accumulation
Direct state intervention
Type o f ‘rents’ for 
bargaining agents in 
LMIs
‘Within-firm rents’ ‘Outside-firm rents’
We found that the so-called ‘business trade unionism’ in Mumbai can be 
explained by the collective bargaining predominantly focused on ‘within-firm 
rents’, which is reflected in the ‘bureaucratic liberalist’ accumulation strategy, 
characterised by legalistic’ form o f industrial relations and the general 
tendency for state resources to be directed to infrastructure provisions. 
Similarly, we described the ‘state controlled unionism’ in Kolkata as a 
reflection o f collective bargaining dominated by ‘outside-firm rents’ generated 
as part o f the state’s ‘ad hoc’ interventionist strategy in sustaining 
accumulation and creating employment, while also maintaining its political 
legitimacy by accommodating a wide section o f the society. We have argued 
that the critical difference in the patterns o f accumulation mirrors the 
different types o f redistributional coalitions in the two regions, which can be 
appreciated by analysing the balance o f power o f classes and social groups in
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the early phases o f industrialisation. Whereas in Maharashtra, the politically 
dominant Maratha castes were able to establish a relatively stable alliance with 
the ‘elite’ clusters o f various castes and social groups, including productive 
classes, which then enabled stable class/caste hegemony, the politically 
dominant Bhadralok castes in West Bengal were unable to achieve such a 
coalition resulting in a clientelist accommodation o f social groups with 
organisational power, particularly in the middle and lower income clusters.
The motivation o f this chapter was to explain the differential types o f LMIs in 
Mumbai and Kolkata identified in Chapter 4 within the wider context o f the 
macro political economy o f Maharashtra and West Bengal. Therefore, let us 
combine the findings from the discussion on the macro political economic 
contexts with our findings from the two dimensional mapping o f LMIs 
obtained from our survey data, which we presented in figure 4-1 o f our 
previous chapter.
In figure 4-1 we found that the types o f LMIs can be broadly classified along 
two dimensions: the first being the extent o f centralisation and state 
involvement in collective bargaining; and the second was the extent of 
political affiliation and involvement o f external leaders in unionism. This is 
broadly consistent with our findings from Section 5.5 o f this chapter in which 
these two factors were indeed two of the central issues in emergence, 
reproduction and transformation o f differential types o f bargaining relations 
and unionism in Maharashtra and West Bengal. For example, the ‘traditional’ 
state-patronage strategy to industrial relations led to emergence o f LMIs 
characterised by centralised bargaining with tri-partite bargaining between the 
state, employer, and the party-affiliated unions, as we saw in the dominance o f 
Congress-affiliated RMMS in the Mumbai textile industry and similarly the 
nexus o f CPI(M)-CITU that dominates the industrial relations in Kolkata. 
The challenge to these state controlled industrial relations in many cases took 
the form o f decentralisation o f the bargaining structure as well as disclaiming
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alliances with political parties, as seen in the ‘independent’ or employees’ 
unionism in Mumbai.
Also at the end o f Chapter 2, we hypothesised that the differential types o f 
LMIs reflected the differential types of ‘rents’ available to bargaining agents in 
industrial relations. In particular, we argued that the typology o f LMIs as 
mapped in figure 4-1 must be understood by focusing on the relative size o f 
‘within’ and ‘outside-firm rents’ available to bargaining agents. For example, 
we hypothesised that centralised LMIs with state involvement are likely to be 
found in sectors where the scope o f achieving significant gains from 
increasing productivity to bargaining over company-based ‘within-firm rents’ 
is limited. In contrast, we hypothesised that in dynamic sectors and regions, 
there are likely to be stronger incentives for bargaining agents to organise 
LMIs to seek ‘within-firm rents’. Similarly, we hypothesised in Chapter 2 that 
the party-based or external union leadership are more likely to be found when 
gains from ‘outside-firm rents’ either outweigh those o f ‘within-firm rents’ or 
strengthen their bargaining power in redressing grievances or securing 
benefits.
From the context of the discussion in this chapter, the relative size o f ‘within’ 
and ‘outside-firm rents’ are related to the location o f bargaining agents within 
patron-client politics that dominate the redistributive conflicts at the macro 
political economy, and more broadly the particular patterns o f accumulation. 
For example, we discussed that the macro political economic conditions in 
Maharashtra has been such that the dominant type o f  ‘rents’ took the form o f 
‘within-firm rents’, especially in the dynamic sector o f the economy, as a 
backdrop to the state’s bureaucratic and legalistic approach to development 
management and regulation, which was supported by the broadly ‘pro- 
developmental’ coalition o f dominant social groups. Similarly, we suggested 
that industrial development based on subsides (especially from the centre) and 
direct state interventions into production activities, combined with the need
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of the ruling government to manage political stability by accommodating a 
wide section o f the society, has meant that ‘outside-firm rents’ have 
dominated in West Bengal.
By bringing together these observations, we can provide further explanation 
on the determinants o f LMIs in Mumbai and Kolkata as mapped in figure 4- 
1. First, the units in Kolkata jute manufacturing industry had similar types o f 
LMIs, as reflected by their being positioned close to each other within a 
‘cluster’ on the two dimensional mapping, characterised by the high degree o f 
centralisation and politicisation. Similarly, the rest o f the units based in 
Kolkata (with the exception o f the banking unit) also were concentrated in 
another cluster, with the combination o f decentralised bargaining and 
politicised unionism. The difference in the extent o f centralisation between 
these two clusters reflects the relative size o f ‘within-firm rents’ in these 
sectors. The jute industry has been characterised by low productivity and 
obsolete technology, which indicates limited scope for generating sufficient 
surplus at the point o f production, and stronger incentives for bargaining 
agents to seek politically-created ‘rents’ by making the most o f their links with 
political parties and their location with the redistributional coalition. In more 
‘m odem ’ sectors where bargaining agents are more likely to extract gains by 
utilising their favourable product market conditions, bargaining agents are 
more likely to benefit from plant-level negotiation whereby the bargaining 
relations can be reorganised according to their local needs. However, the 
overall stagnation o f economic growth in W est Bengal may imply that the size 
o f ‘within-firm rents’ are likely to be smaller compared to more industrially 
dynamic regions. More importantly, the Kolkata based units generally 
maintained politicised LMIs reflects the scope o f ‘outside-firm rents’ in the 
region, based on the politically created resources from the state’s reliance on 
subsidies and interventionist development management, combined with the 
accommodation strategy o f the political classes which includes strong state 
control over unionism.
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Second, from figure 4-1, the units based in Mumbai, both in the ‘traditional’ 
and ‘m odem ’ sectors, have shown greater diversity in the types o f LMIs, 
especially in terms o f their affiliation to political parties and involvement o f 
external leaders, compared to their Kolkata counterparts. In the Mumbai 
cotton textile industry, while the ‘traditional’ industry-level settlements signed 
by party-based unions were maintained in the public sector mills, private 
sector mills have removed themselves from the industry-wise collective 
bargaining, with differential outcomes. In a small number o f ‘progressive’ 
mills, which have modernised their production capacities and diversified into 
higher quality products, bargaining agents negotiate over their share o f 
‘within-firm rents’ at the point o f production at mill-level. In ‘backward’ mills 
characterised by low levels o f productivity, management’s focus has shifted to 
diversifying the mill land to speculative interments in real estate and other 
leisure facilities, which reflects dynamic economic growth in the rest o f the 
economy. Similarly in the ‘m odem ’ sector units, the dynamic but ‘uneven’ 
nature o f industrial development has meant that the types o f LMIs have been 
diverse reflecting the particular technological, economic, and social 
conditions. The general observation that can be extracted from these case 
studies is the greater scope for differetical types o f LMIs to emerge and be 
transformed in Mumbai, which reflects the space created for diverse forms of 
bargaining relations and unionism, and the backdrop o f the dynamic yet 
‘contradictory’ nature o f capitalist development and the ‘bureaucratic’ and 
‘legalistic’ state regulation in Maharashtra, based on the relatively stable and 
broadly ‘pro-developmental’ political coalition.
Our findings in this chapter have important implications for theoretical and 
policy debates on LMIs. In Chapter 2, we saw that much of the m odem  
economic literature on LMIs has increasingly turned its attention to the 
determinants o f LMIs, with two contrasting hypotheses found in the literature. 
The first was the explanation based on transaction costs and policy failures, 
both factors that can be attributed to individual preference and ideology, a
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view most explicitly developed by Douglas N orth (1981; 1990; 1999). The 
second political economic approach explained the emergence o f and changes 
in institutions by placing greater emphasis on social and political structure. In 
the context o f the discussion in this chapter, the former approach would 
argue that industrial performance in Mumbai was better because it enjoyed 
professional company-based unions compared to unions organised at 
industry-level and affiliated to political parties in Kolkata. In contrast, the 
second approach would argue that the causality is at least in the opposite 
direction, with the dynamic region providing strong incentives for unions to 
organise to seek company-based ‘rents’ rather than political rents that are 
more attractive in less industrially dynamic regions. Although there are 
insights to be gained from the former agency-based approach, our 
contribution in this thesis has clearly emphasised the latter structuralist 
argument on the basis o f our observation that to understand the reproduction 
and transformation o f LMIs in India, a greater emphasis must be placed on 
the role o f ‘outside-firm rents’ as exogenous constraints to micro-level choices.
Having discussed the macro political economic determinants o f the types o f 
LMIs, in Chapter 6 we shall next turn our attention to the ways in which these 
differential types o f LMIs reflect how labour process are managed and 
controlled at the point o f production. By doing so, we shall examine the 
implications o f the reproduction and transformation o f LMIs for the mode o f 
managing and controlling the labour process.
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A PPE N D IX  T O  CH A PTER 5
5A.1 Types of state amendment on the Industrial Disputes Act
Table 4A-1 lists the state amendments by the Maharashtra and West Bengal 
government on the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. As can be seen there are 
some amendments where our interpretation o f the nature o f amendments 
(and hence its categorisation) differs from that o f Besley and Burgess (2002). 
This appendix aims to provide justification to our interpretation where this is 
the case.
5A.2 Maharashtra state amendments
1981 amendment on Chapter I, Section 2, Subsection (a), Clause (kkk)
This clause, inserted in the central Act in 1953 (Act No. 43, S. 2, w.e.f. 24-10- 
1953), defines “lay-off’ as:
“lay-off’ (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) 
means the failure, refusal or inability o f an employer on account o f 
shortage o f coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation o f 
stocks or the break-down o f machinery to give employment to a 
workman whose name is bom e on the muster-rolls o f his industrial 
establishment and who has not been retrenched. (Srivastava 1985: 
56)
The Maharashtra Act 22 o f 1981, Section 2 (w.e.f. 1-7-1981) inserts the 
following after the words “the break-down o f machinery”:
or on account o f discontinuance or reduction o f the supply o f 
power to the industrial establishment for contravention o f any 
provisions o f the Bombay Electricity (Special Powers) Act 1946, or 
o f any orders or directions issued thereunder” (Srivastava op. cit:. 61)
Besley and Bergess (2002) interpret this amendment as “pro-labour/anti- 
employer” because ‘ ‘ [d]iscontinuation or reduction o f power supply to an
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industrial establishment can be used [as] a reason for lay-off (for which 
workers will receive compensation). Under the central act only shortage o f 
coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation o f stocks or the breakdown 
of machinery are listed as valid reasons for lay-offs”.
However, the amendment can be interpreted in a different way if  we focus on 
the fact that under the central Act where the “discontinuation or reduction o f 
power supply” is not explicitly mentioned as a valid reason for lay-off, if 
employers were to lay-off workers, they would need to obtain “prior 
permission o f the appropriate Government or such authority as may be 
specified by that Government by notification” (IDA, Ch. V-B, S. 25-M). As 
Besley and Bergess (op. tit) correcdy points out the amendment entail that 
workers laid-off due to discontinuation or reduction o f power would receive 
adequate compensations. But also the amendment implies that employers can 
lay-off workers on the ground o f discontinuation or reduction o f power 
without obtaining prior permission from the authorities. In this sense, Besley 
and Bergess’s interpretation that this amendment is “pro-labour/anti­
employer” is questionable. We would rather argue that the amendment is in 
fact “anti-labour/pro-employer” .
Chapter V-A, Section 25-C
Section 25-C provides the “right o f workmen laid off for compensation” as:
Whenever a workmen (other than a badli workman or a casual 
workman) whose name is borne on the muster rolls o f an industrial 
establishment and who has completed not less than one year o f 
continuous service under an employer is laid off, whether 
continuously or intermittently, he shall be paid by the employer for 
all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly 
holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to 
fifty per cent o f the total o f the basic wages and dearness allowance 
that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid-off:
Maharashtra state amendment inserts after this the following proviso:
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[...] Provided that, where the lay-off is on account o f 
discontinuance or reduction o f the supply o f power to the industrial 
establishment for contravention o f any provisions o f the Bombay 
Electricity (Special Powers) Act, 1946, or o f any order o f directions 
issued thereunder, the compensation payable to the workman shall 
be equal to hundred per cent o f the total o f the basic wages and 
dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not 
been so laid off:” (Srivastava op tit:. 679)
Besley and Bergess interpret this amendment as being “pro-labour” on the 
ground that if  being laid off is due to electricity problems then the workers 
receive 100% of their wage as compared to the normal 50%. Besley and 
Bergress’s interpretation is correct and justifiable if  we read the amendment 
on this clause independently. As a result o f this amendment, the state o f 
Maharashtra indeed imposes a higher compensation payable to the workers 
when the workers are laid off due to power shortages. O n the other hand, the 
context under which this amendment is made must be noted. As we pointed 
out above, the backdrop o f these amendments were incidents o f 
disconnection and reduction o f electricity without clear legal procedure in 
Maharashtra at the time. The State amendments were made because o f the 
employers’ need to be able to lay-off workers without government 
authorisation. Therefore, while this amendment on Chapter V-A Section 5-C 
permits laid off workers due to power shortage to gain higher amount o f 
compensation, once we interpret it in combination with the amendment on 
Chapter I, Section 2 (a), Clause (kkk), we notice that the true intention o f this 
amendment is hardly “pro-labour” .
Chapter V-B, Section 25-K
Chapter V-B which lists special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment 
and closure in certain establishments, was inserted by Act 32 o f 1976, S. 2 
(w.e.f. 5-3-1976). In the central Act, sub-section (1) states that the provisions 
applies to establishment that are not o f a seasonal character or where work is 
performed only intermittendy, and have more than 300 workers15 employed
15 This was later substituted with 100 by central A ct 46 o f  1982, S. 12 (with effect from 21 August 1984).
353
on an average per working day for the proceeding 12 months. The 
Maharashtra amendment (Maharashtra Act No. I ll  o f 1982, Section 2) adds 
the following provision:
without prejudice to the provision o f the sub-section (1), the 
appropriate Government may, from time to time, by notification in 
the official Gazette, apply the provisions o f Section 2 5 -0  and 
Section 25-R in so far as it relates to contravention of sub-section (1) 
or (2) o f Section 25-0 , also to an industrial establishment (not being 
an establishment o f a seasonal character or in which work is 
performed only intermittently) in which such number o f workmen, 
which may be less than three hundred but not less than one 
hundred, as may be specified in the notification, were employed on 
an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. 
(Srivastava op. tit:. 742-3)
Section 25-(0) relates to the procedure o f closing down an undertaking and 
section 25-(R) refers to the penalty for closure.
Besley and Bergess interpret this amendment as being “pro-labour” because 
the Maharashtra state amendment amounts to extending the rules o f lay-off, 
retrenchment and closure to establishments with employee greater than 100 
but less than 300, whereas in the central Act the provisions applied only for 
establishments with more than 300 employees (at 1981. Later in 1982 the 
number was amended to 100 in the central Act as well; see footnote 13). 
However, we should also note the fact that is done according to the discretion 
of the state government. In this sense this amendment is less “pro-labour” 
compared to what was agreed as a central amendment only a year later. Also, 
we should note that this amendment implies stronger ability o f the state 
government to influence the labour m arket
1983 amendment on Chapter V-B, Section 25-0
This section, which states the process for closing down an undertaking, was 
initially enacted by the Amending Act 32 o f 1976. However, it was deemed
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ultra vires 16 by the Supreme Court in Excel Wear v. Union of India, and later 
substituted by Section 14 o f Act 46 o f 1982. The contention was mainly 
around sub-section (2) and (5) o f the original Act. Sub-section (2) defined the 
procedure for the Government to order grading or refusing permission to 
close down an establishment. It stated that on receipt o f a notice by an 
employer who intends to close down an establishment, the appropriate 
Government can direct the employer not to close down “if it is satisfied that 
the reasons for the intended closure o f the undertaking are not adequate and 
sufficient or such closure is prejudicial to the public interest”. In effect the old 
Section 25 -0  grants Government with a strong right to dispose o f the 
application for permission to close down the establishment simply by passing 
an order. Sub-section (5) provides that if there is no application for 
permission or if  the permission for closure has been refused, “the closure o f 
the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date o f closure and the 
workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being 
in force as if no notice had been given to him” . Note that once the order 
from the Government is given there is no procedure to review it, and any act 
to refuse it is deemed illegal (although there is no criminal liability in such as 
case). The old Act permits the Government to have the last say over the issue 
o f closure.
The key incident that led to state-level amendments in various states and 
ultimately a central amendment in 1982 was the court case regarding the 
closure o f Excel Wear in 1978. When employers and stakeholders o f the 
company applied for permission to the State Government for closure alleging 
a list o f reasons including labour trouble and recurring losses, the State 
Government refused permission on the ground that “the reasons are not 
adequate and sufficient” (although they accepted that the facts listed for the 
reasons were correct) and that “the intended closure is prejudicial to the 
public interest”. The case went to the Supreme Court challenging the
16 “beyond the scope” or “in excess o f  legal power or authority”.
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constitutional validity o f Sections 25 -0  and 25-R. The Supreme Court 
accepted the petition and held that “the provision o f Section 25 -0  are 
“constitutionally bad and invalid” For the first reason that the reasons are not 
adequate and sufficient although they may be correct, the Supreme Court 
deemed such order “unreasonable” and that “ [t]he authorities can refuse 
permission to close down whimsically and capriciously”. For the second 
reason that the intended closure was prejudicial to public interest, the 
Supreme Court argued that such reason “will be universal in all cases o f 
closure” . Further it was declared that “ [a] tight to close down as business is 
not a right appurtenant to the ownership o f the property but is an integral 
part o f the right to carry on the business”.
Maharashtra was one o f the States (along with Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa and Rajasthan) which substituted the original Section 25 -0  with State 
amendments. Two amendments made under the Maharashtra Act No. I ll o f 
1982, S. 3 should be noted in particular.
First, the Maharashtra amendment lists additional requirements for the 
Government to satisfy before granting or refusing permission o f closure. Two 
changes made to the original Section 25 -0  are o f particular importance. The 
first was to state that the Government is required to give reasonable 
opportunity o f being heard to the employer and the representatives o f the 
workmen. The second was to make mandatory that the Government records 
in writing the reason for refusal to the employer and also to send a copy o f 
the decision to the representatives of the workmen.
Second change made under the Maharashtra State amendment is on sub­
section (5) o f the original Act. In the Maharashtra amendment the order by 
the Government is subject to employer’s appeal to the Industrial Tribunal 
(within 30 days from the date o f the order), and any order made by the 
Industrial Tribunal in such appeal is final and binding. Similarly, when the 
permission is deemed to be granted, workers may appeal to the Industrial
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Tribunal (again within 30 days from the date which the permission is deemed 
to be granted).
Both o f these changes can be seen as curbing the one-sidedness o f the 
original clause and limiting the area o f manoeuvring by the State. The 
question is whether such amendment is likely to benefit the employer or the 
workers. Bensley and Burgess argue that the Maharashtra amendment is “pro­
labour” on the ground that it adds an additional clause which states that “any 
employer or worker affected by the decision to close down an enterprise is 
permitted for 30 days from the date o f permission to close being granted 
appeal to an Industrial Tribunal to overturn the decision”. However, since 
both employer and the workers have rights to contest government decision to 
permit or not permit the closure, it seems more appropriate to interpret that 
the effect o f the amendment is equally “pro-employer” and “pro-labour” . 
Further, if we consider the context behind the amendment, we should argue 
that the amendment is delivered from “pro-employer” considerations.
Chapter V-B, Section 25-R
This section, which defines the penalty for closure, was inserted by Act No. 
32 o f 1976. The section, as it stood before 1982, when it was amended at the 
centre, provided penalty for breach o f the pre-1982 Section 25-0 . However 
because the old Section 2 5 -0  was declared ultra vires, part o f  Section 25-R was 
also deemed ultra vires. Hence, in the 5 states that made amendment on 
Section 25-0 , consequential amendments to Section 25-R were made as well 
(as with the old Section 25-0 , 25-R was also later amended by the central Act 
o f 1982, Section 15). Hence the state amendment on 25-R must be consider 
in connection to the amendment on 25-0 , which, as we discussed above, was 
led by “pro-employer” motives.
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5A.3 West Bengal state amendments
1974 amendment on Chapter I, Section 2, Subsection (a), Clause (kkk)
We saw part of this clause in the 1981 Maharashtra State amendment. After 
the words defining “lay-off’, the clause (kkk) in the central Act further 
explains that:
Every workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls o f the 
industrial establishment and who presents himself for work at the 
establishment at the time appointed for the purpose during normal 
working hours on any day and is not given employment by the 
employer within two hours o f his so presenting himself shall be 
deemed to have been laid off for that day within the meaning o f this 
clause [...] (Srivastava op cit 56)
That is, in order for a worker to be considered laid-off within the central Act, 
the worker must (a) be on the muster rolls A N D  (b) present for work during 
normal working hours A N D  (c) not given employment within two hours. In 
the W est Bengal 1974, this ‘explanation’ o f lay-off is replaced by the 
following:
N o workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls o f the 
industrial establishment and who presents himself for work at the 
establishment at the time appointed for the purpose during normal 
working hours on any day and is given employment by the employer 
can be laid-off for that day but if any such workman is not given 
employment by the employer within two hours o f his so presenting 
himself, he shall be deemed to have been laid off for that day within 
the meaning o f this clause [...] (Srivastava op cit 61. Emphasis by the 
author)
The W est Bengal amendment on clause (kkk) appears to be restating the same 
1980 amendment on Chapter IV, Section 12
Chapter IV, Section 12 o f the Act defines the “duties o f conciliation officers” . 
As part o f the duties, S. 12 o f the Act mentions two types o f reports that 
must be submitted by the conciliation officer. The first is the so-called 
settlement report, which the conciliation officer send to the appropriate 
government if a settlement o f the dispute is arrive at in the course o f the
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conciliation proceedings (sub-section 3); and the second is the so-called 
failure report, which the conciliation officer send if no settlement is arrived 17 
(Maalhotra 1985: 1015). Sub-section (6) sets the period of submition o f these 
reports as follows:
A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days 
o f the commencement o f the conciliation proceedings or within 
such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government: 
Provided that subject to the approval o f the conciliation officer, the 
time for the submission o f the report may be extended by such 
period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the 
dispute [...] (Srivastava op cit 550)
West Bengal Act No. LVII o f 1980, Section 6 amends this sub-sections as 
follows. First it changes the time period in which the report must be 
submitted from “within fourteen days” to “after completion o f the 
conciliation proceedings within sixty days”. Second, it inserts the words “not 
exceeding six months” after the words “the report may be extended by such 
period”, imposing a limit to which the submission o f report may be delayed.
Besley and Burgess argue that this amendment is “pro-labour” because it 
extends the deadline o f the report o f the outcome o f the conciliation 
proceedings from 14 days to 60 days. However, it is not clear why the 
extension o f the deadline o f the report may benefit the bargaining position o f 
workers. A more straightforward implication o f this amendment is that under 
the West Bengal law, third party conciliation has a greater role in resolving 
labour dispute and is done within a more rigorous and transparent procedure. 
This amendment seems to increase the State government’s influence over 
resolution o f labour disputes, and in this sense, we would rather categorize 
this amendment as “pro-govemment” .
17 O n a consideration o f  the failure report, i f  the government is “satisfied that there is a case for 
reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference” (sub­
section 5).
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Chapter IV, Section 20
Section 20, subsection (1) o f the central Act states that the conciliation 
proceeding must start on the day the notice o f strike or lockout is received in 
all industries. West Bengal state amendment (W.B. Act No. LVII o f 1980, 
Section 10) separates industries into two categories, “public utility service” 
and others, and specifies that, while conciliation must start on the day the 
notice o f strike or lockout is received in the case o f industries declared as 
former, in the case o f industries not declared as such, the conciliation must 
take place only after the conciliation officer issues the notice for a joint 
conference. (Srivastava op cit 635-6)
Besley and Burgess categorise this amendment as “pro-labour”. It is clear that 
at least some section o f workers, namely those in the “public utility service”, 
may benefit from this amendment. More importantly, this amendment 
increases the role o f third party conciliation in labour disputes, particularly in 
the so-called “public utility service”, and hence strengthens West Bengal 
state’s ability to influence industrial relations. Hence we categorise this 
amendment as “pro-govemment” as well as “pro-labour”.
Chapter IV, Section 11-A
Chapter IV o f the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the “Procedure, 
Powers and Duties o f Authorities” and Section 11-A, inserted by Act No.45 
o f 1971, S. 3 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971), defines the “Power o f Labour Courts, 
Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case o f 
discharge or dismissal o f workmen”, which states that industrial disputes 
related to discharge or dismissal must be referred to the Labour Court, 
Tribunal or National Tribunals; and if the Court or the Tribunal find that the 
case for discharge or dismissal is not justified, it can set aside the order o f 
discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement o f the workman.
The West Bengal amendment (W.B. Act No. LVII o f 1980, Section 5) inserts 
the following section after Section 11-A o f the principal Act:
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11-B. Power o f a Labour Court or Tribunal to execute its award by 
decree, etc. — A Labour Court or a Tribunal shall have the power of 
a civil court to execute its own award as a decree o f a civil court and 
also to execute any settlement as defined in clause (p) or Section 2 as 
a decree. [...] (Srivastava op cit 549)
This amendment empowers Labour Courts and Tribunals so that it can have 
the same power as the civil court to execute its award or settlement as a 
decree o f a civil court. W hat is the implication o f this amendment to the 
relative bargaining relations o f labour and management? Besley and Burgess 
(2002) categorise this as an anti-labour/pro-employer amendment. While it is 
true that there may be cases where Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals 
favour unions or labour, the reverse is also possible. As discussed in Section 
5.5 there are evidence to suggest that employers use litigation as a tool for 
delaying settlements or provide legal justification to their strategies. In this 
sense, the implication o f this amendment is likely to depend on the interests 
o f the state, and therefore we interpret this amendment as “pro-government’5.
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T a b l e  5A-1 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  ID A  
i n  M a h a r a s h t r a  a n d  W e s t  B e n g a l
(a) Maharashtra state amendments
Year o f  amendment
Section/ clause in the 
IDA
B&B (2002)’s 
category Author’s category
1974 7 Neutral Neutral
1974 7A Neutral Neutral
1981 2 Pro-labour Pro-employer
1981 25C Pro-labour Pro-employer1
1981 25K Pro-labour Pro-govemm ent/
pro-labour
1983 2 5 0 Pro-labour Pro-employer
1983 25R Neutral Pro-employer 2
(b) West Bengal state amendments
Year o f  amendment
Section/ clause in the 
IDA
B&B (2002)'s 
category Author's category
1958 7A Neutral Neutral
1959 7C Neutral Neutral
1974 2 Pro-labour N o change
1980 2 Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 2 Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 12 Pro-labour Pro-govemment
1980 20 Pro-labour
Pro-labour/
pro-govemment
1980 11A-11D Pro-employer Pro-govemment
1980 17A Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25C Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25E Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25FFF Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25H Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25HH Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25K Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 25M Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 33C Pro-labour Pro-labour
1980 9A Pro-labour Pro-labour
1981 19 Neutral Neutral
1986 15 Pro-labour Pro-labour
1989 7 Neutral Neutral
1989 10 Pro-labour Pro-labour
1989 38 Neutral Neutral
1989 2 5 0 Pro-labour Pro-labour
1989 25P Neutral Neutral
1989 2A Pro-labour Pro-labour
1990 7A Neutral Neutral
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Note: B&B stands for Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 1 Maharashtra state amendment 
on 25C is ‘pro-labour’ in nature if  considered on its own. However, here we are considering it 
in connection to the amendment on 25.
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C h a p t e r  6
LABOUR M ARKET IN STITU TIO N S, B A R G A IN IN G  A G EN TS A N D  
T H E  M O D E  O F M A N A G IN G  T H E  LABOUR PROCESS
6.1 Introduction
This final chapter o f the thesis brings together the discussion in the previous 
chapters to provide alternative analysis o f labour market reform properties. In 
Chapter 1 o f this thesis, we proposed that labour market institutions (LMIs) 
in India can be better understood as a systematic consequence o f how the 
society organises the process o f accumulation, and how the labour process is 
managed and controlled. Following this hypothesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, we 
explained the typology o f LMIs as reflections o f the balance of power at the 
macro-level, which in turn is constituent to the particular patterns o f 
accumulation in the region, using observations from our field research in 
Mumbai and Kolkata. An important implication o f our hypothesis is that 
LMIs are ‘endogenous5 to the process o f accumulation and therefore a 
broader set o f reforms are required for sustaining growth.
To develop our discussion on alternative policy priorities for India5s LMIs, we 
must first return to the methodological issue we have been highlighting 
throughout this thesis. Recall that our hypothesis was presented as an 
intervention both in the on-going policy debates on labour market reforms in 
India and the wider theoretical debates on LMIs, whereby in both sets o f 
literature, the tendency has been to implicidy assume that LMIs precede 
growth and misleadingly treat them as ‘exogenous variables’ that are chosen by 
micro-level agency, as we argued in Chapter 2. In particular some mainstream 
theories that inform policy, such as Banerji, Campos, and Sabot (1995) and 
Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), have focused on transaction costs and policy
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failures as the main determinants o f LMIs, in which individual cognitive 
beliefs and ideologies play important roles. Therefore, in Section 6.2 we 
analyse the mode o f unionism and union leadership to examine whether there 
is significant difference in the perceptions, strategies and behaviour o f union 
leaders under different types o f LMIs. Our analysis o f trade union leaders 
reveals a vast diversity in their self-perceptions and behaviour patterns, but 
which appears not to be strongly associated with the types of LMIs. This o f 
course does not mean that ‘choices’ o f individual bargaining agents do not 
have implications for LMIs. In reality, the relationship is a dialectical one, 
since political economic structure is not a metaphysical entity that directly 
creates trade unions and labour laws. LMIs are organised by bargaining agents 
in response to the opportunities, incentives and constraints determined by the 
historically specific way in which industrial development proceeded. It is in 
this sense that we have argued that the types o f LMIs are explained in terms 
of the wider economic, social and political context in which labour- 
management bargaining takes place.
Section 6.3 o f this chapter thus takes our analysis further to examine the 
implications o f different types o f LMIs for the way in which the labour 
process is controlled and managed. The idea that LMIs such as trade unions 
and labour legislation act as ‘mediator’ o f capital and labour to impose 
discipline and facilitate productivity growth is o f course not new. In Chapter 
2, we saw m odem  economic theories such as the collective voice (Freeman 
and M edoff 1984) and the neo-corporatist models (Calmfors and Driffill 
1988) which describe LMIs as arbitrator o f information and transaction costs 
with potential efficiency-enhancing effects. In Marxist political economy, the 
idea that trade union is not an agent to overthrow capitalism but rather has 
interest in sustaining it has been developed, as expressed in Lenin’s (1970: 80) 
critique that “the spontaneous working class movement is trade-unionism, 
[...] and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement o f the workers by 
the bourgeoisie”.
365
It is however our argument that the role o f LMIs as ‘mediator’ o f the labour 
process carries particular importance in developing countries such as India, 
where industrial capital and organised labour are not dominant both 
numerically and politically, and that this aspect o f LMIs is not sufficiently 
analysed in the mainstream models. Therefore in Section 6.3 we shall analyse 
the mode o f controlling and managing the labour process in the surveyed 
units from our field work in Mumbai and Kolkata under different types o f 
LMIs. We point out that the decision making over issues o f labour 
management vary, from on the one hand, Kolkata’s ‘traditional’ sector, where 
multiple trade unions together with a wide range o f social actors are involved 
in the day-to-day decision o f hiring, firing, job allocation and promotion, to 
on the other hand, Mumbai’s ‘m odem ’ sector, where the union involvement 
in such decision making is limited. Similarly, we shall analyse the pay-scale 
agreed in collective bargaining settlements as an indication for the earning 
distribution and the type o f mobilisation strategies for surplus appropriation 
by bargaining agents. Once again, the pattern o f pay schedule vary from a 
‘flat’ pay-scale that homogenise earnings across the sector in the ‘traditional’ 
sector on the one hand, to the steep pay structure in the ‘m odem ’ sector units 
that differentiates earnings according to seniority and performance. Also we 
find significant diversity in the mode o f managing the pay structure amongst 
the ‘m odem ’ sector units. Our hypothesis is that the different mode o f 
managing the labour process reflects factors such as the work organisation, 
technological and market conditions, but is also in part explained by the 
bargaining power o f other actors in the wider social context in which labour- 
management bargaining takes place.
This final point is particularly important when we consider how the types o f 
LMIs change or do not change over time. In Section 6.4 we examine several 
case studies from our field research that lead us to hypothesise that the 
transformation o f LMIs is associated with changes in the firm’s earning 
structure and work organisation. However, the trajectory and process o f
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institutional transformation is neither linear nor smooth, and are shown to be 
significantly affected by the bargaining powers o f other actors in the wider 
social context in which labour-management bargaining takes place. We 
therefore argue that the reproduction and transformation o f LMIs are 
‘endogenous’ variables that reflect the balance o f power and the particular 
patterns o f accumulation at the macro political economy. We conclude the 
thesis by proposing the need for alternative labour market reform priorities.
6.2 Determinants of LMIs revisited: the role of agency
6.2.1 Methodological individualistic interpretation of LMIs
In Chapter 4 we used our fieldwork data to illustrate the diversity in LMIs 
amongst the surveyed units in Mumbai (Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta), 
from the ‘state-controlled’ industrial relations in Kolkata jute industry to the 
‘business unionism’ o f Mumbai ‘m odem ’ sector. In particular we found 
significant difference in the type o f LMIs in the two cities, even in industries 
with comparable technological conditions. For example in Mumbai’s cotton 
textile industry, which has similar historical origins and technological 
characteristics to Kolkata’s jute industry, we found that the type o f unionism 
was more diverse reflecting local conditions. The observations led us to focus 
on the opportunities, incentives and constraints for bargaining agents 
determined by technological and market conditions as well as the location o f 
bargaining agents in the changing patron-client politics in the region.
O ur argument contrasts to that o f the popular perception in India which 
focuses on the difference in culture. For example, when the Kolkata high 
court restricted public rallies and processions on weekdays in October 2003, 
the mainstream media generally welcomed the order on the ground that it 
could help change the “Bengal’s work culture” (Mehta and Nanda 2003)1. The 
popular image o f Bengal’s work culture is that Bengalis like to complain, as
1 “True to Calcuttan form,” the ruling was immediately met with marches organised by the Left Front 
activists (Reeves 2003).
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the Mumbai-bom journalist Vir Sanghvi (2003) wrote: “W hen I moved to 
Calcutta in 1986,1 was briefed by long-term non-Bengali residents o f the city. 
One Bengali, they said, was a chronic complainer. Two Bengalis were a trade 
union. And three Bengalis were two trade unions.”2 This perception extends 
to an argument that politicians flourish by appealing to this “moan and 
groan” culture, and that this is reflected in the way trade union operates. 
Trade unionism in Kolkata is perceived to be used as machine to mobilise 
support for political parties, rather than constructively dealing with issues 
workers face at plant level. Public rallies (or morchas, dhamas, etc.), it is argued, 
are organised in order to cause disruption. Tactics like single file 
demonstration, where demonstrators would march in a single file with large 
gaps in between them to maximise disruption to traffic, are typically cited as 
reflection o f the trade unionism in Kolkata, in contrast to the apparently m ore 
‘responsible’ “business unionism” of Mumbai.
The focus on culture and tradition in the popular image o f LMIs coincides 
with the mainstream economic theories inspired by the new institutional 
economics (NIE) which treats LMIs as ‘exogenous’ variables. For example, in 
Chapter 1 we reviewed Banerji, Campos and Sabot’s (1995) argument that the 
disparity in the economic performance between East and South Asia can be 
explained by the different types of unions in the two regions, which in turn 
reflected contrasting attitude o f agency. They suggest that persistence o f 
‘distributional’ mode o f labour market regulation in India is explained by 
informational and transaction costs as well as policy failure. O n the one hand, 
the ‘elites’ in India were supposedly committed to state-led development due 
to their ‘intellectual heritage’ o f Nehruvian ideology, while on the other hand, 
the leftist ideological stance of the organised labour had led them to belief 
that market forces would erode their gains (p.22-4). We pointed out that the 
NIE-inspired models ultimately lead to the hypothesis that focuses on
2 Symbolically this editorial for the national newspaper Hindustan Times was subsequently reprinted in BJP 
Today, Vol. 12 No.21 (N ov 1-15 2003).
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perceptions and belief as the key explanatory factors for the persistence of 
inefficient institutions3. In this section we critically examine the perceptions 
and behavioural patterns o f union leaders as assumed determinants o f LMIs.
6.2.2 Unionists’ self perception on leadership
As part of the structured interview with union leaders, we presented them 
with a list o f 20 different attributes o f trade union leadership, and asked them 
to score their own capability or skills for each o f the attributes4. The 20 
attributes selected are listed in table 6-1. The structure and the variables o f 
this questionnaire was based on Jaspal Singh’s (1980) sociological study on the 
‘quality o f leadership’ in trade unions in Punjab; although we have added two 
extra attributes “Connections with politicians and state officials” and 
“Negotiation with managers” in order to incorporate our research interest on 
the union leaders’ interaction with different types o f bargaining agents. 
However, our interpretation o f the data collected from this questionnaire 
differs from Singh’s approach in that we are not using this as a measure the 
quality or the nature o f union leadership. As discussed in Chapter 3, our 
interpretation is that the resulting scores obtained from this data collection 
help us understand their self-perceptions about what kind o f leaders they are, 
or the way the unionists themselves want outsiders to perceive them.
3 This is o f  course a somewhat crude simplification o f  the methodological approach o f  mainstream
models. In reality, many authors make reference to the historical and social contexts, but our critique 
is that the methodological tools such as the game theory (used for example by Banaji, Campos and 
Sabot) imply the underlying assumption that structures must be ultimately explained by individual 
agency.
4 It is commonly know that asking question about perception is difficult because it can lead to non­
sampling error if  the interviewer does not follow appropriate probing techniques. In addition to this, 
question involving ranking with large rank order, in this case order o f  20, can be difficult compared to, 
say, rating scales Converse and Presser (1986: 27-29). For example, it is known that ranking can suffer 
from the primacy/ recency effect in impression formation; whereby the order o f  items can heavily 
influence the way respondents rank them. A t the same time, ranking can provide meaningful values to  
study if  the respondents are given a “show card”, sufficient time to understand the logical contrast 
between the items, and appropriate amount o f  probing is applied. For more discussion on the 
possibility o f  non-sampling error, see Chapter 3.
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As an ‘exploratory’ statistical method to examine the underlying patterns in 
our ‘self-perception’ scores, we have used the factor analysis. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, factor analysis is a mathematical tool to simplify the correlation 
between multiple variables into a few underlying factors. The details of the 
extraction procedure are explained in the Appendix o f this chapter. The 
extracted factors are summarised in the rotated component matrix in table 6- 
1. Our task here is to identify what each o f the extracted component 
represents. Since factors or principal components are derived directly from 
the correlation matrix, in theory the maximum number o f components that 
can be extracted is the same as the number o f variables in the original matrix 
(in this case 20). In practice, however, the first component explains more 
variance than the other components, and as we keep on extracting, the last 
few components will account for very litde o f the variance (i.e. they have 
small loadings). A common way to decide when to stop extracting is to 
choose components that contain at least an eigenvalue o f 1. As shown in the 
Appendix 6A.1, in our example, there are 5 components that satisfy this ‘rule 
o f thumb’. However, in addition to the statistical criteria o f which component 
to use, it is also important to make sure that the component extracted can be 
interpreted in a meaningful way and does make sense in light o f social science 
theories. In our example, it is difficult to meaningfully interpret the fifth 
component and therefore it is excluded from subsequent analysis despite 
having an eigenvalue greater than 1, as we discuss below.
The first component is most highly correlated with the “connections with 
politicians, political party or state officials”, the “connections with other trade 
union leaders”, and the “connections with members o f the union”, and 
modestly correlated with the “dedication to the cause” and “organise agitation 
and demonstration”. All five o f these variables are representative, because 
they have weak correlation with other 4 components. From  the variables 
closely associated with this first component, we may interpret that the first
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component captures the collection o f characteristics o f Indian trade union 
leaders as ‘political organisers’ or ‘agitators’.
T a b l e  6-1 R o t a t e d  c o m p o n e n t  m a t r i x
FC1 FC2 
Political organiser/ Technocratic 
agitator leader
FC3
Orator/
pleader
FC4
Articulate
leader
FC5
Ability to control 0 . 3 5 5 0 . 7 4 0 - 0 . 1 5 4 0 . 0 7 2 - 0 . 0 0 9
Make decisions 0 . 1 8 1 0 . 8 8 0 0 . 0 6 9 - 0 . 2 3 8 0 . 0 8 9
Make speeches - 0 . 0 3 3 - 0 . 0 7 5 0 . 3 6 2 0 . 1 3 3 0 . 7 9 1
Negotiate with managers 0 . 5 1 7 0 .  45 4 0 . 3 4 9 - 0 . 0 7 0 0 . 2 3 2
Organise agitations and demonstrations 0 . 6 7 8 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 4 4 6 - 0 . 0 4 3 - 0 . 1 5 4
Take initiatives 0 . 0 6 6 0 .  66 7 0 . 3 6 3 - 0 . 3 2 3 0 . 1 8 3
Communication skill 0 . 3 1 6 0 . 1 7 7 0 . 7 1 3 - 0 . 2 9 6 0 . 0 6 1
Connection with other trade union leaders 0 . 7 1 0 - 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 4 4 7 0 . 1 7 1 0 . 0 7 1
Connections with members o f  the union 0 . 7 0 6 0 . 2 3 6 0 . 0 4 8 0 .  01 4 0 . 1 9 3
Connections with politicians, political party ot 
state officials
0 . 8 2 0 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 2 3 9 0 .  0 0 1 - 0 . 1 0 9
Dedication to the cause 0 . 6 8 2 0 . 3 4 7 - 0 . 0 4 1 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 1 2 1
Honesty 0 . 6 2 3 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 0 0 9 - 0 . 3 3 6 0 . 1 5 9
Education - 0 . 2 0 2 - 0 . 1 6 6 0 . 0 7 7 0 . 7 6 7 0 . 1 6 9
Intelligence 0 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 0 2 8 - 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 0 4 5
Leadership skill 0 . 4 5 1 0 . 3 1 3 - 0 . 2 1 6 0 .  1 2 9 0 . 7 1 5
Persistence 0 . 2 7 0 0 . 8 2 7 0 . 1 6 0 - 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 1 5 4
Persuasiveness 0 . 4 5 6 0 . 5 2 8 0 . 2 7 1 - 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 1 4 5
Resourcefulness 0 . 1 2 8 0 . 8 3 3 0 . 0 5 2 0 .  0 1 3 - 0 . 2 1 0
Self confidence 0 . 5 6 2 0 . 3 9 7 0 . 0 1 5 - 0 . 3 3 9 0 . 0 4 7
Skill in court work 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 0 8 2 0 . 7 5 7 0 . 1 9 7 0 . 1 1 5
Note: (1) Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
(2) Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization Rotation converged in 10 
iterations.
(3) Cumulative variance explained by the 5 extracted components: 71.338%.
The second component is most highly correlated with the “ability to make 
decisions”, “resourcefulness”, “persistence” and the “ability to control” . 
Again, all four variables have very weak correlations with the other 4 
components, and hence can be taken to represent the characteristics o f the 
component. From the four variables correlated with the second component, 
we may interpret this second component to reflect the focus on the 
‘technocratic’ aspects o f leadership qualities.
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The third component is most highly correlated with the “skill in court work” 
and “communication skills”, both o f which are not correlated with other 
components. Because both o f these variables are related to the ability to 
communicate arguments to the court or in general, we interpret this 
component to represent emphasis on aspects o f union leadership as an 
‘orator’. This component corresponds (negatively) to the leadership quality 
labelled as “ V akil (pleader)” in Singh (1980: 92).
The forth component is most highly correlated with “intelligence” and 
“education”, and therefore we can interpret this component to highlight the 
aspect o f being an “articulate leader”.
The fifth component is most highly correlated with “making speeches” and 
“leadership skill” . However, note that these two variables that are highly 
correlated with this component also have some correlation with other 
extracted components. “Leadership skill” is modestly correlated with 
component 1 (political mobilisation) and 2 (autocratic leader). “Making 
speeches” also has a weak positive correlation with component 3 (orator). 
Moreover, the two variables with which the fifth extracted component is 
correlated reflect general ‘qualities’ o f trade union leaders, making it difficult 
to attach any specific label. Hence we will ignore this fifth component and 
proceed with our analysis on the basis o f the four extracted components 
interpreted above.
The five factors or components extracted from our survey data reflect diverse 
and multidimensional characteristics o f union leaderships in Indian industry. 
Interestingly our extracted factors do not necessarily correspond to those 
obtained from Singh’s study o f trade union leaders in Punjab in the late 1960s 
on which our questionnaire was based. In Singh’s analysis, three factors were 
extracted, which he interpreted as three styles o f union leadership: “Sarpanch 
(village leader)” which has high correlation with “honesty”, “self-confidence” , 
“persistence”, “intelligence”, “dedication” and “resourcefulness”; “Jathedar
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(agitator)” with high correction with “making speeches” and “negotiations”; 
and finally “ V akil (pleader)” with negative association with “correspondence” 
and “court work” . Since we modified the wording and enlarged the list o f 
leadership ‘qualities’ with several additional attributes, and also since the data 
analytical procedure in Singh’s factor analysis is not explained in his book, we 
cannot directly compare our results. The first “Sarpanch” factor, which Singh 
interprets to capture a broad-ranging leadership quality o f Indian trade 
unionists, overlaps to some degree with our first ‘political organiser’ or 
‘agitator’ component, but our additional attribute “connections with 
politicians, political party or state officials” dominates the variation in the 
correlation matrix. As we noted already, the third “ V akil (pleader)” factor is 
negatively correlated with the same variables (but with slightly modified 
wording) that was correlated with our ‘orator’ component, indicating 
similarity between the two dimensions. Interestingly, Singh comments that 
this third factor represents “a case of psudo-leadership, i.e. persons holding 
offices in trade unions without being the real leaders”, and portray them as 
“bureaucratic qualities” (p.93).
Following from the analysis in Chapter 4, we are interested in examining the 
relationships between the principle components that characterise union 
leadership perceptions and the dimensions that represent the typology of 
LMIs. Table 6-2 presents the bivariate correlations amongst the two 
dimensions we obtained from multidimensional scaling (MDS) o f the 
typology o f LMIs in Chapter 4 and the four factors representing the 
(perceptions on) leadership types. Since factors are extracted in such a way 
that they are uncorrelated amongst them (see Appendix), not surprisingly they 
have a correlation coefficient o f zero, and similarly the two MDS dimensions 
are uncorrelated. Therefore we are only interested in the 8 cells which are not 
shaded in grey. We find a moderate positive correlation between the first 
‘political organiser/ agitator’ component and the second MDS dimension that 
represents the extent o f politicisation and extemalisation o f union leadership.
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However all other bivariate correlations are very weak, and are not statistical 
significant.
T a b l e  6-2 C o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  o f  d i m e n s i o n s  f r o m  t h e  
M D S  A N D  F A C T O R  A N A L Y S I S
MDS diml 
Centralisation o f  bargaining 
MDS dim2 
Extemalisation o f  unionism  
FC1
Political organiser/ agitator 
FC2
Technocratic leader 
FC3 
Orator/ pleader 
FC4 
Articulate leader
MDS dim l MDS dim.2 FC1 FC2 FC3 FC4
1 .. 0 0 0
- 0 .. 0 3 2 1 . 0 0 0
0 ., 0 5 6 . 3 4 4 * 1 .. 0 0 0
0 .. 1 0 9 0 . 0 6 4 0 .. 0 0 0 1. . 0 0 0
0 .. 1 5 3 - 0 . 0 3 6 0 ., 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0
- 0 .. 2 2 1 - 0 . 0 0 5 0 ., 0 0 0 0 ., 0 0 0
Note: Figures are Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
* indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
T a b l e  6-3 M e a n  a n d  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  c o m p o n e n t
S C OR E S  B Y  R E G I O N A L  A N D  S E C T O R A L  C A T E G O R I E S
FC1
Political organiser/ 
agitator
FC2
Technocratic leader
FC3 
Orator/ pleader
FC4 
Articulate leader
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Kolkata traditional 0 . 5 8 2 0 .  608 0 . 2 0 0 0 . 8 4 5 0 . 2 8 8 1 . 1 6 8 - 0 . 4 3 1 0 . 9 7 0
Kolkata modern - 0 . 1 4 3 1 . 3 5 8 - 0 . 4 3 9 1 .  3 9 7 - 0 . 3 5 4 1 . 1 2 2 0 . 4 2 9 0 . 4 2 1
Mumbai traditional - 0 . 3 4 3 0 . 7 0 7 0 . 2 7 6 0 . 5 3 1 - 0 . 0 7 6 0 . 8 1 8 - 0 . 0 4 8 1 . 5 0 1
Mumbai modern - 0 . 4 4 3 0 . 8 8 5 - 0 . 0 4 7 0 . 8 9 3 0 . 1 6 0 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 2 0 2 0 . 5 2 9
Note: The number o f  observation is 46 (respondents from 18 units)
Similarly, in table 6-3 we have compared the component scores according to 
the four regional and sectoral categories we discussed in Chapter 4. Once 
again, it is difficult to find a clear association between our regional/sectoral 
categories and the extracted factors. If  we simply examine the mean scores, 
union leaders in the Kolkata ‘traditional’ sector perceive themselves as 
‘political organisers’ or ‘agitators’ rather than as ‘articulate leaders’. This is 
contrasted with leaders in Mumbai who seem to have the opposite 
characteristics. O n this basis, it could be suggested that our findings are 
consistent with the ‘stylised images’ about Mumbai and Kolkata unionism we
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described earlier. However, it is important to note that the standard deviation 
(s.d.) scores are generally high, in almost all cases exceeding its mean scores. 
This implies that the leadership perceptions are diverse and cannot be 
attributed to the regional and sectoral characteristics alone.
F i g u r e  6-1 S c a t t e r  p l o t  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  p e r c e p t i o n  s c o r e s
2 .00000 -
1 .00000 -
O  - 2 .0 0 0 0 0 -
- 3 .00000 -
- 4 .00000 -
Type of LMIs
4  Kolkata traditional 
> Kolkata modern 
Mumbai traditional 
V  Mumbai modern
-4.00000  - 2.00000  0.00000
FC 2 T e c h n o c ra tic  lea d er
2.00000
This observation is confirmed from the scatter plot of perception scores 
along the first two components. In figure 6-1, which plots the union leaders’ 
perception scores with the ‘political organiser’ component on the vertical axis 
and die ‘technocratic leader’ component on the horizontal axis, we cannot 
find clear ‘clusters’ of leadership characteristics, apart from the tendency of 
leaders in Kolkata ‘traditional’ sector to have a higher score along the vertical 
‘political organiser’ axis. In fact, a closer inspection of the data reveals that 
leaders in the same unit, or even the same union, may have vert- different 
perception about their leadership style. This suggests that the leadership
375
perception may depend significantly on the individual characteristics of 
leaders.
These findings suggest that the correlation between union leaders’ self­
perceptions and the type o f LMIs is at best weak, and therefore we have to 
look for alternative explanations o f why types o f LMIs and bargaining 
outcomes differ across regions and sectors. Moreover, the weak relationship 
that is observed between self perceptions of union leaders and institutions 
could just as well be interpreted with the reverse causality: that unionists’ 
attitudes are dependent/ endogenous variables that are primarily determined 
by the nature o f bargaining opportunities at the firm and extra-firm level.
6.2.3 Union activities
The type o f union leadership can also be examined by looking at the activities 
o f union leaders. It is o f particular interest to examine with whom  union 
leaders interact, communicate, and negotiate the most, given the stylised 
image o f politicked unionism motivated by party agenda in India. O f  course 
just because union leaders spend more time with state officials rather than 
plant-level management, it does not necessarily mean that political linkages 
have more weight in the bargaining process, nor does it indicate that these 
leaders represent a more politicised unionism. Nonetheless this dimension o f 
differences in union practices gives us further information on union strategies 
that need to be taken into account
Table 6-4 shows the distribution o f hours spent per week by union leaders on 
trade union work categorised by sector and region, following our typology o f 
LMIs in Chapter 4. If as the NIE-inspired models postulate, the type o f 
unionism is a strong explanatory variable that determines bargaining relations, 
we can expect to observe significant differences in the nature o f union 
activities between the 4 categories. From the table, we immediately observe 
that there is a wide diversity in the amount o f time union leaders devote to 
trade union activities as opposed to other activities, and as a result it is
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difficult to claim that there is a systematic difference in activities o f unionists 
in different sectors and regions. Statistical tests confirm that there is no clear 
pattern between the hours spent on union activities and the region or sector 
in which the union leader is operating ( f t 1 test does not reject the null 
hypothesis o f no association).
T a b l e  6 - 4  U n i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  (h o u r s  p e r  w e e k ) b y  
r e g i o n / s e c t o r
Less than 5 5 < 15 15 < 2 0 20 < 30 30 < 5 0 50 < Total Mean S.d.
Traditional
Kolkata
1 9 2 3 2 0 17 1 3 . 6 4 7 8 .  6 0 9
Modern 4 5 0 3 0 1 13 1 5 . 8 9 1 2 1 . 8 7 5
. . Traditional 
Mumbai
Modern
3 1 2 0 1 1 8 2 0 . 2 5 0 2 2 . 1 5 4
0 0 2 1 1 2 6 4 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 . 6 7 5
Total 8 15 6 7 4 4 44
Note: Pearson’s chi-square test was computed as — 2 3 .6 2 4  <  / f o 05 ( l 5 ) ,  failing to
reject the null hypothesis that the variables are statistically independent.
Source Author’s fieldwork
In general, we observe that unionists in Mumbai tend to spend more time in 
union activities compared to those in Kolkata, regardless o f whether they are 
located in the ‘m odem ’ or ‘traditional’ sectors. In Chapter 4, we argued that 
the type o f LMIs in Mumbai was characterised by more decentralised 
bargaining relations compared to those in Kolkata. Especially in Mumbai’s 
‘m odem ’ sector, where collective bargaining takes place exclusively at the 
plant-level, bargaining issues are more localised and therefore local union 
organisers carry a heavier task load in dealing with them. In addition, many o f 
the unionists represents ‘employees’ unions’, as discussed in Chapter 5, which 
are characterised by limited involvement o f external agency, the implication o f 
which may be that local union leaders must work harder to force employers 
to negotiate with them. In Section 5.3.3 o f the same chapter, we also 
highlighted the importance o f court work in union activities in Mumbai, as 
reflected in the highest number o f labour courts and industrial tribunals in 
Maharashtra. Bilateralism in Mumbai was always a contested terrain, which 
unions forced companies to accept through litigation, while employers have
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also used courts and tribunals to give legality to their practices and objectives. 
In contrast, we have seen in Chapter 5 that unions in Kolkata, especially those 
in the jute industry, are seen to lend its existence around disputes and 
conflicts by mobilising workers for strike and political rallies. However, once 
again we must note the variation within the regions and sectors as reflected in 
the high standard deviation (s.d.). O ur observation indicates that the regional 
difference is important in explaining the patterns o f unionists’ activities, 
although due to the degree o f variation within regions, it is difficult to 
generalise with great confidence.
T a b l e  6 - 5 ( A ) .  A g e n t s  w i t h  w h o m  u n i o n i s t s  s p e n d  t h e i r
T I ME  (1 S T  C H O I C E )
Members Top managers Middle managers State officials/court Other leaders Total
Traditional 10 2 1 13
Calcutta
Modern 10 2 1 13
Traditional 5 1 1 7
Bombay , ,  ,
Modern 3 1 1 5
Total 28 3 2 2 3 38
T a b l e  6 - 5 ( B ) .  ( 2 n d  c h o i c e )
Members Top managers Middle managers State officials/ court Other leaders Total
, Traditional 2 1 2 2 3 10
Calcutta
Modern 2 1 2 3 1 9
Traditional 1 3 1 5
Bombay
Modern 1 1 2 1 5
Total 5 4 7 7 5 28
Note: figures are rank in order o f  length o f time union leaders spent time with. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork
Let us next consider the nature o f unionists’ activities. As part o f the 
structured interview, union leaders were asked who they engage with on a 
regular basis in the course o f their work and activities, and were asked to 
select from and rank the agency: members o f the union; top-level 
management; middle management; state officials and court; leaders o f other 
unions. The summary o f the unionists’ first and second choice is presented in 
table 6-5 against the region and sector in which they are located. We observe 
that the majority o f unionists, regardless o f the region and industry, spend
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most of their time with the members of their union. If  we focus on the agents 
that came second in the ranking, we see that there is no clear difference we 
can highlight. Apart from the fact that the majority o f unionists prioritised 
meeting their own union members, we cannot find any particular pattern in 
the nature o f unionists’ activity by difference in region and sector.
The statistical analysis o f union leaders’ self perception and activities show a 
weak relationship between the type of unionism or union leadership and the 
different types o f LMIs we find across sectors and regions. We argue that this 
relationship is generally too weak to support the assumptions implicit in some 
mainstream economic models that assume that types o f LMIs and their 
bargaining outcomes can be attributed to individual perceptions and 
behavioural patterns o f bargaining agents. Instead, our interpretation is that 
behavioural variables are easier to interpret if we see them as an outcome o f a 
particular bargaining process.
Our observations in this section should not o f course be interpreted as an 
indication that individual bargaining agents are not important in determining 
types o f LMIs. It merely shows that the extreme version o f methodological 
individualistic approach, which suggests that LMIs must be explained 
exclusively in terms o f the perceptions and behaviours o f individuals, is 
unlikely to be useful as explanation for the types o f LMIs in Indian industry. 
Incidentally, our evidence also implies that the other extreme of the 
‘functionalist’ interpretation o f political economic/ structuralist approach, 
which postulates that individual behaviours must be explained by structures, is 
equally unconvincing, given the diverse patterns o f unionists’ perceptions and 
behaviours within regions and sectors.
Indeed, the history o f India’s trade unionism is a tale full o f  charismatic 
leaders, from the Gimi Kamgar Union (GKU) in the 1920s that bred 
nationalist leaders such as N. M. Joshi and S. A. Dange, to Geroge 
Fernandes’s socialist Bombay Labour Union, Datta Samant’s Mumbai Gimi
379
Kamgar Union (MGKU), and recendy the cross-party Joint Action 
Committee o f Trade Unions (JACTU) led by many prominent unionists 
today. There is no question that their ideology, strategy and leadership helped 
shape the different types o f unionism and bargaining relations we observe 
across India, but it is our analysis that these are also formed in response to the 
particular political and economic processes, and not necessarily by their ex ante 
or ‘innate’ preferences alone. These unionists in leading positions form their 
perceptions and strategies in response to the opportunities, incentives and 
constraints determined by their position in the wider social relations and 
political processes. The position o f this thesis is to argue that the type o f 
LMIs must be understood within the context o f the macro political economic 
structure, not because micro-level decisions and behaviours are not 
important, but because the structural position o f bargaining agents in the 
particular patterns o f accumulation must have primacy in explaining their 
actual decisions and behaviours.
6.3 Implications of LMIs for labour management
6.3.1 LMIs as ‘mediator’ of the labour process: concept and context
In the previous section, we proposed a dialectical approach in analysing the 
types o f LMIs by specifying the structural opportunities, incentives and 
constraints, as well as capacity, for micro-level bargaining agents. This section 
extends this argument to analyse the ways in which different types o f LMIs 
are reflected in particular modes o f managing and controlling the labour 
process, which in turn reflect the different process o f accumulation and 
redistributional politics that underpins it.
O f course, the role o f trade unions and other extra-economic forces in 
establishing and sustaining labour discipline is not specific to developing 
countries such as India. Indeed, many mainstream economic models such as 
Freeman and M edoff (1984) and Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have focused 
on the role o f LMIs in eliminating problems of informational asymmetry,
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helping coordinate work organisation, and facilitating wage restraint. In 
contrast, our argument is therefore that the role o f LMIs is not restricted to 
mediating informational or transaction costs.
As defined in Chapter 3, the labour process refers to the social relations o f 
production which ensures that productive forces are brought together and the 
capacity o f work is realised. However, how this process is controlled and 
managed varies depending on the historically specific social conditions. Since 
the labour process is subject to production relations, and more specifically to 
class struggle, capitalists are almost never fully in control over the labour 
process. Therefore, in general, capitalists are dependent on extra-economic 
forces and processes, m ost importantly but not exclusively the state, for 
controlling and managing the labour process. However, the particular mode 
of such intervention differs in important ways in different society. The task 
for our political economic analysis o f LMIs and the labour process is 
therefore to specify the structural conditions that determine the m ode o f 
controlling and managing the labour process.
In Chapter 1 and elsewhere, we have pointed out that many developing 
countries including India can be characterised by the weak political legitimacy 
o f the emerging industrial capital. The historical roots o f the relatively weak 
bargaining position o f Indian industrial capital can be traced back to at least 
the period o f British colonial rule, when Indian capital was smaller (in scale 
and number) compared to the Europeans, and even the industrial 
establishments which were Indian owned were managed by European 
managing agencies. This weak political position o f economically accumulating 
classes meant that company managers faced difficulties in imposing effective 
control over labour. Individual industrial entrepreneurs may control financial 
resources, but as a group, they often do not have the ability to impose new 
concepts o f labour discipline or new political setdements that imply a 
resolution o f distributive conflicts in their favour (Khan 1996; 1998; 2005). As
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a result, it is commonly observed that in the early stages o f industrialisation in 
industries such as cotton textile in Bombay (Mumbai) and jute textile in 
Calcutta (Kolkatta) the employers left all recruitment and virtually all 
disciplining (including discharge) o f workers in the hands o f intermediaries or 
foremen variously called jobbers, daffadars (freelance recruiters), sardars, and 
arkatis (village-level recruiters) (Morris 1955, pp.294-5; Robb 1993, p. 19; de 
Haan 1993; 1999; Sen 1999). These intermediaries were described to maintain 
“cavalierly” and “capricious” regime o f labour management whereby a large 
number o f workers, with litde loyalties to the mill and high turnover, were 
hired and discharged arbitrarily, often involving bribes and corruptions. This 
provided the scope for a tri-partite system o f labour management whereby the 
state acts as conciliator o f labour-management disputes and directly 
intervenes in the process o f wage determination and other welfare provisions. 
In this context, trade unions are seen to serve a ‘peculiar’ role o f “disciplinary 
institutions” to maintain stable political conditions necessary for industrial 
development (Morris 1955: 304), sometimes by taking over the role 
previously played by jobbers and sometimes operating alongside them.
In the context of our analysis o f the comparison o f LMIs in Mumbai and 
Kolkata, we argue that different historical processes lead to different types o f 
redistributional politics, which is in part reflected in the mode o f managing 
the labour process. O f course, this is not to suggest that other factors such as 
technology, production organisation, and other labour market conditions are 
not important in determining the mode o f managing the labour process. 
Instead, our hypothesis is that the different types o f LMIs and their 
implications for the specific ways in which the labour process is managed 
cannot be explained without reference to the different types o f macro political 
conflicts.
In Chapter 5, we suggested that the combination o f the redistributional 
politics in Maharashtra based on caste and communal identities, and the
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upper class/caste hegemony based on the relatively stable, apparently ‘pro- 
developmental’, alliance o f the ‘elite’ clusters, increasingly restricted the role o f 
the emerging industrial capital and organised labour in the macro political 
economic conflicts over ‘outside-firm rents’, while the dynamic and ‘uneven’ 
accumulation in the region providing incentives for bargaining over company- 
based ‘within-firm rents’. Our hypothesis is that these structural conditions in 
the region imply that the bargaining in many firms in Mumbai have tended to 
focus on increasing the share o f the surplus in the form of ‘wage-welfare’ 
payoff while sustaining productivity growth, rather than on the day-to-day 
involvement in the management o f the labour process.
O n the other hand, the failure to establish such stable alliance o f political 
elites and economically productive groups in West Bengal has led to the ruling 
coalitions to accommodate a wide section o f the society, particularly in middle 
and lower income groups, which combined with less dynamic industrial 
development in the region, opened opportunities for industrial capital and 
organised labour to seek resources through their location in the patron-client 
networks that dominates redistributional conflicts. The implication for labour 
management in Kolkata-based firms is that bargaining agents and other social 
agency o f different types are more likely to intervene in the day-to-day 
management o f the labour process to secure benefits, rather than to bargain 
over long-term payoffs based on future surplus growth.
6.3.2 The mode of managing the labour process in Mumbai and 
Kolkata
As an empirical analysis o f the different modes o f managing the labour 
process, in this section we shall examine the role of different types o f agency 
in influencing decisions on recruitment, restructuring and discharging o f 
labour. One o f the objectives o f the field research was to investigate the role 
o f different levels o f management, trade unions and other agents in ensuring 
that production takes place and work capacity utilised. As part o f the
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interview with labour union leaders and factory managers at the plant level, 
they were asked who make decisions regarding hiring and firing o f workers, 
job allocation and promotion5.
T a b l e  6 - 6  A g e n t s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  o n
H I R I N G ,  F I R I N G ,  J O B  A L L O C A T I O N  A N D  P R O M O T I O N  P O L I C I E S
Kolkata jute Mumbai textile Kolkata ‘m odem ’ Mumbai ‘modern’ 
(Hastings Mill, (Podar, IN D U  (Orient, IN D A L (INDAL Taloja, INDAL  
Wellington Mill) Nos.3&4, Sitram) Belur) Kalwa, Philips Kalwa)
Top 
Labour office
Hiring, Supervisor workers r
Jobber 
Trade union
• □ n □
□ □  o/m o
□
0
o (o) •  (o)
Top
Labour office
Firing c° Supervisor 
workers
Jobber 
Trade union
•  □  □  □  
□  □  □  □
(°)
•
•  (o) o/m
Top
Labour office
Supervisor allocation r
Jobber 
Trade union
• 
° 
£ 
£
 
□
• 
• 
□ 
o 
•
Top 
Labour office 
Promotion Supervisor 
Jobber 
Trade union
o (o )  □
□  o n  (o)
□  □  O
•  o •  o/m
Note: □ : main agents in decision making; o: other agents participating in decision 
making; •: agents who have influence over the decision-making process; ( o )  and 
( • )  indicates that the involvement was observed in some units but not in all; o/m 
indicates that the level of involvement varied in different units.
Source: A u th o r’s fieldw ork
5 It is known that this type of question must be used with care because a concept like ‘control’ is 
ambiguous and often left to respondents’ own subjective definitions (Converse 1986). Probing has 
been used to attempt to eliminate potential sampling error, but obviously subjectivity cannot be 
eliminated entirely from this type of data. It is perhaps realistic to understand the observations as 
union leaders’ perception of control on labour discipline rather than necessarily the ‘facts’ that refers 
to reality.
384
Table 6-6 summarises the findings on 4 aspects o f labour employment and 
allocation issues: hiring, firing, allocation and promotion. While there are 
differences in their extent o f involvement, in general, trade unions across the 
surveyed units in Mumbai and Kolkata appear to have some influence over 
labour employment and allocation issues. However, it is immediately apparent 
that there is significandy greater number of agents involved in the decision 
making in Kolkata jute mills compared to other sectors. Trade unions have 
some involvement in all 4 o f labour employment and allocation issues, and 
jobbers are involved in hiring and labour allocation decisions and some 
influence over firing decision as well, which is not observed in other sectors. 
We have already pointed out the multiple unions prevalent in Kolkata jute 
industry, whereby as many as 14 trade unions may be recognised as bargaining 
agents in a single mill, competing for mobilisation o f workers at time of 
industrial conflicts and political events. The finding that a multitude o f social 
actors beyond the narrowly defined bargaining agents are involved in the 
labour process in Kolkata ‘traditional’ sector is consistent with our field 
observation during the factory visit as well as interviews from mill managers. 
For example, in a particular jute mill, workers in the whole o f the weaving 
section was recruited from a single village area in the neighbouring State o f 
Orissa, and a jobber from the region was able to exercise strong control over 
the labour process to the extent that an absent weaver could not be replaced 
by a substitute or temporary worker (badli) on the day without the jobber’s 
consent. In a separate case, an interview with a particular union leader 
required approval o f a ‘religious leader’ who was said to have strong influence 
over the workers. The importance of jobbers and other social actors in 
recruiting and controlling workers in Kolkata jute mills is also consistent with 
other studies such as Das Gupta (1976), de Haan (1993; 1995; 1999) and Sen 
(1999).
In addition, our observation is that in Kolkata jute mills, the decision is made 
at relatively lower level o f the managerial hierarchy, with relatively little
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involvement from the top management. In most labour management issues, 
the labour office and supervisory ranks are the main decision makers. This is 
in contrast to the other 3 sectors, where hiring and firing are essentially 
decided by top-level management together with the labour office. O ur 
observation is that in jute mills, the labour office operates independently from 
other branches o f top level management and is more directly responsible for 
establishing labour discipline at the shop floor level together with jobbers and 
labour unions. In other industries, the labour office operates in much close 
connection with (and in many cases as part of) the top level management and 
labour control is more strongly subjected to financial and budgetary planning. 
This is again consistent with field observations, as revealed by the candid 
statement by a mill owner:
Multiplicity o f trade union reflects poor human resource management. 
It reflects the lack o f commitment in building management-workers 
relations. Management at the mill level would do anything to secure 
their position. They would even submit false report to me to pretend 
that industrial peace is kept at the mill. This is understandable 
considering the very high compensation these executives receive. [Also] 
There are two types o f trade unionist. The first is [party-] affiliated 
unions. The second type is caste based or village based unions. Babu 
[clerks] would bribe [these trade union] officers. The society accepts 
this type o f bribery. Bribes take the form of wages or kind, for example, 
employing his friends or recording him present when he is absent.
Interestingly, table 6-6 suggests that there is less involvement o f trade unions 
or jobbers in the Mumbai cotton textile industry. This is at variance with 
Morris’s (1955) argument that Bombay textile was the “laboratory” o f Indian 
factory system, where management control over labour discipline supposedly 
failed and all recruitment and disciplining was left in the hands o f jobbers and 
labour unions in the early 20th century. Also this is contrary to observations 
from our field research, whereby trade union leaders appear to have active 
role in imposing labour discipline in certain cases. In one textile mill, we came 
across a situation in which local union leaders were called into the labour 
officer’s room  together with workers who had been seen to have problems in
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terms o f absenteeism and low work moral, and union leaders assisted 
management in disciplining these workers. Once again, our observation that 
the representative union can be an effective tool for the management and 
government is consistent with other existing studies such as van Wersch 
(1992); Pinto and Fernandes (1996) and Krishnan (2000).
One possible interpretation is that the observations in table 6-6 are based on 
union leaders ‘perceptions’ o f labour control, and not necessarily reflecting 
the ‘reality’. It is possible that trade union leaders in Kolkata jute mills have 
vested interest in presenting themselves to be actively involved in labour 
control, given the multiplicity o f unionism and rivalry amongst them, whereas 
union leaders in Mumbai textile industry may prefer to put a more ‘business- 
oriented’ face. However, our interpretation is that the observation at least 
partially captures the different mode o f involvement by trade unions and 
other agency. Our hypothesis is that bargaining agents in Kolkata jute industry 
regularly intervene in the labour process at almost all levels, whereas in 
Mumbai textile industry, the involvement o f unions appears to be kept under 
stronger control by the mill management.
In addition, it is our argument that this difference in the mode o f managing 
the labour process cannot be explained by informational or transaction costs 
alone. While there may have been some changes in production technology 
and market conditions in the Mumbai textile industry, particularly in a small 
number o f privately-owned mills, which could be interpreted to have led to 
differing monitoring costs and requirements for coordination, we find such 
changes insufficient as explanatory factors. Instead, we argue that the 
multiplicity o f interventions in the labour process o f the Kolkata jute industry, 
both in terms o f the type o f agency and the level o f involvement on one 
hand, and the ‘disciplined’ involvement o f unions in the labour process o f the 
Mumbai textile industry on the other hand, cannot be understood without 
reference to the opportunities for different type o f rent-seeking under
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different mode o f patron-client politics in the wider social context in which 
labour-management bargaining takes place.
Table 6-6 also suggests that the labour process in the ‘m odem ’ sector units in 
Mumbai and Kolkata was mainly controlled by the top-level management, but 
with varying degrees o f involvement by lower-level management and unions, 
as indicated by symbols (o) and o /  •  in the table. From our field observation, 
one o f the areas in which union involvement is wide spread is the issue o f 
voluntary retirement scheme (VRS). In an interview with workers who have 
taken up the VRS and left the Phillips Kalwa factory in Thane (greater 
Mumbai), it has been suggested that union leaders played an important role in 
persuading workers to accept the scheme in the early 2000s, which was also 
confirmed by union leaders and personnel managers. However, some media 
reports suggest that there were various intimidation used by management to 
force workers to take up the VRS6. Similarly, in the BOC factory in Kolkata, 
although the trade unions do not openly advocate the VRS, personal 
managers admit that the scheme is implemented through ‘discussion’ with 
trade unions, where union leaders informally suggest some workers to take up 
the VRS. These observations are in line with Ramaswamy’s (1988: 75) 
observation that in Mumbai “a new kind o f ‘responsible trade unionism” has 
developed whereby “unions are aggressive and demanding and refuse to 
accept that management have the final word, but team up with the 
management to ensure that workers perform as promised”, and thus “have 
become the honorary personnel and industrial relations managers o f the 
organization”. Symbolically, the President of the Philips Workers’ Union had 
his desk in the personnel office. Once again, our interpretation is that the 
degree o f trade union involvements, and the issues on which they are 
involved, in the management o f the labour process vary significandy reflecting 
the opportunities, incentives and constraints for appropriating different types 
o f ‘rents’.
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6.3.3 Analysis of the ‘wage-welfare’ payoff
In this section, we examine the pay-scale in our surveyed units. Pay-scale or 
schedules is a grade-scales matrix o f wages and is typically determined within 
the formal collective bargaining settlements between trade unions and the 
management. It specifies worker’s wage increment typically by the length o f 
service and therefore informs how the firm rewards seniority and experience 
o f workers. O ur hypothesis is that the pay-scale reveals important information 
about (i) the incentives and disincentives for long-term investment by workers 
in firm-specific skills, and (ii) the importance given by the union to mobilising 
workers for long-term firm-specific action, as opposed to mobilisation o f the 
maximum number o f workers for actions that are likely to seek rents beyond 
the firm.
A ‘steep’ pay schedule may indicate the value to the firm o f long-term 
investment in skills by the worker, whereas a firm in a sector that did not 
require much investment in skills on the part o f labour, other factors being 
equal, would not want to increase pay over time. The latter may particularly be 
important if skills acquisition is less important than labour discipline in 
ensuring production, and the management o f the labour process relies on 
trade unions, jobbers and other social agency. At the same time, for a given 
technological and production condition, a particular pay structure may reflect 
union power in negotiating such package for their members. If  there is 
sufficient scope for productivity growth and space for bargaining over 
‘within-firm rents’, unions may also want to tie in workers to a long-term 
commitment to the union by going for ‘steep’ wage schedules. A ‘steep’ 
schedule would then indicate successful bargaining by a strong union. O n the 
other hand, if  the scope for productivity growth is limited, unions may prefer 
‘egalitarian’ flatter pay schedule that would enable large number o f workers to 
be mobilised in order to improve their position in the redistributional 
conflicts over ‘outside-firm rents’.
6 Maharashtra Times, 27 Septem ber 2000, pages 1 and 8.
389
Existing studies such as Piore and Sabel (1984), Aoki (1988), and Calmfors et 
al. (2001: 63-4) suggest that ‘flat’ wage progression tends to be found more in 
public sectors or in producers o f ‘up-stream’ goods (i.e. relatively distant from 
customers) and in centralised bargaining where the cost o f rent-seeking can be 
passed on relatively easily. In contrast, seniority wages are found in 
organisations with more complex division o f labour and team operation. Thus, 
conventional models have tended to focus mainly on technology and 
production organisation as determinants o f pay schedule. In this context, our 
hypothesis is that the pay schedule is influenced by social and political context 
in which the bargaining takes place, as much as being determined by the 
technological and organisational factors.
Pay or rem uneration7 package in the organised sector o f Indian industry 
consists of: basic wage; dearness allowance; house rent allowance; and other 
allowances. Here we are interested in the composition as well as the type o f 
worker’s pay, particularly the relative importance o f basic wage (BW), which is 
the basic component o f the earnings, distinguished from various allowances, 
and dearness allowance (DA), a cost o f living allowance to compensate for 
inflation and typically calculated using consumer price index (CPI) o f the 
locality, and is characteristic to Indian industry.
*S teepn ess’ o f  the p a y  schedule
To compare incentives for bargaining agents to engage in long-term firm- 
specific collective action, we shall look at two measurements. The first is the 
average pay-scale per grade in the surveyed factories. Pay-scale per grade is 
the extent to which the span o f progression in direct wage due to annual 
increment extends within a grade. This can be interpreted as the measurement 
of the range o f seniority increments (Banaji and Hensm an 1990: 60-61). In
7 According to the Equal Remuneration Act 1976, “remuneration” is defined as “the basic wages or 
salary, and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable, either in cash or kind to a person 
employed in respect of employment or work done in such employment, if the terms of the contract of 
employment, express or implied, were fulfilled”.
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other words, a pay-scale with a longer range in a given grade can be 
interpreted as an indication that there is more scope for workers to move up 
the pay-scale ladder while remaining in a particular grade or job grouping. O f 
course, the grade does not necessarily have to be a grouping o f jobs with 
similar worth but generally, movements up a scale are much more frequent 
than movements between grades.
Another measurement o f the willingness to reward seniority is the ‘steepness’ 
o f the pay increments with respect to scale. I measure this by considering the 
elasticity o f direct wage to seniority. In general, if we have wage scheme o f N  
grades and T scales, where wage can be denoted by Wjt, i=  1 1
If  we assume that w it is a function o f parameter i attached to individual grades 
and scale t, i.e. Wjt = f  (7, t), we can define the elasticity o f w tt with respect to 
scale t to be the proportional change in wit for a given proportional change in
dw /w- dw I dt 
t, assuming that there is no change in the grade, that is — " ■ or — —— .
dt/t  wu/ t
Let us call this the scale elasticity o f wage8.
8 Elasticity is a better measure of the importance of long-term skill acquisition and firm-specific 
collective action than simply calculating dwjt j  d t , the marginal change in wages that is expected for a
unit change in the pay-scale (workers moving up one ‘spine point’). The problem with this measurement 
is that pay-scale may be designed differently depending on the local condition at the plant leveL For 
example, let’s say in one firm workers move up a scale after one year of tenure whereas in another it
takes two years to move up a scale. In such a case, even if the calculated d\Vlt j  dt is the same, for the
first firm it in fact measures reward for one year tenure while for the second it gives the reward for two 
years seniority. In addition to this, we must also be aware that we are comparing pay-scale of firms in
diverse settings both in terms of location as well as industrial sectors. Therefore even if d\Vit j  d t is the
same, the same wage changes per scale may have different implication as reward to seniority. Workers 
may not be concerned with the absolute changes in the wages but more concerned with relative changes 
in wages. For these two reasons we compare elasticity of wage to seniority, which can be compared 
across the observations to get a sense of the relative magnitudes.
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T a b l e  6-7 S c a l e  p e r  g r a d e  a n d  s c a l e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f
E A R N I N G S  I N  S U R V E Y E D  E S T A B L I S H M E N T S
Industry/ firm Year
Pay-scale (by job 
categories) Grade Scale Scale per 
grade
Scale elasticity o f  wage
„ Basic wage 
Basic wage + D A
Jute mills in WB 1995 Production workers 7 75 1 0 . 7 0 .  0 5 6 0 . 0 0 8
Support workers 20 2 8 5 1 4 . 3 0 . 0 7 6 0 . 0 1 2
Public sector 
engineering in WB
1997
Factories employing 50 
to 249 workmen, 
Production workers 
Factories employing 50 
to 249 workmen,
4 36 9 . 0 0 . 0 3 8 0 . 0 2 4
Support workers 
Factories employing 
250 workmen and
7 7 6 1 0 .  9 0 . 0 6 2 0 . 0 3 9
above, Production
workers 4 3 6 9 . 0 0 . 0 3 7 0 . 0 2 3
Factories employing 
250 workmen and
above, Support 
workers 7 76 1 0 .  9 0 .  0 6 1 0 . 0 3 8
Philips Taratalla, WB 2000 6 24 4 . 0 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 0 3
Phillips Kalwa, Mah 1998 20 2 8 2 14 .1 NAV NAV
BOC, WB 1999
Factory and general 
staff 5 1 0 6 2 1 . 2 0 . 3 7 0 NAP
Office staff 3 65 2 1 . 7 0 .  4 0 9 NAP
HMV/ Saregama, WB 2000 Production workers 2 90 4 5 . 0 0 . 3 0 5 0 . 1 2 2
Support workers 4 1 3 3 3 3 . 3 0 . 2 8 8 0 . 1 1 0
Indal Belur, WB 1999 Daily rated 18 4 3 2 24 . 0 0 . 1 2 0 NAP
Monthly rated 10 2 5 0 2 5 .  0 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 0 3 4
Indal Kalwa, Mah 1993 Daily rated workmen 13 3 2 5 2 5 . 0 0 .  4 9 3 NAP
Monthly rated 
workmen 10 2 5 0 2 5 .  0 0 .  5 3 5 0 . 1 6 3
1996 Daily rated workmen 13 4 5 5 3 5 .  0 0 . 5 6 4 NAP
Monthly rated 
workmen 10 35 0 3 5 . 0 0 .  61 5 0 . 1 9 9
Indal Taloja, Mah 1995 Daily rated workmen 11 5 3 9 4 9 . 0 0 .  638 NAP
Monthly rated 
workmen 7 3 4 3 4 9 . 0 0 .  6 4 5 0 . 1 5 6
1999 Daily rated workmen 11 671 6 1 . 0 0 .  69 1 NAP
Monthly rated 
workmen 7 427 6 1 . 0 0 . 7 0 0 0 . 1 3 3
Ind-Auto/Fiat, Mah 1999
Monthly rated 
production workmen 5 1 1 0 2 2 . 0 0 . 3 6 0 NAV
Security staff (daily 
rated) 3 48 1 6 . 0 0 . 3 9 8 NAV
Daily rated support 
workers 3 50 1 6 . 7 0 . 2 3 2 NAV
Note: N A V  = not available; N A P =  not applicable. The classification o f  D A  in som e units varies: 
Philips Taratalla includes D A  and Additional DA; IN D A L  Belur includes D A , Extra D A , Standard 
Allowance, Special incentive, Special allowance, Additional standard allowance, and Growth incentives. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork.
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Table 6-7 shows 24 sets o f pay-scale from 9 units or industries, which we 
used for calculation. 11 pay-scales are from 3 units based in Mumbai, and the 
rest are from factory-level or industry-level settlements in Kolkata or West 
Bengal. 6 pay-scales in West Bengal are taken from two industry-level 
settlements, an industry-level settlement that applies to jute mulls affiliated to 
the Indian Jute Mills Association (IJMA), and an industry-level settlement that 
applies to public sector engineering firms in W est Bengal.
The number o f units from which the data is taken in this analysis is less than 
the number covered in the author’s field survey (23 units). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, in some cases firms and unions did not have setdements agreed for 
years. Notable omissions include the cotton textile mills in Mumbai under the 
public sector National Textile Corporation (NTC) where there have been no 
setdements agreed since 1992, and even this did not involve drawing up a new 
pay-scale. Pay in the Mumbai textile mills appears to be negotiated on an ‘ad- 
hoc’ or personalised basis, as we discuss in section 6.4 below, and the pay 
progression based on grade and scale appears to have been eroded.
The lack o f pay-scale data in some key firms and industries makes it difficult 
to make a full comparison between different types o f industries, particulady 
between what we called ‘traditional’ and ‘m odem ’ sectors. W hat stands out 
instead is the difference in the pay-scale o f firms located in Mumbai 
contrasted to those located in Kolkata.
If  we first focus on the scale per grade in table 6-7, we can see a wide range o f 
increments, from 4 ‘spine points’ per grade in the 2000 settlement o f Phillips’s 
luminaire plant located at Taratolla in Kolkata to 61 scales per grade in the 
1999 settlement o f INDA L Taloja factory in Mumbai. It is particularly 
interesting that the settlements o f units under the same company organisation 
have very different pay schedule. In contrast to the small number o f scale per 
grade in Taratolla, the 1998 settlement at the Phillips Kalwa light factory in
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the Thane-Belapur district o f Greater Mumbai had a much higher 14 
increments per grade. Similarly INDAL’s Belur plant in Kolkata had the 1999 
settlement with 25 ‘spine points’, which is in variance with 61 in Taloja, 
despite both factories involved in a similar production process, namely 
remelting and rolling o f aluminium
Similarly if we turn to the scale elasticity o f wage in table 6-7, again we find a 
range o f values, from 0.3 percent increase in the sum o f basic wage (BW) and 
dearness allowances (DA) by moving up the ‘spine’ o f the pay schedule by 1 
percent in the 2000 settlement for Phillips Taratolla in Kolkata, to 19.9 
percent in INDAL Kalwa factory in Mumbai. Once again, the comparison o f 
the setdements in the three INDAL units is interesting. The two INDA L 
plants with similar production technology have very different scale elasticity 
o f pay, between 3.4 percent increase in pay in the Belur unit in Kolkata and
13.3 percent in Taloja o f Mumbai.
Our finding that units in Mumbai and Kolkata under the same company, and 
with similar technological and production conditions, have very different pay 
schedule is in line with our focus on social and political contexts in the two 
regions. Our hypothesis is that the limited scope for bargaining agents to 
impose political setdements in their favour in redistributional conflicts at the 
macro political economy, and the relatively dynamic accumulation in the 
region, provided greater incentives as well as compulsion for bargaining 
agents in Mumbai to seek long-term company-based collective action in order 
to extract a greater share o f ‘within-firm rents’. In contrast, we suggest that 
bargaining agents in Kolkata faced greater opportunities to seek ‘outside-firm 
rents’ from their location in the patron-client networks o f various political and 
social actors, and therefore unions’ strategy have tended to focus on attracting 
resources through their ability to mobilise workers.
This is o f course not to suggest that technological and production conditions 
are not important in determining pay structure. It is insightful to note that
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INDAL’s Kalwa factory, which had the highest scale elasticity o f pay amongst 
our surveyed units, produces aluminium foils and packages, and therefore 
involved in a more ‘down-stream’ operation compared to the production 
process in the other two INDAL plants. In Chapter 4, we pointed out that 
the production process in the Kalwa unit requires greater technological and 
skill acquisition on the part o f the workers, which enables workers to exercise 
greater threat to the profitability o f the firm compared to the other two 
‘downstream’ units. The ‘steep’ pay schedule in the Kalwa plant therefore 
implies a greater willingness on the firm’s side to award long-term skill 
development and greater success on the union’s side in getting reqards for 
long-term collective action, where there are favourable conditions o f 
bargaining agents to extract a greater share o f ‘within-firm rents’. Thus we 
conclude that to explain the emergence o f very different pay structures, we 
need to look more closely at the unions’ negotiation o f pay-scales with 
management in line with different mobilisation strategies.
T ypes o f  D earness allow ances (DA)
As another aspect o f the ‘wage-welfare’ payoff is the dearness allowance (DA) 
paid in the surveyed establishments. DA is a form o f payment linked to 
workers’ cost o f living, typically measured by the consumer price index (CPI). 
Payments linked to price inflation are not unique to Indian industries9, as seen 
in “price compensation” payments in Holland (Banaji and Hensman 1990: 63) 
but what is peculiar about the DA in India is the fact that workers receive an 
amount o f DA which is typically way above the amount earned as their direct 
wage, sometimes as high as 90 percent o f the total earnings. Because DA 
often accounts for a major part o f workers’ earnings, although it is termed 
‘allowance’, it is treated differently from other types o f allowances, such as 
canteen allowances or housing allowances. For example, to be a member o f
9 However this type of payment linked to consumer price index do not appear in ILO’s categorisation of 
workers’ earnings (or labour cost from the management’s point of view). C.f. “Resolution concerning 
statistics of labour cost” adopted at the Eleventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians, 
October 1966.
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India’s Employee Provident Fund Scheme (that covers workers need in case 
o f Retirement, Medical Care, Housing, etc.), employers and employees 
contribute 12% of the workers’ ‘pay’, whereas ‘pay’ includes “basic wages with 
dearness allowance, retaining allowance, (if any) and cash value o f food 
concessions admissible thereon”10. Hence clearly DA is considered to be part 
o f the basic and main component o f organised workers’ earnings in Indian 
industries.
The use o f DA in Indian industries goes back to the period o f the First World 
War and was established around the 1940s as a measure to compensate for 
the rapid price inflation. According to one o f the leading authorities on wages 
in India:
[t]he basic principle behind DA payment is one o f correction adopted 
to neutralize [the] fall in the value o f money, so as to keep the workers’ 
real wages constant at a given level. This being so, it naturally follows 
that the payment o f dearness allowance should be based exclusively on 
the cost o f living index [...] (Papola, 1970: 111).
Yet in reality, the forms and roles o f DA are quite diverse and are far from 
being “exclusively” based on the CPI. The fact that there are diverse types o f 
DA in Indian industries is important because, despite the popular perception 
that DA is a need-based wage, the way in which DA is paid may or may not 
be designed to satisfy workers’ needs.
To see this, let us focus on the type o f dearness allowances (DA) paid in 
Indian establishments. Here, following Banaji and Hensman (1990), we 
categorise DA into three types: flat rate schemes, double linkage schemes, and 
salary group schemes. In flat rate scheme, the amount o f DA is linked only to 
the CPI and not to the basic wage. Under this scheme, all employees will 
receive the same amount o f DA regardless o f their rank, seniority or their 
performance. Double linkage schemes allow the amount o f DA to be linked
10 Cf. Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme 1952 (http://www.epfindia.com/epf.htm; accessed 
05/09/09).
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to both basic wage and CPI. Salary group schemes links DA to basic wage, 
but instead o f direcdy linking the amount o f DA to the exact amount o f 
individual basic wage, as in the case of percentage or double linkage schemes, 
here, a fixed amount o f DA is paid for employees whose basic wage is within 
a certain range.
It is, o f course, not correct to assert that flat DA schemes are m ore needs- 
based or ‘egalitarian’ than variable DA like the double linkage and salary 
group schemes. Flat DA may look ‘egalitarian’ from the viewpoint that the 
same amount o f pay increase is given to all worker regardless o f grade and 
scale. But in the context o f seniority wage, it is possible to argue that pay that 
is linked to age or length o f service is more needs-based from the point of 
view of a worker’s life cycle.
Apart from having implications for the amount o f DA  employees receive, the 
three types o f DA schemes have important implications for the employers’ 
capacity to control wage increase. Under a flat rate DA scheme, due to its 
nature, employers do not have any direct control over the amount o f DA. 
Management can negotiate the size o f DA payment associated with changes 
in price, but once the amount is settled, since consumer price is exogenous to 
individual firms, the employers have little control over the increase o f DA. In 
the case o f double linkage schemes, the DA payment to employees is linked 
to the exact amount o f basic wage as well as the CPI, and hence there is scope 
for the employers to curb wage increase. While employers do not have 
control over the inflation rate, they are able to influence or negotiate the 
weight with which the amount o f DA is linked to the basic wage, as well as 
the amount o f basic wage at each pay-scale, and the distribution o f employees 
within the grade-scale structure. The third method o f DA payment, salary 
group scheme also offers employers with scope for influencing wage changes. 
It is therefore our hypothesis that different types o f DA reflect patterns of 
firm-union bargaining resolution over ‘rent’ redistribution, and indicate the
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extent to which importance is given to mobilisation o f workers to increase 
productivity and seek £within-firm rents’ in the long-run, as opposed to 
seeking ‘outside-firm rents’ through homogenising pay within the sector and 
maximising their organisational power.
T a b l e  6 - 8  T y p e s  o f  d e a r n e s s  a l l o w a n c e s
Settlement Bargaining level Location Type o f DA
Jute industry (1995), WB Industry Kolkataa Flat
Public sector engineering industry (1997), WB Industry Kolkata Flat 0)
National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) 
(1992) Industry Mumbai Flat
Saregama India (2001) Plant Kolkata Flat
Philips Taratolla (2000), WB Plant Kolkata Group (54 slabs)
Phillips Kalwa (1998), Mah Plant Mumbai Group (27 slabs) +  Double <2)
INDAL Belur (1999), WB Plant Kolkata Flat +  D ouble P)
INDAL Taloja (1995), Mah Plant Mumbai Double (75-110%) +  Group (7 slabs)
INDAL Taloja (1999), Mah Plant Mumbai Double (75-110%) +  Group (7 slabs)
INDAL Kalwa (1993), Mah Plant Mumbai Double (25-150%) +  Group (7 slabs)
INDAL Kalwa (1998), Mah Plant Mumbai Double (15-150%) +  Group (8 slabs)
Notes: Flat stands for flat rate schemes, Double refers to double linkage schemes, and Group
is the salary group schemes.
(1) The D A  in public sector engineering is different for different grades but is not 
linked to scale o f the basic wage. The same rate o f the D A  is paid for all workers 
in the same job category regardless o f their seniority or merit.
(2) The D A  o f  Phillips Kalwa is paid by salary group schemes. In addition to this, 
workers receive additional dearness allowance which is paid proportional to the 
basic wage.
(3) In addition to the traditional flat rate DA, Indal Belur has the Additional Dearness 
Allowance scheme that is paid proportional to the basic wage.
Source: Author’s fieldwork.
In our sample, 5 wage settlements employed flat dearness allowances scheme. 
Flat DA is implemented in all three industry-wide settlements studied: jute 
textile industry in W est Bengal, West Bengal public sector engineering, and 
cotton textile industry in Maharashtra. Flat DA is also found in two plant- 
level setdements. One is Saregama India, a music cassette tape producer 
operating since 1929. INDA L Belur, an aluminium-processing factory 
producing sheet aluminium, pays different types o f DA with the basic DA 
paid in flat scheme and additional DA linked with the amount o f basic wage. 
Both o f these establishments which had plant-level setdements with flat DA 
were located in Kolkata.
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O n the other hand, DA linked to basic wage payment, either in the form o f 
double linkage or in the form of group payment, is found in ‘m odem ’ sector 
establishments where bargaining takes place at plant-level. For example, in 
Philips’ Kolkata plant, salary group scheme is used, and therefore the amount 
o f DA paid to employees is linked to the salary category to which they belong.
It is our hypothesis that the flat DA in industry-wide settlements in 
‘traditional’ sectors such as textile and jute industries, as well as in public 
sector engineering industry, indicates a rent extraction based on mobilisation 
o f workers to be part o f a wider social and political process, whereby the 
capacity to capture rents beyond the firm depends on the unions’ ability to 
mobilise the maximum number o f workers across firms and sectors on 
solidaristic grounds. In contrast, the variable DA in some o f the ‘m odem ’ 
sector firms in our sample is consistent with bargaining by unions for a share 
o f ‘within-firm rents’, which is likely to result in key groups o f workers being 
able to extract higher incomes.
This hypothesis can be further elaborated by examining the types o f DA in 
the three INDAL units in Mumbai and Kolkata. In all establishments o f 
INDAL we surveyed, DA is proportionally linked to basic wage (BW). 
However, the rate o f linkage to BW is slightly different. While the proportion 
is the same across employees in INDAL’s Belur factory, the two factories in 
Mumbai employ both double linkage and salary group schemes, where the 
rate o f linkage to basic wage differs depending on workers’ scale and grade. In 
addition, we can observe that the double linkage in the Kalwa unit allows 
potentially greater variation in pay compared to that in Taloja. Recall that the 
main operation in INDA L Belur and INDAL Taloja are sheet rolling 
processes with seemingly similar technology, while the operation at INDAL 
Kalwa is foil rolling and converting, which is a more technically advanced and 
‘down-stream’ process. O ur observation therefore leads us to hypothesise that 
the type o f DA appears to be associated with technological and market
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conditions, as well as with broader social and political conditions in which 
labour-management bargaining takes place, which provide different 
opportunities, incentives and constraints for the mobilisation strategies of 
bargaining agents.
6.4 Reproduction and transformation of LMIs and their policy 
implications
6.4.1 Trajectories of institutional transformation
In this final section o f the thesis, we will draw inferences on the potentials or 
otherwise o f transformation o f labour market institutions (LMIs) in Kolkata 
(Calcutta) and Mumbai (Bombay). Types o f LMIs as identified in Chapter 4 
o f this thesis are constantly reproduced or transformed in response to their 
location in the changing patron-client politics, which is continuously 
contested by other actors in the wider social context. The objective o f this 
section is therefore, to analyse the trajectories o f institutional changes drawing 
on case studies from our field research.
The question of how institutions change is important especially in light o f the 
on-going debates on labour market reforms in India, which we reviewed in 
Chapter 1. The emerging policy consensus emphasises (i) the removing of 
protective labour legislation and institutional restrictions on the labour 
markets, as well as (ii) encouraging the localisation o f bargaining structure, 
combined with (iii) micro-level reforms that ‘empowers’ rank-and-file workers 
by improving the democratic accountability and transparency o f LMIs in 
order to focus bargaining agents’ strategies on issues closer to the economic 
‘reality’ o f the firm, rather than for them to be motivated by political issues 
(Banerji, Campos and Sabot 1995; Hossain, Islam and Kibria 1999; Aidt and 
Tzannatos 2002; Debroy 2005).
We have also pointed out throughout this thesis that the emerging policy 
consensus on labour market reforms has significant overlap with the
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theoretical arguments o f the new institutional economics (NIE), m ost notably 
that o f N orth (1990; 1999), who have focused on the role of economic 
opportunities that leads to changes in perceptions o f political and economic 
entrepreneurs. The NIE-inspired models assume that the difference between 
LMIs that supposedly enhance and those that hinder productivity growth lies 
in the extent to which they enable or restrict the effective functioning o f 
labour markets. They hypothesise that certain LMIs are inefficient or 
unproductive because unions focus on short-term gains from rent-seeking, 
rather than to use their ‘voice’ effect or ability to reduce transaction costs and 
increase productivity to realise long-term payoffs (Freeman and M edoff 1984; 
Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002). Therefore, the 
implication is that institutional change that enhances efficiency or productivity 
is achieved by providing stronger incentives for unions to seek company-based 
mobilisation so that institutional restriction to markets can be reduced.
The political economic approach, especially the so-called ‘transition’ debates11 
in Marxist political economy (Brenner 1976; 1985; W ood 2002; Khan 2005), 
offer contrasting insights into the subject o f institutional change that leads us 
to hypothesise that market-based incentives may not be sufficient for the 
emergence o f productivity-enhancing institutions. O ur hypothesis is that to 
explain trajectory o f institutional transformation, we need to examine the 
structural ‘compulsions’ and ‘imperatives’ for bargaining agents to organise 
LMIs differently, rather than to reduce it to economic opportunities and 
incentives alone (Wood 2002: 54). In this sense, the political economic 
analysis differs from, as Baker et al. (2004) critically labelled, the exercise of 
conventional studies to find the “right mix” o f LMIs or to simply specify 
‘compatibility’ o f LMIs with certain technological and governance conditions. 
Rather than to simply assume that by removing state and other political
11 The ‘transition’ debate were of course concerned with transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist 
society, whereas our concen here is about different concrete forms of capitalist production relations. 
However, the insights that emerged from the debates offer a framework for our analysis of 
institutional change.
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interventions in LMIs and make them democratically accountable to the rank- 
and-file workers, the type o f unionism and bargaining relations would be 
'liberated’ and be guided by the market impulse, we must empirically study the 
experiences o f institutional changes, or lack o f them, by focusing on the 
structural conditions that compel and enable bargaining agents to organise their 
mobilisation strategies differently.
We shall therefore use case studies from our field research to argue that 
trajectories o f institutional transformation are not as simplistic as assumed in 
some of the mainstream theories o f institutional change. We show that the 
collapse o f more 'encompassing’ bargaining system and the shift to localised 
LMIs was associated with significant changes in wage structure, work 
organisation, and patterns o f capital investments. However, we point out that 
the trajectories o f institutional changes cannot be explained by the changes in 
economic incentives alone, and must also be understood in the context o f structural 
imperatives faced by bargaining agents. We argue that transitions between 
different types o f LMIs are contested making the path open to a num ber o f 
outcomes, and the process often involves conflict and violence.
6.4.2 Institutional change in ‘traditional* sectors: cases of Mumbai 
textile and Kolkata jute industries
We have already discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 that in Mumbai’s cotton textile 
industry, the ‘traditionar industry-wide state-dominated collective bargaining 
is maintained by public sector mills, at least on the surface, today. However 
after the prolonged Mumbai textile strike o f 1982-83, privately-owned mills 
broke away from the industry-wide employer association and started to hold 
separate collective bargaining at individual mill-levels. Even in the public 
sector mills, decision making over many important issues such as changes in 
work organisation, modernisation and labour restructuring in the form of 
voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) have been localised to the mill-level. In
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Chapter 4, we showed that this was manifested in the diverging typology o f 
LMIs in the Mumbai ‘traditional’ sector.
The purpose o f this section is to provide an analysis o f the implications o f the 
this ‘localisation’ o f bargaining, which led to ‘personalisation’ o f pay in the 
textile mills. We also examine competing hypotheses on the trajectories of this 
institutional change. The case o f Mumbai textile industry is o f particular 
interest for our comparison with the Kolkata jute industry, which leads us to 
consider the relevance o f the hypotheses in explaining why similar types o f 
institutional transformation did not take place in the Kolkata jute. We argue 
that the different patterns o f accumulation and political mobilisation in the 
two regions offered different opportunities and incentives for the bargaining 
agents in the two industries.
One phenomenon observed as a result o f the localisation o f bargaining level 
in Mumbai’s textile industry since the 1980s is the increasing importance o f 
‘personalised’ or ‘ad hoc’ wage12, as opposed to the conventional Task: wage’ 
which is defined in pay-scale and determined by collective bargaining. It is 
important to note that this change in the pay patterns happened not only in 
private sector mills, which opted out o f the industry-wide collective 
bargaining, but also in public sector mills, where the industry-wide collective 
bargaining is still legally imposed under the Bombay Industrial Relations 
(BIR) Act o f 1946, at least on the face o f it. As an example, let us consider the 
pay patterns in Podar Mill, a public sector National Textile Corporation 
(NTC) mill in Mumbai, using the data from the mill-level union-management 
settlement in 1999.
From table 6-9, we can confirm that the proportion o f personal pay in 
relations to the basic wage has increased in all 4 departments o f the mill. In 
this textile mill as a whole, the average proportion o f personal pay increased
12 I would like to acknowledge Suchita Karkani for suggesting this trend in pay patterns in the textile 
industry.
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from 0.027 prior to the settlement to 0.058 in the post-agreement wage level. 
The figure, at the same time, shows that despite its increased influence in 
shaping the wage distribution, the effect o f personal pay in the overall wage 
composition is limited. Thus the short-term immediate impact of the 
introduction o f personalised payment is not great.
T a b l e  6-9 A g r e e m e n t  o n  c h a n g e s  i n  w o r k  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
A N D  W A G E S  I N  N T C  P O D A R  M I L L  ( M U M B A I ) ,  1999
(I) Blow  
Room  
Department
(II) Frame 
Department
(III) Ring 
Department
(IV) Ring 
Maintenance 
Department
Total 
( I - IV)
Present complement o f  workers 34 1 1 2 2 4 4 42 4 3 2
Proposed complement o f  workers 27 92 1 9 4 3 6 3 4 9
Changes in post - 7 - 2 0 - 5 0 - 6 - 8 3
Mean o f  present basic wage 3 3 7 . 8 4 7 3 8 2 . 0 2 6 3 8 7 . 3 7 7 3 8 7 . 6 1 7 3 7 9 . 2 9 2
Mean o f  present personal pay 1 . 9 0 9 5 .  4 0 7 1 8 . 1 7 7 9 . 5 9 8 1 0 . 4 3 3
Mean o f  proposed basic wage 3 4 6 . 3 9 8 3 9 0 . 3 0 5 3 9 2 . 8 0 2 3 9 0 . 6 3 1 3 8 5 . 2 2 7
Mean o f  proposed personal pay 3 . 2 7 3 1 6 . 0 7 1 3 5 . 6 0 7 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 3 . 5 8 6
Present proportion o f  personal pay 0 . 0 0 6 0 .  0 1 4 0 .  0 4 5 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 2 7
Proposed proportion o f personal pay 0 . 0 0 9 0 .  0 4 0 0 .  0 8 3 0 . 0 6 2 0 . 0 5 8
Changes in mean o f  basic wage 8 . 5 5 1 8 . 2 7 8 5 .  4 2 5 3 . 0 1 4 5 .  9 3 5
Changes in means o f personal pay 1 . 3 6 4 1 0 . 6 6 4 1 7 . 4 3 0 1 6 . 1 1 7 1 3 . 1 5 4
Standard deviation o f  present wages 2 6 . 9 5 3 1 7 0 . 7 5 9 1 3 9 . 3 3 6 7 9 . 0 2 1 1 2 4 . 3 7 8
Standard deviation o f  proposed wages 2 9 . 9 1 5 1 8 0 . 6 6 6 1 4 9 . 4 9 1 8 6 . 1 1 6 1 3 2 . 8 3 3
Standard deviation o f  changes in mean o f  
basic wage 5 . 1 3 5 1 0 . 0 0 3 1 0 . 0 9 6 3 . 4 8 4 8 . 4 4 2
Standard deviation o f  changes in means 
o f personal pay 4 . 5 2 3 1 2 . 8 2 2 1 4 . 9 4 5 1 4 . 4 6 6 1 4 . 0 7 7
Source: Memorandum o f Agreement Under Section 44(1) o f  the Bombay Industrial Relation 
Act 1946, Podar Mill, 1998-99
However the long-run impact may be different. For example, in the frame 
department (II), ring department (III) and ring maintenance department (TV), 
the average increase o f personal pay was higher than in the increase in the 
basic wage. In other words, in these three departments, wage increase took 
the form o f increase in personal wage instead o f the increase in basic wage. 
The consequence o f this is the increased standard deviation o f wage after the
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agreement relative to the pre-settlement wages. As the mill as a whole, the 
standard deviation o f the sum of basic wage and personal pay rose from 
124.378 in the pre-agreement wage scheme to 132.833 in the post-agreement 
scheme. This can be explained by the higher standard deviation in the wage 
increase in the form o f personal wage relative to the basic wage. Standard 
deviation o f wage increase in the form o f basic wage was 8.442 whereas in the 
form of personal pay it was 14.077.
The data from Podar mill therefore shows an increased importance placed on 
‘personalised’ or ‘ad hoc’ pay, even in a public sector mill with supposedly 
legal commitment to industry-wide bargaining, which compared to the 
traditional pay-scale based wages and benefits, allows greater ability for the 
mill management to control the pay patterns. Our hypothesis is that this 
change in pay patterns was possible because o f the collapse o f the more ‘all- 
encompassing’ collective bargaining system, whereby pay tends to be 
homogenised for similar work categories, and therefore reflects the changing 
mobilisation strategies o f bargaining agents. It is however too simplistic to 
assume that such change in pay patterns alone was the main incentive that led 
to the institutional change. Rather our interpretation is that this emerging 
pattern in pay structure reflects wider changes in the labour management as 
an outcome o f the trajectory o f institutional transformation in the Mumbai 
textile industry.
In his study on the Mumbai textile strike o f 1982-83, van Wersch (1992: 497) 
suggested that “economic demands and not political objectives were foremost 
in the mind o f the workers” during the strike, which he attributes as the main 
reason for the failure to remove the Congress-affiliated Rashttiya Mill 
Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS) and ultimately the collapse o f the industry-wide 
bargaining. As we have discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the dispute initiated in 
September 1981 over bonus payments, and the growing dissatisfaction to the 
RMMS’s inability to resolve the issue, led to workers inviting Datta Samant o f
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: the Maharashtra Gimi Kamgar Union (MGKU) to lead the struggle to
| demand wage increase and permanency o f badlis (casual labourer) in addition
| to the higher bonus. Despite the widely held understanding that ousting the
| RMMS was a precondition for realising these demands, the strike failed to
generate ‘all-encompassing’ alternative institutions to the nexus between the 
Congress, employers association and the RMMS. Van Wersch attributes this 
to the weakness o f ‘'class solidarity or class consciousness” amongst workers, 
who preferred mill-level negotiation to the industry-wide bargaining from the 
belief that they could extract higher returns. However, if this is the case, the 
task for a political economic analysis is to examine the particular process and 
relationship that mediates the class-in-itself (objective, economic/ 
sociological) and the class-for-itself (subjective, political), and problematise 
the weak ‘class consciousness’ (Thompson 1963; W ood 1995; Bensai'd 2002).
Bhattacherjee (1989; 1994) argues that the main factor that determined the 
textile strike o f 1982-83 and the subsequent institutional changes was the 
dynamic but ‘uneven’ development in the textile industries since the 1970s. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, an increasing gap emerged between a small number o f 
‘progressive’ companies who have invested in costly new technology and 
diversified to higher-end o f the market focusing on quality products for the 
rich and middle classes and export on the one hand, and the ‘backward’ mills 
with obsolete technology who faced competition from the unorganised small- 
scale power-loom and hand-loom sectors on the other. We have argued that 
this particular pattern o f industrial development created opportunities for 
bargaining agents to appropriate ‘rents’ at the local mill-level.
We have also suggested in Chapter 4 that in many of the ‘sick’ mills, real 
estate speculation has become a profitable venture since the 1990s. Prior to 
the 1990s, mill lands in Mumbai were classified as ‘comforting zones’ for 
industrial activity, which meant that land use for other purposes were illegal. 
However the revision o f the Development Control (DC) rule in 1991 opened
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possibility for land use to be switched subject to certain conditions. In the 
case of cotton textile mills the proviso was for the proceeds to finance the 
modernisation o f the mills, although “the process o f the sale and the sale 
proceeds go unmonitored” (Pinto and Fernandes 1996: 11-2). As a result, 
many mills were either closed or running with limited capacity, leading to 
further relocation o f production to the power-loom sector. Another 
consequence o f this was the increase in unemployed mill workers, which is 
said to have provided a recruiting ground for organised crimes, and some o f 
the most notorious criminals, such as Romesh Sharmam who is known to 
have been one o f the key fixer o f deals in political corruption and business, 
started their life as migrant mill worker. Some even estimates that “a third o f 
the members o f the new gangs which have grown in the city are from former 
mill-workers’ families” (Krishnan 2000: 12-13). It is also known that some 
mill managers have secretly dealt with mafias and gangs in various activities, 
most prominently in labour disputes and land deals.
These diverging patterns o f accumulation in the Mumbai textile industry can 
be interpreted as providing economic incentives for bargaining agents to 
reorganise their strategies to seek local ‘rents’ at the mill-level. The ‘uneven’ 
pattern o f growth may also explain the difficulty for collective action to 
develop alternative all-encompassing institutions or political projects, as 
suggested by van Wersch (1992). However, our hypothesis is that, in addition 
to all these, the trajectory o f institutional changes in the Mumbai textile 
industry was also subjected to structural opportunities and compulsions from 
the particular patterns o f political economic redistribution conflicts in the 
region. As discussed in Chapter 5, the emergence o f a stable and loosely ‘pro- 
developmental’ coalition o f ‘elite clusters’ from a wide section o f the society 
in the Maharashtra, and the patterns o f redistributional politics that led to 
political clients mobilising their organisational power along caste and 
communal lines to capture resources through land speculations and criminal 
activities, have meant that the opportunities and capacity for bargaining
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agents in industrial relations to mobilise and appropriate ‘outside-firm rents’ 
was limited. Our hypothesis is therefore that such structural conditions 
created opportunities as well as compulsion for bargaining agents to 
reorganise their institutions to focus on the struggle over ‘within-firm rents’.
The significance o f the role o f structural compulsions in institutional changes 
can be explained by asking why a similar transformation did not happen in the 
Kolkata jute industry, despite the desire on the side o f some section o f the 
industry to change the ‘traditional’ clientelist politicised bargaining relations. 
The LMIs in Kolkata jute since 1977 was characterised by a strong state- 
controlled bargaining dominated by the ruling Communist Party o f India 
(Marxist) or CPI(M) on the one hand, and multiple unionism led by the 
CPI(M)’s labour wing, the Centre for Indian Trade Unions (CITU), and 
factional mobilisation o f workers on the other.
If  we extend the ‘class consciousness’ hypothesis, is it possible to suggest that 
the institutional transformation happened in Mumbai textile but not in 
Kolkata jute, because the labour or union movement was not sufficiently 
strong in Mumbai, whereas in Kolkata workers were able to resist such a 
change? This hypothesis does not fit with our observations from our field 
research as well as previous studies such as Ramaswamy (1988) and Sen 
(1992). As discussed in Chapter 4, and further elaborated below, our 
observation is that the diversity o f the types o f LMIs in Mumbai textile 
industry signal the vitality (and volatility) o f unionism in the sector, whereas 
the unions in Kolkata jute is often characterised by rivalry and division along 
party and factional lines, dividing loyalty amongst the organised workers.
Moreover, the inability o f unions, both in Mumbai and Kolkata, to 
meaningfully engage with unorganised or casual workers even within the 
mills, makes the hypothesis that attributes different trajectories o f institutional 
changes to ‘class consiousness’ unconvincing. We can illustrate the point by 
citing the incident o f Baranagore Jute Mill on 13 January 2001, where two mill
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executive officers were burnt to death after one worker was shot down13. The 
media coverage o f the case, largely parroting the official report o f the incident 
authored by the IJMA (2001), pointed their finger at trade unions, and the 
chief minister was reported to have asked trade unions “to refrain from any 
kind o f irresponsible trade unionism and violent activity”14. However, during 
the field research, the author has been told by both unionists and mill 
managers (not at Baranagore itself, but in neighbouring mills) that the 
Baranagore incident was not caused by trade unions but by non-unionised 
casual workers who were dissatisfied with their pay and conditions, and in fact 
unions were “nowhere to be seen”.
It is also questionable whether the lack o f institutional change can be 
attributed to the power o f unions, even o f the ‘traditional’ party-affiliated 
unions (as opposed to the newly emerging faction-based unions which are 
typically small in size) in Kolkata jute. This can be illustrated with another 
rather violent incident in the Kolkata jute mills, whereby on 8 January 2002, 
nearly 100 workers o f the Wellington Jute Mill in Rishtra, Kolkata, attacked 
the house o f the AITUC leader Dcbashis Dutta. According to newspaper 
reports15 the reason for the attack was over the tripartite agreement between 
the jute mill owners, the State government and several trade unions, which 
stated the wages o f one-third o f jute mill workers to be linked to the 
productivity o f a mill. This agreement was arrived at in order to avert a 
looming strike in the jute sector across the State. Dutta was one o f the 
signatories. The labour minister Mohammed Amin, condemning the attack, 
commented that this incident was a burst o f workers’ anger against a union 
leader who did not properly brief “the details o f the agreement” . But also, 
according to the report, we should also note that the workers felt that their 
salary may be reduced as a result o f being linked to productivity. These
13 The Hindu Business Line, Sunday 14 and 18 January 2001.
14 The Hindu Business Line, Thursday 5 April 2001.
13 The Telegraph, Wednesday 9 January 2002.
409
observations seem to indicate that the difference in the degree o f ‘class 
consciousness’ or union power, on their own, cannot explain the trajectory o f 
institutional changes in Mumbai and Kolkata.
It is o f course possible to argue that different patterns o f LMIs can be 
explained by the technological change that led to the dynamic industrial 
development in Mumbai cotton textile industry along the line argued by 
Bhattacherjee (1989), which was not available to the jute industry. However, if  
technological development was lacking in jute machinery, we must explain 
why there was no compulsion for productivity growth despite the industry 
performing poorly in comparison to jute producers in Bangladesh and China, 
and more broadly in competition with synthetic alternatives. Also, there are 
jute mills such as the Hastings Jute Mill, whose owner acquired a jute 
machinery company with the publicised aim to make technological progress 
in jute machinery. Some mills, including Hastings, have introduced incentive 
schemes in an attempt to link pay to productivity, although the margin o f 
incentive scheme is very small compared to the overall wage structure, and 
the peculiar conditions or ‘eligibility’ for the incentive payment16 making the 
scheme difficult to work effectively. The desire in some section o f the 
industry to break away from the ‘traditional’ state-controlled LMIs is evident 
from the statement from our interview with a senior Indian Jute Mills 
Association (IJMA) officer, who spoke about the industrial disputes in the 
1990s, as below:
We intended to create a ‘disaster’ in Calcuttta jute mills, a disaster 
comparable to the cotton textile mills in 1980s Bombay. We in fact
16 There are two ‘entry limits’ to be eligible for instinctive payment. First, in order for a worker to be  
eligible for receiving incentive payments, the person’s productivity must exceed the “participation 
point” predetermined at each department. Second, in order for a worker in any department to be 
eligible for receiving incentive payment, the packing production o f  the plant must reach 26 kg per 
man-day during the incentive period. Som e labour management officers have commented that 
because production fall below either o f  the two entry limits can be caused by any reasons that is 
“beyond the control o f  management”, such as raw material non-availability and machine breakdown, 
and due to the large fluctuation in the production o f  jute products, the scheme has not provided the 
intended effect.
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tried it twice. In both cases, the dispute was short lived and the mill 
reopened operating just as it was before.
Therefore, our argument is that, while the lack o f technological development 
and the slow productivity growth signalled weak incentives for bargaining 
agents to seek ‘within-firm rents’, this must be understood within the totality 
o f the particular patterns o f accumulation in the region. Once again, returning 
to our argument from Chapter 5, the ‘elitist’ political base o f the CPI(M) in 
West Bengal, who were detached from the productive groups, were unable to 
establish a coalition o f ‘elite clusters’ o f a wide social groups in the way it was 
achieved in Maharashtra in the early period o f industrialisation. This meant 
that the state had to appeal to the middle and lower income groups by 
engineering redistribution o f resources, while also sustaining industries and 
generating employment through direct state interventions and subsidies. This 
political condition created opportunities for bargaining agents in industrial 
relations to focus on mobilisation of workers to extract a greater share o f the 
political created ‘outside-firm rents’ in Kolkata, while the general industrial 
stagnation in the region has meant that opportunity and compulsion to shift 
the mobilisation strategy to seek ‘within-firm rents’ was weak.
Another important observation that emerges from the case study o f the 
Mumbai textile industry is that the transformation o f LMIs was not 
necessarily smooth, nor was it necessarily the only trajectory o f change. We 
have already indicated that the collapse o f the industry-wide bargaining was 
triggered by the Mumbai textile strike o f 1982-83, which ended with a 
devastating number o f job losses estimated to be about 75,000 workers (both 
badlis and permanent workers) according to van Wersch (1992). But the 1982- 
83 strike was not the first time workers in Mumbai textile stood up to 
challenge the state-dominated industrial relation system. Since the birth o f the 
Gimi Kamgar Union (GKU) in the 1920s, and emergence o f charismatic 
leaders such as N. M Joshi and S. A. Dange, the Mumbai textile industry was 
a stronghold o f left-wing union political and social actors. Although, the
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communists were alienated during the struggle for Independence, due to their 
support to the British during World War II, the establishment o f the RMMS 
in 1947 by the Congress as the sole recognised bargaining agents for the 
industry can be seen as an attempt to marginalise the “Red menace” 
(Krishnan op tit:. 19).
However, the nexus between the Congress, the employer associations and the 
RMMS was not unchallenged, sometimes manifested as split within the 
RMMS, sometime by the left parties appealing to the Industrial courts to 
contest the representative status o f the RMMS, and generally by continued 
agitation and labour unrest throughout the 1970s and 80s (van Wersch 1992: 
66-75). The latest o f such challenges to the RMMS have come from the Gimi 
Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS), which started as the “Closed Mill Workers 
Action Committee”17 in 1989 and was formed as a union in 1996, led by mill 
workers such as Datta Iswalkar and labour lawyers such as Gayatri Singh. 
Although unrecognised by mill managers, the GKSS in 2001 claimed to have 
membership o f 15 thousand workers from 12 closed mills. Since the majority 
o f its members are workers whose mill has been closed down, normal tactics 
such as strikes cannot be employed. The GKSS does not make demands on 
salary, or work hours, leaves, or facilities. Instead the GKSS demands the 
rehabilitation o f workers and their family by using tactics such as hunger 
strike, workers take over mills, and other creative public campaigning 
methods (Pinto and Fernandes 1996; Krishnan 2000). While these challenges 
have so far failed to resolve the clientelist politicised industrial relations in the 
sector as a whole, and may be ultimately unsustainable because they typically 
rely on personality and commitment o f core activities, they nevertheless show 
that the collapse o f the ‘traditional’ state-dominated bargaining had potentially 
a number o f outcomes in the Mumbai textile industry.
17 Translated from the name o f  the group o f  the time: Bandh G im i Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (Piunto 
and Fernandes op cit. 1996: 30).
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6.4.3 Implications of decentralised LMIs: Case studies from ‘modem* 
sector units
In this section, we shall examine Philips India as another case study o f 
decentralisation o f LMIs, this time in the ‘m odem ’ sector. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, in our field research we have visited two Philips India plants, a 
luminaire factory in Taratolla, Kolkata, and a light bulb factory in Thane- 
Belapur district o f Mumbai. It is therefore o f interest for us to examine the 
implications o f institutional transformation in the two units. In Philips, 
collective bargaining was always organised at the plant-level, but from 1969 to 
1986 there was Philips Workers’ Union that acted as a union ‘federation’ for a 
number o f Philips plants, including the Taratolla and Kalwa units. This 
federation was legally dismembered in 1986, following the formation o f a 
splinter union, with the management playing a significant role in destabilising 
the employees’ union. We provide analysis o f the patterns o f wage 
determination in the company before and after the managerial changes that 
followed the dismembering o f the federation to examine the impact o f the 
localisation o f LMIs. We also show that this institutional transformation led 
to restructuring o f labour in the company, but with differing patterns in the 
two units. Once again, our argument is that the implications o f institutional 
changes to the labour process must be understood within the wider process 
o f accumulation and redistributional conflicts.
Let us first examine the implications o f institutional change on wage 
determination strategies by using the company-level data on employment 
costs, net fixed assets, net sales and profits from 1986 to 1999. We are 
interested in the relationship between the employment cost and other 
finnanial indicators at the company-level before and after the collapse o f the 
national-level union federation. Consider an additive liner wage or 
employment cost function:
wi = A) + P \K X + P 2S t + Pz7tt + P ALt +£, (1)
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where wt is wages or employment costs; K t is capital or fixed assets; S t is 
sales; 7Tt is profits; and L( is labour input. Also, / 0 — P Q/ P 4 , Y\ ~ P\!P* > 
and so on.
Table 6-10 presents the estimated result o f a simple linear regression model 
(2) with employment cost per employee, wt / L t , as the regressand (i.e.
dependent or explained variable) and net fixed asset per employee, K t/ L t ,
annual net sales per employee, S j L t , and profit (after tax) per employee,
x , l L, as the main regressors (independent or explanatory variables). A time
trend variable T  is also included to account for the common trend amongst 
variables. Since we are interested in the changes before and after the 
institutional change, we have introduced an intercept dummy variable, D t , 
which takes a value o f 1 for the period after the institutional change, as well as 
slope dummy variables, Dt x K j L t , D , x S t / Lt , and Dt x n t j L t . 
Unfortunately we were only able to obtain comparable data from 1986, which 
was the year the union federation was dismembered, but instead we have used 
1991 as the cut-off point for the institutional change on the ground that the 
collapse o f the union federation instigated a series o f managerial changes, 
which according to our interview with managers, are said to have been 
completed in 1991. Therefore the dichotomous variable Dt is defined as:
D , =  0 for t  = 1986 — 1991;
Dt =1 for f = 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 9 .
The model was estimated using the ordinary least square (OLS) method, and 
diagnostic tests do not reject the assumption o f normally distributed, spherical 
disturbances, as shown in Appendix 6A.3.
T a b l e  6-10 E s t i m a t i o n  r e s u l t  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  c o s t  
F U N C T I O N  U S I N G  P H I L I P S  I N D I A  A N N U A L  D A T A ,  1986-1999
Regressor Coefficient
N et Fixed Asset per employee 4c 4c1 .  5 6 1
( K . / L , ) ( 0 . 4 7 5 )
Annual N et Sales per employee -I*0 . 1 3 3
( S . / L , ) ( 0 . 0 3 5 )
Profit (after tax) per employee 0 .  0 4 3
w / A ) ( 0 . 2 4 1 )
Dt (Dt =0 for 1986-1991 Dt = 1 4c 4c0 . 2 2 6
for 1992-1999) ( 0 . 0 6 9 )
D x  N et Fixed Asset per employee - 1 . 0 0 0 *
(D , x K , / L ,) ( 0 . 4 1 4 )
D x  Annual N et Sales per employee - 0 . 0 9 1 *
( D , x S , / L , ) ( 0 . 0 3 9 )
D x  Profit (after tax) per employee 0 .  0 0 9
( D ^ ttJ L , ) ( 0 . 2 8 6 )
Intercept
- 0 . 1 2 3 * *  
( 0 . 0 4 4 )
Time trend ( T )
- 0 . 0 1 9 * *  
( 0 . 0 0 6 )
Adjusted R 2 0 .  9 9 1
Note: OLS is used as the estimation method. Diagnostic tests (not reported here) do not 
reject the assumption o f  normally distributed, spherical disturbances. The regressand is
Employment cost ( Wt /  Lt ) =  Salary, bonus and staff welfare (excluding VRS) per employee.
14 observations are used for estimation from 1986 to 1999. ** denotes that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at 5% level, * denotes that it is significant at 10% level. Figures in 
parentheses are standard errors.
The high adjusted coefficient o f determination, R 2 = 0 .9 9 1 ,  indicates that 
the model represents the variation o f the data well. All regressors except the 
profit variables, n t / Lt and Dt xttJ L t , are statistically significant at least at 
the 10 percent level. The signs o f the coefficinents are consistent with 
standard economic theories, with all three o f the economic variables, K t / L t , 
S (/ L t and n t / L t having positive coefficients. For the purpose o f our
analysis, we are interested in significance o f the dummy variables, which 
implies a statistically significant change in the relationship between the 
variables analysed. The positive coefficient on the dummy variable indicates 
that there was an upward shift in the level o f  employment cost function after
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1991, independent o f the regressors, which suggests an average increase of 
employment costs by Rs. 226,000 per employee. However, the negative 
coefficients on the slope dummy variables, Dt x K t/ L t , D t x S t / L t , and 
D t x n t j L t , indicates that the overall impact o f institutional change on
employment costs was likely to have been negative. This can be verified by 
estimating what the employment costs would have been had the relationship 
between the variables remained as in the pre-1991 period, i.e. in the absence 
o f the managerial changes that coincided with the collapse o f the union 
federation. Table 6-11 compares the observed and estimated or simulated 
employment costs.
T a b l e  6-11 C h a n g e s  o f  o b s e r v e d  a n d  s i m u l a t e d
E M P L O Y M E N T  C O STS  
(c) Simulated
(a) Observed (b) Estimated employment N et Fixed Annual N et Profit (after
employment employment cost when Assets per Sales per tax) per
cost__________cost_________ D = 0 _________(c)-(b)_______employee_____ employee_____employee
1986-87 0 0 4 6 0 0 4 5 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 4 7 0 0 0 1
1987-88 0 0 5 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 1 7 0 00 4
1988-89 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 0 5 6 6 - 0 0 1 5
1989-90 0 0 6 9 0 0 6 8 0 0 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 0 5 1 2 0 00 4
1990-91 0 0 7 5 0 0 7 4 0 0 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 0 7 1 4 0 0 3 6
1991-92 0 0 8 9 0 0 8 8 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 0 944 0 0 2 3
1992-93 0 0 9 9 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 4 0 0 2 3 0 1 5 4 1 0 3 8 0 0 1 8
1993-94 0 07 7 0 0 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 1 6 1 0 9 3 2 0 0 1 6
1994 (9 months) 0 1 1 9 0 1 1 4 0 2 3 4 0 1 2 0 0 1 9 2 1 6 9 2 0 06 4
1995 0 1 4 6 0 1 4 0 0 3 5 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 4 0 2 1 6 8 0 0 3 3
1996 0 1 6 5 0 1 5 9 0 4 4 1 0 2 8 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 7 1 0 0 1 2
1997 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 3 0 5 8 1 0 3 8 8 0 3 6 1 2 7 8 2 - 0 0 2 5
1998 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 6 6 7 0 4 5 7 0 3 8 1 3 3 2 1 0 02 4
1999 0 2 9 2 0 2 8 9 0 9 3 8 0 6 4 9 0 4 5 7 4 5 8 8 0 07 4
Note: All figures are measured in million Rs.
From table 6-11 we can observe that the difference in wages or employment 
costs before and after the institutional and managerial change increased 
rapidly in the second half o f 1990s, implying that the employment costs
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would have been much higher had the managerial and institutional changes 
not taken place. A closer inspection of the table reveals that this ‘deviation’ 
was due to the rise o f net fixed capital per employee and annual net sales per 
employee since 1994. It appears that this was part o f the new initiative by the 
management to restructure Philips India in the 1990s. In response to the poor 
sales and profit performance in the late 1980s and early 90s, Philips 
management made “conscious investment in further strengthening the 
Company’s brand equity — the image the customer has o f the products and 
services that Philips offers” and invested heavily in information technology. 
Further, the management started the construction o f “the Rs. 300 crore state- 
of-the-art plant at Kota” in Punjab for manufacturing glass and lamps (Philips 
India Annual Report 1995).
Another aspect o f the managerial initiatives in the 1990s has been the 
restructuring o f work organisation and reduction in employment. Especially 
important was the use o f the voluntary retirement schemes (VRS), designed 
to reduce employment by inducing staffs and workers to accept retirement 
‘voluntarily’ with an attractive parting package in a form o f lump-sum benefit. 
As already discussed in Section 6.3.2 there are question as to what extent we 
can assume that this process is ‘voluntary’ especially in light o f openly 
recognised role trade unions play in selecting and ‘persuading’ certain workers 
to take up the VRS, and intimidation tactics that are reported to be used by 
the management. The effect o f the VRS is partially reflected in the trend o f 
employment in the two Philips factors from our fieldwork data, which is 
presented in Figure 6-2. Although the VRS was introduced at the company- 
level, and therefore employees in any Philips units could potentially apply for 
the scheme, the impact on employment in the two factories appears to be 
different. In the Taratolla luminaire (luxurious lamp) plant in Kolkata, the 
manpower (the sum o f production workers and support staffs) declined from 
254 in December 1996 to 144 in March 2001, when the field research was 
conducted. In contrast, the decline o f manpower was more rapid in the Kalwa
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light factory in Mumbai, from 894 production workers and support staffs in 
1996 to 246 in March 2001.
F i g u r e  6 - 2  E m p l o y m e n t  i n  P h i l i p s  K a l w a  ( M u m b a i ) a n d  
T a r a t o l l a  ( K o l k a t a )
M anpow er in Philips Kalwa (Mumbai), 1996-2001
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■  M an ag em en t
□  Indirect (support staff)
□  Direct (production w orkers)
M anpow er in Philips Taratolla (Kolkata), 1995-2001
300
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001
□  Indirect (support staff)
□  Direct (production w orkers)
N o te: D ata  for m anagem en t in Taratolla w as n o t  m ade available and therefore n o t included . 
Source: A u th o r ’s fieldw ork.
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Given that the two factories produces different products (while the Kalwa 
factory has a product portfolio that includes lamps, filaments, fluorescent 
powder and glass, the Taratolla plant focuses mainly on lamps and other 
domestic appliances), it is possible that different trend in employment during 
the 1990s reflects the overall company strategy o f resource redistribution to 
shift the production, in relative terms, away from Mumbai and to Kolkata, 
either because o f different market conditions or different labour costs. Indeed 
the rapid manpower reduction was made possible, in part, by outsourcing the 
fluorescent powder and glass operations away from Kalwa. It is also possible 
that the manpower reduction in Kolkata happened through other means, such 
as the closure o f Philips’ Salt Lake ‘videocom’ factory in  1999.
However, our interview with managers in the two factories suggests that the 
newly installed managers in 1991 faced different challenges and went on to 
employ different tactics to instigate the changes in Mumbai and Kolkata. In 
the light factory in Kalwa, Mumbai, a dispute occurred regarding flexibility 
and rationalisation policies negotiated during the 1992-93 plant-level 
settlement. Despite the majority Philips Workers Union refusing the 
settlement, the management in Kalwa signed the setdement with the Peico 
Employees’ Union, the union allegedly set up by the Philips management to 
engineer a split in the union movement and ultimately the collapse o f the 
union federation in 1986. Philips Workers Union separately signed the 
settlement later on. This 1993 settlement set the basis for the major 
rationalisation programme that was implemented in the Mumbai union 
throughout the 1990s, o f which the unions are said to be “supportive”.
In contrast, in the luminaire unit in Kolkata, a new personnel management 
came in with the objective to “change the work culture” . According to the 
personnel manager, prior to 1991, management was unable to decide or 
implement policies regarding contract labour, overtime, canteen, transport 
allowances etc. After 1991, the management argues that they gradually started
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to gain control over these issue in such a way that the management felt no 
longer need to consult the union to decide on policies regarding workers. This 
however did not mean that the changes did not face resistance. In fact the 
Peico Employees’ Union, which was said to take a pro-management position 
in Mumbai, was controlled by the CITU and affiliated to the CPI(M) in 
Kolkata, and therefore the restructuring o f work organisation was subjected 
to a series o f labour disputes and court cases throughout the 1990s. In an 
interview with an ex-manager at Philips’ Taratolla unit, we were told that:
In Philips, management played games by creating conflicts between 
two unions. The management wanted to gain control over the trade 
unions, but lost out in the conflict. The management went to the 
Government for intervention but it was too late.
While we have to be cautious about over-extrapolating the observations from 
a case study, the comparison o f the two Philips units located in Mumbai and 
Kolkata suggests that the process and outcome o f institutional change is likely 
to be different depending on the mobilisation strategies o f bargaining agents, 
which in turn reflects the wider process o f accumulation and redistribution 
politics. Our hypothesis is that the more rapid employment restructuring in 
Kalwa was made possible because o f the unions’ strategy in Mumbai to 
maximise the pay-off for the remaining members, in part, as a consequence o f 
a greater incentives and compulsions to focus on cwithin-firm rents’, given the 
limited scope for them to gain from participation in the redistribution 
conflicts in the wider political economy.
The Philips’ experience suggests that the impact o f an institutional change is 
likely to involve different processes and outcomes depending on the local 
economic, social and political conditions. Institutional transformations often 
involve coercive means, and its trajectory is subject to complex, dynamic and 
contradictory social and political processes. This is significant for our 
discussion about labour market reforms, since the implication is that an 
implementation o f the same policy may have diverging implications for LMIs
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depending on their location conditions. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that in none o f the cases where institutional change was observed did we find 
evidence that improvement in accountability and transparency preceded or 
accompanied the changes. It is also doubtful if we can necessarily argue that 
with localisation o f collective bargaining, unions are better able to act as 
Voice’ o f workers, considering the acceptance o f the VRS that led to loss o f 
jobs for those who left and intensification o f work for those who remained. 
Once again, it is important to recognise that the precise effect o f institutional 
change is likely to depend on a set of economic, social and political conditions 
within which the LMIs operate.
6.4.4 Concluding discussion: implications for theory, policy and politics
This final chapter brought together a number o f issues discussed throughout 
the thesis by focusing on the micro-level processes o f labour-management 
bargaining. Following from our discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 on the 
determinants o f the type o f LMIs, in which we argued that LMIs reflect the 
patterns o f accumulation and redistributional conflicts at the macro political 
economy, Section 6.2 o f this chapter examined the perceptions and 
behavioural patterns o f bargaining agents. Using our fieldwork data, we found 
that the self-perceptions and behaviours o f union leaders are only weakly 
associated with the types o f LMIs, at best, which is contrary to the 
methodological individualistic models which assumes that the type o f 
unionism and bargaining relations can be reduced to perceptions and ideology 
o f agency. O n the other hand, we also argued that it is too simplistic to 
assume that the behaviour o f individual bargaining agents can be explained by 
the structural factors alone. The discussion led us to hypothesise that the type 
o f LMIs is a systematic consequence o f the structural constraint and capacity 
o f the bargaining agents, which in turn reflects their position in the wider 
process o f accumulation.
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Section 6.3 then turned to our hypothesis o f LMIs as ‘mediators’ o f the 
labour process, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, by examining bargaining 
agents play in controlling and managing the labour process and surplus 
appropriation. We pointed out that the different modes o f controlling and 
managing the labour process and different pay-off structures in bargaining 
reflects particular mobilisation strategies by bargaining agents, which reflects 
the opportunities as well as compulsion determined by the process o f 
accumulation and the redistributional politics. Our observation has important 
implications to the theory o f LMIs. Conventional models in economics and 
political science have traditionally viewed the types o f LMIs as given and 
focused on their efficiency implications, where as more recent models have 
described the LMIs as being ‘chosen’ by bargaining agents in response to 
different bargaining strategies or “demand functions” (Bhattacherjee 1989: M- 
67). The contribution o f this thesis is to explain different types o f LMIs 
across sectors and regions by specifying the structural opportunities and 
constraints by focusing on different types o f macro political conflicts.
The final section focused on how LMIs change (or do not change) in a 
dynamic context. The issues raised from selected case studies from our field 
research, that the trajectory o f institutional changes are determined, not only 
by economic incentives, but also by structural opportunities and compulsions, are 
significant whether we believe that the decentralisation o f LMIs is necessary 
for economic growth and /o r the reorganisation o f labour movements in the 
long-run. O ur case studies imply that micro-level reforms that focus on 
improving the democratic accountability and transparency o f LMIs, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, may not ‘liberate’ or ‘empower’ workers to choose 
unions that enable productivity growth and greater payoff to workers. In fact, 
our case studies suggest that any such reforms are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for institutional transformation. Instead we argue that the policy debates 
around LMIs need to be refocused on a broader set o f reforms required for 
sustaining economic growth.
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The ‘stylised’ image and perception about LMIs in India, and many 
mainstream models that inform policy assume that LMIs precede growth and 
misleadingly treat them as ‘exogenous’ variables. A n important implication of 
the discussion o f this thesis is that LMIs are ‘endogenous’ variables 
determined within the historically specific patterns o f accumulation and 
economic development. Therefore, we have suggested that the causality 
assumed in some models, which attribute the economic performance to the 
type o f LMIs, is at least partially in the opposite direction. While 
democratically accountable unions may be an important social and political 
goal on its own, and may form an important part o f governance capabilities of 
the state or social system, there is very litde evidence to suggest that such 
micro-level reforms are sufficient, or even necessaiy, for a sustained economic 
development (Khan 2005b). Instead what our analysis seems to suggest is that 
long-term economic development depends on the capacity o f the state to 
legitimately instigate and manage rapid structural change in the economy, which 
depends on the balance o f power o f political entrepreneurs o f different types 
within a society. Clearly this is a question o f social transformation, and while 
the scope and possibility o f external intervention in such process may be 
debatable, any meaningful initiatives and instruments required are likely to be 
complex and interlocked, and most importandy context-specific.
In terms o f the labour movement, our analysis raises question on the role of 
trade unions and other labour organisations as effective agency to organise 
workers, either in terms o f representing the ‘voice’ o f workers in their 
workplace, or acting as class organisation in the wider political economic 
process. However, once again it is doubtful whether making union 
procedures transparent or accountable to the rank-and-file, necessarily enables 
unions to act differendy. The findings o f this thesis are therefore broadly in 
agreement with the argument by RoyChodhury (2008: 29) who attributes the 
decline o f the political significance o f industrial conflicts in India to the lack 
o f an appropriate agency and politics for its particular “modalities o f industrial
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conflicts” . It is ultimately the position o f bargaining agents in the wider social 
relations o f production that determines their mobilisation strategies, which is 
the objective condition o f the class struggle, and therefore such structural capacity 
to organise effective labour movements cannot be reduced to labour laws or 
governance reforms.
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A PPE N D IX  T O  CHAPTER 6
6A.1 Factor analysis of ‘self-perceptions’ of the union leadership
In Section 6.2.1 o f this chapter, we empirically analysed the data obtained 
from the structured questionnaire on unionists’ ‘self perceptions’ on 
leadership attributes. Table A6-1 presents summary statistics o f the 
perception scores on 20 leadership attributes that was collected from our 
survey based on interviews with 46 trade union leaders in 18 units.
T a b l e  A6-1 D e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  i n
T H E  F A C T O R  A N A L Y S IS  O F T H E  L E A D E R S H IP  SE LF P E R C E P T IO N S
Mean Std. Deviation
Ability to control 0 .  611 0 .  094
Make decisions 0 .  6 4 3 0 . 0 7 9
Make speeches 0 .  5 9 1 0 . 1 2 9
Negotiate with managers 0 .  637 0 . 0 8 6
Organise agitations and 
demonstrations
0 .  610 0 . 1 4 1
Take initiatives 0 .  631 0 . 0 9 6
Communication skill 0 .  642 0 .  0 6 5
Connection with other trade 
union leaders
0 . 5 7 4 0 . 1 4 8
Connections with members o f  
the union
0 .  66 7 0 .  0 4 6
Connections with politicians, 
political party or state officials
0 . 5 7 4 0 . 1 5 0
Dedication to the cause 0 .  64 2 0 . 0 6 9
Honesty 0 .  67 8 0 . 0 4 0
Education 0 . 3 8 3 0 . 2 6 3
Intelligence 0 .  5 1 7 0 . 1 9 8
Leadership skill 0 .  6 2 6 0 . 0 7 0
Persistence 0 .  6 3 7 0 .  0 8 6
Persuasiveness 0 .  637 0 . 0 5 9
Resourcefulness 0 .  61 7 0 . 1 0 1
Self confidence 0 .  6 6 6 0 . 0 5 8
Skill in court work 0 . 5 0 9 0 . 1 9 2
Note: The number o f  observation is 46 (respondents from 18 units)
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T a b l e  A 6-2 E i g e n v a l u e s  a n d  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  v a r i a n c e
Component
Initial Eigenvalues 
% o f
Total Variance Cumulative %
Rotation Sums o f  Squared Loadings 
% o f
Total Variance Cumulative %
1 7 . 66 7 3 8 . 3 3 4 3 8 . 3 3 4 4 . 4 0 9  2 2 . 0 4 7  2 2 . 0 4 7
2 2 . 3 9 5 1 1 . 9 7 3 5 0 . 3 0 8 4 . 2 7 1  2 1 . 3 5 4  4 3 . 4 0 1
3 1 .  6 9 8 8 . 4 9 0 5 8 . 7 9 7 2 . 1 1 1  1 0 . 5 5 5  5 3 . 9 5 5
4 1 .  4 2 0 7 . 1 0 0 6 5 . 8 9 8 1 . 9 8 8  9 . 9 3 9  6 3 . 8 9 5
5 1 .  0 8 8 5 . 4 4 1 7 1 . 3 3 8 1 . 4 8 9  7 . 4 4 4  7 1 . 3 3 8
6 . 9 4 0 4 . 69 8 7 6 . 0 3 6
7 . 8 0 6 4 . 0 3 2 8 0 . 0 6 8
8 . 7 4 2 3 .  7 1 0 8 3 . 7 7 8
9 . 5 5 8 2 . 7 9 1 8 6 . 5 6 9
10 . 52 4 2 .  61 8 8 9 . 1 8 7
11 . 3 8 9 1 .  9 4 3 9 1 . 1 3 0
12 . 3 4 0 1 .  7 0 2 9 2 . 8 3 2
13 . 3 2 3 1 .  6 1 6 94 . 4 4 8
14 . 2 7 1 1 . 3 5 3 9 5 . 8 0 1
15 . 2 2 9 1 .  1 4 5 9 6 . 9 4 6
16 . 1 7 8 . 8 9 1 9 7 . 8 3 7
17 . 15 4 . 7 7 2 9 8 . 6 0 8
18 . 1 2 2 . 60 8 9 9 . 2 1 6
1 9 . 0 9 1 . 4 5 4 9 9 . 6 7 0
20 . 0 6 6 . 3 3 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0
As discussed in Chapter 3, a sample size o f 50 observations is often cited as 
the minimum requirement to carry out the factor analysis. While our sample 
size o f n = 46 falls short o f this ‘rule o f thum b’, we justify the use o f factor 
analysis for this data on the ground that (a) the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
Measure o f Sampling Adequacy (MSA) is 0.771, and (b) Bartlett’s Test o f  
Sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that all eigenvalues or ‘roots’ o f the
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covariance matrix £  are equal o f our data, suggesting that sufficient 
correlations exist among the variables ( ^ 2 = 550.627 > Zoooo (190)).
The objective o f the factor or principle com ponent analysis is to find small 
number o f factors or components that account for a large percentage o f the 
total variation in the data. Table A6-2 presents the eigenvalues (total variation) 
and cumulative proportion o f the total variance explained by our factors. I f  
we follow the “root greater than one” criterion (Dillon and Goldstein 1984: 
48), we should select the first 5 components. N ote that about 71.338 percent 
o f the total variance is accounted for by the first 5 eigenvalues. An alternative 
criterion often used is the graphical heuristic approach by looking for ‘an 
elbow’ in the curve o f a scree plot, presented in A6-1. From  the diagram, no 
obvious break can be found, except at the second component, and hence the 
test is inconclusive.
F i g u r e  A6-1 S c r e e  p l o t
Scree Plot
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In Section 6.2.1 we selected four components for the analysis o f unionists’ 
perception on leadership characterisitcs. This was motivated from the 
viewpoint o f meaningful interpretation o f the factors, and not necessarily 
adhering to statistical criteria, although from table A6-2 we can still verify that 
the four components explain about 65.898 percent o f the total variation in the 
variance-covariance matrix.
6A.2 Comparison of pay-scale and actual pay in Cipla
In Section 6.3.3, we provided an analysis o f the ‘wage-welfare’ payoff o f 
workers by focusing on the pay-scale provided by the collective bargaining 
settlements o f surveyed units. The use o f pay-scale is second best compared 
to analysing the actual wage or pay. Due to the reasons discussed in Chapter 
3, we were not able to examine the actual wage data, nor were we able to 
specify the distribution o f workers amongst scale and grades. Since the 
objective o f our analysis in Section 6.3.3 was to examine the pay-scale as a 
reflection o f different mobilisation strategies o f bargaining agents, this 
problem does not invalidate our analysis in the section. But, it still obviously 
raises interesting question on the possible discrepancy between the published 
pay-scale and the actual pay received by workers.
Table A6-3 provides evidence to suggest that the distribution o f wages 
according to the pay-scale is roughly related to the actual wage distribution, by 
considering the case o f Cipla, a pharmaceutical company based in Mumbai. 
We can see that the distribution o f grading scheme and actual payment o f 
workers since the 1980s were roughly linked. Standard deviations o f both the 
grading distribution and the payment distribution have increase during the 
period. For both distributions, the shape has changed from right skewed 
distribution to near normal or left skewed distribution. A possible explanation 
for this shift in the distribution is that the speed for wage increase is faster for 
higher grade/scale workers than for lower grade/scale workers. However, 
considering that the number o f workers in payroll has gone down from 325 in
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1980 to 138 in 1994, an alternative interpretation that works in lower scale are 
either contracted out from the plant or removed from the bargainable 
category seems more plausible. This second interpretation also corresponds to 
our discussion in Section 6.4.3 in which we discussed the changes in pay 
patterns in the ‘m odem ’ sector.
T a b l e  A 6-3  G r a d i n g  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
A C T U A L  P A Y M E N T  O F W O R K M E N  IN  C l P L A ,  1980 -1994
1980 1983 1987 1990 1994
Number o f  grades 5 5 5 5 5
Total number o f  scales 1 0 5 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 3 0
Mean (Rs.) 2 2 0 . 1 9 0 2 7 1 . 3 0 8 3 1 8 . 0 3 8 3 8 0 . 5 3 8 4 4 3 . 0 3 8
o f grading Median (Rs.) 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 6 . 0 0 0 3 0 5 . 0 0 0 3 6 8 . 0 0 0 4 2 6 . 5 0 0
structure Standard deviation 8 8 . 5 3 7 1 2 1 .  5 9 8 1 4 9 . 8 3 1 1 8 4 . 3 3 9 2 1 9 . 8 7 8
Skewness 0 . 7 1 1 0 . 6 1 8 0 . 4 8 1 0 . 3 4 2 0 . 2 5 5
Number o f  workmen 3 2 5 2 6 1 2 4 1 1 3 8
Distribution Mean (Rs.) 1 8 6 . 7 0 8 3 8 4 . 1 9 9 5 0 9 . 8 8 4 7 3 1 . 9 7 1
o f actual 
payment Median (Rs.) 1 8 0 . 0 0 0 3 8 5 . 0 0 0 5 4 3 . 0 0 0 8 4 8 . 5 0 0
Standard deviation 5 0 . 8 8 9 1 0 4 . 7 9 7 1 6 0 . 3 8 8 2 3 7 . 4 2 9
Skewness 0 . 7 9 1 - 0 . 9 0 6 - 1 . 1 1 2 - 0 . 7 4 6
Note: Since we do not have information o f  the number o f  scales in 1987, 1990 and 1994, 
we assumed that it is constant since 1983.
Source: Calculated by the author on the basis of the memorandums of setdement 
1980, 83, 87, 90, and 94.
6A.3 Estimation of the wage function for Philips India
In Section 6.4.3 o f this chapter, we estimated the wage or employment cost 
function using the annual company-level data o f Philips India from 1986 to 
1999 (n = 14), in order to explore the implications o f changes in LMIs and 
management strategies. Table A6-4 lists the main quantitative variables used 
in the regression analysis, while table A6-5 presents the correlation matrix o f 
the same variables. We note positive statistically significant correlations 
between the employment cost per employee (w( j L t ) and net fixed asset per
employee ( K j L ,  ) as well as between wt / Lt and annual net sales per
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employee (S t j L t ). The correlation between wt j L t and profit (after tax) per 
employee j L t ) is found to be statistically insignificant, which is consistent 
with the statistically insignificant coefficient on n t / Lt from the regression 
output in Table 6-10. We may also note the strong correlation between 
K j L t and S , / L t which indicates a possibility o f an imperfect 
multicollinearity.
T a b l e  A 6 - 4  D e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  i n
T H E  E S T IM A T IO N  O F T H E  W A G E  F U N C T I O N
______ Variable (s)______ w,/L, K t/ L t S t / L t 71,/L,
Maximum 0 . 2 9 2 0 . 4 5 7 4 . 5 8 8 0 . 0 7 4
Minimum 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 3 4 7 - 0 . 0 2 5
Mean 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 2 1 0 1 . 5 8 5 0 .  0 1 9
Std. Deviation 0 .  07 1 0 . 1 1 9 1 . 2 7 5 0 .  02 7
Skewness 1 . 0 6 9 0 . 8 6 7 1 . 0 5 0 0 . 4 9 2
Kurtosis - 3 0 . 3 1 3 - 0 . 6 5 8 0 . 1 4 2 - 0 . 1 2 1
C oef o f  Variation 0 .  58 0 0 . 5 6 8 0 . 8 0 4 1 .  40 7
Note: Wt , K f , S ( and 7T( are measured in million Rs.
T a b l e  A  6 - 5  C o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  o f  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  i n  t h e
E S T IM A T IO N  O F T H E  W A G E  F U N C T I O N
W, / A K J L , S ' /L , 7 t j L t
wJ L ,
K , / L ,
1 .  0 0 0  
0 . 9 8 2  ** 1 . 0 0 0
S . /L , 0 . 9 9 2  ** 0 . 9 8 1  ** 1 . 0 0 0
0 .  4 1 2 0 . 3 1 8 0 . 4 5 9 1 . 0 0 0
Note: Figures are Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
* indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, and ** indicates that the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
With multicollinearity, the OLS estimators are still best linear unbiased, i.e. 
BLUE, although it makes precise estimation difficult. This is because 
“multicollinearity is essentially a sample (regression) phenomenon” (Gujarati 
1995:  326), and therefore only affects the variances, without violating the 
assumptions o f the classical linear regression model (CLRM). To see the 
possible effect o f collinearity statistics, the variance-inflating factor (VIF) and
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the tolerance, are reported in table A6-7. The high VIF in K t j L t and S t / L ( , 
as well as in the slope dummy variables, indicate that the variance o f the 
estimators are inflated by the presence o f multicollinearity. A possibly 
consequence o f multicollinearity is a large standard error on estimated 
coefficient, which makes the t ratio statistically insignificant. To put differently, 
the consequence is that the probability o f failing to reject a false null 
hypothesis increases (i.e. type II error). In our case, from table 6-10 we can 
see that the coefficients on variables with possible multicollinearity, such as 
K j L t , S ' /L ,  , D , x K t/ L t and D , x S j L t are all statistically significant, 
and therefore multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem.
T a b l e  A6-7  C o l l i n e a r i t y  s t a t i s t i c s
Tolerance VIF
K . /L , 0 . 0 0 1 9 0 9 . 0 5 7
s j i , 0 .  0 0 2 5 6 4 . 3 4 1
* , I L, 0 .  0 8 3 1 1 . 9 9 2
T 0 . 0 0 5 1 9 2 . 5 6 3
D, 0 .  0 0 3 3 5 7  . 1 2 2
D , x K , / L , 0 .  0 0 1 1 3 4 2 . 1 0 3
D , x S , / L , 0 .  0 0 1 9 6 4 . 1 9 5
D , x j t j L , 0 .  0 6 1 1 6 . 4 2 8
T a b l e  A6-8  D i a g n o s t i c  T e s t s
Test Statistics LM Version F Version
Serial Correlation (*) X2{ l)= 0 . 0 7 9 9 [ 0 . 7 7 7 ]
o<T)CMOoIIi ^ [ 0 . 8 8 7 ]
Functional Form W Z 2 (l)= 1 . 2 9 0 6 [ 0 . 2 5 6 ] T (l,4 )=  0 . 4  0 62 [ 0 . 5 5 9 ]
Normality (c) Z 2 (2 ) =  3 . 2 0 4 8 [ 0 . 2 0 1 ] NAP
Heteroscedasticity W Z 2 (  l)= 1 . 5 1 5 9 [ 0 . 2 1 8 ] F(l,12)= 1 . 4  5 7 1 [ 0 . 2 5 1 ]
Note: (a) Lagrange multiplier test o f residual serial correlation; (b) Ramsey's RESET test
using the square o f  the fitted values; (c) Jarque-Bera test o f  normality based on 
skewness and kurtosis o f  residuals; (d) Microfit test o f  heteroscedasticity based on 
the regression o f  squared residuals on squared fitted values Figures in square 
parenthesis are the p-values.
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We have used diagnositic tests for other potential violations o f the 
assumptions o f the CLRM, which are listed in table A6-8. In all tests, the null 
hypotheses are that the assumptions o f the CLRM hold, and therefore the 
failure to reject the null hypotheses suggest the validity o f our estimation 
result presented in Table 6-10.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of the findings and hypotheses
Labour market institutions (LMIs) such as trade unions and labour legislation are 
systematic consequences of the process o f accumulation. Diversity o f LMIs can 
be found reflecting different ways in which the society organises the process o f 
capitalist development and ways in which the labour process is controlled and 
managed. This is the main hypothesis o f this study. This hypothesis challenges 
the perception prevalent in many theoretical literature as well as policy debates on 
LMIs, which share the assumption that LMIs are amongst the main causes o f 
economic performance both at the firm-level as well as the economy as a whole. 
Instead we have argued that LMIs are ‘endogenous’ to the process o f 
development, and therefore a broader set of policies and political processes that 
goes beyond labour market reforms are required for sustaining economic growth.
Chapters 1 and 2 have cast this argument by making critical interventions in both 
the on-going policy debates on LMIs in India and some theoretical models that 
inform these policies, and thereby proposed an alternative political economic 
framework for analysing the reproduction and transformation of different types 
of LMIs. We argued that LMIs should be treated as particular forms of capitalist 
social relations rather than as an object that is ‘chosen’ by individual agents, 
without denying the role o f agency in political struggle against the prevalent social 
relations. The existing type of LMIs is therefore a manifestation o f structural 
opportunities and constraints for bargaining agents to organise unions and 
labour-management relations differently. Although we agree with the prevalent 
policy consensus that LMIs are important components of institutional and 
governance capacities of society, we argued that it is misleading to treat them as 
exogenous variables. Policy prescriptions that focus on labour law amendments
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and governance reforms with regards to unions and other collective bargaining 
institutions as means of changing existing types of LMIs therefore fail to address 
structural problems underlying them. Also we argued that while the existing 
theories of LMIs are important scholarly attempts to describe unions and labour- 
market relations in different countries and industries, they are nevertheless 
inadequate as models for guiding policies without placing them in the particular 
social and historical contexts.
The political economic approach requires us to explain the existing types of LMIs 
by probing beneath their appearance and specifying the social relations within 
them. This poses a number of dilemmas and challenges in the empirical research 
of trade unions and labour-management relations, which was discussed in 
Chapter 3. The antagonistic relationship between labour and capital gives 
rationale for bargaining agents to act as ‘gatekeepers’ o f information, and to 
obscure the unequal social power that underpins their relationship, which 
challenge the fiction o f researchers as neutral and ‘partial’ observers. We have 
argued that the dilemmas encountered in the field research, which resulted in 
‘uneven’ data, can provide important insights into the social relations that 
underlie perceptions and behaviours of agency and the type of institutions by 
carefully interrogating the data and interpreting them within the specific social 
and historical contexts.
In Chapters 4 through 6, we provided analyses of empirical data collected from 
our field research. Using collective bargaining settlements in our surveyed units, 
in Chapter 4 we have provided an analysis o f the typology o f LMIs in Mumbai 
(Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta). We found significant differences in types of 
LMIs between ‘traditional’ sector units such as jute and cotton textile industries 
and ‘modem’ sector firms in engineering and consumer goods manufacturing, 
especially in terms of their bargaining structure. However, we also found
significantly different institutional characteristics within each of these two sectors 
between those units located in Mumbai and those based in Kolkata. In particular, 
we found greater diversity in the types of LMIs in Mumbai compared to Kolkata 
for both ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’ sectors. This prompted us to hypothesise that 
types of LMIs cannot be explained exclusively by differences in technology and 
production organisation, and that social and political conditions within which 
labour-management relations take place may be significant factors.
The latter observation is important because of the divergence in economic 
performance in the two regions after the mid-1960s, with Maharasthra (Mumbai) 
representing an industrially more dynamic region compared to West Bengal 
(Kolkata) which, at least until recently, lagged behind in growth rates. It has been 
common to attribute this difference in the patterns of economic development to 
contrasting ‘investment climates’ or ‘governance capacities’, with the types of 
LMIs being important components o f them. Our hypothesis is instead that the 
causality is at least partially in the opposite direction, with the existing types of 
LMIs reflecting the particular balance o f power of other actors in the wider social 
context, which in turn is an expression of the historically specific process of 
accumulation, rather than being autonomously ‘chosen’ to determine the latter.
Therefore in Chapter 5, we have explicated the regional macro political economy 
in Maharashtra and West Bengal, outlining the differences in patterns of 
accumulation and types of distributional conflicts that have determined structural 
opportunities and capacities for bargaining agents to adopt different mobilisation 
strategies. We argued that the structural conditions in Maharashtra was such that 
they led to an emergence of a loose but relatively stable coalition between the 
pro-rural dominant class/ castes and the emerging urban industrial and 
commercial capitalists in the early period o f industrialisation, which allowed the 
state to adopt economic policies that focus on providing infrastructures and
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institutions that facilitate accumulation. These policies further mediated the 
process of dynamic but contradictory process of accumulation in the region 
providing strong incentives for bargaining agents to focus labour-management 
bargaining on local conditions and unions to mobilise workers to seek long-term 
company-based ‘within-firm rents’. In contrast, in West Bengal the structural and 
historical conditions did not allow political ‘elites’ to form stable coalition with 
dominant productive classes, and the political legitimacy o f the ruling regimes 
depended on redistributive accommodation o f a wider section of the society from 
lower and middle income groups. As a result, the state policy has been 
characterised by direct state interventions in productive activities in an attempt to 
sustain industrialisation and deliver secure employment and wages. The strategy 
of various social actors and political entrepreneurs in the regions were to mobilise 
organisational power in order to attract resources to industries and obtain 
kickbacks from industrialists, which created greater scope for bargaining agents to 
gain by being part o f this redistributional struggle at the macro-level and seek 
politically created ‘outside-firm rents’. Thus by focusing on the contrasting 
patterns of capitalist accumulation and political mobilisation, we have attempted 
to provide an alternative explanation of the different types of LMIs and the 
diverging economic performance in Mumbai and Kolkata that does not reduce 
them to cultural differences or ideologies.
Chapter 6 has brought together various discussions in our thesis to illustrate 
micro-level responses to and implications o f different types o f LMIs in our 
surveyed units. Using statistical analysis of data on self-perceptions and activities 
of leaders drawn from interviews, we have argued that these variables are only 
weakly correlated with types of LMIs, which is contrary to the empirical 
expectations of some mainstream models of LMIs that focus on the role o f 
agency’s perceptions and ideologies in determining the type of LMIs. Instead we 
hypothesise that ideology and strategy of bargaining agents are focrmed in
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response to the particular political and economic processes, and not 
autonomously determined by their innate preferences alone. We also examined 
the modality of controlling the labour process and the structure of pay scale 
under different types of LMIs, and explained them as reflections of mobilisation 
strategies by bargaining agents in response to structural opportunities and 
compulsion determined by the process of accumulation and the bargaining 
powers of other actors in the wider social context. Finally, we evaluated several 
case studies to show that the trajectory of institutional transformations crucially 
depended on structural opportunities and capacities o f bargaining agents, and that 
localisation of bargaining structure was associated with various changes in the 
mode of controlling and managing the labour process, including personalisation 
of pay, restructuring of labour, intensification o f work, and capital investment.
Possible areas for future research
Let us conclude this thesis by highlighting the limitations of the present research 
and possible future area of developments. The analysis of transformation of 
LMIs at the end of Chapter 6 implies that institutional change is unlikely to be 
instigated by micro-level reforms but rather occurs in response to particular 
political settlements at the macro-level. In the present research on the 
comparison of Mumbai and Kolkata, we compared two regions which were two 
of the oldest industrial centres of India, but followed different paths in terms of 
their types o f distributional politics, growth trajectories, and modality of LMIs. 
Drawing inferences and hypotheses from a comparative studies of two regions, 
especially those which are perceived to represent contrasting fortunes in capitalist 
transformation, may lead to overemphasising the differences in the concrete 
forms through which the process of accumulation is established. It would 
therefore be of interest to extend our research to other regions within India. For 
example, Gujarat, which was a late’ developer compared to Maharashtra, is seen 
to have been similarly successful in achieving relatively dynamic accumulation and
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social transformation, may offer interesting point of reference to our comparative 
analysis (Singha 2005). Similarly, Kerala, which shares the perceived left-leaning 
political regimes with West Bengal, but again had distinctively different growth 
trajectory to our cases may be of interest. Further, it would be interesting to ask 
similar questions of other countries where transformations o f LMIs occurred 
through processes of political settlements, such as Japan in the 1950s, or China 
and Vietnam in recent years. Such comparison with other regions may be one 
possible area of extending this research. Another related limitation of this 
research was the focus on organised manufacturing sectors, and also the 
limitation of study on public sector companies. Public sector, which was 
traditionally the driving force o f industrialisation, still plays important roles in the 
labour movement in India, and it was unfortunately that we were unable to find a 
better balance of private and public sector units in our survey, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Also as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, given the increasing 
finandalisation of the economy, it would be interesting to research the labour- 
management relations in banking and financial sector, which is an area with 
limited research.
Another possible area for future research that the present thesis has opened up is 
the role and impact of political entrepreneurs who are not directly involved in 
productive activities but are influential in organising patron-client networks o f 
various social actors that dominates distributional conflicts in countries such as 
India. In recent decades there have been studies on this topic such as Jeffrey and 
Lerche (2000; 2001), Harriss-White (2003), and Veron, Williams, Corbridge and 
Srivastava (2006), but our research has provided a perspective from the side of 
organised firms and showed that distributional conflicts organised by these social 
actors have significant implications to LMIs. This area o f how to analyse and 
problematise these unconventional forms o f accumulating activities and their
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relations to more conventional accumulation in the organised industrial sector 
needs to be explored further.
Finally, the perceived decline of trade unionism both as bargaining agents to 
reflect the ‘voice’ of workers, and in terms of their effectiveness in the wider 
political processes, raises question on how to problematise the antagonistic 
capital-labour relations and the working class politics under changing forms o f 
accumulation on a global scale. The present study has focused primarily on the 
national economy of India and the regional diversity within the country, but it is 
recognised that these observations are concrete forms o f wider processes in the 
world historical moment. It is hoped that this thesis offers a starting point for a 
future research that contributes to a better understating of the changing global 
political economy and the implications for the livelihood of working people.
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